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Abstract 
 
The thesis “Developing methods for understanding the nature of voting patterns and 
party competition in Britain” is submitted by Galina Borisyuk for the degree of Doctor 
of Philosophy (PhD) on the basis of published works. 
 
This research both develops new methods and expands upon existing methodologies in 
order to improve our understanding of voting patterns and party competition in Britain.  
The thesis comprises five sections, each of which relates to a particular research focus.  
The first and principal section describes the process of determining a new method for 
decomposing electoral bias for three-party competition under simple plurality rules of 
voting.  The study of electoral bias is important for voting systems that requires 
periodic boundary reviews intended to equalise electorate and to remove 
malapportionment.  These papers describe both the process for developing the three-
party bias method and later its application to UK general elections from 1983 onwards.  
The second section uses aggregate data gathered for the elections to the Greater London 
Authority in order to understand the patterns of electoral support across the capital, 
particularly support for minor parties.  A considerable amount of research effort has 
been expended upon providing reliable models for electoral forecasting both in the UK 
and elsewhere.  The third section includes a paper that develops a forecast model that 
utilises aggregate local election data to estimate national vote shares for the three main 
parties in the UK.  A fourth section brings together a series of papers that are linked by 
the themes of voter behaviour, either in terms of geographical or ballot context.  A 
study of voter turnout in a London borough describes the relationship between 
proximity to polling station and electoral turnout at different types of election.  A 
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number of papers included in this section also detail the effects of candidate ballot 
order on electoral support.  The fifth and final section groups together two papers that 
using individual-level survey data to describe the pattern of candidate recruitment for 
local elections in Britain and, specifically, the under-recruitment of both women and 
Black, Asian and other minority ethnic candidates. 
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Critical appraisal 
 
Introduction 
 
The aim of this introduction is to guide the reader through the thinking and processes 
that led to the publications assembled here.  This research has been a collaborative 
exercise and my role within each enterprise has varied and evolved over time.  When I 
first began working with Colin Rallings and Michael Thrasher, for example, my role 
was largely related to the configuration of data, the interpretation of statistics and 
assisting graduate students with their dissertation work.  Gradually my input increased 
as I became more familiar with the intricacies of the local government system and its 
complex electoral cycles!  My interests also then extended to characteristics of electoral 
outcomes (originally the proportion of women candidates and women elected), some 
technical aspects of measurement, (for example, indexes of proportionality), and finally, 
general election forecasting methods.   
 
With regard to other collaborations, for example those with Ron Johnston and Scott 
Orford, the initial contact was made through either Rallings or Thrasher but then tended 
to develop into a series of bi- or tri-lateral discussions involving different people and 
different aspects of the whole project. 
 
It is the nature of collaborative research exercise, therefore, that requires that I guide 
the reader through those parts of the published outputs where I was most directly 
involved, in terms of formulating the research question, finding the appropriate method 
of analysis, compiling the data, interpreting the statistics and writing the evidence.  
Since all these papers are jointly authored there are necessarily parts of them where my 
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input has been rather small – although I am happy to stand by the general conclusions 
that are made there. 
 
The papers may be grouped under a number of research headings, some specific, others 
of a more general nature.  These headings, with the relevant appendix number(s) 
identified are: 
 
 Electoral bias (appendices 1-4) 
 Patterns of voting and party competition in London Assembly elections 
(appendices 5-6) 
 Electoral forecasting (appendix 7) 
 Space, Place and Ballots (appendices 8-11) 
 Candidate recruitment (appendices 12-13) 
 
These research categories are examined in more detail below.  For each category there 
is a brief description of each paper that covers the research question, data 
considerations and analytical methods used in providing the evidence.  The references 
to the published works in the Appendices are intended to highlight my personal 
involvement in the production of that research publication.  I have chosen to expand 
most about the first category on electoral bias partly because this is probably the most 
technically difficult for any new readers coming to the research output and partly 
because this kind of description is useful in demonstrating how the research evolves 
over time. 
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1. Decomposing electoral bias 
 
A feature of simple plurality electoral systems is that outcomes are almost invariably 
disproportional and favour the two largest parties (A & B in are used in most examples) 
by awarding a higher seat than vote share. However, if the main party A obtains that 
bonus but main party B, with the same vote share, gets a smaller bonus, then the system 
is not only disproportional but also biased towards A.  
 
One procedure to measure that bias was developed in New Zealand by Ralph Brookes 
(1953, 1959, 1960).  This has the major benefits of using a readily-appreciated metric 
and being decomposable into the various bias sources that he identified (variations in 
constituency size, abstention rates, voting for third parties, and the distributions of party 
support). It has been widely applied to the analysis of British election results (e.g. 
Johnston et al, 2001, 2002, 2006).   
 
However, its application to British elections since 1974 became constrained by the 
growth of „third party‟ votes in England and „fourth party‟ votes in Scotland and Wales 
that in an increasing number of cases were subsequently translated into seats. Although 
a third party victory component was added by Mortimore (1992: see Johnston et al. 
1999) to get a more realistic appreciation of the extent, direction and sources of any 
observed bias, the method remained focused on the two-party situation.  
 
Following a meeting with Ron Johnston in about 2005 it was decided to tackle this 
problem.  The research goal was to adapt/improve/replace the Brookes‟ method of 
decomposing bias to take better account of three-party competition.  After reading the 
original Brookes papers and the subsequent analyses by Johnston and his collaborators 
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I began the search for a method that could tackle the n-party case.  After a short time I 
realised that this would prove extremely complex and instead focussed specifically on 
the three-party case. 
 
Borisyuk et al 2008 provides our interpretation of what Brookes was formulating in his 
bias decomposition approach (Appendix 1, pp. 4-5).  In Brookes‟ original papers bias is 
defined as the difference between the number of seats won by the leading party – A – at 
an election and the number that would be won by its main opponent – B – if B had 
obtained the same share of the votes.  If A obtains a larger share of the seats than B 
from the same share of the votes, then the positive bias favouring A is the inverse of the 
negative bias suffered by B. 
 
We re-formulate the two-party Brookes‟ method in such a way that will subsequently 
allow extension to the three-party case.  More formally, let ‘x’ be the number of seats 
the leading party A wins with given share, ‘k’, of the two-party vote, and ‘y’ the 
number of seats the second party, B, could win if it got the same share of the votes. 
Then, bias towards the first party is defined as the difference between the number of 
seats gained by this party, ‘x’, and the mean of seats gained by both parties, i.e. the 
mean of ‘x’ and ‘y’. Thus, for the two-party competition, bias is a function of one 
variable, vote share ‘k’. 
 
Bias to party A is defined as 
 biasA(k) = x – MEAN(x,y) = x - (x + y)/2 = (x - y)/2  (1a) 
which is simply the negative of bias towards its rival, B:  
 biasB(k) = y – MEAN(x,y) = y - (x + y)/2 = (y - x)/2 . (1b) 
 
There are four important elements to the Brookes method. We distinguish between: 
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1. introduction of the quantitative measure of bias towards a party (difference 
between „x‟ and the mean of „x’ and ‘y’); 
2. derivation of formulae for decomposition of bias into vote distribution effect, 
constituency size effect, etc.;  
3. inquiry about  magnitude of ‘k’that should be used if we are interested in 
measuring bias for a particular election; and  
4. inquiry about the process whereby we might obtain the figures „x’ and ‘y’. 
 
As part of our extension of Brookes‟ method, therefore, we explicitly address these four 
issues (Appendix 1; pp5-7).The first two are completely independent of any 
operationalising procedure: a quantitative measure of bias that can be partitioned into 
separate components; and formulae for the decomposition themselves.  For example, if 
the two main parties get equal vote shares at an election then we can calculate bias 
without even addressing the fourth point, the process for obtaining x and y.  The reason 
for this is that the two parties have equal vote shares at the outset and the actual seats 
won can be used as ‘x’ and ‘y’. Therefore, we know that we can deal with this part of 
the problem (defining and decomposing bias) without discussing issues 3 and 4 above. 
 
It is doubtful, however, that two main parties would get exactly equal vote shares at any 
election and the last two issues, the magnitude of „k‟ and the process for obtaining x 
and y, have to be dealt with. So, we have to „construct‟ an imaginary election with 
„equal conditions‟ for two parties.  
 
Issue 3 concerns the magnitude of „k‟ that should be used when measuring bias for a 
particular election.  In practise two methods are used. The first of these, the „equal 
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shares‟ approach, compares the number of seats won by each of the two parties 
respectively if the votes actually cast were redistributed equally between them.  The 
second, „reverse shares‟ method, on the other hand, considers what would have 
happened to the distribution of seats had the second-placed party (in terms of votes) 
obtained the vote share won by the first-placed party and the first-placed party obtained 
the vote of the second-placed party.  In principle, it is possible to calculate bias for any 
‘k’in a range between 0 and 100 (as in Johnston et al, 2002). Nevertheless, bias is 
usually calculated at either ‘k’=50%, i.e. equal vote shares method, or at ‘k’= actual 
vote share of the leading party, i.e. reverse vote shares.  
 
Both approaches have merit. The former allows easy interpretation of bias - if two main 
parties get an equal share of votes but non-equal numbers of seats then the bias towards 
one of those parties is its „excess‟/„deficiency‟ in seats.  The latter, it might be argued, 
retains more features from the actual electoral outcome –– size of constituencies 
(electoral units), turnout and minor party support variations across constituencies, as 
well as magnitude of national vote share, ‘k’, of the leading party. The only difference 
is that two main parties swap their positions – actual second party becomes new leading 
party with ‘k’ vote share.  
 
The above two elements of the procedure – deriving a norm for comparison and 
estimating the expected number of seats for each party under certain scenarios  – are 
clearly integral to the way in which the method is operationalised.  Brookes believed 
that uniform swing was the simplest assumption for the first of the latter pair, but our 
interpretation of his original procedure is that it merely operates to construct a „norm 
for comparison‟, which allows us to compare data from the actual election with this 
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benchmark.  It is important, therefore, that our „notionals‟ should be considered as 
technical steps that help in the necessary construction of the symmetrical 
multidimensional distribution that retains features of the actual electoral outcome and is 
independent from the size of electoral area (constituency).   
 
In the event, although this first paper re-states the Brookes method, it is a rare example 
of a paper being accepted for publication that fails to achieve what is sets out to do.  
We had decided to construct two notional elections as well as the actual election 
(Appendix 1 pp. 9-11) and the method appeared to work rather well for the 2005 
general election which we had decided to use as the principal test of the new method.  
Unfortunately, when applied to earlier elections the method did not appear to work as 
expected!  By the time this paper appeared in print we had already worked out a better 
procedure. 
 
Our interpretation of Brookes‟ norm of comparison in the 2-party case is illustrated by 
considering the two-party percentage shares of votes cast at the 2005 British general 
election (i.e. [Conservative + Labour] = 100).  Figure 1a shows the vote share across 
627 parliamentary constituencies
1
 for the largest party A (Labour) and Figure 1b 
presents party B‟s share (Conservative). These distributions are necessarily the mirror 
image of each other.
2
  Also indicated on both distributions is the overall vote share for 
each party; 52 per cent for Labour and 48 for the Conservatives.
3
(In both Figure 1 and 
Figure 2, each constituency is shown as a separate symbol.) 
                                               
1
 There were 628 constituencies in Britain in 2005 but neither of the two major parties contested the 
Speaker‟s constituency.   
2
 In effect the two dimensional problem can be reduced to a single dimension.  Correspondingly, for the 
three-party case we can present the results in two-dimensional space.   
3
These values differ from the mean values of the distribution (54% and 46% respectively) because of the 
unequal size of constituencies. 
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Figure 1.Brookes‟ two-party method: Calculation of bias. 
 
Brookes‟ method begins by asking what would happen to the allocation of seats if 
instead of coming second at the actual election (AB – the parties are listed in order 
according to their share of the votes won, with the largest first), party B came first, 
receiving A‟s vote share at the actual contest.  Using the principle of reverse vote shares 
the method applies a uniform swing to each constituency to create a notional election 
result (the notional BA election) such that party B now wins 52 per cent of the two-
party vote total.  Following the application of uniform swing to the vote share in each 
of the 627 constituencies, party B‟s distribution slides to the right such that its overall 
percentage of the votes becomes 52 per cent in the notional BA election (Figure 1c).   
17 
 
 
These three Figures 1a-c represent the conventional understanding of the Brookes‟ 
method.  However, another interpretation is possible. Figure 1d shows the 
superposition of the distribution for party A at the actual election and the distribution 
for party B at the notional reverse vote share election (literally, a combination of 
Figures 1a and 1c).  This superposition is critical to our interpretation of the Brookes 
method because it in effect constitutes the norm for comparison and retains many 
important features of the actual data.   
 
Because Brookes‟ method focuses on the two largest parties only, all constituencies 
lying to the right of 50 per cent are „won‟ by the respective party.  Thus Figure 1a 
shows the number of seats won by party A at the actual election (i.e. „x‟ in previous 
notation) and Figure 1c shows the number of seats („y‟) „won‟ by party B at the 
notional election, BA.  
 
In Brookes‟ original formulation partisan bias towards party A is measured as the 
difference between the number of points to the right of 50 per cent in Figure 1a and an 
average of the number of points to the right of 50 per cent in Figure 1d.  It is clear from 
the graphs that, in effect, Brookes‟ method compares the distribution of seats at the 
actual AB election (Figure 1a) with the norm for comparison (Figure 1d).
4
 
 
Having set out the principles underpinning Brookes‟ original formulation, we use these 
as the foundation for the extension to the three-party situation.   
 
                                               
4
 For superposition AB and BA, vote shares now has zero correlation with size of constituency and has 
symmetrical shape of distribution (a norm distribution). Because of zero correlation with constituency 
size, the mean of the distribution equals overall vote share. 
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In our first attempt (Borisyuk et al., 2008) the expected norm was based on the actual 
election result plus just two notional elections.  The first notional election saw the 
actual second-placed party awarded the same vote share as the actual first-placed party 
(i.e. the order of the election result was changed from ABC to BAC) whereas in the 
second the original third-placed party was given the vote share captured by the first-
placed party at the actual election (i.e. ABC was converted to CBA). The actual number 
of seats won was thus compared with a norm comprising the mean number of seats 
gained by the leading party under three scenarios – the actual election and two notional 
elections.  
 
This ignored three other scenarios, and was the reason for the unresolved problems 
with the empirical applications. The second paper (Borisyuk et al.,2010; Appendix 2) 
extends the approach to incorporate the entire set of possible outcomes (i.e. including 
the three other potential notional elections: ACB, BCA and CAB). This extension to the 
three-party case does that whilst retaining many of the basic principles underpinning 
the Brookes‟ original formulation (Appendix 2; pp. 18-22). 
 
Three-party vote share can be best captured by triangular graphs (for early proponents 
of this technique see Upton, 1976; Miller, 1977; Gudgin and Taylor, 1979; for a recent 
example that employs this method see Curtice and Firth, 2008).   Figure 2 shows the 
actual 2005 election result. The point for the national three-party vote share (39, 36, 25) 
is represented by a cross.  The area inside the triangle is divided into three, each of 
which shows where the respective parties won seats.  Where the lines intersect at the 
centre of the triangle the vote share for each of the three parties is 33.3 per cent.  Points 
19 
 
towards the peak of the triangle are constituencies where the largest party (in this case 
Labour) performed well.    
 
 
 
Figure 2.Distribution of the three-party vote shares. 
 
 
In constructing the norm for comparison for this extended procedure we have three 
parties, A, B and C with overall vote shares, α, β, and γ respectively, 
where(α + β + γ = 100). The principle is to consider all six possible combinations 
assigning those three values to parties A, B and C – viz. ABC (actual election), ACB, 
BAC, BCA, CAB, and CBA. This is shown on six triangular graphs (Figure 3).  The first 
(ABC) repeats what was shown in Figure 2 while the triangle ACB below it shows the 
notional election where the positions of the second and third-placed parties, B and C, 
have been reversed but that for the first party, A, is unchanged.  It is important to note 
that the top of each triangle always shows the largest party, the right-hand side shows 
the second-placed party while the third-placed party is shown on the left-hand side.   
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Figure 3.Distribution of the three-party vote shares: ABC (actual), ACB, BAC, BCA, 
CAB, and CBA (notional elections). 
 
Figure 4 shows the superposition of these six configurations to create what will be used 
as the „norm of comparison‟ (Appendix 2, pp. 23-4).  This procedure is a precise 
extension of what was done in the two-party case, where Figure 1d represented the 
superposition of Figures 1a and 1c.  Once again, the area inside the triangle is divided 
into three sections  The  top section, for example, shows the total number of seats that 
right shows seats won by whichever party came second (vote share β) while that on the 
left represents seats won by the third party with national vote share γ. The next stage of 
the process compares the actual number of seats won by each party with the expected 
unbiased number of seats derived from construction of the norm of comparison.   
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Figure 4.The superposition ABC + ACB + BAC + BCA + CAB + CBA. 
 
 
A great strength of Brookes‟ method is that it not only estimates total bias in a readily-
appreciated metric but also decomposes that bias into one of four categories (Appendix 
2, pp. 24-5; pp. 27-8 for the algebraic expression of these).   
 
The first of these has been labelled differently (gerrymander, vote distribution, 
efficiency) but we prefer the term „geography‟.  In a „first-past-the-post‟ voting system 
a party performs well in the translation of votes into seats (in terms of the geography of 
its vote across the constituencies) by winning small and losing big; it should avoid 
accumulating surplus votes in constituencies it wins (i.e. those additional to the number 
required to win a constituency) and if it cannot win a constituency then it is best to 
attract as few as votes as possible there since these are literally „wasted‟(see Johnston et 
al., 2001). 
 
The second component within electoral bias stems from malapportionment, i.e. 
differences in electorate size across constituencies (denoted by component „E‟).  A 
party that is stronger in constituencies with relatively small electorates will tend to 
perform better (as shown by comparing its percentage of all votes cast and percentage 
22 
 
of seats) than one which performs better in the larger constituencies.  The level of 
abstention („A‟) is the third component and becomes relevant when one party wins its 
seats where electoral turnout is low compared with its rivals whose victories are 
achieved in constituencies with on average higher turnouts.  Finally, there is the minor 
party effect, component „M‟; here it is restricted to those parties outside the main three. 
 
Brookes‟ algebra enables the contribution of each of these four components (G, E, A 
and M) to be calculated, in the same metric as the total bias. We derived formulae 
similar to Brookes‟ two-party calculations but this time for the three-party case.  In the 
final section of the 2010 paper we examined the outcome of the 2005 general election 
using both the two-party Brookes method (modified to take account of third party 
presence) and the new three-party method (Appendix 2, p. 26). 
 
There are a number of practical applications of this method for decomposing bias in the 
three-party context.  One such is its application prior to and after constituency 
boundary reviews (Appendix 3).  Understandably, there is considerable interest in the 
potential political impact of boundary changes – which party(s) stands to gain and 
which ones might lose as electorates are equalised.  However, there is a widespread 
misconception that boundary revisions will remove electoral bias completely and that 
the impact will be considerable.  This depends, of course, upon the size of the 
electorate bias component.  In a paper published in Parliamentary Affairs we addressed 
this issue, maintaining that the boundary review implemented prior to the 2010 general 
election had largely succeeded in reducing the bias that followed from 
malapportionment and that the bias which remained was a function of other 
components, principally turnout (abstention) and geography.  In order to undertake this 
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analysis we needed to compare the pre- and post-boundary review outcomes using the 
same election.  This meant first, comparing the actual election with an estimate of what 
the result would have been had the new boundaries been in place at the time and then, 
second, decomposing bias for each of those elections (Appendix 3, pp. 44-8). 
 
A further application of the new three-party bias method came with a recent paper 
published in 2012 that reviewed UK general elections since 1983 (Appendix 4).  
Although these elections had been examined before this was an opportunity to examine 
what the new method would reveal in terms of the trend in the composition and 
contribution of bias – was geography becoming more important and if so, for which 
party?  Table 2 in that paper (Appendix 4, p.58) describes the evidence. 
 
Although it is standard practice when considering the geography or vote distribution 
bias component to identify surplus and wasted votes separately, in this paper we began 
to advocateinstead a catch-all concept of „ineffective votes‟ since this may provide 
greater insight into how that bias develops in practice (Appendix 4, pp. 60-2).  Another 
important contribution set out in this paper is a series of graphs that seek to highlight 
the occasions when votes are/are not converted into seats.  Although not shown here in 
colour (the published version does use colour) there are clear advantages in aiding 
understanding using this type of visualisation (Appendix 4, pp. 64-6).  A much more 
detailed example of our approach to data visualisation can be found in a paper that 
decomposes bias for the 2010 general election (Thrasher et al. 2010). 
 
There is no disputing the fact that electoral bias is of considerable interest in the UK 
political context.  There is also no disputing that few people appreciate the complexity 
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of electoral bias.  In developing a new method for bias decomposition for the three-
party case this research has tried to explain what electoral bias is (especially in the 
sense that it is not equivalent to disproportionality) and those separate and sometimes 
conjoined elements that comprise it.  The intended audience is broader than the 
academic community of electoral geographers and political scientists because it matters 
that a wider public understand the reasons that lie behind situations when there is an 
asymmetry in the electoral battleground where one party requires only a narrow lead 
over its rivals to win an overall majority whereas another party needs a much larger 
lead.   
 
It has been particularly important to demonstrate that the impact of boundary changes 
in removing bias is directly linked to the extent of bias contributed by unequal 
electorates; the criticism levelled towards the independent boundary commissions has 
often been unjustified.  Given the radical nature of proposed boundary changes to be 
implemented prior to the 2015 general election it is likely that interest in electoral bias 
among both academics and the wider public will continue. 
 
 
2. Patterns of voting and party competition in London Assembly 
Elections 
 
Occasionally, opportunities for interesting and novel research arise when particularly 
good data become available.  One example of this relates to the elections for the 
Greater London Authority (GLA) which used electronic counting methods to determine 
the winner of its mayoral and assembly contests.  London Elects, the body responsible 
for conducting these elections, released the 2004 data in machine-readable format using 
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London borough wards as the lowest level of aggregation.  Rallings and Thrasher were 
working with Henk van der Kolk, principally looking at the supplementary vote system 
used for electing the mayor but when the 2004 data were published this opened up new 
research possibilities. 
 
One of the principal weaknesses of UK election surveys, such as the British Election 
Study, is that the number of voters that support the smaller parties is often too small to 
obtain a sufficiently large number of responses.  A major weakness of aggregate data 
analysis is that such parties also do not necessarily contest many seats, particularly in 
local elections where the number of vacancies is very large.  This obstacle disappears 
when small parties are required to select a relatively small number of candidates but 
when many electors are eligible to vote for them.  This circumstance arose in the case 
of London when small parties could provide lists for both the Assembly and European 
elections and when the data became available at the ward level. 
 
The 2004 London elections coincided with elections for the European Parliament which 
meant Londoners could vote five times (two votes for London mayor, London 
constituency vote, London-wide list vote and the European vote).  Since 1999 the UK 
has used regionally-based electoral districts for European elections but uniquely these 
voting figures became available at much smaller levels of aggregation than normal.  
Before we could undertake any analysis, however, it would be necessary to construct a 
usable data set (Appendix 5, pp.82-4).  As well as using the ward-level voting data we 
added some demographic characteristics and also local voting figures.  A combination 
of statistical procedures (Appendix 5, pp.86-92) began to build the case that there were 
patterns in support cast for the different minor parties (Respect, Green, UKIP and BNP) 
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competing in London.  But the regression models were not particularly successful in 
highlighting where those differences were.  Accordingly, I used GIS to construct ward 
maps of the London European vote which did succeed in revealing how the votes were 
spatially clustered across London (Appendix 5, pp.94-6).  Mapping permitted us to see 
clear spatial patterns in voter support for the Greens, Respect, UKIP and the BNP 
respectively.   
 
When the 2008 results also became available we decided that we could test the 
proposition that small parties can benefit from opportunities provided by the parallel 
implementation of separate voting systems.  In London elections to the 32 London 
boroughs are conducted by simple plurality, making it difficult for small parties to find 
candidates and difficult to attract votes.  By contrast very few candidates are required to 
contest the London-wide list seats.  Given that the 2004 data were available at the ward 
level would a party like the Greens, for example, note those areas where there was 
support and then use that information to establish target wards in time for the following 
local elections.   
 
Compiling the data set meant merging separate files for 624 wards containing London 
borough election results for 2002, 2006 and 2010 and the London Assembly voting 
figures for 2004 and 2008 (Appendix 6, pp. 110-3).  Multiple binary logistic regression 
was used with the first set of data 2002 - 2004 – 2006 to build a model while the second 
cycle, 2006 – 2008 – 2010 could be used for out of sample testing (Appendix 6, pp. 
107-10).  Once again, we used GIS to map Green support across London (Appendix 6, 
pp. 113-5).  The analysis concluded that it did not appear that the Greens did make use 
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of the potentially valuable data provided by the London list-vote data when identifying 
areas where local election candidates could stand and perhaps attract voter support.   
 
 
3. Electoral forecasting 
 
An important strand of the activity undertaken by the Elections Centre surrounds the 
topic of election forecasting.  Rallings and Thrasher chose to take an entirely different 
route to most other election forecasters, preferring to use local election data to generate 
forecasts, first for the purposes of making predictions about local elections (Rallings 
and Thrasher 1996) and later to extend the method to general election forecasting 
(Rallings and Thrasher 1999).  After joining the Centre I worked on a method based on 
Neural Networks (Borisyuk 2005) and although this had some success and recognition 
we have returned to the aggregate local electoral data for generating national forecasts. 
 
Using local council by-election data to generate these forecasts provides an alternative 
source to national polling data but presents real challenges.  Over recent years we have 
addressed the problems associated with varying patterns of party competition 
(Appendix 7, pp. 122-5) and it is fair to say that for us this continues to be a „work in 
progress‟.  Recent modelling has also incorporated opinion poll data, largely as a 
benchmark for comparison and for this purpose I developed a method of weighting data 
to take account of the different polling companies undertaking surveys with different 
frequencies (Appendix 7, pp.126-7).  The model developed for the 2010 UK general 
election produced a GB national vote share forecast of Conservative 36% (actual 37%), 
Labour 28% (30%) and Liberal Democrats 28% (24%).  The seat forecast was 
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Conservatives 299 seats (actual 306), Labour 237 (258) and Liberal Democrats 83 (57).  
At least we correctly forecast the hung parliament! 
 
Following the lessons of 2010 we have begun to explore the possibilities of generating 
forecasts that take account of the impact of different configurations of party 
competition, i.e. Con versus Lab; Con versus LD etc.  We may also return to the Neural 
Networks approach (Borisyuk et al 2005) or use another method entirely. 
 
 
4. Space, Place and Ballots 
 
This section has a rather catch-all description but the category reflects one of the great 
strengths that the Elections Centre brings to the study of voting behaviour in the UK.  
Over a period of more than 25 years the Centre has developed probably the world‟s 
most extensive collection of aggregate local election data.  Extracting data sets from 
this complex database requires considerable skill and patience but the rewards are that 
we can address important issues, ranging from the under-representation of women 
(Appendix 8), voter turnout (Appendix 9), and the effect of voting procedures on voter 
behaviour (Appendices 10 & 11).   
 
When we examined the presence and performance of women candidates in local 
government there were a number of data issues to resolve (origin time given differences 
in local government reorganisation, structural reforms in local government, complex 
electoral cycles etc. - Appendix 8, p. 136).  The analysis first considers women 
candidates (Appendix 8, pp. 137-41) and addresses the „contagion‟ question – do 
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parties select women candidates when rival parties do so and the balanced ballot – 
when parties can select candidates in multimember wards do they strive for some level 
of gender balance.  The second part of the paper tracks the pace of change in women‟s 
election before examining the relative performance of men and women candidates 
within party slates (Appendix 8, pp. 141-3).  It appears that voters do not discriminate 
either for or against women.  In the final section we addressed questions about tenure – 
are women councillors more likely to retire from office than are men and when male 
incumbents retire do local parties select women to replace them?  The general 
conclusions derived from this analysis are that women are not discriminated against by 
voters and probably not by party selection processes leaving the most likely 
explanation of women‟s recruitment to be resource-based. 
 
Exploring the relationship between voter turnout and geography has led to a valuable 
collaboration between the Elections Centre and Scott Orford of Cardiff University 
(Orford et al 2008, 2009, 2011).  In low information elections we expect that voters 
take more account of the associated costs of voting than they might do when 
participating at a general election.  The challenge lay in organising data that would 
permit the test of that hypothesis.  A handful of local authority election officers retain 
detailed records of voter turnout for each polling station.  One such was the London 
borough of Brent.  We obtained these data for a twenty year period.  Over this period 
voters had (or had not) participated in borough council, European parliament and 
general elections.  Orford created maps of the polling station areas and we used 
different measures of distance (Euclidean, topography etc.) and population density in 
order to estimate average distances to polling station for in-person voters (Appendix 9, 
pp. 160-4).We finally decided to use multi-level modelling (voters are based at polling 
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stations, in local wards within parliamentary constituencies) to examine differences in 
turnout for the three types of election.  The analysis shows the effect on turnout at the 
aggregate level of such factors as deprivation and age while noting that European 
election turnout is most affected by network distance and local election turnout relates 
to ward marginality (Appendix 9, pp. 166-72). 
 
In recent years I have also been analysing individual-level data compiled from the 
annual surveys of local election candidates undertaken since 2006.  This research has 
led to reports (Rallings et al 2007; 2009; 2010) and articles in peer-reviewed journals 
(Rallings et al 2010; Thrasher 2012 forthcoming) with the academic output likely to 
increase as the annual data are pooled and examined in more detail.  Much of this 
research is policy-oriented addressing issues of contemporary importance (for example, 
the under-representation of women, younger people and minority ethnic populations).   
 
It is a feature of the research process that one line of inquiry often leads to another.  
This is the case for two related papers that examine a common phenomenon in local 
elections where voters are invited to fill multiple rather than a single seat.  The first 
paper (Appendix 10) demonstrated that between 7-15% of total potential votes in 
English council elections using a block vote system remain unused; some voters with 
three votes, for example, would opt to use only one of them.  Was this because highly 
partisan voters would refrain from using votes when their chosen party failed to field a 
full set of candidates?  If not, what clues might be found from the election data that 
might indicate some of the causes of unused votes.  Invariably, before addressing the 
question there were data issues to be resolved (Appendix 10, pp. 180-1).   
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We were able to demonstrate that the structure of party competition does not wholly 
explain the absolute level of unused votes (Appendix 10, pp. 181-3).  Another line of 
inquiry was then pursued.  Was there possible evidence that some voters might not 
understand how the voting system worked and might imagine that they had only a 
single vote to cast?  Indeed, there was a strong alphabetic advantage for candidates 
placed near the top of each ballot paper (Appendix 10, pp. 184-6) that was only partly 
mitigated by incumbency factors.  An ordinal logistic model (Appendix 10, pp. 188-92) 
provides strong evidence for an alphabetic bias.  In the final part of the paper (pp. 193-
5) we construct a regression model using the percentage of unused votes as the 
dependent variable and predictor variables that take account of the ward context (party 
competition and demographic characteristics).  Decisions by local parties not to field a 
full slate of candidates has a large impact on the proportion of unused votes but there 
was also no disputing the evidence that support for candidates was affected by their 
order on the ballot. 
 
Appendix 11 builds directly on the conclusions reached in this earlier paper and tests 
the extent of alphabetic bias in local council elections over a forty-year period.  The 
data incorporated the names of 657,704 candidates that stood in 164,333 separate ward 
elections.  The analysis provides stronger evidence than before about the extent of 
alphabetic bias, the relationship with the size of the block vote (bias increases as district 
magnitude rises) and the number of candidates standing (Appendix 11, pp. 207-13.  
The logical consequence of this, of course, is that candidates placed near the top of the 
ballot have a better prospect of gathering votes than do lower-placed candidates and 
therefore have a better chance of being elected.  We tested this using Richard Webber‟s 
name origins software which reports the distribution of surnames currently within the 
UK (Appendix 11, pp. 216-7). We found that compared with the general population 
32 
 
councillors are more likely to be found in top deciles and are less frequent in the lower 
deciles.  To remove this bias we recommend the practice used elsewhere of ballot order 
randomisation for UK elections. 
 
 
5. Candidate recruitment 
 
Although most of my work has been undertaken while using aggregate data there are 
some recent exceptions.  In 2006, Mary Shears of the Elections Centre introduced a 
national survey of local election candidates.  The survey has been conducted annually 
since then with candidates selected randomly from nomination lists and invited to 
participate.  About one thousand responses are collected each year and I have pooled 
these data noting where the same or similar questions have been asked.  I have also 
combined the individual-level data with ward and authority-level measures and 
weighting data to correct for response bias (see Appendix 13 for a more detailed 
description of this procedure).   
 
Two recent publications are included here (Appendices 12 & 13) that reflects the kind 
of research that is being undertaken with these data.  I noted earlier (Appendix 8) that 
the aggregate data analysis of women‟s under-representation in local government could 
only advance our knowledge to a certain extent.  Appendix 12 aims to take the analysis 
a step further by, inter alia, discovering from women candidates some of the processes 
that brought them to stand, the support they received from others and whether their 
experiences were different to those of men.  It appears that women are less likely than 
men to take the decision to stand; they are more likely to be asked to stand.  By contrast, 
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the relatively small group of non-white candidates and those aged below 45 years that 
stand are more likely to make their own decision (Appendix 12, pp. 231-3).  As far as 
the candidates are concerned the problems of under-recruitment lie mainly with supply-
side issues coupled with a feeling that local parties might be doing more to select 
members of these under-represented groups. 
 
For the paper examining ethnic candidates in local elections (Appendix 13) we again 
collaborated with Richard Webber, using his OriginInfo software to identify candidate 
ethnicity.  This was partly to test his software reliability and partly to consider the 
nature and extent of sample/response bias for the Local Candidate surveys.  The first 
part of the paper, therefore, (Appendix 13, pp. 247-8) uses the software to classify the 
ethnic origins of all candidates standing for election.  Next, we compare the list 
selected to be invited to complete a questionnaire with all candidates in order to 
measure any sample bias.  Because we use random sampling we were reasonably 
confident that such bias would be avoided and we were correct in this interpretation.  
The next procedure was to test for response bias by comparing the list of candidates 
that did or did not respond.  This provided evidence of response bias with a lower 
response rate from Black, Asian and other minority ethnic candidates.  The subsequent 
analysis was able to correct for this bias. 
 
BME candidates are more likely to be younger and better educated but fewer women 
are recruited from among this group.  Such candidates are electorally inexperienced, 
have stronger ties with community related organisations and are more likely to make 
their own decision to stand for election rather than being approached by a fellow party 
member.  Community ties are also evident when respondents are asked about their 
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support network upon becoming a candidate with almost two-thirds of BME candidates 
experiencing positive support from this quarter (Appendix 13, pp. 256-7).   
 
 
General Discussion 
 
These research papers seek to expand our understanding about voters and parties in 
Britain.  Generally speaking, the research has relied upon aggregate data (especially 
local and parliamentary election data) but in recent years I have been working 
extensively with survey-level data also.  These different types of data present rather 
separate challenges.  One continuing task with the aggregate data is to check for errors 
and inconsistencies and, where possible, to amend the original records.  When the 
number of candidates and elections numbers in the many thousands as happens with the 
local elections this can be a daunting task, particularly when the contests occurred 
decades ago.  One major task has been the treatment of missing data.  For example, one 
important piece of information that local authorities often failed to record was the 
number of ballot paper issued for elections to multimember wards.  This was handled 
by an algorithm that took account of various patterns of party competition.  A similar 
approach was used for the electoral forecasting model when local parties began to 
withdraw candidates from these contests (see Appendix 7) and in weighting opinion 
poll data when the frequency of polls began to vary widely.   
 
The survey data present different kinds of problems as anyone who has worked with 
these types of data can attest.  In one sense, however, our recent work has transformed 
this „necessary chore‟ into a research programme in its own right.  Recent papers that 
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have used the annual candidates‟ survey have described the methodological innovations 
that we have developed to measure any sampling bias and, more importantly perhaps, 
the nature and extent of response bias.  These papers have also united the aggregate and 
individual-level data analysis because we are extending our application of name 
recognition software from the survey to the aggregate data in order to explore the 
relationship between candidate ethnicity and patterns of vote distributions. 
 
Facing and solving challenges in the research process often leads to methodological 
innovations that were not planned but instead evolved.  The papers included in the first 
section on electoral bias, for example, provide a useful description of this process.  It 
began with an initial discussion about the limitations of the Brookes method for  
three party competition in Britain and the need to search for a more effective approach 
to decomposing bias.  One of the papers included here is rare amongst academic 
publications – a description of a research process that ultimately failed.  But the failure 
led us to reassess our original thinking and then to develop a successful methodology.  
In turn, that methodology was then applied and has hopefully expanded our 
understanding of the operation of the different bias components at UK general elections 
from 1983 onwards.   
 
At other times research in one area has stimulated research that takes another direction.  
This can be illustrated by showing how the study of unused votes led us eventually into 
the field of candidate ethnicity.  When the research was originally envisaged the central 
problem lay in identifying the scale of unused votes in British local elections – how 
many people when given more than a single vote were making full use of those votes.  
It was only after considering this that our focus turned to the examination of patterns in 
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the data.  Later, it was our reporting of alphabetic bias that manifested itself by 
rewarding candidates placed at or near the top of ballot papers organised in order of 
candidate surnames that attracted the attention of Richard Webber.  His own interest 
lay in the ethnic origins of surnames rather than their positioning in both the alphabet 
and specifically on ballot papers.  The paper included here as Appendix 11 is the first in 
what promises to be a rewarding research collaboration.  We are already working on a 
paper that after using the name recognition software to classify candidates as British 
white/other white/non white then considers the relationship between candidates‟ ethnic 
origins and vote change (in the case of single member wards) or finishing party 
position order (in the case of multi-member wards).  Ultimately, for the UK context, we 
hope to be able to answer the question – does a candidate‟s name on the ballot affect 
the distribution of votes and what is the direction, strength and impact of that 
relationship? 
 
Further collaboration with Scott Orford and the geography of voting is also being 
undertaken.  This research is another demonstration of how we are merging aggregate 
and individual-level data and applying multi-level methods.  The focus of this research 
will be on local election candidate recruitment and the relationships between a 
candidate‟s residence and the location of the ward that is being contested.  We know 
from the candidates‟ surveys that just under half of all candidates (the figure is lower 
for councillors) live outside the ward that they contest.  We also know that around one 
in four are „paper‟ candidates, agreeing to stand on condition that there is no prospect 
of winning.  What we do not know, as yet, is in the cases where residence lies outside 
ward boundaries whether the two areas are close to one another or not and how that 
geography varies across the country.  Is it the case that parties try, where possible to 
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select candidates that if not a ward resident are at least living close by, or are (some) 
parties mainly concerned with finding names to include on the ballot paper? 
 
Finally, it is worth noting the extent to which this research impacts or seeks to impact 
upon the real world of politics and policy making.  It is understandable that during UK 
general elections that people become interested in explanations that account for 
asymmetries in vote/seat distributions.  The value of extending the Brookes‟ method is 
that we can show how far one party‟s advantage is a function of say, unequal 
electorates, and how other factors contribute also to that bias.  Much of our work 
addresses practical issues.  If ordering ballot papers according to candidate surname 
affects the distribution of votes should be rotate those names randomly as happens in 
other countries?  Given that women and minority ethnic candidates are under-
represented in local elections is the best approach for remedying that situation to 
address supply or demand issues?  If the location of polling stations directly affects the 
proportion of voters that participate in certain kinds of low salience elections and 
expanding the pool of postal voters is not a positive option then how can we optimise 
those locations to improve turnout?  Political science does not have to be relevant to be 
important but when it can address such questions empirically then it should. 
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Abstract
One method for assessing the extent of electoral bias is that first developed by Brookes. This method decomposes bias into dif-
ferent elements, including efficiency of vote distribution as well as effects separately produced by electorate size and turnout.
Brookes’ method is used to measure electoral bias largely in two-party systems but the rise of third parties, particularly in recent
UK elections, has prompted the search for a reliable alternative. This paper reports upon findings from an on-going research pro-
gramme. The nature and theoretical underpinnings of different procedures that might be used for decomposing bias in the three-
party case are outlined. Two main procedures are constructed and then tested against the results from actual elections. The evidence
shows that these procedures produce similar findings in respect of the 2005 general election but differences emerge when earlier
elections are considered. Research continues to assess whether these differences follow from the nature of party competition at each
election or the particular procedure employed.
 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
A well-known feature of simple plurality electoral
systems is that, irrespective of any explicit political
involvement in drawing district boundaries (the malap-
portionment and gerrymandering strategies char-
acteristic of much redistricting in the United States),
legislative contest outcomes are almost invariably
disproportionaldmore so than with many other types
of electoral system. Such disproportionality usually
favours the largest of the two main parties whichdas
identified from Duverger’s classic work (Duverger,
1954) onwardsdtend to dominate such systems.
What is not as well attested is whether that dispropor-
tionality is unbiased by not treating these two largest
parties differentially. A system that gives the largest
party a ‘winner’s bonus’, with, say, a ten percentage
points greater share of the seats than of the votes, is
disproportional. However, if main party A obtains that
bonus but main party B, with the same vote share,
gets a bonus of only five points, then the system is
not only disproportional but also biased towards A.
Such a winner’s bonus is sometimes termed exaggera-
tion (Johnston et al., 2002) or responsiveness (King,
1990), or majoritarian bias (as in Calvo and Micozzi,
2005), and it differs from ‘electoral bias’ (Johnston
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et al., 2001) or ‘partisan bias’ (Grofman and King,
2007) which refers to an asymmetry in the way party
vote share is translated into seats (the same share of
the votes cast can result in substantially different shares
of the seats). We will consider electoral bias only and
refer to it as simply bias.
An unbiased system, according to Grofman and King
(2007), is characterised by what they term partisan sym-
metry (see also King et al., 2005), a requirement that
‘. the electoral system treat similarly-situated
parties equally, so that each receives the same frac-
tion of legislative seats for a particular vote percent-
age as the other party would have received if it had
the same percentage’.
Grofman and King (2007, p. 6) claim that this defini-
tion of partisan symmetry has been virtually the consen-
sus position of social scientists as a means of assessing
the partisan fairness of a districting scheme. Measuring
it has been a cause of considerable experimentation and
debate, however: as King et al. (2005, p. 9) note:
‘A consensus exists about using the symmetry stan-
dard to evaluate partisan bias in electoral systems.
But such a consensus does not answer the subsidiary
question: how to measure symmetry itself in order
to determine whether partisan bias exists’.
(Hence the experimentationdas in King, 1990;
Gelman and King, 1994; Grofman et al., 1997; Gelman
et al., 2004dsome of which has sought only to identify
the extent of bias, without also decomposing it to un-
cover its sources.1)
One procedure used to measure that bias was devel-
oped in New Zealand by Ralph Brookes (1953, 1959,
1960), which has the major benefits of using a readily-
appreciated metric and being decomposable into the
various bias sources that he identified (variations in con-
stituency size, abstention rates, voting for third parties,
and the distributions of party support).2 It hasbeenwidely
applied to the analysis of British election results in the last
two decades (e.g. Johnston et al., 2001, 2002, 2006).3
Brookes’ method was ideally suited to the analysis of
a system where two parties predominateddas was the
case in New Zealand until the 1990s: it assumes that
other parties gain a proportion of votes cast that cannot
be translated into seats. Its application to British elec-
tions since 1974 is thus constrained by the growth of
‘third party’ votes in England and ‘fourth party’ votes
in Scotland and Wales that were subsequently translated
into seats. Although a third party victory component
was added later by Mortimore (1992): (see Johnston
et al., 1999) to get a more realistic appreciation of the
extent, direction and sources of any observed bias, nev-
ertheless the method essentially remains focused on the
two-party situation. Brookes’ methoddalong with most
others seeking both to identify and decompose the level
of biasdtreats third parties as, in effect, the source of
relatively small amounts of ‘noise’ in a predominantly
two-party system. Our goal here is to undertake a further
modification of the method of decomposing bias that
will make it better suited to the realities of three-party
competition, where each of the parties is competing
with the other two (perhaps in different places) for sub-
stantial numbers of votes and all three are potential seat-
winners. This paper represents the initial stages in this
process.
2. Reformulating Brookes’ measure
In this paper, we re-formulate the two-party
Brookes’ method in such a way that will subsequently
allow extension to the three-party case. More formally,
let x be the number of seats the leading party wins with
given share, k, of the two-party vote, and y the number
of seats the second party could win if it got the same
share of the votes. Then, bias towards the first party is
defined as the difference between the number of seats
gained by this party, x, and the mean of seats gained
by both parties, i.e. the mean of x and y. Thus, for the
two-party competition, bias is a function of one vari-
able, vote share k.
Bias to party A is defined as
biasAðkÞ ¼ xMEANðx; yÞ ¼ x ðxþ yÞ=2
¼ ðx yÞ=2 ð1aÞ
which is simply the negative of bias towards its rival, B:
biasBðkÞ ¼ yMEANðx; yÞ ¼ y ðxþ yÞ=2
¼ ðy xÞ=2: ð1bÞ
Although Brookes’ method of measuring bias is often
considered as based on electoral outcomes of uniform
1 Grofman and King (2007, p. 32) do claim, however, that ‘The de-
gree of deviation from symmetry of treatment is known as partisan
bias, and is easily quantified, and made specific as to direction’.
2 An alternative approach, developed almost contemporaneously
with Brookes’, identifying the same basic bias components, is Soper
and Rydon (1958), who developed early ideas of Brookes (1953).
3 The only other attempts to measure and account for bias in the
UK have been those by Curtice (2001) (see also Curtice and Steed,
1986), which although it identified the various sources of bias did
not quantify their relative importance in terms of seats, and Blau’s
important critique of Brookes’ approach (Blau, 2001) and his sugges-
tion to use an ‘integrated method’ (Blau, 2001, 2004).
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swing of support from one party to another across all
constituencies (Rossiter et al., 1999) or cited almost
exclusively in the course of criticism of the assumption
of uniform swing (Blau, 2001), here we distinguish
between:
1. the quantitative measure of bias towards a party
(difference between x and the mean of x and y);
2. the derived formulae for decomposition of bias into
vote distribution effect, constituency size effect,
etc.;
3. what magnitude of k should be used if we are inter-
ested in measuring bias for a particular election;
and
4. the process whereby we might obtain the figures x
and y.
As part of our extension of Brookes’ method, there-
fore, we explicitly address these four issues.
The first two issues are independent of the ‘uniform
swing’ procedure. For example, if the two main parties
get equal vote shares at an election then we can calcu-
late bias without even addressing the fourth point, the
process for obtaining x and y. The reason for this is
that the two parties have equal vote shares naturally
and the actual seats won can be used as x and y. There-
fore, we know that we can deal with this part of the
problem (defining and decomposing bias) without dis-
cussing issues 3 and 4 above.
The last two issues, the magnitude of k and the pro-
cess for obtaining x and y, are however concerned with
‘notional’ electionsdit is doubtful that two main
parties would get exactly equal vote shares at any elec-
tion! So, we have to ‘construct’ an imaginary election
with ‘equal conditions’ for two parties.
Issue 3 concerns the magnitude of k that should be
used when measuring bias for a particular election. In
practise two methods have been used. The first of these,
the ‘equal shares’ approach, compares the number of
seats won by each of the two parties respectively if
the votes actually cast were redistributed equally be-
tween them. The ‘reverse shares’ method, on the other
hand, considers what would have happened to the distri-
bution of seats had the second-placed party (in terms of
votes) obtained the vote share won by the first-placed
party and the first-placed party obtained the vote of
the second-placed party. In principle, it is possible to
calculate bias for any k in a range between 0 and 100
(as in Johnston et al., 2002). Nevertheless, bias is usu-
ally calculated at either k ¼ 50%, i.e. equal vote shares,
or at k ¼ actual vote share of the leading party, i.e. re-
verse vote shares. Both approaches have merit. The
former allows easy interpretation of biasdif two main
parties get an equal share of votes but non-equal num-
bers of seats then the bias towards one of those parties
is its ‘excess’/‘deficiency’ in seats. The latter, it might
be argued, retains more features from the actual elec-
toral outcomedsize of constituencies (electoral units),
turnout and minor party support variations across con-
stituencies, as well as magnitude of national vote share,
k, of the leading party. The only difference is that two
main parties swap their positionsdactual second party
becomes new leading party with k vote share.
This leaves only the process for arriving at the values
of x and y at our notional election. Brookes used uni-
form swing, applying change in vote share for both
parties in each available electoral district (constitu-
ency).4 In principle other approaches might be used,
for example, Monroe’s (1998) variable swing or the
method of simulation (‘approximate uniform partisan
swing’) favoured by Gelman, King and others (Gelman
and King, 1994; Grofman and King, 2007).
3. Measuring three-party bias
Whereas Brookes’ method performs well in evaluat-
ing bias in electoral situations where two parties pre-
dominate, it is less satisfactory in systems where there
is a strong third-party attracting support from either
or both of the main contestants. This has been the situ-
ation in Great Britain since the mid-1970s, and
although it is possible to use Brookes’ method to com-
pare the situation of any pair of parties in a three-party
system (as in Johnston et al., 2006) this is not particu-
larly satisfactory. Hence our search for a better proce-
dure, based on Brookes, in which we allow for shifts
in support across all three parties rather than one being
treated as a ‘constant’ thereby restricting the focus to
a contest between the other two.
The original definition of bias permits an extension
to the three-party case. Bias towards the leading party
4 Swing is a measure of the net change in support for two parties, A
and B, compared across two elections and can be defined as:
½ðShareA2  ShareA1Þ þ ðShareB1  ShareB2Þ=2. Two variants of
swing are known: Butler swing and Steed swing. Both rely on the
same formula but apply different methods for calculation of parties’
share of vote. For Butler swing, vote share is calculated on the basis
of the total vote cast for a party whilst Steed swing uses total two-party
vote (or total three-party vote). In this paper we apply ‘Steed’ rather
than ‘Butler’ swing for precisely the same reasons as discussed by
Blau, 2001, p. 62 (see also Mortimore, 1992). The former is preferred
because it preserves the shape of the distribution of votes of the relevant
parties which feature in our estimations. Under Butler’s approach
parties’ shares are changed uniformly across constituencies; Steed’s
method imposes uniform change on relative two/three-party shares.
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is measured as the difference between the number of
seats gained by the party and a norm which is the
mean of seats gained by three parties under equal con-
ditions:
biasAðkÞ ¼ x MEANðx; y; zÞ; ð2aÞ
where x, y, and z are the number of seats won by parties
A, B, and C respectively under ‘equal conditions’, i.e.
with the same percentage of votes cast (in actual or
notional elections). In turn, bias towards party B is mea-
sured as
biasBðkÞ ¼ yMEANðx; y; zÞ; ð2bÞ
and it follows that bias towards party C is measured as
biasCðkÞ ¼ zMEANðx; y; zÞ: ð2cÞ
4. How to identify different components of bias
if x, y, z are known
Let us suppose that we know/can calculate x, y, and z.
Then the formulae (2a)e(2c) given in the definition
of bias can be rearranged in the following form
xMEANðx;y;zÞ¼ x xþ yþ z
3
¼ x y
3
þ x z
3
ð3aÞ
yMEANðx; y; zÞ ¼ y x
3
þ y z
3
ð3bÞ
zMEANðx; y; zÞ ¼ z x
3
þ z y
3
ð3cÞ
We can see from these equations that bias towards party
A, for example, is partitioned into two termsdbias re-
sulting from a non-symmetry between party A and B,
ðx  yÞ=3, plus bias derived from a non-symmetry be-
tween A and C, ðx  zÞ=3. These may both move in
the same direction, or one may partly cancel out the
other if they move in opposite directions.
We follow Brookes’ method when decomposing
terms ðx  yÞ=3, ðx  zÞ=3 etc. in equations (3a)e(3c).
Four main components of bias were scrutinized in
Brookes’ and subsequently in Johnston et al. papers:
 ‘gerrymandering’ (also termed the ‘vote distribu-
tion’ or ‘efficiency’ effect), i.e. asymmetry in the
distribution of partisan voting strength across con-
stituencies as indicated by skewed frequency distri-
butions (Gudgin and Taylor, 1979);
 malapportionment, i.e. differences in electorate
size across constituencies;
 abstainers/turnout effect; and
 minor party vote effect.
A fifth component, minor party victory, was intro-
duced by Mortimore (1992) (see formulae in Johnston
et al., 1999) to take into account the fact that in recent
British elections the ‘third’ party became much more
prominent since 1970 there than it was in New Zealand
when Brookes was writing. Naturally, we do not need to
include this fifth term in the decomposition of bias be-
cause our analysis specifically considers three-party
competition from the outset.
As a result of decomposition, we get the following
formulae for different bias components towards party A:
Vote distribution effect5
Gtoward A ¼ y
3
ðPx=Qy  1Þ þ z
3
ðPx=Qz  1Þ ð4Þ
Malapportionment or electorate size effect
Etoward A ¼ y
3
ðSy=Rx  1Þ þ z
3
ðSz=Rx  1Þ ð5Þ
Abstention or turnout related effect
Atoward A ¼ y
3

Rx
Rx CxðCx=Rx Dy=SyÞ

þ z
3

Rx
Rx CxðCx=Rx Dz=SzÞ

ð6Þ
Minor party vote effect
Mtoward A ¼ y
3

Rx
Rx UxðUx=Rx Vy=SyÞ

þ z
3

Rx
Rx UxðUx=Rx Vz=SzÞ

ð7Þ
where: x ¼ number of seats won by party A,
y ¼ number of seats won by party B, z ¼ number of
seats won by party C; Px ¼ average number of com-
bined votes for three major parties where party A won
seats,Qy ¼ average number of combined votes for three
major parties where party B won seats, Qz ¼ average
number of combined votes for three major parties
where party C won seats; Rx ¼ average electorate
where party Awon seats, Sy ¼ average electorate where
5 Notation for the equations follows the traditional form where G
represents gerrymander (Brookes’ original term), E is electorate
size, A is abstention and M for minor party votes. We do not believe
that gerrymander is the most appropriate term (‘distributional effect’
is more accurate perhaps and throughout the rest of the paper we pre-
fer this term) but we have resisted the temptation to alter the notation
from Brookes’ original. By so doing we believe we make more trans-
parent our alterations to the original algebra.
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party B won seats, Sz ¼ average electorate where party
C won seats; Cx ¼ average number of abstentions
where party A won seats, Dy ¼ average number of ab-
stentions where party B won seats, Dz ¼ average num-
ber of abstentions where party C won seats;
Ux ¼ average number of minor party votes where party
Awon seats, Vy ¼ average number of minor party votes
where party B won seats, Vz ¼ average number of mi-
nor party votes where party C won seats.
It is important to note that we compare places where
parties win seats. This is the method used by Brookes
but was subsequently modified by Johnston et al.
(1999). Their chosen method was for, say, party A, to
examine all seats where A’s vote share was greater
than B’s vote share and not simply those seats won by
party A. This was done to accommodate the principle
of the ‘third’ party winning seats. Because we are deal-
ing with the three-party case we can now ignore this
procedure and revert to the original.
Decomposition of biases towards party B and C
yields formulae analogous to those stated in equations
(4)e(7) above.
5. Does it work?
To illustrate how this extension of the Brookes
method takes into consideration the third party, we con-
sider two examples where a ‘third’ party participates
and wins seats. We compare the results of two-party
bias decomposition (including a ‘third party victory’
component) with our three-party bias analysis.
To avoid any unnecessary discussion at this point
about the approach for defining ‘equal conditions’ re-
quired for calculation of three-party bias (see equations
2) and whether ‘equal’ or ‘reverse’ vote shares are pref-
erable for two-party bias, we consider examples where
all parties get a virtually equal number of ‘actual’ votes
overall, thereby avoiding the need to construct any no-
tional elections. Furthermore, for the purpose of these
examples we assume that turnout in each constituency
is 100% (thereby reducing the number of components
in the decomposition).
The chosen examples are admittedly rather extreme
but they are used to make important general points and
to demonstrate more clearly how the two approaches
treat the ‘third’ party. Both examples show an unbiased
electoral outcome when three participating parties win
the same number of seats and receive virtually the
same share of votes. Although bias toward any single
party equals 0 in each case (the parties get an equal
share of votes and an equal share of seats) we neverthe-
less can partition bias using the above formulae and find
that the bias components differ from 0, operate in oppo-
site directions, and cancel out each other. When calcu-
lating two-party bias, the party that receives a slightly
smaller number of votes than the others is considered
as the ‘third’ party.
In the first example (Table 1) parties A and B (with
225 votes each) are the two main parties with equal
two-party vote shares and party C is the third party
(223 votes). Parties A and B win two seats each, both
have 15 surplus votes (i.e. votes cast where a party
wins the seat but receives more votes than are necessary
to defeat the second-placed party), and 115 wasted
votes (votes that bring no return because they are cast
in constituencies where the party loses). Of these 115
wasted votes, 95 are wasted in a constituency where
the rival main party wins, and 20 are wasted where
the third party C is the winner. The positions of parties
A and B look identical and unbiased. To investigate
whether there are any sources of bias that operate in op-
posite directions, cancelling each other out and so not
immediately apparent, decomposition formulae were
applied.
Unsurprisingly, Brookes’ two-party method per-
forms badly in this extreme situation when the ‘third’
party (smallest in terms of vote share) becomes an equal
player in terms of seat distribution. As the calculations
below show, the algorithm gives a false impression that
party A has a more efficient vote distribution than party
B (the G component is positive for A and negative for
B); that the electorate size component also gives party
A the advantage over B; and that A loses from third
party votes whilst party B gains from that effect.
Vote distribution effect
Gtoward A ¼ 0:08, Gtoward B ¼ 0:08,
Electorate size effect
Etoward A ¼ 0:15, Etoward B ¼ 0:14,
Table 1
Example 1 of a hypothetical election
Constituencies Electorate Votes Winner
Party A Party B Party C
I 150 60 55 35 A
II 100 50 40 10 A
III 150 55 60 35 B
IV 100 40 50 10 B
V 103 5 9 89 C
VI 70 15 11 44 C
Overall share of vote (%)
33.4 33.4 33.1
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Third party votes effect
Mtoward A ¼ 0:21, Mtoward B ¼ 0:25, and
Third party victories effect
Wtoward A ¼ 0:00, Wtoward B ¼ 0:00.
But we have already demonstrated that the positions
of parties A and B at this election are virtually identical.
Therefore, the Brookes method of decomposition in this
case appears counter-intuitive.
Next, we consider for the same election how a mea-
sure of three-party bias operates. We can calculate
biases toward each party using the formulae from
equations (2a)e(2c) and then partition them applying
the algorithm for decomposition of three-party bias,
(equations (4)e(7)). The outcome is presented in
Table 2.
Of course, Table 2 does not consider any turnout
effect (turnout is 100%) nor does it consider a minor/
fourth party effect (because the example uses only three
parties). From the results of decomposition using this
new method we can now see that parties A and B
have equal advantage over party C in terms of the
vote distribution and are equally disadvantaged in terms
of size component. The total number of ineffective
votes for both A and B equals 130 (surplus plus wasted
votes) and for C it equals 199, (109 surplus and 90
wasted votes). Parties A and B won seats in constituen-
cies with an average size of 125 electors while party C
won in constituencies with a smaller average, just 86.5
electors. It was shown earlier that each component of
bias toward a party, let’s say party A, can be further par-
titioned regarding the source of asymmetrydan asym-
metry between A and B, i.e. ‘bias toward A from B’,
and an asymmetry between A and C, i.e. ‘bias toward
A from C’. Thus, we can see that the electoral disadvan-
tages for both A and B came from C rather than from
each other. Party C gets its gains and losses equally
from A and B. In short, the pattern of bias decomposi-
tion using the three-party method lies in the expected
direction.
The next example is used to demonstrate how the
two-party Brookes method is sensitive to the precise
distribution of votes between one of the major parties
and the third party in constituencies won by the third
party. It differs from the example in Table 1 only in
the distribution of votes (bold figures in Table 3)
between party A and party C in seats won by party
Cdin all other respects (overall vote and seat share)
the two examples are identical.
The components of two-party competition bias are
very different from those for example 1. For party A
we can see an even larger ‘distributional advantage’
relative to B (0.14 vs. 0.08 in example 1) and ‘minor
party vote disadvantage’ (0.26 vs. 0.21).
Vote distribution effect
Gtoward A ¼ 0:14, Gtoward B ¼ 0:13,
Size effect
Etoward A ¼ 0:15, Etoward B ¼ 0:14,
Minor party vote effect
Mtoward A ¼ 0:26, Mtoward B ¼ 0:31, and
Minor party victories’ effect
Wtoward A ¼ 0:00, Wtoward B ¼ 0:00.
By contrast, using the three-party bias method the
components of the decomposition remain unaltered,
as we should expect.
The purpose of these examples was to construct
elections for which the Brookes’ method was never
intendeddwhere there is real three-party competition
and where, as in the example above, the third party
actually wins most seats. That method, of course, is
primarily concerned with the relationship between
Table 2
Decomposition of three-party bias (Example 1 election)
Toward party A Toward party B Toward party C
overall from B from C overall from A from C overall from A from B
Vote Distribution 0.30 0.00 0.30 0.30 0.00 0.30 0.41 0.21 0.21
Electorate Size 0.21 0.00 0.21 0.21 0.00 0.21 0.59 0.30 0.30
Table 3
Example 2 of a hypothetical election
Constituencies Electorate Votes Winner
Party A Party B Party C
I 150 60 55 35 A
II 100 50 40 10 A
III 150 55 60 35 B
IV 100 40 50 10 B
V 103 1 9 93 C
VI 70 19 11 40 C
Overall share of vote (%)
33.4 33.4 33.1
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party A and party B. In an election including a signif-
icant third party the Brookes method tries to assign
any special features to one or other of the two main
parties. The three-party bias method, however, is pre-
cisely designed to measure relationships across three
and not two parties.
6. What is ‘equal conditions’? How to derive x, y,
and z?
To calculate bias we have to know x, y, and zdthe
number of seats each of three parties could get, given
share of vote, k. In the real world, of course, we have
just one actual election. Therefore, we need to con-
sider at least one notional election with ‘similar condi-
tions’. Analogous to the two-party case, we have
a choice between constructing some form of ‘equal’
or ‘reverse’ share situations. If we construct a notional
election with equal three-party votes, then we lose in-
formation about the leading party’s actual vote share.
Our current thinking, therefore, suggests a preference
for redistribution of shares using some variant of re-
verse shares. Under this notional election procedure
a new leading party will be awarded the same vote
share as the leading party at the actual election while
at the same time the relative weights of the other
two parties will be retained. The attraction of this
approach is that it retains more memory of the actual
election.
In the three-party case, therefore, we need to con-
sider two notional elections. One of these would see
the actual second-placed party awarded the same vote
share as the actual first-placed party. The second no-
tional election would see the actual third-placed party
awarded the same vote share as the actual first-placed
party. For the calculation of bias we will use actual
number of seats won by leading party, x, and y and z
will be the respective seats won by the new leading
parties in our two notional elections.
Assuming that we follow this procedure we still have
to consider how votes are re-distributed within each
constituency. The standard procedure is to assume uni-
form swing within each constituency. A number of ob-
jections can and have been raised with this procedure,
not least the fact that when applied to some constituen-
cies a uniform swing might take a party’s vote share
above 100 or below 0. These problems are magnified
when it comes to the three-party case.
We need to consider adopting a different procedure,
or two as it happens for this paper. The first of these
methods begins by applying a uniform/homogeneous
increase in share of vote for the new leading party
across all constituencies. Next, it reduces the votes of
the notional two non-leading parties though retaining
the ratio of votes won at the constituency level between
those parties at the actual election.6 This means, in
effect, that different constituencies may see a non-
uniform reduction of votes for the two non-leading
parties, as the example discussed below shows. The
main attraction of this procedure is that it is perhaps
closest to the uniform swing procedure that is currently
used for the two-party bias method.
For the second approach the most important con-
cern is to retain the ratio between national vote shares
for the two non-leading parties. It does this by calcu-
lating a coefficient that becomes the proportion of
decrease for the vote share of the two notional non-
leading parties. This coefficient is arrived at by sum-
ming the vote share of the actual two non-leading
parties and dividing the resulting total by the sum of
the vote shares for the actual leading party and that
party which is neither the leading party at the actual
election nor the leading party at the notional election.
These new votes are then added to the vote of the new
leading party at the notional election.7 As a result of
6 The formal procedure is as follows.Assume that partyA is the lead-
ing party and party B is second leading party with a difference between
their national vote shares of deltaAB, where deltaAB ¼ shA  shB, and
where shA, shB, shC are national vote shares for parties A, B, and C re-
spectively. Constructing notional election, for each constituency, i, we
add deltaAB percentage points to partyB: shB i
NEW ¼ shB i þ deltaAB and
then redistribute remaining threeeparty votes between parties A and C
in such a way that preserves the initial ratio between their shares (in
eachconstituency, i), shA i
NEW/shC i
NEW ¼ shA i/shC i.As a result of thepro-
cedure, the newnational vote share for partyB (new leading party),will
be the same as that for leading party A in the actual election, shB
NEW ¼
shA. Party A becomes second largest party and party C stays the third.
Notional electionwith partyCas the new leadingparty is constructed in
a similar way, increasing vote share of party C by deltaAC percentage
points, deltaAC ¼shA  shC and so on as above.
7 Constructing Version 2 notional election with party B as a
new leading party, we compute a ratio, gammaAB, where
gammaAB ¼ (shB þ shC)/(shA þ shC), which effectively is the ratio
of vote share of party A and party C together in the new (notional)
election to their vote share in the actual one. For each constituency,
i, vote shares for party A and party C are reduced proportionally:
shA i
NEW ¼ shA i  gammaAB, and shC iNEW ¼ shC i  gammaAB (that pre-
serves the ratio between A and C shares: i.e. shA i
NEW/shC i
NEW ¼ shA i/
shC i). Then vote share of party B is increased by a certain amount
of percentage points: shB i
NEW ¼ shB i þ (1  gammaAB)  (shA i þ
shC i) ¼ shB i þ  (shA  shB)  (shA i þ shC i) / (shA þ shC). This
value means that different percentage points will be added to the
new leading party in each constituency. New leading party B will
get the same national share of votes as the leading party A in the ac-
tual election: shB
NEW ¼ shA. New ratio of vote shares of non-leading
(new) parties, shA
NEW/shC
NEW, will be exactly the same as the initial
one, shA
NEW/shC
NEW ¼ shA/shC.
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this procedure the new leading party is guaranteed to
receive the same national vote share as that received
by the lead party at the actual election. Another attrac-
tion of this second approach is that it avoids com-
pletely the problem of constructing party vote shares
that rise above 100 or fall below zero.
Example 3 hypothetical election (Table 4) has just
two constituencies, with a thousand votes cast in each.
Overall, the national vote sees party A win with 50%
of the vote share, party B is placed second with
32.5% and party C wins 17.5%.
Table 5 sets out two notional elections based on
Table 4, using the first procedure described above.
When using this procedure, party B becomes the new
leading party. To take it to 50% of the overall vote we
apply a uniform 17.5% percentage point increase across
constituencies. The non-leading parties see a reduction
in their vote share that maintains the original constitu-
ency level ratios (see the final two columns in the first
part of the table).
As a result of this procedure, the new leading party
gets exactly the same ‘national’ (overall) share of vote
as that of the leading party at the actual election. The
new non-leading parties keep the same finishing order
that they have in the actual election. However, as we
noted earlier, with this procedure we cannot guarantee
the ratio of national shares of non-leading parties.
Nevertheless, in this example the new national ratio
of 2.81 (or 1.52 in the case when party C becomes
the leading party) is close to the original value of
2.86 (1.54).
Next, in Table 6 we construct two further notional
elections based on Table 4 but this time instead use
the second procedure described above. Once again,
we describe the notional election where the new lead-
ing party is B. In this example the use of procedure
two means that parties A and C will retain 74% of
their votes in each constituency (obtained by summing
32.5 and 17.5 and dividing by 50.0 plus [in this case]
17.5). These votes are then assigned to party B. In the
notional election this means that in constituency I
party B will receive a 19.4 percentage point increase
in vote share but a 15.6 percentage point increase in
constituency II.
In effect, using these two procedures means that cer-
tain (though different) information about the original
election has been retained for the two constructed no-
tional elections. The first procedure retains two
Table 4
Example 3 of a hypothetical election, actual election outcome
Actual election (Party A is the leader)
Votes Ratio: share A to
share B
Ratio: share A to
share C
Party A Party B Party C
Constituency I 500 250 250 2.00 2.00
Constituency II 500 400 100 1.25 5.00
National share of votes (%)
50.0 32.5 17.5
Ratio: share A to share B 1.54
Ratio: share A to share C 2.86
Table 5
Notional elections using procedure 1
Party B as the leader Party C as the leader
Votes Ratio: share A to
share C
Votes Ratio: share A to
share B
Party A Party B Party C Party A Party B Party C
I 383 425 192 2.00 283 142 575 2.00
II 354 575 71 5.00 319 256 425 1.25
National share of votes (%) National share of votes (%)
36.9 50.0 13.1 30.1 19.9 50.0
Ratio: share A to share C 2.81 Ratio: share A to share B 1.52
252 G. Borisyuk et al. / Electoral Studies 27 (2008) 245e256
A 10
characteristics: the shape of the vote distribution for the
new leading party; and the relative weight of the two
non-leading parties at the constituency level. The sec-
ond procedure also retains two characteristics: the rela-
tive weight of the two non-leading parties at the
constituency and national levels.
Intuitively, it appears as though we should prefer the
second procedure over the first. From a formal mathe-
matical point of view however no such preference can
be made.
7. Applying methods for calculating bias to the
2005 British general election
Johnston et al. (1999), (2002) prefer the ‘equal’ vote
shares procedure for calculating two-party bias but be-
cause we propose here a three-party method that con-
centrates on the investigation of bias for/against the
leading party we consider the ‘reverse’ shares two-party
procedure as more appropriate for the comparison of
the two-party/three-party analyses. We calculate three-
party bias for the 2005 British general election (North-
ern Ireland is, as usual, excluded, as is the Speaker’s
seat) using the two variants of constructing notional
elections described earlier and compare the results
with the two-party bias method.
7.1. Two-party bias (reverse shares)
In this section, we revisit the 2005 general election
using the standard Brookes two-party method (as in
Johnston et al., 2006), except that we use the reverse
share rather than equal share approach (see Table 7).
Labour won 0.52 of the two-party vote at that election,
and the Conservatives 0.48, with Labour getting 355
seats (x ¼ 355 in our notation): if those shares were re-
versed (using the Steed swing) the Conservatives would
get 255 seats (i.e. y ¼ 255). Using formulae (1a) and
(1b) above, this indicates a bias towards the Labour
party of 50 seats.8 Decomposing that bias we find that
all the components favour Labour apart from minor
party votes. For the Conservatives this feature works
in the party’s favour but rewards them with less than
nine seats.
7.2. Three-party bias. Decomposition of bias (using
procedure 1 notional elections)
We now use the first version of our three-party
method to evaluate the 2005 general election result
with three notional results. These produce a substantial
pro-Labour bias of 89.7 seats, and biases against the
Conservatives and Liberal Democrats of 21.3 and 68.3
seats respectively (Table 8). According to these
estimates, Labour was clearly the main beneficiary of
how the system operated (or was being operated
through the geography of party vote-winning strategies:
Johnston et al. (2006) distinguish between system
operation and operation of the system) and the Liberal
Democrats the main losers.
The bias decompositions (using formulae (4)e(7))
show not only which component favoured which party
but also which of its opponents it gained that advantage
from. Labour’s greatest advantage came from the vote dis-
tribution effect,with three-quarters of that advantage (34 of
45 seats) coming at the expense of the Liberal Democrats,
which clearly have the least efficient distribution of votes
across the country’s constituencies. The Conservatives,
too, have a net advantage from this component (7 seats);
however, this net figure comprises a loss to Labour of 15
Table 6
Notional elections using procedure 2
Party B as the leader Party C as the leader
Votes Ratio: share A to
share C
Votes Ratio: share A to
share B
Party A Party B Party C Party A Party B Party C
I 370 444 185 2.00 303 152 545 2.00
II 370 556 74 5.00 303 242 455 1.25
National share of votes (%) National share of votes (%)
37.0 50.0 13.0 30.3 19.7 50.0
Ratio: share A to share C 2.86 Ratio: share A to share B 1.54
8 In our notation biasLab(0.52) ¼ þ50 and biasCon(0.52) ¼ 50.
We thank the anonymous referee for his/her suggestion that we
should characterise overall bias as biasLab(0.52)  biasCon(0.48).
But because we are mostly interested in bias for/against the leading
party we do not concern ourselves with overall bias.
253G. Borisyuk et al. / Electoral Studies 27 (2008) 245e256
A 11
seats but a gain from the Liberal Democrats of 21 seats. It
should be noted that there are important differences
between the three-party and two-party bias methods in
respect of minor party votes and victories. Under the
two-party Brookes method Labour was disadvantaged by
the minor party votes component but this disappears
when the Liberal Democrats are excluded from the minor
party category with the three-party method.
7.3. Three-party bias. Decomposition of bias (using
procedure 2 notional elections)
Turning to our second method of estimating bias in
a three-party situation, the net figures in Table 9 are
very similar to those in Table 8. Voter distribution was
the main source of bias giving us 49 seats to Labour
compared with 45 seats under the first procedure. The
further partition of this particular term shows that
Labour gained 12 seats from the Conservatives under
both procedures and 37 and 34 seats from the Liberal
Democrats using the second and first procedures respec-
tively. Variation across constituencies in abstentions
was the second largest component in both procedures
and variation in constituency size the third. The impact
of minor party votes (i.e. mainly the two nationalist
parties) is small. Overall, Labour is the main benefi-
ciary, gaining a bias advantage from each of the four
components, and the Liberal Democrats are the most
disadvantaged, again especially because of the vote dis-
tribution effect. The Conservatives are also largely dis-
advantaged, although they have a more efficient vote
distribution than the Liberal Democrats; the abstention
and constituency size components both work to the Con-
servatives disadvantage against each of the other parties.
8. Discussion and conclusion
In constructing a method for measuring three-party
bias we gave close attention to four issues that relate
to the original Brookes method: the definition of bias;
formulae for the decomposition of that bias; and (the
third and fourth issues), construction of some ‘norm’
for comparison, by choosing equal or reverse shares,
for example, and how exactly we derive this norm.
We have suggested a definition of bias for the three-
party case with reference to mean values. Formulae
for the decomposition of bias were derived.
Table 7
Electoral bias at the 2005 general election: Brookes’ two-party
method
Lab Con
Number of seats won with 52% of
two-party vote share
355 255
Bias at 52% þ50 50
Decomposition of bias
Vote distribution 11.6 13.6
Electorate size 12.5 14.5
Abstention 17.8 20.0
Third party votes 6.5 8.6
Third party victories 11.0 11.0
Net interaction 3.6 0.6
Table 8
Electoral bias at the 2005 general election: three-party method, procedure 1
Lab Con LD
Number of seats won with 39% of
three-party vote share
x ¼ 355 y ¼ 244 z ¼ 197
Expected unbiased number of seats
won with 39% vote share
MEAN(x,y,z) ¼ 265.3
Bias at 39% x MEAN(x,y,z) ¼ 89.7 y MEAN(x,y,z) ¼ 21.3 z MEAN(x,y,z) ¼ 68.3
Decomposition of bias
Vote distribution 45.3 6.8 60.2
From Con 11.5 Lab 14.7 Lab 40.2
LD 33.8 LD 21.4 Con 20.0
Electorate size 10.8 11.4 3.8
From Con 7.1 Lab 9.5 Lab 6.3
LD 3.7 LD 1.9 Con 2.4
Abstention 16.5 14.4 14.4
From Con 10.0 Lab 13.0 Lab 13.0
LD 6.5 LD 1.4 Con 1.4
Third party votes 2.4 3.0 0.4
From Con 1.7 Lab 2.4 Lab 1.2
LD 0.7 LD 0.6 Con 0.8
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In terms of the construction of some norm for com-
parison we suggested two procedures. Each was then
used to re-examine the components of bias at the
2005 general election. The results showed only small
differences between them with each clearly indicating
a pro-Labour bias largely derived from a vote distribu-
tion effect followed by abstention and size effects.
Compared with the two-party bias method the three-
party approaches find a strong bias towards Labour as
expected. Although the absolute size of that bias differs
(50 seats in the case of two-party and nearer 90 for
three-party bias) that is of no real concern because we
are taking into account the disadvantage suffered by
the Liberal Democrats. Moreover, there do not appear
to be any substantial differences between the two proce-
dures for constructing notional elections. When we con-
sider the different components of the bias again the
findings appear intuitively correct and potentially offer
a big advantage over the two-party method since we can
now identify the partitions (the direction of bias in re-
spect of two other parties) within each bias component.
As expected, the Liberal Democrats suffer, as third
parties frequently do, from an inefficient distribution
of votes. The calculations show the Conservatives are
advantaged by an effective vote distribution but this
advantage is still smaller than that enjoyed by Labour
in its vote distribution.. Regarding the effects from ab-
stention it is apparent that Labour benefits while both
Conservative and Liberal Democrats are net losers.
However, and it is a rather important however, when
we applied the three-party procedures to the previous
five general elections (1983, 1987, 1992, 1997 and
2001) the congruence between them was reduced. The
initial findings that give most cause for concern come
from an examination of the 1983 general election.
Both three-party methods give a different picture of
the bias and moreover give quite different findings to
those obtained from Brookes’ two-party method. Whilst
the two-party bias method shows a pro-Conservative
bias (þ5) the three-party methods both show a negative
bias for the Conservatives (12 for the first procedure;
53 for the second procedure). We are still assessing
which of the particular features of the 1983 compared
with the 2005 election are responsible for contributing
to such differences in the operation of our procedures.
It is worth noting that the 1983 election is the one that
reveals the largest discrepancy between Brookes’ two-
party (see, for example, Rossiter et al., 1999) and
integrated methods (Blau, 2004). While the former
estimates a pro-Conservative bias the latter finds a pro-
Labour bias of some 46 seats. It is possible that the
1983 election is simply unusual, but it may be that the
problem is more fundamental and we have to return to
what is a rather complex question: what are the most im-
portant features of the actual election that should inform
the process of constructing any notional elections that
are necessary for the decomposition of electoral bias?
This paper reports on research in progress and the
findings demonstrate that more work is needed to de-
velop a robust method for measuring three-party bias.
However, our initial research has led us to believe that
Brookes’ method does permit extension to the three-
Table 9
Electoral bias at the 2005 general election: three-party method, procedure 2
Lab Con LD
Number of seats won with 39% of
three-party vote share
x ¼ 355 y ¼ 243 z ¼ 187
Expected unbiased number of seats
won with 39% vote share
MEAN(x,y,z) ¼ 261.7
Bias at 39% x MEAN(x,y,z) ¼ 93.3 y MEAN(x,y,z) ¼ 18.7 z MEAN(x,y,z) ¼ 74.7
Decomposition of bias
Vote distribution 48.6 9.0 66.4
From Con 11.8 Lab 15.1 Lab 43.9
LD 36.7 LD 24.1 Con 22.6
Electorate size 10.7 11.2 4.2
From Con 7.1 Lab 9.5 Lab 6.5
LD 3.8 LD 1.7 Con 2.43
Abstention 16.2 14.3 14.3
From Con 10.0 Lab 13.0 Lab 13.0
LD 6.2 LD 1.3 Con 1.3
Third party votes 2.3 2.9 0.6
From Con 1.6 Lab 2.4 Lab 1.3
LD 0.7 LD 0.6 Con 0.7
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party case, something that is important given the current
context of UK elections. It is also clear to us that we
have to give serious thought to what features of the ac-
tual election we retain when constructing alternative
equal condition notional elections. The initial findings
from the 2005 general election persuaded us that the im-
pact of making different kinds of choices about those
features was not significant. The findings from applying
those procedures to earlier elections perhaps suggest
otherwise. Currently, we are still trying to determine
which of the many features of the actual election should
be retained when constructing the norm for comparison
when estimating bias for the three-party case.
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The measurement of bias in election results, whereby one or more parties are advantaged
in the translation of votes into seats at the expense of others, is attracting increasing
attention. So far, almost all of the analytical work – aimed at both identifying the extent of
bias in an election result and establishing its causes – has focused on either two-party
systems or on the largest two parties in multi-party systems. Building on the ﬁrm foun-
dations of one such approach, this paper introduces an original procedure for analysing
bias in three-party systems using a readily-appreciated metric for both evaluating the
degree of bias and decomposing it into the various causal factors. This is illustrated using
the example of the 2005 British general election and a comparison of the results from two-
party and three-party analyses of six recent elections there.
 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Disproportional election results, where a party’s share of
the votes cast is incommensurate with its share of the seats
allocated, are more likely to occur under some types of
electoral system than others. The greatest levels of dis-
proportionalityaremostlygenerated inelectionsdetermined
on a plurality basis in single-member legislative districts.
Thatdisproportionalityalmost invariably involvesa ‘winner’s
bonus’, whereby the party with the largest share of the votes
castobtainsagreater shareof the seats.However, the second-
placed party may not be disadvantaged; its vote and seat
sharesmay be such as to give it a seats’ bonus also. Third and
smaller parties generally suffermost in the allocation of seats
from votes, leading to the formation of a strong two-party
system as anticipated by Duverger’s Law (Duverger, 1954).
A further feature of such electoral systems and their
outcomes, less frequently noted, is that in many cases the
disproportionalitydoesnot favoureachof the twodominant
parties to the same extent. For example, one party may get
a largerwinner’s bonus than the otherwouldwith the same
vote share. According to Grofman and King (2007, 6) this
indicates an absence of partisan symmetry, a requirement
that ‘. the electoral system treat similarly-situated parties
equally, so that each receives the same fraction of legislative
seats for a particular vote percentage as the other party
would have received if it had the same percentage’.
Where this requirement is not met there is partisan
asymmetry – or partisan bias (Grofman and King, 2007, 32).
Its measurement has been the subject of debate (see King,
1990; Gelman and King,1994; Grofman et al., 1997; Gelman
et al., 2004), leading King et al. (2005, 9) to conclude that;
A consensus exists about using the symmetry standard
to evaluate partisan bias in electoral systems. But such
a consensus does not answer the subsidiary question:
how to measure symmetry itself in order to determine
whether partisan bias exists.
Grofman and King (2007, 32), on the other hand, claim
that ‘the degree of deviation from symmetry of treatment
. is easily quantiﬁed, and made speciﬁc as to direction’.
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Quantifying the reasons for such deviation has not proved
straightforward, however, hence the literature to which
this paper is a signiﬁcant extension.
Much of the debate about the quantiﬁcation of partisan
bias – leading to Grofman and King’s conclusion – has
occurred in the context of USA elections, especially to the
House of Representatives, where two parties predominate.1
Little attention has been paid to countries which use the
same electoral system but where the two-party predomi-
nance expected by Duverger’s Law is absent, as in Great
Britainwhere, since the 1970s, a third partyandother smaller
parties have presented a substantial challenge to Conserva-
tive and Labour, which predominated during the preceding
three decades.2 Nevertheless, analyses of partisan bias there
have continued to focus on those two parties. The results,
although very illuminating with regard to the situation as it
affects the twomajor participants, present a partial viewonly
of the extent and nature of the partisan asymmetry involved
in the translation of votes into seats for all three parties.
The British case therefore indicates the need to extend
discussion of partisan bias and its measurement into three-
party situations generally. A recent paper (Borisyuk et al.,
2008) laid the foundations for such an extension, but
empirical applications of the proposed algebra for analysing
and decomposing three-party bias produced some unre-
solved issues (as noted there, p. 225). That paper adapted an
algebra developed for the analysis of two-party situations,
and the empirical applications did not all produce sensible
results. Rather than adapt it further, however, this paper
returns to the ﬁrst principles of the original formulation and,
using the same underlying approach, develops a newalgebra
for identifying and decomposing bias in three-party situa-
tions. It thus represents a departure from what has become
a standard approach to bias estimation in the British context
over recent decades, offering an alternative new procedure
built on the same foundations but speciﬁcally designed for
the three-party situation, with potential wide application to
other electoral systems where three parties predominate.
This paper is thus an original contribution to the analysis
of bias in plurality electoral systems where three parties all
win substantial shares of both the votes cast and the legis-
lative seats into which those totals are translated. It returns
to the ﬁrst principles established in a seminal study of
electoral bias, and derives a newalgebra (set out in full in the
Appendix to this paper) for the identiﬁcation and decom-
position of bias in three-party systems. Its application is
illustrated with data for the 2005 British general election,3
and a ﬁnal section presents summary ﬁndings for the
preceding ﬁve contests, all of which can readily be charac-
terised as three-party in nature. This provides, for the ﬁrst
time, an evaluation of not only the degree to which each of
those three parties was advantaged or disadvantaged in the
procedure for translating votes into seats, and how, but also
the extent to which that advantage/disadvantage involved
both, or only one, of the other two parties.
2. Disproportionality and bias at recent British
general elections: the two-party case
A method for measuring and decomposing bias devel-
oped by Ralph Brookes (1953, 1959, 1960) for use in New
Zealand (he termed the outcome ‘distorted representation’
rather than bias) has beenwidely applied in recent analyses
of British election results (e.g. Johnston et al., 2001, 2002,
2006).4 His approach has the major beneﬁts of using
a readily-appreciated metric and being decomposable into
the various bias sources that he identiﬁed.5 Its major draw-
back, however, is that whereas it is excellent for analysing
a system where two parties predominate its application to
recent British elections is constrainedby the growth of three-
partypolitics.DespitemodiﬁcationsbyMortimore (1992: see
Johnston et al., 1999), it focuses on the two largest parties
only, treating the third as a source of bias affecting the other
two rather than as also potentially either suffering or
beneﬁting frombias–where its share of the seats allocated is
incommensurate with its share of the votes cast.
Table 1
Percentage shares of the votes and seats at British general elections, 1983–
2005.
Conservative Labour LD Other
1983 Votes 43.5 28.3 26.0 2.2
Seats 62.7 33.0 3.6 0.6
Seats-Votes 19.2 4.7 22.4 1.6
1987 Votes 43.3 31.5 23.1 2.1
Seats 59.4 36.1 3.5 0.9
Seats-Votes 16.1 4.6 19.6 1.2
1992 Votes 42.8 35.2 18.3 3.7
Seats 52.9 42.7 3.2 1.1
Seats-Votes 10.1 7.5 15.1 2.6
1997 Votes 31.5 44.4 17.2 6.9
Seats 25.7 65.2 7.2 1.9
Seats-Votes 5.8 20.8 10.0 5.0
2001 Votes 32.7 42.0 18.9 6.4
Seats 25.9 64.4 8.1 1.6
Seats-Votes 6.8 22.4 10.8 4.8
2005 Votes 33.2 36.2 22.7 7.9
Seats 31.5 56.7 9.9 1.9
Seats-Votes 1.7 20.5 12.8 6.0
Source: C. Rallings and Thrasher, 2007.
1 Indeed, the software designed to measure partisan bias, JudgeIt,
originally developed by King and others, depends upon a two-party
system and is therefore inappropriate for the British case, and other
systems with strong third parties.
2 Throughout this paper we deal with the situation in Great Britain
only, rather than the United Kingdom. Northern Ireland is excluded
because it has a separate party system and the dominant British parties
do not compete for votes there.
3 Data for the 2010 general election only became available after this paper
was almost completed but aminor reference to it is contained in Fig. 7 towards
the end of this paper. A more detailed examination of the application of the
three-party bias method to the 2010 general election may be found in, G. Bor-
isyuk et al. “Electoral bias in 2010: Evaluating its extent in a three-party system”
paper presented to the EPOP annual conference, Essex, September 2010.
4 The only other attempts to measure and account for bias in Great Britain
have been those by Curtice (2001; see also Curtice and Steed, 1986), which
although it identiﬁedthevarious sourcesofbiasdidnotquantify their relative
importance, and Blau’s (2001) important critique of the Brookes’ method.
5 An alternative approach, developed almost contemporaneously with
Brookes’, identifying the same basic bias components, is Soper and Rydon
(1958), who developed some early ideas of Brookes (1953).
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That Great Britain currently has a three-party system is
clearlydemonstratedby thevote sharesdata inTable1 for the
six general elections held during the period 1983–2005. In
none of those contests did the winning party obtain
a majority of the votes cast and, with the exception of the
2005 election, the winning party’s vote share varied by only
2.4 percentage points around a mean of 43.3 per cent. There
was slightly more variation in the shares obtained by the
second- and third-placed parties, however, with the former
obtaining on average 32.0 per cent and the latter 21.0. That
ﬁnal ﬁgure is crucial to the argument developed here; with
a third party (in each case the Liberal Democrats6) gaining on
averagemore than one-ﬁfth of the votes cast andwinning an
increasing proportion of seats it is clearly not sensible to try
andmeasure partisan bias as if it were a predominantly two-
party system comparable to the United States.
The disproportionality generated by those results is
shown inTable 1, which gives each party’s shares of the votes
cast and seats allocated. The winner’s bonus (the percentage
seat share less the percentage vote share) was very substan-
tial at each contest: 20, 16 and 10 percentage points for the
Conservatives at the ﬁrst three elections respectively, and 21,
22 and 20 points for Labour at the last three. There is also
a hint of partisan bias as the elections differ in the second-
placed party’s performance. In the ﬁrst three elections
second-placed Labourenjoyed anadvantage in seat over vote
sharebut that isnot true for theConservativeparty in theﬁnal
set of three where it ﬁnished second. (For example, in 1987
Labour received 31.5 per cent of the votes cast but won 36.1
a     The original largest party A, i.e. A at AB election  
b     The original B party, i.e. B at AB election  
c     B party after uniform swing, i.e. B at BA election  
d     Norm for comparison, i.e. superposition of A at AB and B at BA  
0%   25%   50%   75%   100% 
Fig. 1. Brookes’ two-party method: Calculation of bias.
6 Throughout this paper, we refer to the third party as the Liberal
Democrats. In 1983 and 1987, two parties – Liberals and Social Democrat
– contested the general elections as the Alliance, with an agreed single
candidate in each constituency. The two parties merged in 1988 (see
Crewe and King, 1995) and adopted their current name in 1989.
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per centof the seats; in2001 theConservativeswon the same
share of the votes, but only 25.7 per cent of the seats.) In
addition, Labour’s winner’s bonus was generally larger than
the Conservatives’; in 2001 with 42.0 per cent of the votes
Labourgained64.4percentof the seats,whereas in1992with
42.8 per cent of the votes the Conservatives were allocated
only 52.9 per cent of the seats. These ﬁgures suggest bias
(or partisan asymmetry, or distorted representation) favour-
ing Labour at each of the six contests. Substantial under-
representation in the House of Commonswas the experience
of the Liberal Democrats at all six elections, however.
Howmight this asymmetry affecting all three parties be
evaluated quantitatively? In answering that question, this
paper presents a major extension of Brookes’ method –
rather than a further modiﬁcation – to incorporate three-
party situations. Brookes’ method deﬁnes partisan bias as
the difference between two parties in the number of seats
they would win if they had a particular share of the votes
cast. It then decomposes that bias into separate components
including efﬁciency of vote distribution as well as effects
separately produced by electorate size, turnout and minor
parties’ votes. Brookes (1960, 166) operationalises this
decomposition by assuming ‘a uniform percentage shift in
support between themajor parties’. Wemaintain that there
are four important elements to the Brookes method. The
ﬁrst two are completely independent of any operationalis-
ing procedure: a quantitative measure of bias that can be
partitioned into separate components; and formulae for the
decomposition themselves. The other two elements –
deriving a norm for comparison and estimating the expec-
ted number of seats for each party under certain scenarios
(these are described in more detail in Borisyuk et al., 2008
and below) – are clearly integral to the way in which the
method is operationalised. Brookes believed that uniform
swing was the simplest assumption for the ﬁrst of the latter
pair, but our interpretation of his original procedure is that it
merely operates to construct a ‘norm for comparison’, which
allows us to compare data from the actual electionwith this
benchmark. It is not unusual, of course, for students of
electoral system effects to want to derive some basis for
considering the seat/vote curve. (See, for example, discus-
sion in Blau (2001, 2004) about the use of the Edgeworth
expansion of the normal distribution that retains the same
mean, standard deviation and kurtosis as the actual
frequencydistribution of vote shares.) It is important to note
that our interpretation does notoffer a justiﬁcation for using
uniform swing as the basis for a counterfactual – ‘what
would happen if the election had been won by another
party?’; it simply uses it as the means of establishing
a reasonable norm, derived on rational grounds, against
which the actual result can be compared. It is important,
therefore, that our ‘notionals’ should be considered as
technical steps that help in thenecessary constructionof the
symmetrical multidimensional distribution that retains
features of the actual electoral outcome and is independent
from the size of electoral area (constituency). In short,wedo
not actually argue, or expect the reader to believe, that
Labour gets 18.9% of the vote while the Liberal Democrats
receive 42% at a general election but rather that this is
merely part of a technical construction of the multidimen-
sional distribution and permits us to compare the actual
outcome with a norm for comparison.
In Brookes’ original presentation bias is deﬁned as the
difference between the number of seats won by the leading
party – A – at an election and the number that would bewon
by itsmainopponent–B– ifBhadobtained the same share of
the votes. As demonstrated by the full algebra set out in the
Appendix, therefore, if A obtains a larger share of the seats
thanB fromthe sameshareof thevotes, then thepositivebias
favouring A is the inverse of the negative bias suffered by B.
This method is illustrated by considering the two-party
percentage shares of votes cast at the 2005 British general
election (i.e. [Conservative þ Labour] ¼ 100). Fig. 1a shows
the vote share across 627 parliamentary constituencies7 for
the largest party A (Labour) and Fig. 1b presents party B’s
share (Conservative). These distributions are necessarily
the mirror image of each other.8 Also indicated on both
distributions is the overall vote share for each party; 52 per
cent for Labour and 48 for the Conservatives.9 (In both Figs.
1 and 2, each constituency is shown as a separate symbol.)
Brookes’method begins by askingwhat would happen to
the allocation of seats if instead of coming second at the
actual election (AB – the parties are listed in order according
to their share of the voteswon, with the largest ﬁrst), party B
Fig. 2. Three players at 2005 British General Election.
7 There were 628 constituencies in Britain in 2005 but neither of the
two major parties contested the Speaker’s constituency.
8 In effect the two-dimensional problem can be reduced to a single
dimension. Correspondingly, for the three-party case we can present the
results in two-dimensional space.
9 These values differ from the mean values of the distribution (54% and
46% respectively) because of the unequal size of constituencies.
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came ﬁrst, receiving A’s vote share at the actual contest.
Using the principle of reverse vote shares the method
applies a uniform swing to each constituency to create
a notional election result (the notional BA election) such that
party B now wins 52 per cent of the two-party vote total.
Following the application of uniform swing to the vote share
in each of the 627 constituencies, party B’s distribution slides
to the right such that its overall percentage of the votes
becomes 52 per cent in the notional BA election (Fig. 1c).
These three ﬁgures represent the conventional under-
standing of the Brookes’ method. However, another inter-
pretation is possible. Fig. 1d shows the superposition of the
distribution for party A at the actual election and the distri-
bution for party B at the notional reverse vote share election
(literally, a combinationof Fig.1a,c). This superposition that is
critical toour interpretationof theBrookesmethodbecause it
in effect constitutes the norm for comparison and retains
many important features of the actual data.
Because Brookes’ method focuses on the two largest
parties only, all constituencies lying to the right of 50 per
cent are ‘won’ by the respective party. Thus Fig. 1a shows
the number of seats won by party A at the actual election
(i.e. ‘x’ in previous notation) and Fig. 1c shows the number
of seats (‘y’) ‘won’ by party B at the notional election, BA.
In Brookes’ original formulation – to which we are
returning here – partisan bias towards party A is measured
as the difference between the number of points to the right
of 50 per cent in Fig. 1a and an average of the number of
points to the right of 50 per cent in Fig. 1d. It is clear from
the graphs that, in effect, Brookes’ method compares the
distribution of seats at the actual AB election (Fig. 1a) with
the norm for comparison (Fig. 1d).10
Having set out the principles underpinning Brookes’
original formulation, we use these as the foundation for the
extension to the three-party situation.
Applying his algebra to the six general elections shown
in Table 1 produces interesting results (Johnston et al., 1999,
2006). At the ﬁrst two contests (1983 and 1987), which the
Conservatives won with comfortable margins in votes cast
over Labour (Table 1), there was a small total bias of below
15 seats favouring the Conservatives. Over the next four
contests, however, the amount of partisan bias increased
substantially, reaching a level of more than 100 seats and
beneﬁting Labour rather than the Conservatives (Johnston
et al., 2006); bias both increased substantially and
changed direction.
However, these results treat the Liberal Democrats as
a minor party only (its vote share in each constituency is
unchanged in Brookes’ procedure) and take no account of
their substantial vote-winning capacity which was
unmatched by the allocation of seats – although the party
won 18.3 per cent of the votes it gained only 62 seats in
2005, just under 10 per cent of the total. At that election
some constituencies had a clear three-party battle, whereas
in others therewas a two-party contest between the Liberal
Democrats and one of the other two parties – with the
other (i.e. either Conservative or Labour) being, in effect,
a minor party.
The importance of the Liberal Democrats in re-
deﬁning the nature of party competition in Britain is
further illustrated from the distribution of Labour’s share
of the two-party (i.e. Labour þ Conservative) vote in 2005
(Fig. 2), on which is also indicated which party won each
seat. Some seats in the centre of the distribution – where
Labour and the Conservatives got very similar shares of
the two-party vote – were won by either the Liberal
Democrats or one of the ‘other’ parties. Many more
Liberal Democrat victories are towards the distribution’s
extremes, however, especially at the left-hand end, indi-
cating constituencies where Labour got only a small share
of the (Labour þ Conservative) two-party vote, so that the
‘real’ contest was between the Conservatives and the
Liberal Democrats.
This pattern in Fig. 2 complements that in Table 1;
although the Liberal Democrats were the third-largest
party, their share of the vote (averaging about 20 per cent
across the six elections) was not evenly distributed across
the constituencies. But, as Table 1 makes clear, they rarely
gained sufﬁcient votes in a constituency to win it, so that
their seat share was incommensurate with their vote
share. This was especially the case in 1983, when the
Liberal Democrats were only two points behind Labour in
the vote share but Labour won nine times more seats. The
implication is that not only was the 1983 outcome slightly
biased towards the Conservatives relative to Labour but
also probably substantially more biased towards Labour
relative to the Liberal Democrats. Similarly in 2005,
whereas the Conservatives’ vote share was 1.46 times that
of the Liberal Democrats, the ratio for seats share was
3.18:1. These elements of the disproportionality clearly
indicate the need for a bias measure which takes into
account the vote and seat shares of all three parties rather
than just the ﬁrst two.
Fig. 3. Distribution of the three-party vote shares.
10 For superposition AB and BA, vote shares now has zero correlation
with size of constituency and has symmetrical shape of distribution (a
norm distribution). Because of zero correlation with constituency size,
the mean of the distribution equals overall vote share.
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3. Towards a partisan bias measure for the three-
party case
In Brookes’ procedure for evaluating partisan bias in the
two-party case the establishment of a norm of comparison
for the actual distribution of seats is central to the
measurement of bias. This also applies with our proposed
extension to the three-party case inwhich the bias towards
a party is measured as the difference between the actual
number of seats gained and a norm of comparison which is
the expected unbiased number of seats that, on average,
the three parties could win under similar conditions at
a notional election; this is formally deﬁned in the second
section of the Appendix.
In Borisyuk et al. (2008) the expected norm was based
on the actual election result plus just two notional elec-
tions. The ﬁrst notional election saw the actual second-
placed party awarded the same vote share as the actual
ﬁrst-placed party (i.e. the order of the election result was
changed from ABC to BAC) whereas in the second the
original third-placed party was given the vote share
captured by the ﬁrst-placed party at the actual election
(i.e. ABC was converted to CBA). The actual number of
seats won was thus compared with a norm comprising
the mean number of seats gained by the leading party
under three scenarios – the actual election and two
notional elections. This ignored three other scenarios, and
was the reason for the unresolved problems with the
empirical applications noted above. This paper thus
extends the approach to incorporate the entire set of
possible outcomes (i.e. including the three other potential
notional elections: ACB, BCA and CAB). This extension to
the three-party case does that whilst retaining many of
the basic principles underpinning the Brookes’ original
formulation.
In the two-party case the distribution of vote share
can be depicted one-dimensionally (e.g. Figs. 1 and 2).
Three-party vote share can be best captured by triangular
graphs (for early proponents of this technique see Upton,
1976; Miller, 1977; Gudgin and Taylor, 1979; for a recent
example that employs this method see Curtice and Firth,
2008). Fig. 3 shows the actual 2005 election result. The
point for the national three-party vote share (39, 36, 25)
is represented by a cross. The area inside the triangle is
divided into three, each of which shows where the
respective parties won seats. Where the lines intersect at
the centre of the triangle the vote share for each of the
three parties is 33.3 per cent. Points towards the peak of
the triangle are constituencies where the largest party (in
this case Labour) performed well. For example, in Blae-
nau Gwent, the Labour candidate received 86 per cent of
the three-party vote, leaving just 6 per cent for the
Conservative and 11 per cent for the Liberal Democrats.11
The constituency of Staffordshire South occupies an
entirely different part of the triangle, located towards the
bottom right corner. Here, the Conservatives dominated
the three-party vote, winning a 62 per cent share
comfortably ahead of Labour on 21 per cent and Liberal
Democrats on 17 per cent.12 Finally, the Liberal Demo-
crats performed exceptionally well (with 70 per cent) in
their party leader’s Scottish constituency of Ross, Skye
and Lochaber.
In constructing the norm for comparison for this
extended procedure we have three parties, A, B and C with
overall vote shares, a, b, and g respectively, where
(aþ bþ g¼ 100). The principle is to consider all six possible
combinations assigning those three values to parties A, B
and C – viz. ABC (actual election), ACB, BAC, BCA, CAB, and
Fig. 4. Distribution of the three-party vote shares: ABC (actual), ACB, BAC, BCA, CAB, and CBA (notional elections).
11 Blaenau Gwent was won by a ‘fourth-party’ candidate (an indepen-
dent) with 58 per cent of the votes cast so that the three ﬁgures quoted
here refer to the remaining 38.9 per cent of the votes won by the three
main parties. Blaenau Gwent is thus an excellent example of a seat where
the impact of minor parties is felt – as discussed in the section below on
decomposing bias.
12 South Staffordshire is included in our data although the election in
that particular constituency was held some six weeks after the general
election owing to the death of one of the original candidates.
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CBA. This is shown on six triangular graphs (Fig. 4). The ﬁrst
(ABC) repeats what was shown in Fig. 3 while the triangle
ACB below it shows the notional election where the posi-
tions of the second- and third-placed parties, B and C, have
been reversed but that for the ﬁrst party, A, is unchanged. It
is important to note that the top of each triangle always
shows the largest party, the right-hand side shows the
second-placed party while the third-placed party is shown
on the left-hand side.
Fig. 5 shows the superposition of these six conﬁgura-
tions to create what will be used as the ‘norm of compar-
ison’. This procedure is a precise extension of what was
done in the two-party case, where Fig. 1d represented the
superposition of Fig. 1a and c. Once again, the area inside
the triangle is divided into three sections The top section,
for example, shows the total number of seats that would be
won by the largest party (with vote share of a) across the
six elections (the actual plus the ﬁve notional ones). Like-
wise, the section on the right shows seats won by which-
ever party came second (vote share b) while that on the left
represents seats won by the third party with national vote
share g. The next stage of the process compares the actual
number of seats won by each party with the expected
unbiased number of seats derived from construction of the
norm of comparison.
The distribution of points in Fig. 5 clearly differs from
a Gaussian/normal distribution because the points are
not at their densest around the overall national vote
share and instead form their own distinctive shape. This
means that we cannot calculate expected values for the
bias equations by simple reference to a normal distribu-
tion. Instead, our approach considers all points in that
scatter plot and identiﬁes the number in each patterned
area.13 The estimate for the unbiased number of seats is
1/6th of the number of dots within each corresponding
patterned area (equations (10)–(12) in the Appendix). We
use this fraction because these dots represent the
superposition of six scenarios and altogether there are six
times as many dots as seats contested at the actual elec-
tion (i.e. each constituency appears six times). Techni-
cally, we get the same outcome by separately six
scenarios considering, calculating the values for each of
them, and averaging the results.
In the two-party case, total bias (as deﬁned by Johnston
et al., 1999 and Blau, 2001) may be either negative or posi-
tive dependent upon the directionof bias towards or against
the leading party. For three-party competition, however,
there is no simple dichotomy and theoretically it may be in
one of six possible directions. Three of these directions
depict the situation when just one party has a positive bias
while the remaining two parties have a negative bias. Three
others are when two parties show a positive bias of seats
while a single-partyexperiencesnegativebias. The resulting
equation for total bias is in equation (13).
Applying equations (10)–(13) produces our estimates
of bias at the 2005 British general election using this new
procedure (Table 2). The six blocks give the results of the
actual election (ABC) and those for the ﬁve notional
outcomes of that election, showing for each party its share
of the votes and the number of seats it would win under
that scenario. Thus, for example, the second block shows
that if the positions of the Conservatives and the Liberal
Democrats were reversed (i.e. notional election ACB), the
latter would just overtake the former in seats won –
compared to a threefold difference between the two at the
actual election; the third block shows that if the Labour
and Conservative positions were reversed (i.e. BAC),
nevertheless Labour would still have 59 more seats than
the notional victor.
Overall, the results of the six separate outcomes suggest
that Labour was the major beneﬁciary from partisan bias;
not only was it the outright winner in terms of seats allo-
cated in the two contests when it was placed ﬁrst (ABC,
ACB), but it also gained most seats in the two where it was
placed second (BAC, CAB); indeed, in the latter it had an
absolute majority over all other parties.14 The Liberal
Democrats, on the other hand, experienced substantial
negative partisan bias: in the two contests in which they
are placed ﬁrst they come a poor second in the allocation of
seats in one (CAB) and third in the other (CBA).
The ﬁgures at the foot of Table 2 conﬁrm this; total bias
is calculated for each party as the number of seats it
obtained in the actual election minus one-sixth of the sum
Fig. 5. The superposition ABC þ ACB þ BAC þ BCA þ CAB þ CBA.
13 A possible alternative would be to use Monte Carlo simulation such
that points/values should be randomly drawn with a sample size equal to
the number of seats at the actual election. The number of points located
within each of the three patterned areas may be used as an estimate for
the unbiased number of seats won. Samples of the same size could be
drawn randomly from the distribution repeatedly and points/values
calculated for each re-sample. Taking an average of these sample results
would give an approximation for the unbiased number of seats for each
party (the ﬁrst-, second- and third-parties). This approach has the
possible additional advantage that we could calculate not only expected
values but also errors and conﬁdence intervals.
14 Which would remain the case even if the 18 Northern Ireland MPs
were included.
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of the seats it would win across all six scenarios. A positive
partisan bias of 83.0 seats favours Labour, with negative
biases of 30.2 and 51.7 respectively for the Conservatives
and Liberal Democrats. The overall bias (i.e. the sum of
those three values, irrespective of sign) is thus just under
165 seats – in a House of Commons with 627 British
members (i.e. excluding the Speaker). Removing that bias
would involve on average changing the result in one-
seventh of the country’s constituencies (83 of 627). This
estimate of the pro-Labour bias is commensurate with
analyses using the two-party measure (e.g. Johnston et al.,
2006) but what that application could not show amongst
other things was that the largest proportion of this was
delivered to Labour at the Liberal Democrats’ expense.
4. Decomposing the three-party bias estimates
A great strength of Brookes’ method is that it not only
estimates total bias in a readily-appreciated metric but also
decomposes that bias into one of four categories. The ﬁrst
of these has been labelled differently (gerrymander, vote
distribution, efﬁciency) but we prefer the term ‘geography’
(denoted by ‘G’ in the Appendix equations). It shows the
degree of asymmetry in the distribution of partisan voting
strength across constituencies for the parties being
considered (Gudgin and Taylor, 1979 address the two-party
situation). In a ‘ﬁrst-past-the-post’ voting system a party
performswell in the translation of votes into seats (in terms
of the geography of its vote across the constituencies) by
winning small and losing big; it should avoid accumulating
surplus votes in constituencies it wins (i.e. those additional
to the number required to win a constituency) and if it
cannot win a constituency then it is best to attract as few as
votes as possible there since these are literally ‘wasted’ (see
Johnston et al., 2001).
The second component within electoral bias stems from
malapportionment, i.e. differences in electorate size across
constituencies (denoted by component ‘E’). A party that is
stronger in constituencies with relatively small electorates
will tend to perform better (as shown by comparing its
percentage of all votes cast and percentage of seats) than
one which performs better in the larger constituencies. The
level of abstention (‘A’) is the third component and
becomes relevant when one party wins its seats where
electoral turnout is low compared with its rivals whose
victories are achieved in constituencies with on average
higher turnouts. Finally, there is the minor party effect,
component ‘M’; here it is restricted to those parties outside
the main three.
Brookes’ algebra enables the contribution of each of
these four components (G, E, A and M) to be calculated, in
the same metric as the total bias. In addition, there are also
interactions across each combination of bias components –
the combined impact of abstentions and electorate size is
an example of two-way interactions; there are also three-
and four-way interactions. These are not separately calcu-
lated here; instead we just report the net interaction, which
is the difference between the total bias for each party
(equations (10)–(12)) and the sum of four components
identiﬁed here (equations (15) and (16)).
The results of these calculations for the 2005 election
are in Table 3 and allow an evaluation of the sources of the
bias either favouring or disadvantaging each of the
parties.15 Thus, for example, of the total bias of 83.0 seats
towards Labour the four blocks below that ﬁgure show that
just under half (40.6) resulted from differences in the
geography of the three parties’ support across the constit-
uencies. A further 10.5 and 16.2 seats (13 and 20 per cent of
the total respectively) came from the electorate size (E) and
abstentions (A) components, and a small amount (2.5 seats)
from the impact of minor party (M) votes. There was also
a substantial interaction effect, undoubtedly reﬂecting
Labour’s greater electoral strength in both the smaller
constituencies and those with the lower turnouts (see
Johnston et al., 2006).
Labour’s positive bias resulting from the G component
was complemented by the negative bias of 45.8 for this
component for the Liberal Democrats, which accounted for
Table 2
Measuring three-party bias: 2005 General Election.
Three-party
Vote Share, %
Number
of Seats
Election: ABC (actual)
A (Labour) 39 355
B (Conservative) 36 198
C (Liberal Democrat) 25 62
Other 12
Election: ACB (notional)
A (Labour) 39 374
B (Conservative) 25 112
C (Liberal Democrat) 36 129
Other 12
Election: BAC (notional)
A (Labour) 36 308
B (Conservative) 39 249
C (Liberal Democrat) 25 57
Other 13
Election: BCA (notional)
A (Labour) 25 178
B (Conservative) 39 304
C (Liberal Democrat) 36 130
Other 15
Election: CAB (notional)
A (Labour) 36 349
B (Conservative) 25 93
C (Liberal Democrat) 39 172
Other 13
Election: CBA (notional)
A (Labour) 25 180
B (Conservative) 36 255
C (Liberal Democrat) 39 178
Other 14
Bias towards each party
A: 355  [(355 þ 374 þ 249 þ 304 þ 172 þ 178)/6] ¼ 83.0
B: 198  [(198 þ 129 þ 308 þ 130 þ 349 þ 255)/6] ¼ 30.2
C: 62  [(62 þ 112 þ 57 þ 178 þ 93 þ 180)/6] ¼ 51.7
Total bias: abs(83.0) þ abs(30.2) þ abs(51.7) ¼ 164.9,
where ‘abs(.)’ is the absolute value, i.e. the magnitude of a number irre-
spective of its sign.
15 The SPSS code for performing these calculations may be obtained
from the authors.
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some 89 per cent of the total negative bias which that party
experienced: the geography of its support operated very
much to its disadvantage (largely, toomanywasted votes in
seats that it lost). For the Conservatives, on the other hand,
its negative overall bias stemmed largely from the E and A
components: compared to Labour especially, its support
was over-concentrated in the constituencies with larger
electorates and higher turnouts. Fig. 6 clearly shows the
overall distribution of electoral bias at the 2005 general
election and the relative contributions to that bias provided
by the different components.
As well as identifying the various sources of each party’s
bias at the 2005 general election –which are dominated by
the geography of support for Labour (positively) and Liberal
Democrats (negatively) – it is also possible to identify
whether each component operated at a similar scale in all
cross-pair comparisons. This is shown by the three sets of
data in each block of Table 3. Regarding the abstentions (A)
component, for example, Labour’s positive bias of 16.2 seats
derived from this source, 10.4 came from the contrast with
its larger rival (the Conservatives) and 5.4 from its smaller
rival (Liberal Democrats): there were greater differences
between Labour and the Conservatives in the average
number of abstentions in the constituencies that they
would win across the six contests than between Labour and
the Liberal Democrats. The same is true with regards to
electorate size: there is a greater difference between Labour
and the Conservatives in the average electorate of seats
won than between Labour and the Liberal Democrats.
Most of the results of this decomposition show how the
source of each party’s bias is split between its two rivals.
Thus, for example, most of Labour’s positive outcome from
the G bias is to the detriment of the Liberal Democrats.
Indeed, the 42.3 seat advantage shown there is larger than
the overall beneﬁt to Labour of 40.6 because of the asym-
metry in the geography of support for its two rivals. Liberal
Democrats, on the other hand, are substantially disadvan-
taged in the geography of their support not only relative to
Labour (a negative bias of 32.5 seats) but also to the
Conservatives (14.4 seats). This produces the asymmetry
just noted because the Conservatives have a positive G bias
relative to the Liberal Democrats (28.4 seats) which more
than counters the negative bias (24.3 seats) it suffers rela-
tive to Labour.
The geography of Labour’s support in 2005 was more
efﬁcient than that of either of the other two parties’; the
Conservatives’ was less efﬁcient than Labour’s but more
efﬁcient than the Liberal Democrats’; and the Liberal
Democrats’was less efﬁcient than that of either of the other
two – they wasted too many votes won in the ‘wrong
places’ where their chances of victory were slight. The last
point is probably typical of third parties that contest
constituencies everywhere; in this case, by winning only
one in ﬁve votes the Liberal Democrats were almost bound
to suffer from a poor vote distribution unless much of their
vote-winning was highly targeted on relatively few seats.16
It is also worth noting that the bias components regarding
the votes for minor parties are small. This is to be expected
given that the procedure is speciﬁcally designed for the
three-party case and ‘others’ captured just 12 of the
remaining seats at the 2005 electionwith 7.9 per cent of the
votes. Plaid Cymru contested only the 40 Welsh constitu-
encies, winning three of them (its share of the votes cast in
Wales only was 12.5 per cent, which yielded 7.5 per cent of
the 40 seats); the SNP contested all 59 Scottish constitu-
encies, obtaining 17.6 per cent of the votes there and
winning 6 (10.2 per cent) of the seats; the Respect party
contested 26 constituencies in Britain, winning one; and
two independents were elected.
Table 3
2005 British General Election: components of three-party bias.
Party Labour Conservative LD
Overall result
Three-party vote share (%) 39 36 25
Seats won 355 198 62
Expected unbiased number of seats 272.0 228.2 113.7
Bias (seats won – expected) 83.0 30.2 51.7
Decomposition of bias
Vote distribution (G) 40.6 4.5 45.8
From: non-symmetry
between other parties
4.2 8.6 1.2
. bigger rival* 2.5 24.3 32.5
. smaller rival 42.3 28.4 14.4
Electorate size (E) 10.5 11.5 2.6
From: non-symmetry
between other parties
0.3 0.5 0.1
.bigger rival 7.1 9.4 3.9
.smaller rival 3.0 1.6 1.5
Abstention (A) 16.2 13.9 9.5
From: non-symmetry
between other parties
0.6 0.6 0.1
.bigger rival 10.4 12.4 9.9
.smaller rival 5.4 0.9 0.4
Minor party votes(M) 2.5 2.7 0.5
From: non-symmetry
between other parties
0.1 0.0 0.0
.bigger rival 1.8 2.2 0.9
.smaller rival 2.4 0.4 0.4
Net interactions 13.2 2.5 6.7
* Note: The bigger rival for Labour is Conservative and the smaller rival is
Liberal Democrats. For the Conservatives, the bigger and the smaller rival
parties are Labour and the Liberal Democrats respectively. For the Liberal
Democrats, they are Labour and the Conservatives.
Fig. 6. 2005 British General Election: components of bias.
16 Which would be counter-productive. Unless it builds a base in
a wider range of constituencies the party can never expect to be
a potential party of (single-party) government.
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5. Comparing the two-party and three-party analyses:
Great Britain 1983–2005
This search for a new method to measure and decom-
pose electoral bias was stimulated by the results of recent
British general elections, a country which now has a party
system quite different to that studied by Brookes when he
ﬁrst developed his procedure. (New Zealand’s party system
in the 1950s was evenmore dominated by two parties than
was Britain’s prior to 1970.) Although others subsequently
modiﬁed his procedure to take account of the growing
impact of a third party this did not fully incorporate it into
the analysis and a radical redesign, based on Brookes’
principles and procedures, was clearly needed. Having
completed such a redesign, therefore, this section
compares the two methods applied to British general
elections from 1983 to 2005.
The relevant comparisons are shown in Table 4, where
the two-party bias is calculated according to Mortimore’s
(1992) modiﬁcation of Brookes’ method which compares
the two parties as if they each achieved the vote share
obtained by the winning party at the actual election rather
than the comparison as if they had each won half of the
two-party vote total, as used by Johnston et al. (2001,
2006). There are some obvious substantial differences
relating to speciﬁc elections. In 1983, for example, whereas
the two-party method produces an estimated total bias of
only 11 seats the three-party method comes out at 176. The
small positive bias towards the Conservative (six seats)
now becomes a negative bias of nine seats but the main
difference lies in the large pro-Labour bias of 89 seats and
the large negative disadvantage of 78 seats for the Liberal
Democrats. Once the third party is incorporated into the
analysis, the narrow Labour lead over the Liberal Demo-
crats in vote share (Table 1) but the large disparity in the
seat allocation between the two indicates a very substantial
bias favouring the former. It is unsurprising to ﬁnd rather
large difference in bias estimates comparing the two- and
three-party cases alongside one another. The two-party
method, adapted to meet the demands of greater three-
party competition, could only assign bias within the system
as a whole to one or other of the two main parties whereas
the three-party method is free to incorporate the third
party explicitly.
Using the three-party method the least biased election
of the seven is 1997 (Fig. 7; the 2010 general election is
included here), when Labour won an electoral landslide.
The Brookes’ two-party method for this election shows
total bias as 62 seats with a pro-Labour bias of 31 seats. By
contrast, the three-partymethod calculates total bias at less
than half that ﬁgure, with only a modest pro-Labour bias
and rather small negative biases for the Conservatives and
Liberal Democrats. This conﬁrms our interpretation of the
three-party method’s superiority. The 1997 election result
was certainly disproportional – Labour won more than
two-thirds of the seats (418 of 641) with just 44 per cent of
the vote – but the decomposition suggests that it was not
particularly biased. The Conservative party won just 31 per
cent of the votes and 26 per cent of the seats while the
Liberal Democrats demonstrated the success of their seat-
targeting strategy then: their overall vote share fell slightly
(from 18 per cent of the three-party vote in 1992 to 17 in
1997) but they more than doubled their share of seats (20
of 634 in 1992 and 46 of 641 in 1997: Table 1). At subse-
quent elections, the Liberal Democrats’ share of the seats
increased by less than the increase in their share of the
votes, thus increasing the partisan bias operating against
them after reducing it between 1992 and 1997.
Furthermore, at the 1997 election – much more so than
at either 1992 or 2001 – both Labour and the Liberal
Democrats reduced their wasted vote totals by their
connivance at tactical voting practices, whereby, for
example, in seats where the Labour candidate was likely to
come third many putative Labour voters transferred their
support to the Liberal Democrat candidate to try and unseat
an incumbent Conservative; complementing this, many
Liberal Democrat supporters in seats where they were
likely to come third voted Labour instead. As Curtice and
Steed (1997, 309) noted, ‘voters exhibited a striking
tendency to opt for whichever of the two opposition parties
appeared best placed to defeat the Conservatives locally’.
The 1997 general election outcome was certainly highly
disproportional but because both Labour and Liberal
Democrats each had an effective geographical distribution
of their vote, the extent of electoral bias was relatively low.
6. Conclusions
The presence of partisan bias in single-member district,
plurality electoral systems is a consequence of several
aspects of a country’s electoral geography (Johnston and
Pattie, 2006) – and can be stimulated by cartographic
Table 4
British General Elections 1983–2005: Comparing two- and three-party
methods.
Party
Method
Conservative Labour Liberal
Democrat
Total Bias
2prt 3prt 2prt 3prt 2prt 3prt 2prt 3prt
1983 5.5 8.7 5.5 89.3 – 78.0 11.0 176.0
1987 6.5 4.5 6.5 60.8 – 64.2 13.0 129.5
1992 16.5 11.3 16.5 55.8 – 41.7 33.0 108.8
1997 31.0 5.0 31.0 14.5 – 7.8 62.0 27.3
2001 48.0 35.2 48.0 56.5 – 19.8 96.0 111.5
2005 50.0 30.2 50.0 83.0 – 51.7 100.0 164.8
2prt – two-party method; 3prt – three-party method.
Fig. 7. Three-Party Bias at British General Elections, 1983–2010.
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practices such as malapportionment and gerrymandering.
Even where such practices are absent, however, and dis-
tricting is undertaken by non-partisan bodies (as in the
UK), nevertheless bias may be produced because of the
geographies underpinning that neutral boundary-drawing
process (Gudgin and Taylor, 1979).
Of the various approaches available, that developed by
Brookes and subsequently modiﬁed in a number of ways,
has provedvaluable inunderstandinghowthe translationof
votes into seats operates in the British electoral system.
There has been one very important drawback, however: the
method, despite the subsequent modiﬁcations, treats the
British electoral situationas a two-party system, and the role
of the thirdparty –whichhaswonon averageone-ﬁfth of all
votes cast at the last six general elections – is only marginal
to the bias calculation. As such, the illuminationprovided by
theBrookes’methodhas been only partial– indicative of the
size and direction of the bias, but not conclusive.
To address that deﬁciency, this paper has redesigned
Brookes’ approach to make it ﬁt for the analysis of a three-
party situation. Its foundational principles have been
retained, but the algebra rewritten to represent the pres-
ence of three major parties. Application of that redesigned
procedure to the 2005 British general election has
adequately illustrated the substantial increase in under-
standing the nature of partisan bias in that outcome as it
differentially impacted upon the three parties, as has a brief
evaluation of its comparative performance to the data for
a six-election sequence compared to the original Brookes’
formulation.17 As such, this paper has presented a meth-
odology with wide potential applicability in analyses of the
translation of votes into seats in situations where three
parties each receive a sizeable percentage of votes.
Appendix; The algebra
The basic equations for a two-party system
We prefer to use a different notation to Brookes because
of the added complexity introduced by dealing with three
rather than just two parties. For all subsequent formulae
the subscript relates to the party under considerationwhile
superscripts describe the ﬁnishing order for the parties.
Thus, in the two-party situation seatABA ðaÞ identiﬁes seats
won by party A at the election where A is the leading party
with a share of the two-party vote and seatBAB ðaÞ identiﬁes
seats won by party B at the notional election where B is the
leading party with a share of the two-party vote.
Bias towards the leading party is set out by Brookes as:
Bias to party A is
biasAðaÞ ¼ x ðxþ yÞ=2 ¼ ðx yÞ=2; (1)
which is simply the negative of bias towards its rival, B:
biasBðaÞ ¼ y ðxþ yÞ=2 ¼ ðy xÞ=2: (2)
In our revised notation
biasAðaÞ ¼ seatABA ðaÞ 

seatABA ðaÞ þ seatBAB ðaÞ

2
¼ seatABA ðaÞ  seatBAB ðaÞ2 (3)
Bias to the second-placed party (B) is then
biasBð1 aÞ ¼ seatABB ð1 aÞ 

seatABB ð1 aÞ
þ seatBAA ð1 aÞ

2
¼ seatABB ð1 aÞ  seatBAA ð1 aÞ2 (4)
If we assume that minor parties win no seats and N
equals the total number of seats then we can re-write
formula 4 as
biasBð1 aÞ ¼

N  seatABA ðaÞ
 N  seatBAB ðaÞ2
¼ seatBAB ðaÞ  seatABA ðaÞ2 ð5Þ
which is simply the negative of bias towards its rival, A.
Moreover, we can specify total electoral bias for the
two-party case as:
total biasABða;1 aÞ ¼ jbiasAðaÞj þ jbiasBð1 aÞj
¼ seatABA ðaÞ  seatBAB ðaÞ: (6)
This ﬁgure is the sum of the absolute values generated by
(3) and (5) and indicates the total amount of bias generated
by the system given the actual election outcome and its
translation into the notional election.
Extending the equations to the three-party case
For the three-party (A, B, C with vote shares a, b, and g
respectively) situation, with the expected norm estab-
lished, bias for each of the parties is stated as:
biasAðaÞ ¼ seatABCA ðaÞexpected norm

ajgiven distribution
	
(7)
biasBðbÞ ¼ seatABCB ðbÞexpected norm

bjgiven distribution
	
(8)
biasCðgÞ ¼ seatABCC ðgÞexpected norm

gjgiven distribution
	
(9)
The procedure adopted elaborates further on equations
(7)–(9). When calculating bias towards party A at the actual
electionwe take the actual number of seats won by A at the
election and subtract the average of the number of seats
that would bewon by the party with vote share a across the
six contests. In similar fashion the bias towards party B is
calculated with reference to the seats won with vote share
b, and bias affecting party C is calculated by using vote
share g. Formally:
Decomposing the three-party bias
Total electoral bias is deﬁned here as a sum of the
absolute bias values for the three parties:
17 Prior to the 2010 UK general election it was argued by some that the
review of parliamentary constituency boundaries had apparently failed to
address the extent of electoral bias that favoured Labour. Interested
readers may wish to consult Borisyuk et al. (2010) for a discussion of this
issue.
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total biasABCða; b;gÞ ¼ jbiasAðaÞj þ jbiasBðbÞj þ jbiasCðgÞj:
(13)
Brookes’ algebra enables the contribution of each of
these four components (geography – G; electorate size – E;
abstentions – A; and minor parties – M) to be calculated, in
the samemetric as the total bias. In order to achieve that for
the three-party case being developed here, we rearrange
formulae (10)–(12) such that bias towards party A, for
example, is:
biasAðaÞ ¼ seat
ABC
A  seatACBA
6
þ seat
ABC
A  seatBACB
6
þ seat
ABC
A  seatBCAB
6
þ seat
ABC
A  seatCABC
6
þ seat
ABC
A  seatCBAC
6
(14)
The notation used here replicates that used for the two-
party method, as set out in Brookes’ (1960) original formu-
lation with the addition of the use of subscripts and
superscripts as described earlier. We also omit here for the
sake of simplicity references to vote shares, a, b and g.
Hence:
seatABCA – number of seats won by party A at actual election;
seatACBA – number of seats won by party A under ACB
scenario;
seatBACB ; seat
BCA
B – number of seats won by party B under BAC
and BCA scenarios respectively;
seatCABC ; seat
CBA
C – number of seats won by party C under CAB
and CBA scenarios respectively;
PABCA ; P
ACB
A ; P
BAC
B ; P
BCA
B ; P
CAB
C ; P
CBA
C – combined vote totals for
three major parties where corresponding party won seats
under particular scenarios;
RABCA ;R
ACB
A ;R
BAC
B ;R
BCA
B ;R
CAB
C ;R
CBA
C – average electorate;
DABCA ;D
ACB
A ;D
BAC
B ;D
BCA
B ;D
CAB
C ;D
CBA
C – average number of
abstentions;
UABCA ;U
ACB
A ;U
BAC
B ;U
BCA
B ;U
CAB
C ;U
CBA
C – average number of minor
party votes.
We can now specify the formulae for the four compo-
nents of bias, in this case towards party A.
Decomposition of bias towards party B and party C yields
similar formulae; for example, the decomposition of the
biasAðaÞ ¼ actual seatsABCA  norm seats

ajgiven distribution
	
¼ seatABCA 
seatABCA þ seatACBA þ seatBACB þ seatBCAB þ seatCABC þ seatCBAC
6
; (10)
biasBðbÞ ¼ seatABCB 
seatABCB þ seatCBAB þ seatBACA þ seatCABA þ seatACBC þ seatBCAC
6
; (11)
biasCðgÞ ¼ seatABCC 
seatABCC þ seatBACC þ seatBCAA þ seatCBAA þ seatACBB þ seatCABB
6
: (12)
Gtoward A ¼ seat
ACB
A
6
 
PABCA
PACBA
1
!
þseat
BAC
B
6
 
PABCA
PBACB
1
!
þseat
BCA
B
6
 
PABCA
PBCAB
1
!
þseat
CAB
C
6
 
PABCA
PCABC
1
!
þseat
CBA
C
6
 
PABCA
PCBAC
1
!
Etoward A ¼ seat
ACB
A
6
 
RACBA
RABCA
1
!
þseat
BAC
B
6
 
RBACB
RABCA
1
!
þseat
BCA
B
6
 
RBCAB
RABCA
1
!
þseat
CAB
C
6
 
RCABC
RABCA
1
!
þseat
CBA
C
6
 
RCBAC
RABCA
1
!
Atoward A ¼ seat
ACB
A
6
 
RABCA
RABCA DABCA
 
DABCA
RABCA
D
ACB
A
RACBA
!!
þseat
BAC
B
6
 
RABCA
RABCA DABCA
 
DABCA
RABCA
D
BAC
B
RBACB
!!
þseat
BCA
B
6
"
RABCA
RABCA DABCA
 
DABCA
RABCA
D
BCA
B
RBCAB
!#
þseat
CAB
C
6
"
RABCA
RABCA DABCA
 
DABCA
RABCA
D
CAB
C
RCABC
!#
þseat
CBA
C
6
"
RABCA
RABCA DABCA
 
DABCA
RABCA
D
CBA
C
RCBAC
!#
Mtoward A ¼ seat
ACB
A
6
"
RABCA
RABCA UABCA
 
UABCA
RABCA
U
ACB
A
RACBA
!#
þseat
BAC
B
6
"
RABCA
RABCA UABCA
 
UABCA
RABCA
U
BAC
B
RBACB
!#
þseat
BCA
B
6
"
RABCA
RABCA UABCA
 
UABCA
RABCA
U
BCA
B
RBCAB
!#
þseat
CAB
C
6
"
RABCA
RABCA UABCA
 
UABCA
RABCA
U
CAB
C
RCABC
!#
þseat
CBA
C
6
"
RABCA
RABCA UABCA
 
UABCA
RABCA
U
CBA
C
RCBAC
!#
ð15Þ
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component relating to the electorate size effect relevant to
party C would read:
Etoward C ¼ seat
BAC
C
6
 
RBACC
RABCC
 1
!
þ seat
BCA
A
6
 
RBCAA
RABCC
 1
!
þ seat
CBA
A
6
 
RCBAA
RABCC
 1
!
þ seat
ACB
B
6
 
RACBB
RABCC
 1
!
þ seat
CAB
B
6
 
RCABB
RABCC
 1
!
ð16Þ
This compares the actual position of the third party C
with that of the third (in terms of overall vote share) party
under each of the ﬁve notional election scenarios.
There are also interactions between these four compo-
nents – the combined impact of both abstentions and
electorate size, for example. These (which can be two-way,
three-way, and four-way) are not separately calculated
here; the net interaction is simply reported, calculated as
the difference between the total bias ﬁgure for each party
(Table 2) and the sum of the four components calculated
using the formulae above.
References
Blau, A., 2001. Partisan bias in British general elections. In: Tonge, J.,
Bennie, L., Denver, D., Harrison, L. (Eds.), British Elections and Parties
Review, vol. 11. Frank Cass, London, pp. 46–65.
Blau, A., 2004. A quadruple whammy for ﬁrst-past-the-post. Electoral
Studies 23, 431–453.
Borisyuk, G., Johnston, R., Thrasher, M., Rallings, C., 2008. Measuring Bias:
Moving from two-party to three-party elections. Electoral Studies 27,
245–256.
Borisyuk, G., Johnston, R., Thrasher, M., Rallings, C., 2010. Parliamentary
constituency boundary reviews and electoral bias: how important are
variations in constituency size? Parliamentary Affairs 67, 4–21.
Brookes,R.H.,1953. Seatsandvotes inNewZealand.Political Science5,37–44.
Brookes, R.H., 1959. Electoral distortion in New Zealand. Australian Jour-
nal of Politics and History 5, 218–223.
Brookes, R.H., 1960. The analysis of distorted representation in two-party,
single-member elections. Political Science 12, 158–167.
Crewe, I., King, A., 1995. SDP: The Birth, Life and Death of the Social
Democratic Party. Oxford University Press.
Curtice, J., 2001. The electoral system: biased to Blair? Parliamentary
Affairs 54, 803–814.
Curtice, J., Firth, D., 2008. Exit polling in a cold climate: the BBC–ITV
experience in Britain in 2005. Journal of Royal Statistical Society A
171, 509–539.
Curtice, J., Steed, M., 1986. Proportionality and exaggeration in the British
electoral system. Electoral Studies 5, 209–228.
Curtice, J., Steed, M., 1997. Appendix 2: The Results Analysed. In:
Butler, D., Kavanagh, D (Eds.), The British General Election of 1997.
Macmillan, London, pp. 295–325.
Duverger, M., 1954. Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in
the Modern State. Methuen, London.
Gelman, A., King, G., 1994. A uniﬁed method of evaluating electoral
systems and districting plans. American Journal of Political Science
38, 514–554.
Gelman, A., Katz, J., King, G., 2004. Empirically evaluating the electoral
College. In: Creigler, A.N., Just, M.R., McCaffery, E.J. (Eds.), Rethinking
the Vote: The Politics and Prospects of American Electoral Reform.
Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 75–88.
Grofman, B., King, G., 2007. The future of partisan symmetry as a judicial
test for partisan gerrymandering after LULAC v. Perry. Election
Law Journal 6, 2–35. Copy at. http://gking.harvard.edu/ﬁles/jp.pdf
[accessed 26.06.08].
Grofman, B., Brunell, T., Campagna, J., 1997. Distinguishing between the
effects of swing ratio and bias on outcomes in the U.S. Electoral
College, 1900–1992. Electoral Studies 16, 471–487.
Gudgin, G., Taylor, P.J., 1979. Seats, Votes and the Spatial Organization of
Elections. Pion, London.
Johnston, R.J., Pattie, C.J., Dorling, D.F.L., Rossiter, D.J., 2001. From Votes to
Seats: The Operation of the UK Electoral System Since 1945. Man-
chester University Press, Manchester.
Johnston, R.J., Pattie, C.J., 2006. Putting Voters in Their Place: Geography
and Elections in Great Britain. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Johnston, R.J., Rossiter, D.J., Pattie, C.J., Dorling, D.F.L., 2002. Labour
electoral landslides and the changing efﬁciency of voting distribu-
tions. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers NS27,
336–361.
Johnston, R., Rossiter, D., Pattie, C., 1999. Integrating and decomposing the
sources of partisan bias: Brookes’ method and the impact of redis-
tricting in Great Britain. Electoral Studies 18 (3), 367–378.
Johnston, R.J., Pattie, C.J., Rossiter, D.J., 2006. Disproportionality and bias
in the results of the 2005 general election in Great Britain: evaluating
the electoral system’s impact. Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and
Parties 2, 37–54.
King, G., 1990. Electoral responsiveness and partisan bias in multiparty
democracies. Legislative Studies Quarterly 15, 159–181.
King, G., Grofman, B., Gelman, A., Katz, J., 2005. Amicus brief in the case of
Jackson v. Perry in the U.S. Supreme Court (No. 05-276). Available from:
http://gking.harvard.edu/ﬁles/amicus-sym.pdf [accessed 26.06.08].
Miller, W.L., 1977. Electoral Dynamics in Britain Since 1921. Macmillan,
London.
Mortimore R. The Constituency Structure and the Boundary Commis-
sion: the Rules for the Redistribution of Seats and Their Effect on
the British Electoral System 1950–1987. PhD thesis, University of
Oxford; 1992.
Rallings, C., Thrasher, M. (Eds.), 2007. British Electoral Facts: 1832–2006,
seventh ed. Ashgate, Aldershot.
Soper, C.S., Rydon, J., 1958. Under-representation and electoral prediction.
Australian Journal of Politics and History 4, 94–106.
Upton, G.J.G., 1976. The diagrammatic representation of three-party
contests. Political Studies 24, 448–454.
G. Borisyuk et al. / Electoral Studies 29 (2010) 733–745 745
A 29
A 30  
 
 
 
A 31  
 
 
Appendix 3 
Parliamentary Constituency Boundary Reviews and Electoral Bias:       
How Important Are Variations in Constituency Size? 
 
 
Borisyuk, G., R. Johnston, C. Rallings, & M. Thrasher (2010) Parliamentary 
Constituency Boundary Reviews and Electoral Bias: How Important Are 
Variations in Constituency Size?  Parliamentary Affairs, 63 (1), 4-21. 
35% of the work for the paper was undertaken by Galina Borisyuk 
As part of copyright agreement with Oxford University Press, authors of published 
papers retain the right to use all or part of the article, provided that a full 
acknowledgement is made to the original publication in the journal and public 
availability be delayed until 24 months after first online publication in the journal. 
. 
A 32  
 
 
 
Parliamentary Constituency Boundary Reviews
and Electoral Bias: How Important Are Variations
in Constituency Size?
BY GALINA BORISYUK, RON JOHNSTON, COLIN RALLINGS AND
MICHAEL THRASHER
ABSTRACT
It is frequently canvassed by some politicians and political commentators that the
current British electoral system is biased against the Conservative party because of
variations in constituency size: seats won by the Conservatives at recent elections
have been larger than those won by Labour in terms of their registered electorates,
thereby disadvantaging the former. As a consequence, it is argued that equalisation
of constituency electorates by the Boundary Commissions would remove that dis-
advantage. The validity of this argument is addressed in two ways. First, we
demonstrate that the rules and procedures applied by the Boundary Commissions
when redistributing seats in the UK preclude the achievement of substantial equal-
ity in constituency electorates. Secondly, we use a recent adaptation of a widely-
used procedure for establishing electoral bias in three-party systems to show that
variations in constituency electorates had only a minor impact on the outcome of
elections after the last two redistributions. The geography of each party’s support
base is much more important, so changes in the redistribution procedure are unli-
kely to have a substantial impact and remove the significant disadvantage currently
suffered by the Conservative party.
TO many observers, the result of the 2005 United Kingdom general
election was a clear exemplar of the disproportionality that characterises
first-past-the-post electoral systems. The two leading parties—Labour
and Conservative—were separated by only three percentage points in
their share of the votes cast in Great Britain (36.1 and 33.2 per cent,
respectively), but whereas Labour obtained 56.5 per cent of the House of
Commons seats, the Conservatives got only 31.5 per cent. The Liberal
Democrats were similarly disadvantaged—as they have been at all
post-war general elections: with 22.6 per cent of the votes nationally they
were allocated only 9.9 per cent of the seats. Such disproportionality was
not the only consequence of the votes-to-seats translation process,
however. There was also clear evidence of bias, suggesting that Labour
was much better treated than the Conservatives: one analysis indicated
that if they had each won 34.7 per cent of the votes cast, Labour would
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have won 111 more seats than the Conservatives.1 Labour could remain
not only the largest but also the majority party, even if it came a close
second to the Conservatives at the next general election.
Following the 2005 general election, there was much discussion
about this disproportionality and bias, with many suggestions about its
causes and how they might be eliminated—some of which related to
the current electoral system and others to its replacement by one based
on principles of proportional representation. One issue attracting con-
siderable attention was variation in constituency electorates, and the
observation that the seats won by Labour tended to be smaller on
average than those won by the Conservatives: of the 125 smallest con-
stituencies in Great Britain (with electorates less than 62,600), Labour
won 96 and the Conservatives only 11 (and the Liberal Democrats 12):
of the 125 largest (with electorates greater than 75,400) Labour won
36, compared to the Conservatives’ 69 and the Liberal Democrats’ 19.2
If constituency electorates were equalised, therefore, Labour’s advan-
tage might be removed, and ‘fairer’ election results eventuate—or so
the argument went.3
The United Kingdom has an accepted procedure for equalising elec-
torates. A Periodic Review of Parliamentary constituencies is under-
taken by the four Boundary Commissions—one each for England,
Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales—every 8–12 years.4 One of
these had recently been completed prior to the 2005 election for
Scotland (where constituencies have on average been much smaller
than those in England, although this was changed by implementation
of provisions in the Scotland Act 19985) and the ongoing reviews for
the other three countries would be reporting before the next general
election. Thus it was anticipated by some observers that Labour’s elec-
toral advantage in 2005 would be eliminated and that there would be a
‘level playing field’ for all participants at the next contest.6
The outcome of the latest Review did not produce the anticipated
outcome, however.7 The number of constituencies was increased by
four, they were more equal in their electorates than ever before, and
yet Labour’s advantage remained; if the 2005 general election were
re-run in those new constituencies, there would still have been a sub-
stantial bias favouring Labour and disadvantaging both the
Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats. Why should that be? One
argument is that the Boundary Commissions have failed in their task:
although they have significantly reduced the variation in constituency
electorates substantial differences remain—which could be why
Labour’s advantage has not been removed. Alternatively, it could be
that equalising electorates is not the key issue: the asymmetries in the
translation of votes into seats that currently favour Labour result from
other additional factors.
This paper addresses those arguments by focusing on two misunder-
standings. The first relates to the work of the Boundary Commissions
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which are required to review constituency electorates regularly and to
ensure that they have equal electorates ‘So far as is practicable’, but
various constraints to their operations mean that they can never
achieve anything close to genuine equality; this is addressed in a discus-
sion of those constraints and the Commissions’ working practices. The
second misunderstanding relates to the role of electoral inequalities (or
malapportionment) in the production of disproportional and biased
outcomes to first-past-the-post elections. To counter that, we use a new
method of evaluating the amount of bias in election results to show the
relative unimportance of malapportionment and the very limited
impact of the Boundary Commissions’ changes with regard to electo-
rate size on recent election results. Our illustrations of this point are
drawn from analyses of the Commissions’ last two Periodic Reviews.
The most recent, the Fifth Review, will have its recommendations
implemented at the next general election (although changes for
Scotland were implemented prior to the 2005 general election). The
Fourth Review reported after the 1992 general election, creating new
constituencies deployed for the first time in 1997. We show that
variations in constituency size would have made only a small contri-
bution to electoral bias if each of these reviews had been enacted in
time to be used in the 1992 and 2005 general elections, respectively.
Other sources—entirely outside the remit of the Boundary Commission
redistributions—are thus operating as major contributors to electoral
bias.
The first section of the article clarifies the difference between the
terms disproportionality and electoral bias and is followed by a brief
section presenting an overview of the purpose and scope of the bound-
ary review process using the recently completed Fifth Periodic Review
as illustration. The third section describes a method for decomposing
electoral bias specifically for a three-party system. This is intended to
replace the original two-party method, first developed by Ralph
Brookes and then subsequently modified by Roger Mortimore and
others to decompose bias under conditions of three-party competition.
This new method we feel better reflects the reality of the party system
in Great Britain that has emerged over recent elections. Following that,
we describe in the fourth section the process of estimating notional
general election results following revisions to Parliamentary constitu-
ency boundaries. Crucial for our argument is that we decompose the
three-party electoral bias for both the 2005 and 1992 estimated results
and compare that with the composition of bias at the actual elections.
This analysis of the two most recent reviews serves both to illustrate
the impact of constituency boundary changes upon the distribution of
seats between parties and also the effect, if any, on the components of
any electoral bias contained within the system.
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Disproportionality and electoral bias
A recurring feature of the UK electoral system, indeed virtually all
examples of first-past-the-post voting, is disproportionality between a
party’s vote and seat share—larger parties usually receive a much
greater share of seats than votes; smaller parties obtain a lower seat
than vote share. Proponents of first-past-the-post voting systems believe
this so-called winner’s bonus is a strength not a weakness; the largest
party will normally win a much larger share of seats than is commen-
surate with its share of the votes and as a consequence have a majority
in the legislature even if it has only a minority of the votes cast. This
advantage of seats over votes often extends to other large parties;
assuming that more than two parties contest an election a relatively
large second-placed party often emerges with a greater share of seats
than votes. Smaller parties, particularly those with a spatially dispersed
vote share, are mostly disadvantaged by first-past-the-post voting.
However, such disproportionality is not synonymous with electoral
bias; an election outcome may be highly disproportional while electoral
bias remains relatively low. Bias occurs when the parties are treated
unequally in the process of allocating seats: if one party would get a
larger share of the seats with a given share of the votes than would
another party with the same vote share, then the electoral system’s
operation favours the former. Bias is generated when there is asymme-
try in the translation of vote shares into seat shares.
The production of bias is best understood by describing an election
that is both disproportional and biased. Consider one contested only
by two parties, A and B, where each finishes with exactly half the
votes. However, party A wins 60% of the seats with its half share
while party B has the remaining 40%. In this example, the lucky
party’s bonus is a 20-point advantage of seats over votes and the
outcome is highly disproportional. There is also a clear asymmetry in
votes and seats—despite winning the same vote share as party A, party
B suffers from a large degree of electoral or partisan bias whose pro-
duction is discussed below.
By contrast to this example, Britain’s 1997 general election outcome
was highly disproportional (Labour won 43% of votes but 63% of
seats) but electoral bias, as measured by our three-party method, was
not particularly large. Given Labour’s 13-point and 27-point leads in
the popular vote over the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats respect-
ively, it is an acknowledged and widely understood outcome of
first-past-the-post that a party which so dominates its competitors is
likely to win a clear majority of seats—the winner’s bonus. However,
the Liberal Democrats, which in previous elections had suffered greatly
from the voting system, were much more successful in targeting seats;
their votes per seats ratio at the 1997 election was three times smaller
than it was for the Liberal/SDP Alliance following the 1983 election.
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Electoral bias and disproportionality, although closely related
therefore, are separate features of an election result.
Re-drawing constituency boundaries
The regular electoral redistributions undertaken by the Boundary
Commissions are generally believed to reduce, if not entirely remove,
bias from election results. And yet, it seems that they do not. Why that
is the case requires a clear understanding of the nature and scope of the
review process.
Regular Parliamentary seat redistributions by Boundary
Commissions were introduced in 1944. Although the rules which they
operate are to some extent unclear and contradictory, their main task
is to ensure that constituencies in the relevant country conform to two
main criteria. The first—which takes precedence in the legislation—
ensures that the constituencies nest within the major local government
administrative areas: the Shire and Metropolitan Counties and the
London Boroughs in England; Scotland’s unitary local authorities; and
in Wales the eight ‘preserved counties’ which were abolished for all
other purposes when unitary authorities were created in 1995. In
Northern Ireland there is no such requirement. No constituency should
cross a boundary separating two such authorities, unless a case is made
that this is necessary to meet the other significant rule’s requirement
that, ‘The electorate of any constituency shall be as near the electoral
quota as is practicable’, although ‘a Boundary Commission may depart
from the strict application of [this] rule . . . if it appears to them that a
departure is desirable to avoid an excessive disparity between the elec-
torate of any constituency and the electoral quota, or between the elec-
torate thereof and that of neighbouring constituencies in the part of the
United Kingdom within which they are concerned’.8 The electoral
quota is the relevant country’s total electorate at the start of redistribu-
tion, divided by the current number of seats there. (Each of the UK’s
countries has its own Boundary Commission and electoral quota.).
Although the principal goal of the Fifth Periodic Review was to
achieve greater electoral equality across the Parliamentary constituen-
cies within each UK nation, a number of factors—including the inter-
action of the two rules outlined here—ensured that the outcome was
far from equal. Although there was a reduction in the variation around
both the average electorates and the quotas, considerable variation
in constituency size remains with implications for the continued
production of electoral bias. The reasons for this are:
† The four countries are treated differently in the first rule the
Commissions must take account of, which states that Great Britain
shall have not substantially greater or less than 613 constituencies,
Wales not less than 35 and Northern Ireland not more than 18 and
not less than 16. Following the passage of the Scotland Act 1998,
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Scotland is now required to use the same quota as England and in
2005 its constituencies were reduced from 72 to 59. Wales was not
similarly treated after the 1998 devolution settlement, however,
and retains 40 constituencies—at least eight more than its entitle-
ment if its Commission also deployed the English quota.
† Each Commission can deviate from the electoral equality
requirement, under the ‘special geographical considerations’ rule
referred to above. This has always been interpreted as applying to
sparsely populated, relatively inaccessible areas only, and in the
Fifth Reviews was only deployed in Scotland’s Highland and
Islands region and Orkney and Shetland. Thus, whereas 16 Scottish
constituencies had electorates larger than the English average in
2005, four had only 21,576, 33,048, 46,837 and 50,507 electors,
which substantially reduced the national average constituency elec-
torate to 65,083 (England’s then was 70,203).
† Although the Commissions can combine adjacent local authority
areas to reduce variations in constituency size, they have been
unwilling to do this save in certain circumstances—notably at
recent redistributions in Greater London and England’s
Metropolitan Counties. The impact of this reluctance is most
apparent with the Isle of Wight, with a 2005 electorate of 109,046.
The Boundary Commission for England, taking account of the
opinions of island residents, has never either allocated two small
constituencies to the island or attached part of it to a mainland
constituency in nearby Hampshire.9 Furthermore, even the allo-
cation of seats within local authority areas according to their mean
entitlement can generate sharp disparities. For example, Berkshire’s
eight constituencies after the Fifth Review had a mean electorate of
72,655, whereas for the five in neighbouring Wiltshire it was only
64,430. Within Greater London, despite some grouping of adjoin-
ing Boroughs, the differences were even greater: Croydon’s three
constituencies averaged 77,200 electors, for example, and nearby
Wandsworth’s 65,295; Islington’s two constituencies averaged
59,946 electors, whereas Camden’s two averaged 76,440.
† Constraints on constituency delimitation within a local government
area also necessarily produce variations in electorate size. The
Parliamentary Constituencies Act 1986 rules make no reference to
how this is to be done, save in Northern Ireland where ‘no ward
shall be included partly in one constituency and partly in another’.
Nevertheless, all of the Commissions have operated this system and
the constituencies they define are groupings of adjacent local gov-
ernment wards which almost invariably create differences between
constituencies within a local authority area. Some are considerable,
because wards—especially in urban areas—are relatively large and
Parliamentary Constituency Boundary Reviews 9
 at U
niversity of Plym
outh on Septem
ber 18, 2012
http://pa.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
A 38
their number is not divisible into an integer by the number of con-
stituencies. Wandsworth, for example, had 20 wards to be allocated
between three constituencies in the Fifth Review: two have seven
wards and electorates of 67,111 and 69,445; one has six wards and
59,331 electors. Walsall similarly had 20 wards and its three consti-
tuencies had electorates of 58,695, 66,287 and 64,995—all well
below the national quota of 69,934.
† A further possible cause of continued inequalities is a consequence
of the public consultations the Commissions are required to under-
take on their provisional recommendations. These recommendations
are frequently challenged by local interest groups, with some
(especially the political parties) preferring alternative constituency
architectures. Such challenges rarely use electoral equality as their
predominant criterion but instead rely on a later rule that ‘It shall
not be a duty of a Boundary Commission to aim at giving full effect
in all circumstances to the above rules, but they shall take account,
so far as they reasonably can—(a) of the inconveniences attendant
on alterations of constituencies other than alterations made for the
purposes of [fitting them within the current local government
boundaries] . . ., and (b) of any local ties which would be broken by
such alterations’. To the extent that the Commissions accept any
alternative proposals promoted at, and then commended to them by
the Assistant Commissioners who hold, the Public Inquiries, elec-
toral equality is likely to retreat in importance. Thus in the Fourth
Periodic Review in England, the average deviation from the mean
electorate within the relevant local government area, as a percentage
of that mean, in the Commission’s provisional recommendations
was 3.62 (with a standard deviation of 3.08); in its final recommen-
dations, the average was 4.22 (standard deviation 3.22). The con-
sultation process results in greater variation in constituency
electorates once local community issues are brought to the fore.
† Finally, even if the Commissions achieved virtual equality across all
constituencies, this will almost certainly be diluted because of
population changes—variations between constituencies in deaths,
the number of residents reaching the minimum voting age,
in-migration and out-migration. As constituencies age, their electo-
rates vary in their rates of net change, with some (notably in subur-
ban areas, growing towns and popular retirement centres)
expanding rapidly, whereas others (in declining manufacturing
areas and inner cities, for example) decline. Thus in England, the
new constituencies first deployed at the 1997 general election aver-
aged 68,927 electors, with a standard deviation of 5835: in 2001,
the same constituencies averaged 69,899 (standard deviation 6512);
and in 2005 the respective figures were 70,203 and 7472. As the
constituency map ‘aged’, inter-constituency electorate variations
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increased. Indeed, this happens even before an election is fought in
the new constituencies. The Fourth Review in England began in
1991 and its electoral quota of 69,281 was based on the then elec-
toral register. By the 2005 election the constituencies were 14 years
old. Although some of these changes might have been anticipated—
through expectations of population growth given the number of
planning applications for new housing in particular areas, for
example—the Boundary Commissions do not take them into
account; they operate only with the electoral quota determined at
the start of each Review.
Because of this combination of factors constituencies will never have
equal electorates under the current rules and procedures.10 Unequal
electorates are only one of the factors that may generate electoral bias,
however; because of these constraints the boundary review process may
reduce but almost certainly not eradicate any bias derived from this
source. However, it may be that unequal electorates make only a minor
contribution to the total bias, in which case it is unreasonable to
expect a Boundary Commission redistribution to ensure that all parties
are treated equally in the votes-to-seats translation.
Measuring and decomposing electoral bias
A number of methods for measuring electoral bias have been proposed.
We favour one developed by a New Zealand political scientist, Ralph
Brookes,11 for a predominantly two-party system that was subsequently
adapted by others.12 We have recently extended the method so that it
is now specifically designed to decompose bias in three-party situ-
ations, such as that which currently operates in Great Britain.13 This
method not only provides a ‘norm of comparison’ against which any
deviation (bias) can be assessed but also, and very importantly for our
purposes, allows that assessment of the degree of bias to be decom-
posed into its various sources, including that derived from having
unequal electorates. Its use therefore allows us not only to establish the
extent of bias but also to evaluate the role and weight of unequal elec-
torates in its production.
Brookes’ interest lay in understanding whether and how the
geographical pattern of voting (i.e. the distribution of each party’s
support across the constituencies), size of electoral units and turnout
variations contribute towards one party in a two-party system receiving
a bonus of seats relative to what the other would probably experience,
by establishing for any election what we term a ‘norm of comparison’.
This benchmark comprises two elements: the actual number of seats
gained by one of the parties and the number of seats that would be won
if the vote share of the two parties at the actual election had been
reversed. The latter figure is calculated by taking the overall vote shares
at the actual election, say 53% for party A and 47% for party B, and
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reversing them so that party B is now assumed to have won 53% and
party A 47%. This six-point reversal in vote share is then applied to
each constituency, assuming a uniform shift across the whole country,
and the winning party, which may now have changed, is noted. For
each party, averaging the number of seats at the actual election and
what we might call the ‘reverse-shares election’ produces the norm for
comparison. Subsequently, if this average is smaller than the seats won
at the actual election the party concerned is favoured by electoral bias,
otherwise it is disadvantaged; formally, if one subtracts the average
from the party’s actual share at the election, it experiences a positive
bias if it has more than the average (i.e. it gets more seats than
expected if both parties were treated equally in the votes-to-seats trans-
lation process) and a negative bias if it has less than the average.
Having established the existence of and level of electoral bias
Brookes then identified four of its contributory factors:
† Geography—acquiring votes requires the expenditure of resources
and so the most efficient party is that which gets most seats for a
given number of votes (i.e. the smallest ratio of votes to seats
won14). This will be the party that both wins its own constituencies
by narrow margins and, when it does lose, does so by a very large
margin. In this way, any ‘surplus’ and ‘wasted’ votes are mini-
mised.15 “Win small but lose big” becomes a useful motto for a
party optimising its vote distribution.
† Malapportionment—assuming turnout is constant across all consti-
tuencies and electorates vary in size, a party that wins seats in areas
with small electorates will perform better than a rival that wins
seats with large electorates—it will again get more seats for a given
number of votes.16
† Abstention—assuming electorates are equal in size but turnout
varies, then a party that wins its seats in the low turnout areas will
need to accumulate fewer votes than a rival that wins only in the
high turnout areas.17
† Minor party effect—as long as minor parties do not gain victories
in those seats that a major party anticipates winning then the
minor party effect is beneficial to the latter; the minor parties have
attracted wasted votes and improved the overall situation for the
winning party since it requires fewer votes itself to win (and
accumulates fewer surplus votes). Conversely, should the minor
party capture seats then the major party that loses them has now
itself accumulated wasted votes.
† There may also be interactions between two or more of these
factors—for example, if a party does well in areas where constitu-
encies are both smaller than average and have lower turnouts than
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average.18 In applications of Brookes’ methodology these
interactions are normally summed rather than separately identified.
The operation of these factors at both the actual and reverse shares’
elections reveals both the direction and composition of electoral bias.
The net bias for each party is the sum of bias derived from each of four
components, some of which may be negative and others positive.
The Boundary Commissions are only striving to remove the sources
of the malapportionment component directly when reviewing constitu-
ency boundaries and equalising electorates, however. Changing bound-
aries may, of course, have an impact on the geography of a party’s vote
distribution—it may now find its majorities increased in some constitu-
encies whereas, even worse, it changes from being a narrow winner to
a narrow loser in others. But this is incidental to the boundary review
process; the UK’s Boundary Commissions take no account whatsoever
of political considerations when undertaking their reviews.
Brookes’ method works well enough for elections dominated by two
major parties but less well for those where three parties compete and each
winsseats.Atsomepoint,admittedlynotalwaysaprecisemoment,asystem
evolves fromtwo-party to three-partywhenaminorpartywinsseatsyet the
two major parties, albeit weakened, remain dominant. Currently, the UK
system, where the third party Liberal Democrats now win not only about
one-fifthof the votes cast (which they—and their predecessors—have done
since the1970s)butalsoasignificantnumberofParliamentaryseats,might
be better regarded as three- rather than a two-party system. Under such cir-
cumstances it seems appropriate, therefore, to adapt the original Brookes’
method to measure and decompose electoral bias for the three-party case.
We have developed such a procedure which retains many of Brookes’ orig-
inal features. The seats won by the principal three parties are measured
against a norm for comparison which shows whether the electoral bias for
that party is positive or negative. The four separate components identified
earlier—geography, malapportionment, abstention and minor party
effects (now referring to fourth and lesser parties)—together contribute
towardsthenetbiasforthethreeleadingparties.Acomprehensiveandtech-
nical discussion of the three-party method may be found elsewhere.19 In
what follows, we apply this method to the situations following both the
Fourth and Fifth Periodic Reviews of constituencies in Great Britain, to
assesstheimpact,ifany,onelectoralbiasbroughtaboutbythegreaterequal-
isationofconstituencyelectoratesachievedthen.
Constituency boundary changes and estimating notional
election results
For each of the last two reviews the partisan effects of boundary
changes have been estimated for a media consortium comprising the
three major UK news broadcasters—BBC, ITN and Sky News—and,
on behalf of print media, the Press Association. They require an agreed
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set of results that show how the previous general election would have
finished had the new rather than old boundaries been in place.
There is no single, correct method for compiling estimates. The
Plymouth team which has undertaken this task for the media uses
results from local council elections to compile estimates, as did the
team that compiled notional results for the Third Periodic Review.20
Other methods for calculating notional results have been used and
there are two other estimates of the 2005 election outcome on the new
boundaries.21 Fortunately, there is general consensus about the overall
impact of the boundary changes although some differences of detail
remain.
Appreciating the procedure for producing estimates that rely upon
local election results is important because it helps to clarify how the
distribution of votes in the new constituencies is derived and underpins
our assessment of the impact of the boundary changes upon the com-
ponents of electoral bias. It begins by building a set of ward-level elec-
tion results for the old parliamentary constituencies based on the local
elections immediately prior to the general election.22
Some features of local elections require adjustments before the data
are suitable for estimating party strength at the constituency level. To
accommodate multimember wards, used in London boroughs and
some shire districts, an algorithm for calculating total vote and party
vote is employed.23 Another problem affects wards where one or other
of the major parties does not contest a local election vacancy. Where a
candidate is elected unopposed previous local election results for that
ward are examined and vote shares estimated on that basis. If no com-
parison is possible (the ward is frequently unopposed or its boundaries
are also new and no past data are available), then the winning party is
awarded a vote share equivalent to that in its best performing ward in
that local authority. A party that has not fielded a candidate is given a
vote share equivalent to the vote received in its worst performing ward.
A final consideration is support for Independent candidates. In some
rural wards Independents may be returned unopposed. Initially, past
elections are examined to find evidence of party political candidates. If
none exist then the ward’s social characteristics, derived from the
nearest national census, are used to provide estimates of likely party
voting. Where Independents and minor party candidates appear to
have been given a free run by one of the three main parties their vote is
given to that party as if they were its surrogate. When all the main
parties contest a ward then the vote for Independents and other parties
is ignored.
Once the matrix of local elections results is completed, those wards
or parts of wards which are being removed from the old constituency
are identified. The local votes for each party in those wards and part
wards are also summed. It is then assumed that the proportion of a
party’s total local vote received in any given set of wards will equal the
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proportion of its total general election vote in the same wards. In other
words, its strongest and weakest wards will remain the same regardless
of any gross differences in performance between the general and local
elections.
Dividing each party’s local vote in the wards being removed by the
total local vote across the whole constituency and then multiplying that
figure by the party’s vote at the actual general election provides the
estimated vote for that part of the constituency that is migrating. This
notional vote is then subtracted from the party’s actual vote in the old
constituency, awaiting transfer into a new constituency. Any wards
from another constituency that are being moved into the constituency
will have been subjected to the same treatment before being transferred
over. This method limits the scope for error because only the parts of
constituencies that are being moved are subjected to calculations of this
type—the part that is left intact carries forward towards the notional
vote total. Another merit of this procedure is that no votes are gained
or lost—votes that are exported from a constituency must be imported
intact into another; the procedure is therefore zero-sum. This means
that the total votes calculated for the notional election equal the votes
cast at the actual election.
Of course, this method can make no allowance for any changes to
the tactical situation in a new constituency. For example, a party may
move from third to second place and claim that, had the new bound-
aries actually been in place, then its vote would have been larger
because tactical voters would have switched in its favour. The estimates
reflect the work of the Boundary Commissions in equalising electo-
rates, but do not impose any artificial interpretations of how groups of
voters might have behaved in a different tactical situation.
Comparing bias components at actual and notional
elections
According to our evaluation of the impact of the boundary changes,
the outcome of the Fifth Periodic Review on the allocation of seats in
the notional 2005 election across the parties is not dramatic
(Table 1).24 There is a small overall increase in the size of the House of
Commons (from 646 to 650 seats), a net reduction of seven seats for
Labour, and a 12 seat increase for the Conservatives. With the excep-
tion of Plaid Cymru, which loses one of its three seats, the smaller
parties are unaffected. The increase in constituencies means that a
party now requires 326 seats to acquire an overall majority. The
reduction for Labour means that its majority of 66 seats in the
Parliament elected in 2005 is cut to just 48 seats in the run-up to
the next general election, so a net loss of 24 Labour-held constituencies
at the next contest would remove its overall majority. The creation of
additional Conservative seats means the party now needs to win an
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additional 116 seats to form a majority government instead of the 126
seats it needed formerly.
The impact of the Fourth Review was similarly modest (Table 2).
The overall increase in seats was larger (from 651 to 659 seats), but
the widely anticipated Conservative gains based on the conventional
wisdom that they normally benefit from redistributions which eliminate
many small inner-city constituencies (generally Labour-supporting)
scarcely materialised: as Rossiter et al. (1999) have shown, this is
partly because Labour realised that careful development of cases to be
presented at the Commissions’ Public Inquiries could minimise their
losses, and the Conservatives failed to respond to those tactics. The
Conservatives did have a net gain of seven seats, but with Labour too
registering a net increase in seats (2), the Conservative advantage was
minimal. The remaining changes saw a net reduction of two seats for
the Liberal Democrats and an increase of one seat in Northern Ireland.
At the 1992 general election the Conservative’s lead in the popular
vote (they obtained 41.9 per cent of the votes, to Labour’s 34.4 per
cent) resulted in a Commons majority of just 21 seats. The boundary
changes modestly boosted the government’s notional overall majority
to 27, but this remained vulnerable to a less than one per cent swing to
Labour.
The explanation for the rather minor overall effects produced by the
two boundary reviews becomes clearer after applying the method for
decomposing three-party bias for the actual and notional elections in
2. Actual and estimated seats for the 1992 general election
Actual Notional Change
Conservative 336 343 þ7
Labour 271 273 þ2
Liberal Democrat 20 18 22
Plaid Cymru 4 4 —
SNP 3 3 —
Northern Ireland 17 18 þ1
Total seats 651 659 þ8
1. Actual and estimated seats for the 2005 general election
Actual Estimate Change
Labour 356 349 27
Conservative 198 210 þ12
Liberal Democrat 62 62 —
Plaid Cymru 3 2 21
SNP 6 6 —
Northern Ireland 18 18 —
Other 3 3 —
Total seats 646 650 þ4
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2005 and 1992. For 2005, Table 3 indicates a total bias at the actual
election estimated by the three-party method as 165 seats, comprising
a positive bias favouring Labour of 83 seats plus negative biases of 30
and 52 seats for the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats, respectively.
The corresponding figures for the notional election (estimate) are total
bias 148 seats, a positive bias for Labour of 75 seats, a smaller negative
bias of 21 for the Conservatives and an unchanged negative bias affect-
ing the Liberal Democrats.
Given that boundary reviews first and foremost aim to equalise
electorates we begin with that element in analysis of the bias decompo-
sition; a positive bias towards Labour of 11 seats at the actual election
has reduced to only 4 seats on the new boundaries. This is to be
expected given that the electorates in Labour held areas had become
rather smaller than elsewhere since the last review as a result of popu-
lation changes. A negative bias from electorate size of 12 seats for the
Conservatives was halved, as some of the large constituencies in the
areas of population growth where it is strong were reduced in size, but
it remains negative at 26. Again, given that the average size of electo-
rates in seats won by the party in 2005 was larger than for other
parties a reduction in bias from this component was anticipated. For
the Liberal Democrats a negative bias of three seats is replaced by a
positive bias, albeit one of only two seats. Overall these changes are
small—reflecting that the inequalities that had built up were not
extreme save in a few areas and that the redistribution did not involve
major changes to the constituency map in many parts of the country
(other than in the special case of Scotland). Nevertheless, the continu-
ing effects of unequal electorates favour Labour and still work against
the Conservatives.
Almost half of the bias enjoyed by Labour in 2005 stemmed from
geography, its superior vote distribution; on average it was more likely
to ‘win small but lose big’ than its opponents, notably the Liberal
Democrats which amassed very large numbers of wasted votes in the
seats they contested but lost (566 of the 628 constituencies in Great
Britain in 2005). This accounts for a positive Labour bias of 41 seats
3. Decomposing the bias for actual and estimated election results (2005)
Labour Conservative Lib Dem
Actual Estimate Actual Estimate Actual Estimate
Total bias þ83 þ75 230 221 252 252
Electorate þ11 þ4 212 26 23 þ2
Geography þ41 þ41 25 þ2 246 249
Abstention þ16 þ17 214 214 210 29
Minor party þ3 þ3 23 23 21 þ0
Net interactions þ13 þ11 þ3 þ0 þ7 þ4
Note: Columns do not sum to totals because of rounding.
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from a total bias of 83 seats. The boundary changes made no impact at
all on this component as far as Labour is concerned; the geography of
its support is insufficiently altered to affect the greater efficiency of its
vote distribution. Because the total bias towards Labour reduces to 75
seats on the new boundaries, however, the geography component now
accounts for more than half of the positive bias. That component orig-
inally accounted for very little of the Conservative negative bias, just
five seats, but the effect of moving the boundaries now produces a
positive bias of two seats. The Liberal Democrats suffer most with
their geographical disadvantage increased from a negative bias of 46 to
an estimated 49 seats on the new boundaries.
Of the two remaining components, the largest effect derives from
abstention, which in recent elections has favoured Labour over the
Conservatives; turnout tends to be much lower in seats where the
former wins than in those where the latter prevails. The abstention
component continues to benefit Labour after redistribution (16 seats
for the actual election, 17 on the new boundaries), while disadvanta-
ging the Conservatives (unaltered on 14 seats) and Liberal Democrats
(10 and 9 seats, respectively). As with the relatively small changes in
the geography component, this is because in general the redistribution
did not move many wards between constituencies of radically different
political or social type in much of the country, thereby leaving the
underlying pattern of turnout largely unchanged. The bias component
from the distribution of minor party votes contributes little—unsurpris-
ingly since the three-party method used here takes account of the
Liberal Democrat presence and is only concerned with votes for nation-
alist and other small parties, which have an impact on the three main
parties in a minority of constituencies only.
The effect of the Fourth Review upon electoral bias was even less
than that for the Fifth Review (Table 4). The original election resulted
in less total bias, 101 compared to 165 seats in 2005, but its direction
(a 55 seat positive bias towards Labour, and negative biases of 11 and
42 seats towards Conservatives and Liberal Democrats, respectively) is
the same as for 2005. The pressing need to re-draw constituency
4. Decomposing the bias for actual and estimated election results (1992)
Labour Conservative Lib Dem
Actual Estimate Actual Estimate Actual Estimate
Total bias þ55 þ51 211 211 242 240
Electorate þ18 þ8 216 28 þ1 þ3
Geography þ18 þ24 þ17 þ9 243 241
Abstention þ10 þ10 28 29 23 23
Minor party þ3 þ3 23 22 þ1 þ0
Net interactions þ7 þ6 22 21 þ2 þ0
Note: Columns do not sum to totals because of rounding.
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boundaries is reflected in the larger contribution to bias derived from
the electorate component at the earlier election; it was worth 18 seats
for Labour in 1992, a third of its overall bias total. This hardly
impacts on the Liberal Democrats’ unfavourable position, however,
which is overwhelmingly caused by the party’s very inefficient vote dis-
tribution (geography). As in 2005, the Conservatives were adversely
affected by the electorate component, which costs 16 seats at the actual
election. However, this was compensated by the positive bias the party
gained from its vote distribution—John Major’s majority was courtesy
of some very narrow wins in marginal constituencies.
Although the boundary changes that came into force in time for the
1997 election favoured the Conservatives by halving to eight seats the
negative bias from the electorate component, this benefit was cancelled
out by a reduction in the positive bias from vote distribution. These
movements are in the opposite direction for Labour; although the
benefit from the electorate component reduces to eight seats this is
almost balanced by an additional six seats gained from the geography
component. Labour’s more skilful exploitation of the opportunity to
present evidence at the Public Inquiries to influence the boundary
re-drawing is apparent; almost half of its positive bias now came from
a superior vote distribution that followed from the boundary changes.
The Liberal Democrats captured around one in five votes at the 1992
general election but succeeded in winning only 3% of the seats. It is
unsurprising, therefore, to discover that the geography component
accounts for most of its negative bias—a plethora of wasted votes
again. The Fourth boundary review, like the Fifth, hardly affected the
third party’s overall position.
Conclusions
This analysis of the two most recent Parliamentary constituency
boundary reviews in the UK shows that this process largely does not
remove electoral bias, a bias that currently favours the Labour party.
These reviews are first and foremost concerned with equalising electo-
rates and therefore address only one of the elements that may contrib-
ute towards bias. The real value of Brookes’ method, adapted here to
deal with the reality of a three-party system, lies with its ability to dis-
aggregate total bias and peer inside the mechanics that drive each elec-
toral outcome, either actual or estimated. By comparing the
composition of bias at the actual election with that for the estimated
result we have shown the impact of boundary reviews upon bias.
In this respect, the review that will be fully implemented at the next
election is similar to its predecessor implemented at the 1997 election.
Various constraints that effectively limit the Boundary Commissions
from completely equalising electorates mean that even the contribution
towards bias by the electorate component is not totally removed. The
Fifth Review has reduced Labour’s advantage from electorate size from
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11 to four seats while the Fourth Review still left Labour an eight seat
advantage. Moreover, the four additional elements—geography,
abstention, minor party and interaction effects—are largely untouched
by the boundary review process. Following the 2005 general election,
three of these (geography, abstention and interaction effects) made a
larger contribution to the overall bias favouring Labour than did the
electorate component; the Fifth Review is destined only to make a
small impression in reducing Labour’s overall bias advantage. The situ-
ation in 1992 was slightly different, partly because of the larger net
increase in seats and partly because of Labour’s superior strategy
during the review process which saw it increase its advantage from the
geography component.
Hopes among Labour’s rivals that revising constituency boundaries
might level the playing field are very largely misplaced, therefore.
Labour continues to benefit from electorate size but its real advantage
currently stems largely from a better distributed vote—it acquires fewer
surplus and wasted votes than its rivals. It is also benefitting more than
other parties from the general decline in electoral turnout, requiring
fewer votes for its victories. These are the reasons why despite the
boundary changes that come into force at the next general election the
Conservative party needs, ceteris paribus, to hold a double-digit lead
over Labour in the popular vote in order to secure even a slender
majority in the next House of Commons.
Galina Borisyuk, Colin Rallings and Michael Thrasher*
LGC Elections Centre, University of Plymouth, UK
*Corresponding auhor: m.thrasher@plymouth.ac.uk
Ron Johnston
School of Geographical Sciences, University of Bristol, UK
1 R. J. Johnston, D. J. Rossiter and C. J. Pattie, ‘Disproportionality and Bias in the Result of the 2005
General Election in Great Britain: Evaluating the Electoral System’s Impact’, Journal of Elections,
Public Opinion and Parties, 16, 2006, 37–54.
2 Ibid.
3 It even stimulated Lord Baker of Dorking—a former Conservative Home Secretary—to pilot a
Parliamentary Constituencies (Amendment) Bill through the House of Lords (it was never debated in
the Commons) in 2007 which would have both reduced the number of constituencies by 65, created a
uniform electoral quota for the entire UK, and limited variations around the quota to no more than 5
per cent. The debates on this Bill (Hansard, House of Lords, 18 May 2007, Column 399) illustrate
the belief that variations in constituency size contributed substantially to the anti-Conservative bias at
the previous three elections. Many of the Bill’s proposals became official Conservative party policy in
2009 (see, for example, Telegraph View, 12 April 2009: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/
politics/conservative/5145102/Conservatives-plan-to-cut-number-of-MPs-by-65.html).
4 For full details on the redistribution process see D. J. Rossiter, R. J. Johnston and C. J. Pattie, The
Boundary Commissions: Redrawing the UK’s Map of Parliamentary Constituencies, Manchester
University Press, 1999.
5 D. T. Denver, C. Rallings and M. Thrasher, Media Guide to the New Scottish Westminster
Parliamentary Constituencies, Local Government Chronicle Elections Centre, 2004.
20 Parliamentary Affairs
 at U
niversity of Plym
outh on Septem
ber 18, 2012
http://pa.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
A 49
6 As it happens, the new constituencies proposed by the Boundary Commission for Scotland—a
reduction to 59 from the 72 used at the 2001 election—were in place in time for the 2005 election:
only one—with an electorate close to the Scottish average—was won by the Conservatives.
7 Following each review estimates are made of how votes would have been distributed had the new con-
stituencies been in place at the previous general election: see C. Rallings and M. Thrasher, Media
Guide to the New Parliamentary Constituencies, Local Government Chronicle Elections Centre,
1997; C. Rallings and M. Thrasher, Media Guide to the New Parliamentary Constituencies, Local
Government Chronicle Elections Centre, 2007.
8 The rules are set out in full in Rossiter et al. The Boundary Commissions.
9 The Liberal party did propose a subdivision of the island into two constituencies at the time of the
Third Periodic Review, but put its representation in six months late.
10 The Conservatives’ proposal to gain much greater equality—at least at the time when the electoral
data are collected—involves weakening the importance of nesting constituencies within local govern-
ment areas plus removing the ‘special considerations’ and ‘community ties’ rules, but without much
more frequent and quicker reviews they cannot reduce the impact of population change.
11 R. H. Brookes, ‘The Analysis of Distorted Representation in Two-Party, Single-Member Elections’,
Political Science, 12, 1960, 158–67.
12 R. Mortimore, The Constituency Structure and the Boundary Commission: the Rules for the
Redistribution of Seats and their Effect on the British Electoral System, 1950–1987. DPhil Thesis,
University of Oxford, 1992; D. J. Rossiter, R. J. Johnston and C. J. Pattie ‘Integrating and
Decomposing the Sources of Partisan Bias: Brookes’ Method and the Impact of Redistricting in Great
Britain’, Electoral Studies, 18, 1999, 367–78 and 649–50.
13 Our initial attempts at constructing a method for measuring bias in a three-party system can be found
in G. Borisyuk, R. Johnston, C. Rallings and M. Thrasher, ‘Measuring Bias: Moving from two-party
to three-party Elections’, Electoral Studies, 27, 2008, 245–56. A more detailed outline of the method
used here may be found in G. Borisyuk, R. Johnston, C. Rallings and M. Thrasher, A Method for
Measuring and Decomposing Electoral Bias for the Three-Party Case, Political Methodology
Working Papers, 2008, available at http://polmeth.wustl.edu/workingpapers.php?order=datedesc&
title=2008&startdate=2008-01-01&enddate=2008-12-31. It has not yet proved possible to devise a
method for the four-party case that applies in parts of Great Britain.
14 In England at the 2005 general election, for example, Labour obtained one seat for every 28,111
votes that it won, whereas the ratios for the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats were 41,982 and
110,591, respectively.
15 Wasted votes are those cast for a party in constituencies where it loses, and thus make no contribution
to the number of seats that it wins. Surplus votes are those in excess of the number needed to defeat
its main opponent in seats that it wins—in effect, its majorities there.
16 With 20,000 electors in a constituency contested by only two parties, 10,001 votes are needed for
victory; with 25,000 electors, 12,501 are needed. Thus in an area with 100,000 electors and five con-
stituencies, a party with 50,005 votes would win five seats; if that area had only four constituencies,
then it would win only four.
17 The logic for this is given by reworking the data in the previous example. In a constituency with
20,000 electors and a turnout of 90%, 9001 votes would be needed for victory; if turnout were 70%,
then only 7001 would be needed.
18 Johnston et al., op. cit.
19 Borisyuk et al., op. cit.
20 BBC/ITN, The BBC/ITN Guide to the New Parliamentary Constituencies, Parliamentary Research
Services, 1983.
21 www.electoralcalculus.co.uk and www.ukpollingreport.co.uk; see also D. J. Rossiter, R. J. Johnston
and C. J. Pattie ‘Estimating the Partisan Impact of Redistricting in Britain’, British Journal of Political
Science, 27, 1997, 319–31.
22 For a detailed description see Rallings and Thrasher, op. cit, 2007.
23 L. Ware, G. Borisyuk, C. Rallings and M. Thrasher, ‘A New Algorithm for Estimating Voter Turnout
when the Number of Ballot Papers Issued is Unknown’, Electoral Studies, 25, 2006, 59–71.
24 The notional partisan impact of the redistribution undertaken by the Boundary Commission for
Northern Ireland is not included in any of the analyses which follow.
Parliamentary Constituency Boundary Reviews 21
 at U
niversity of Plym
outh on Septem
ber 18, 2012
http://pa.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
A 50
A 51  
 
Appendix 4 
Unequal and Unequally Distributed Votes:                                       
The Sources of Electoral Bias at Recent British General Elections 
 
Johnston, R. J., G. Borisyuk, M. Thrasher, & C. Rallings (2012) Unequal and 
Unequally Distributed Votes: The Sources of Electoral Bias at Recent British 
General Elections. Political Studies, 60 (4); first published online: 22 February 
2012 doi:10.1111/j.1467-9248.2011.00941.x   
40% of the work for the paper was undertaken by Galina Borisyuk 
A copyright permission request to include this paper in the submission was made 
to and granted by the publisher Elsevier. 
A 52  
 
 
Unequal and Unequally Distributed Votes:
The Sources of Electoral Bias at Recent British
General Electionspost_941 1..22
Ron Johnston Galina Borisyuk, Michael Thrasher and Colin Rallings
University of Bristol Plymouth University
Using a method for decomposing electoral bias in a three-party competitive system we contend that discussion
surrounding electoral reform for the House of Commons is largely based on misconceptions about bias sources at
recent British general elections (Northern Ireland is excluded from the analysis). Labour is the principal beneficiary
across these seven elections while the third party, the Liberal Democrats, consistently suffers from a negative bias.
There is no clear pattern for the Conservative party, however; it experienced a positive net bias at two of the
elections but was disadvantaged for the remaining five. For three bias components – electorate, abstentions and
minor party – Labour consistently has a positive advantage and the Conservatives are always disadvantaged.
Abstentions contribute relatively strongly to Labour’s advantage but differences in electorate size are not a major
contributor to overall bias. Despite this, legislation changing the independent boundary review process is predicated
on the assumption that new rules should remove much of the pro-Labour bias. The analysis finds instead that
most bias stems from the geography component: differences in the distributions of each party’s votes and the
translation of votes into seats. Vote distribution is clearly the largest component explaining the Liberal Democrats’
disadvantage but it is also the largest component for both Conservative and Labour parties in five of the last
seven general elections. Although future boundary reviews will remove the effects of unequal electorates,
this process is not designed to address either the impact of turnout/abstention or vote distributions on overall
electoral bias.
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Although electoral reform has been at the core of the Liberal Democrats’ (and their
predecessors’) aspirations for many decades, both the Conservatives and Labour have
generally sustained a commitment to the status quo (although with small elements within
each committed to a move away from the current system). The year 2010 was thus unusual
in that all three parties included some form of reform for parliamentary elections in their
general election manifestos.
The Liberal Democrats’ manifesto maintained their promise to introduce a ‘fair, more
proportional voting system for MPs’ using the single transferable vote (STV); they also
proposed reducing the number of MPs by 150, to 500.1 Labour’s commitment paralleled
earlier flirtations with the idea of voting reform when they feared they could not win again
under first-past-the-post (FPTP) rules.2 In the early 1990s, for example, two reports were
commissioned (Plant, 1991; 1993) which commended a version of the alternative vote (AV)
later adopted for the election of mayors in England.When still uncertain of its prospects in
1997, the party’s manifesto included a commitment to hold a referendum on the parlia-
mentary voting system, following a report from an independent commission. The Jenkins
report (1998) recommended a change to a more proportional system (known as AV+) but
was quickly shelved after the landslide general election victory.
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Labour returned to the issue in 2009 when victory at the forthcoming general election
looked doubtful although a hung parliament appeared a distinct possibility. Gordon Brown
indicated that if re-elected Labour would hold a referendum on changing from FPTP to
AV; this offer was added to the Constitutional Reform and Governance Bill 2010 but the
relevant clauses were removed before it was enacted. It was renewed in the party’s 2010
manifesto and addressed at the Liberal Democrats, the party with most to gain from a switch
to the preferential AV system (which in 2010 would probably have given them a slightly
more favourable outcome than FPTP: Sanders et al., 2011); were there a hung parliament,
Labour would hope to form a coalition with the Liberal Democrats, so the smaller party
was being offered a share of power.3
The Conservatives, with the exception of the small Conservative Action on Electoral
Reform (CAER),4 have always been strongly committed to FPTP. Changing the voting
system has never been a manifesto commitment. However, the party became increasingly
concerned with aspects of how FPTP is structured and operates in the UK and its 2010
manifesto promised measures to negate some of those. These measures were first raised in
a pamphlet published by Conservative Reform (Tyrie, 2004), publicised in a bill presented
to the House of Lords by Lord Baker in 2007 and, with one slight change, repeated in a
proposed amendment to Labour’s Constitutional Reform and Governance Bill 2010 (on
which see McLean et al., 2009). The 2010 manifesto indicated continued support for FPTP
but also an intention to ‘ensure every vote will have equal value by introducing “fair vote”
reforms to equalize the size of constituency electorates, and conduct a boundary review to
implement these changes within five years’, while reducing the number of MPs by 10 per
cent (from 650 to 585).5
In the post-election coalition bargaining, the Conservatives met the Liberal Democrats’
desire for both a reduction in the number of MPs and putting the issue of voting reform
to a referendum, although only AV and not proportional representation. After one of the
longest parliamentary debates, the bill facilitating a binding referendum on a switch to AV
in May 2011, reducing the number of MPs and introducing new rules for delimiting
constituencies was passed on 16 February 2011. Voters rejected the move to AV but other
aspects of the legislation continue.
The contention of this article, however, is that much of the discussion within and
between the various political parties about the operation of the current voting system is
based on fundamental misconceptions so that elements of their arguments for supporting
some form of electoral reform are faulty. To clarify these points we explore recent election
results, using an enhanced method of measuring electoral bias (Borisyuk et al., 2010).
Having identified the nature and extent of the bias affecting each party the different biases
are decomposed to understand their origins better. It appears that much, but not all, of the
current electoral bias will prove immune to changes in either the number of MPs who are
elected or the redrawing of constituency boundaries.
Why Reform? Recent UK Election Results
The reasons why the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats are at present concerned with
the current electoral system are readily appreciated by perusal of the last seven general
election results. Table 1 gives each party’s shares of the UK votes and seats, and the
2 RON JOHNSTON ET AL.
© 2012 The Authors. Political Studies © 2012 Political Studies Association
POLITICAL STUDIES: 2012
A 54
difference between the two.For the Liberal Democrats, the problem is acute: they were very
substantially under-represented in the House of Commons,with much smaller shares of the
seats than votes (the largest deficit being in 1983, when with over one-quarter of the votes
cast they obtained only 3.5 per cent of the MPs).
For the Conservatives, the main problem is seen when comparing their performance in
similar situations with Labour’s. At each election Labour obtained a larger share of the seats
than votes, by an average of 20.6 percentage points at the three it won – in 1997, 2001 and
2005. For the Conservatives, on the other hand, at their four victories (1983–92 and 2010)
the average difference between share of seats and votes was only 13.8 percentage points.
Furthermore, at the three which they lost they obtained a smaller share of the seats than of
the votes (an average of 4.6 percentage points less) whereas when Labour lost it still gained
a greater share of the seats than votes (an average of 6.7 percentage points more). Indeed,
in 2010 Labour had a ‘bonus’ of some 10.7 percentage points in its share of seats compared
to its vote share, which was almost as large as the Conservatives’ bonus as the winning
party (Dorey, 2010). Additionally, with 40.7 per cent of votes in 2001 Labour won a clear
majority (62.5 per cent) of seats but in 1992 the Conservatives, despite winning a similar
vote share (41.9 per cent), barely secured an overall majority of seats (51.6 per cent). The
Table 1: Results of British General Elections 1983–2010
Party
Per cent of
Election Votes Seats (Seats–Votes)
Conservative 1983 42.4 61.1 18.7
1987 42.2 57.7 15.5
1992 41.9 51.6 9.7
1997 30.7 25 -5.7
2001 31.7 25.2 -6.5
2005 32.4 30.7 -1.7
2010 36.1 47.2 11.1
Labour 1983 27.6 32.2 4.6
1987 30.8 35.2 4.4
1992 34.4 41.6 7.2
1997 43.2 63.4 20.2
2001 40.7 62.5 21.8
2005 35.2 55 19.8
2010 29 39.7 10.7
Liberal Democrat 1983 25.4 3.5 -21.9
1987 22.6 3.4 -19.2
1992 17.8 3.1 -14.7
1997 16.8 7 -9.8
2001 18.3 7.9 -10.4
2005 22 9.6 -12.4
2010 23 8.8 -14.2
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voting system in those elections clearly favoured Labour over the Conservatives (as well as
the Liberal Democrats).
Decomposing Unequal Treatment
Why, over a sequence of seven consecutive general elections, has FPTP not only very
substantially discriminated against the smallest of the three main British parties in the
translation of votes into seats but also favoured one of the larger two parties over the other?
A way of ‘unpacking’ such election results both to measure the extent of such ‘favouritism’
and also to understand its origins was proposed by Ralph Brookes (1959; 1960); he termed
the unequal treatment ‘distorted representation’ but it is now termed ‘bias’ by British social
scientists who have adopted and subsequently modified his method.
Brookes’ approach was based on two methodological contentions. First, by using the
widely deployed concept of a uniform swing it was possible to construct a ‘notional
election’ whereby the overall strength of the parties was changed, but their relative strength
(and that of all other parties, plus non-voters) across the country’s constituencies remained
constant. Using Brookes’ two-party bias method in 1997, for example, when Labour won
43.2 per cent of the votes cast and the Conservatives 30.7 per cent, if Labour’s vote share
was reduced by 6.25 percentage points in each constituency and the Conservatives’ share
increased by the same amount, so that each had equal shares (36.95 per cent of the votes
cast nationally) in that ‘notional election’, then Labour would have won 82 more seats than
the Conservatives (Johnston et al., 2001). This can be taken as the extent to which the
election result is ‘biased’ or ‘distorted’, with respect to the two largest parties only: with
equal shares of the votes cast, they would have been very unequally treated in the translation
of votes into seats.6
Brookes’ second contention was that the distorted representation or electoral bias could
be decomposed into different sources – viz., malapportionment/unequal electoral size;
abstention/turnout; impact of small parties; and vote distribution/geography (Johnston
et al., 2001;Rallings et al., 2008). Brookes’ approach (his algebra is set out in Brookes, 1960)
has been adapted (notably by Mortimore, 1992, and Johnston et al., 1999; 2001) and used
to identify the volume and direction of bias at post-SecondWorldWar UK general elections
(e.g. Johnston et al., 2001; 2006).7
A major change in the British electoral scene over recent decades has reduced the value
of the adaptations of Brookes’ approach – the movement away from a two-party to a
somewhat more complex party system (Curtice, 2009; 2010). The growth of electoral
support since 1970 for both the Liberal Democrats and the two nationalist parties (the
Scottish National party [SNP] and Plaid Cymru [PC]) has very substantially eroded the
previous Conservative-Labour predominance. No longer do they together win more than
90 per cent of all the votes cast as they did in the 1950s; instead, their share has fallen to less
than two-thirds (although they still gain a very disproportionate share of the MPs elected
– in 2010, 89 per cent of the 632 elected on the British mainland, for example; Northern
Ireland is excluded from all of the discussion in this article because of its separate party
system). Indeed, only 45 per cent of all British constituencies at the 2010 general election
saw Conservative and Labour candidates occupy the first two finishing positions (Johnston
and Pattie, 2011a); in almost one-third the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats occupied
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the first two places, with Labour and Liberal Democrat candidates relegating the Conser-
vative candidate to third place in a further 15 per cent.
A more suitable methodology for identifying and decomposing electoral bias is needed,
therefore. This is done by reworking Brookes’ algebra so that,while in no way violating the
original method’s axioms, it can identify the impact of how the FPTP electoral system
translates votes into seats for each of the Conservative,Labour and Liberal Democrat parties.
The conventional description of Brookes’ method refers to creation of a ‘notional election’
using uniform swing. However, another interpretation is possible, useful when extending
the method to the three-party situation. This ‘notional election’ could be considered simply
as a technical step for the creation of the norm for comparison (Borisyuk et al., 2010), that
is, a specific symmetrical distribution that retains many important features of the actual data.
Each party’s bias is evaluated by contrasting its actual electoral outcome against that
expected from this symmetrical distribution/the norm.
In the three-party case, the norm for comparison is a combination of six distributions –
one for each of the possible orderings of those three parties (the actual election outcome
and five artificial constructs/‘notionals’). Similar to the two-party situation, each party’s bias
is defined as the difference between its actual result and what is expected from the ‘norm’;
the degree of bias is calculated as the difference between the observed result and the average
outcome over all six notional elections (Borisyuk et al., 2010).
Thus, for example, if the actual election result was that the (C)onservatives, (L)abour and
Liberal (D)emocrats won 40, 35 and 20 per cent of the votes, respectively (thereby finishing
in the order ‘CLD’), the five ‘notional’ elections would recalculate the distribution of seats
using the orderings CDL, LCD, LDC, DCL, DLC, where the three parties in the given
order would obtain 40, 35 and 20 per cent of the votes, respectively. The net bias estimate
for the Conservative party is then calculated by subtracting its average number of seats
across the six ‘elections’ that constitute the norm for comparison (i.e. two elections when
it is in the first position, two elections when it is positioned second and two further
elections when it occupies the third-placed position) from the number of seats actually won
at the general election. A positive figure indicates that the result was biased in the party’s
favour; a negative figure indicates that it was disadvantaged. The net bias towards or against
each party can then be decomposed – again, using a direct extension of Brookes’ algebra.
Four such bias components are identified: three are the non-partisan equivalents of mal-
apportionment (variations in constituency electorates, numbers of abstainers and minor
party votes – including the SNP and PC); the fourth is the geography component, which
evaluates the effect of the distribution of each party’s support across the constituencies. In
addition, we calculate a residual, net interaction component.8
Bias in Britain’s Three-Party System 1983–2010
The net bias figures for each party calculated using this modification of Brookes’ algebra are
in the first column of Table 2. The overall picture has three main characteristics. The first
is that Labour was the main beneficiary across the seven elections, with a positive net
outcome in every case.9 This was smallest in 1997; of the three elections that Labour won,
this had the largest gap in vote share between it and the second-placed party (Table 1), and
its landslide victory was fairly faithfully reflected in the allocation of seats; each of the other
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parties would have been treated similarly if they had won by that margin over the other two.
Labour’s greatest benefits from biases in the system’s operation came in 1983,when it won
its smallest share of the votes across the seven elections but still gained nearly one-third of
the seats, and in 2005, when its share of the votes was less than three points more than the
Conservatives’, but the difference between the two in seats share was nearly 25 percentage
points.
The second salient conclusion is that the Liberal Democrats suffered a net bias against
them at all seven elections. Just as Labour’s smallest advantage came in 1997, so did the
Liberal Democrats’ smallest disadvantage; it was the election where their vote and seat
shares were closest (Table 1). The third salient aspect of this sequence of outcomes is that
there was no consistent pattern in the treatment of the Conservatives: they experienced a
positive net bias at two of the elections (which they won, including 2010) but were
disadvantaged at the other five, substantially so in 2001 and 2005.
Table 2 identifies the size of the separate bias components which, like the net figures, can
be interpreted as the number of seats’ advantage or disadvantage that the parties experi-
enced; a strong feature of Brookes’ approach is its easily interpretable metric. Two features
Table 2: Bias and Its Components at British General Elections 1983–2010
Party Election Total bias
Bias components
G E A MP NI
Conservative 1983 -9 5 -9 -3 -1 -1
1987 5 25 -13 -3 -2 -3
1992 -11 17 -16 -8 -3 -1
1997 -5 13 -10 -8 -2 2
2001 -35 -12 -13 -14 -3 6
2005 -30 -5 -11 -14 -3 2
2010 13 36 -7 -11 -2 -3
Labour 1983 89 75 4 3 1 7
1987 61 39 12 4 2 5
1992 55 18 18 10 3 7
1997 15 -18 15 13 2 2
2001 57 11 15 18 3 9
2005 83 41 10 16 2 13
2010 63 31 6 13 2 11
LibDem 1983 -78 -79 10 4 1 -5
1987 -64 -67 12 -2 2 -9
1992 -42 -43 1 -3 1 -2
1997 -8 -10 -4 -5 -1 12
2001 -20 -12 -4 -9 -1 6
2005 -52 -46 -2 -10 -1 7
2010 -76 -74 1 -6 -1 4
Key: G – geography; E – electorate; A – abstentions; MP – minor parties; NI – net interaction.
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stand out with regard to the three ‘malapportionment’ components – electorate, abstentions
and minor party: Labour has a positive advantage from all of them, whereas the Conser-
vatives are disadvantaged in every case. In general, the Liberal Democrats are disadvantaged
on all three, though they did benefit from winning relatively small constituencies in 1983
and 1987, when a substantial proportion of their victories occurred in Scotland andWales,
where constituencies have traditionally been much smaller than in England.10
Of these three components, the impact of minor parties on the outcomes is, not
surprisingly, small.11That of abstentions is quite substantial, however,with Labour the major
beneficiary and the Conservatives the most disadvantaged. Turnout fell substantially over
the period, reaching its nadir in 2001 at 59.1 per cent of the electorate. As it fell, Labour’s
advantage increased, because the percentage of abstainers tended to be larger in the seats
that it won.12
A similar difference characterises the Labour–Conservative comparison with regard to
the electorate component: Labour benefited from its strength in the relatively small
constituencies, whereas the Conservatives were disadvantaged by their relative strengths in
the larger constituencies. Labour’s advantage comes from three sources. The first is its
relative strength vis-à-vis the Conservatives in the two parts of Great Britain with the smaller
constituencies – Scotland andWales – which was integral to the system.13
Labour also benefits in respect of electorate size bias from variations within each country,
especially England. This is partly a result of the Boundary Commissions producing
constituencies with smaller electorates in Labour’s heartlands (the inner cities and industrial
areas). Because they have had to fit constituencies into the local government map and not
cross county and borough boundaries unless the disparities between neighbouring con-
stituencies are extreme, areas with small entitlements may get smaller seats than the average;
most of those are in urban areas, where Labour tends to be the stronger party, notably but
not only London, which has some of England’s smallest constituencies (as well as some of
its largest; counties tend not to have as many small seats).14 In addition, Labour tends to
benefit most from demographic changes subsequent to boundary revisions being accepted.
The Commissions do not take projected population and electorate forecasts into account:
they use the latest figures available at the start of their redistribution exercises to define
constituencies with electorates ‘as equal as practicable’. As those constituencies ‘age’, some
lose population and others grow – and areas of Labour strength tend to lose people. Thus,
for example, in England the 1997, 2001 and 2005 elections were fought in constituencies
originally defined on 1990 electorate data (i.e. they were some seven years out of date when
first used). Of the 312 constituencies that Labour won at all three contests, the average
electorate remained consistent at around 67,000,whereas in the 154 constituencies won by
the Conservatives at all three it increased from 81,700 through 84,000 finally reaching
85,000 at the 2005 election.
These differences produced by the over-representation of Scotland and (especially after
2005) Wales relative to England, combined with the increasing variation in constituency
electorates over time as they ‘age’, stimulated the Conservatives to propose the changes
implemented in the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Act 2011. These
modified rules require every constituency with four exceptions to have electorates within
+/-5 per cent of a UK-wide electoral quota (this is 76,641 for the first redistribution,
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which began in March 2011).15 In addition, redistributions are to take place every five years
so that each general election (under the Fixed Term Parliaments Act 2011) will be fought
in a new set of equalised constituencies. In this way the Conservatives expect to remove the
disadvantage that they have suffered from constituency size differences at every general
election since 1959 (Johnston et al., 2001).
Why is Geography so Important?
The coalition government will probably remove (nearly?) all of one of the main sources of
bias in the electoral system’s current operation when new constituencies are defined under
the 2011 Act, therefore.16 But, as Table 2 shows, differences in electorate size are not a major
contributor to the overall bias, never exceeding +/- eighteen seats for any one party. Indeed,
at recent elections size differences have been less substantial than those associated with
abstentions. Thus the changes introduced in the new legislation are unlikely to result in
election outcomes that treat each of the parties equally – and certainly not the Liberal
Democrats relative to the other two.
The impact of the geography of abstentions cannot be changed by legislation, other than
by making voting compulsory; it reflects individual behaviour patterns. Hence there is no
reason to explore it further here. But what of the geography component, which Table 2
shows was by far the largest in its impact on the translation of votes into seats at every
election for the Liberal Democrats, and the largest for both Labour and the Conservatives
at five of the seven elections? Furthermore, although this component was consistently a
negative source of bias for the Liberal Democrats – a very large one at two of the elections
– it was positive at some elections and negative at others for the remaining two parties, as
well as varying very substantially in its size, especially for Labour (from +75 to -18).
The geography component, as already noted, reflects the efficiency – or effectiveness –
of a party’s distribution of votes across the constituencies, illustrated by dividing each party’s
achieved votes into three groups:
• Surplus votes are those won in excess of the number needed to win in any constituency
where it occupies first place; they are defined as the party’s total number of votes
obtained minus those won by the second-placed party, minus one. Thus if Labour wins
25,000 votes in constituency x and the Conservatives come second with 22,000,Labour
has amassed 2,999 surplus votes.
• Wasted votes are those won in seats where a party loses (i.e. 22,000 Conservative votes
are wasted in the above example).
• Effective votes are those needed for victory in seats that the party wins – as defined above
(i.e. 22,001 of Labour’s votes in that example).
Surplus and wasted votes do not contribute to winning seats, therefore; only effective votes
do. It is thus in each party’s interests to optimise its campaign efforts by maximising its
effective votes and minimising the other two groups – which it can do by ‘winning small
and losing big’: it should aim to win constituencies by only small majorities and in those
seats where it is destined to lose it should accumulate few wasted votes and lose big. If a
party was highly successful at that strategy, of course, it would be vulnerable to losing seats
at the next election if there is a small swing against it, and would find it difficult to win other
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seats because of the large swing needed to overhaul the leading party locally. Nevertheless,
at any one election, the closer its distribution of votes across the constituencies conforms
to the maxim, ‘win small, lose big’, the better the outcome in the translation of votes into
seats.
Table 3 gives the number of votes for each party and the percentage of these that
were surplus,wasted and effective. The great majority of the Liberal Democrats’ votes were
wasted. They performed best in 2001 and 2005,when some 16 per cent of their votes were
effective, but there was a fall-off in 2010: very few of their votes were surplus. This is the
usual situation in an FPTP system when votes for a third-placed party are not spatially
concentrated.17 Few candidates win an election even in a three-party system with less than
40 per cent of the votes – in part because of the impact of small parties and independents
even if the smallest of the three largest parties does not perform well (see Johnston and
Pattie, 2011a). At the 2010 general election in England, for example, only 78 of the 532
seats contested by all three of the largest parties (i.e. excluding the Speaker’s) were won with
less than 40 per cent of the votes and just nine with less than 35 per cent.18 Not only did
the Liberal Democrats average well below that threshold at all of the elections being
considered here, but they also had a relatively even distribution of their share across all
Table 3: Surplus, Wasted and Effective Vote Shares at British General Elections 1983–2010
Party Election Total votes
Per cent of votes that were
Surplus Wasted Effective
Conservative 1983 13,012,316 31.1 22.5 46.4
1987 13,760,583 31.2 23.3 45.6
1992 14,048,399 28 28.8 43.2
1997 9,591,085 11.3 59.9 28.8
2001 8,355,203 13.8 57.5 28.8
2005 8,782,197 18.7 49.1 32.2
2010 10,703,720 27.1 31.8 41.1
Labour 1983 8,456,934 19.1 49.5 31.5
1987 10,029,807 24.3 46 29.8
1992 11,560,484 24.3 42.6 33.1
1997 13,518,167 41 20.8 38.3
2001 10,724,953 37 23.1 39.9
2005 9,552,436 29.1 30.5 40.4
2010 8,606,524 23.7 41.9 34.4
LibDem 1983 7,780,949 1.3 94.2 4.5
1987 7,341,633 1.4 94.4 4.3
1992 5,999,606 1.3 93.2 5.4
1997 5,242,947 4.6 80.7 14.7
2001 4,814,321 6 78 16.1
2005 5,985,454 5.6 78.5 15.9
2010 6,836,718 4.7 82 13.4
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constituencies: in 2010, for example, they had a mean constituency share of 23.1 per cent,
with a standard deviation of 10.5,whereas for the Conservatives and Labour the comparable
figures were 35.6 (standard deviation 14.6) and 31.0 (15.9), respectively. The geography of
Liberal Democrat support resembles a plateau with few peaks or troughs, so while it
continues to get between one-fifth and one-quarter of the votes it is unlikely to win many
seats – or come close to victory in others.
Turning to the other two parties,one clear difference is between the situations when they
won and lost the election overall. Each had more than 40 per cent of its votes effective in
the elections that it won, and less in those that it lost. The Conservatives had more effective
votes when they won in 1983, 1987 and 1992 (averaging 45.1 per cent) than Labour at the
subsequent three elections (an average of 39.5). The Conservatives also had a slightly higher
percentage of effective votes in 2010 than did Labour with a similar share of the votes
overall in 2005. At the three elections they lost, however, the Conservatives had a smaller
percentage of effective votes (averaging 29.9 per cent) than did Labour at the four they lost
(average 32.1).
One clear indicator of the efficiency of a party’s vote distribution is its number of surplus
votes.On this measure, the Conservatives clearly ‘outperform’ Labour: their average surplus
percentage at their four victories was 29.3, compared with 35.7 for Labour at its three
victories. Similarly, the Conservatives had many fewer surplus votes when they lost (an
average of 14.6 per cent) than did Labour (average 22.8). Labour traditionally had a large
number of very safe seats that it won by substantial majorities – mainly in mining and
industrial areas where not only was its support base large but local trades unions mobilised
substantial numbers of electors to vote. Although much of the industrial and union base to
that support has been dissipated by post-1980 industrial change,nevertheless Labour still has
these strongholds – a lot of them inWales and Scotland – which deliver large percentages
of surplus votes (even if the vote totals there are relatively small, because of both small
electorate size and high abstention rates). This accounts for its large positive geography
component at the 1983 and 1987 general elections (Table 2), and again in 2010. These were
the elections when Labour performed particularly badly (getting around 30 per cent of the
votes) and those relatively safe constituencies ensured that its seats share fell by less than was
the case for the Conservatives in 1997–2005.When there was an overall swing of votes away
from Labour this was not as exaggerated in the decline in the number of seats won as was
the case when the Conservatives experienced a similar loss of support.
So why did Labour do so well in 1997 and 2001, when its seat share was more than 20
percentage points higher than its vote share? Its percentage of wasted votes was small – 20.8
and 23.1, respectively, probably because of tactical voting.During the campaign prior to the
1997 general election Labour and the Liberal Democrats were not only united in their
desire to remove the Conservative government but also close on many policy issues, as both
party leaders reported in their memoirs (Ashdown, 2009; Blair, 2010). Thus there was a
great deal of (implicit and sometimes explicit, at least at the grass-roots level) encourage-
ment to vote tactically where this could assist in the goal of defeating a Conservative
candidate. Estimates suggest that substantial numbers did vote tactically (Johnston and
Pattie, 2011b; Pattie and Johnston, 2010; Johnston et al., 2001, pp. 168–75) so where Labour
was in third place its vote fell relatively, if not absolutely, thereby reducing its number of
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wasted votes: the second part at least of the ‘win small but lose big’maxim certainly applied
then. Tactical voting was again on the (implicit) agenda in 2001, to prevent a Conservative
recovery, but there was something of a ‘tactical unwind’ in 2005 (Fisher and Curtice, 2006).
It reappeared in 2010, however, as a result of further attempts by Labour and Liberal
Democrat supporters to prevent a (large?) Conservative victory, although there were also
some moves by Conservative and Liberal Democrat supporters to prevent a further Labour
government ensuing (Johnston and Pattie, 2010; 2011b).
Skewed Distributions and the Conversion of Votes into Seats
Tactical voting illustrates how (party-induced in many cases) voter behaviour can influence
the frequency distribution of a party’s support across the constituencies. Figures 1–3 show
the vote distributions for Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat parties for all seven
elections since 1983. According to the ‘win small, lose big’ maxim, the most efficient
distribution would be negatively skewed, and the least efficient positively skewed, with the
mode in the region of 45–55 per cent. In a two-party system, a party with just over 50 per
cent of the votes cast and a negatively skewed distribution would win a much larger share
of the seats than of the votes, with the converse for a party having a positively skewed
distribution (Gudgin and Taylor, 1979; Johnston et al., 2001).19 In a three-party system in
which one of them gets a substantially smaller share than the other two, a positive skew is
desirable for that third party since with a relatively small share (<25 per cent) of the votes
nationally a number of constituencies where its percentage is much greater than the average
allows it to win some seats and establish a parliamentary presence. As it grows, however, it
needs to change the shape of its distribution from a positive to a negative skew, which is a
difficult task (although not impossible, as the post-war Labour experience demonstrates: it
had an inefficient positive skew in the early decades, but a much more efficient negative
skew by the 1990s – Johnston et al., 2002). The shape of the Liberal Democrat vote
distribution has posed a considerable problem at recent elections: should the party invest
limited campaigning resources in the relatively small number of seats where they have a
chance of winning, thereby increasing their parliamentary cohort, or should they aim to
broaden the geographical base of their support and build the foundations for shifting to a
negatively skewed distribution (Denver, 2001)? Figure 3 indicates little change over the
period: their geography of support was very positively skewed at all seven elections, a
pattern quite different to Labour’s (which is very platykurtic, with both positive and
negative elements but with a long negative tail, especially in 1997 and 2001 when it
benefited from tactical voting: Figure 2) and the Conservatives’ (which is negatively
skewed: Figure 1).
In a two-party system, where minor parties gain only a very small share of the votes cast
(as in Britain before the 1970s), the interconnection of the two parties’ frequency distri-
butions is crucial in determining the extent of the disproportionality and bias in general
election outcomes. In a three-party system (or even a ‘two-and-a-half party system’, which
is how some commentators describe the current British situation: Laakso, 1979; Siaroff,
2003) the interconnection of the three frequency distributions determines how their votes
are translated into seats, a process further complicated by the impact of the smaller parties,
which won 10 per cent of the votes cast in 2010. As the number of parties – large and
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Figure 1: Conservative Share of Vote
Notes: Each bar corresponds to a percentage point range and the height of the column reflects the number of cases. Coloured
elements represent constituencies where the relevant party won the seat. ‘g1’ and ‘g2’ stand for skewness and kurtosis,
respectively.
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Figure 2: Labour Share of Vote
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Figure 3: Liberal Democrat Share of Vote
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small – increases, so the average percentage of the votes cast needed for victory is reduced
in most constituencies. A share considerably below 40 per cent may deliver a constituency
victory, especially if the three largest parties are all strong contenders. In 2010 only fifteen
constituencies out of the 631 in Great Britain20 had all three parties with 25 per cent or
more of the votes – what might be identified as the ‘three-party marginals’. In a further 78
seats, however, all parties got 20 per cent or more – although in 26 of them the winning
party had a margin of 20 or more percentage points over the second placed and in a further
22 the lead was between 10 and 20 points.
What is crucial for a party in such a situation, therefore, is whether it converts its share
of the votes into winning the seat. Table 4 shows that in 2010 all three parties won all of
the seats where they obtained 45 per cent or more of the votes cast, and there was only one
case where a party won with less than 30 per cent (the Liberal Democrats in Norwich
South).21 Crucial, therefore, is relative success in converting votes into seats where a party’s
share falls between 30 and 45 per cent. In 2010 there were very considerable differences
among the parties in this respect. Labour won virtually all of the seats where it gained
between 40 and 45 per cent of the votes, for example, whereas the Conservatives failed to
win eleven of the 77 where it was in that position, and the Liberal Democrats failed to win
as many as half. It was the same where the parties gained 30–40 per cent of the total; Labour
achieved victory in 38 per cent compared to 26 per cent for the Conservatives and only 11
per cent for the Liberal Democrats.
Why this difference? One possibility is that Labour was more likely to get 30–45 per cent
of the votes in Scottish andWelsh constituencies where the presence of a fourth substantial
party nationally (the SNP and PC, respectively) meant that on average a smaller share of the
votes cast was likely to result in a constituency victory than was the case in England,where
in most constituencies there was no comparable fourth party. (Apart from the three
incumbent independent MPs, all of whom lost their seats, there were only eight English
Table 4: From Votes to Seats at the 2010 British General Election
Party
Per cent of votes cast in constituency
<30% 30–40% 40–45% >45%
Conservative
Won 0 34 66 205
Second 82 97 11 0
Total 218 131 77 205
Labour
Won 0 55 67 136
Second 65 91 4 0
Total 276 146 71 136
Liberal Democrat
Won 1 9 11 36
Second 165 67 11 0
Total 495 78 22 36
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constituencies where at least one of the small party candidates won 10 per cent or more of
the votes).22 Indeed, of the 112 seats where Labour won with 30–45 per cent of the votes,
28 were in Scotland orWales (where it lost just 8 seats with that share of the votes); for the
Conservatives, only 8 of their victories in that vote share band were in Scotland orWales
(where they also lost 14);23 and the Liberal Democrats won 9 of the 18 seats there where
they won 30–45 per cent of the votes.24
Apart from this difference between the three parties in their relative strengths in England,
Scotland andWales, a further difference in their ability to convert a vote share of 30–45 per
cent into a constituency victory reflects their geographies of support. In effect, Labour was
better able to win in the constituencies where the three main parties were relatively equal
– that is, those that came closest to being three-way marginals. This can be illustrated by
computing a simple statistic PCS:
PCS Sqrt shLab shCon shLDi i i i= − ) + −( ) + −( )[ ]33 3 33 3 33 32 2 2. . .
where shLabi, shConi and shLDi are the Labour, Conservative and Liberal Democrat
percentages of the total number of votes cast for those three parties only in constituency i.
This statistic shows how far away each constituency is from the ‘equal shares’ situation
(perfect three-party competition). The smaller the value of PCSi, the more three-way
marginal is the seat. In England, constituencies where Labour obtained between 30 and 45
per cent of the three-party votes had an average PCS of 18 whereas the mean PCS values
in similar Conservative or Liberal Democrat seats were 21 and 25, respectively.On average,
therefore, seats where Labour got 30–45 per cent of the votes in 2010 were also more likely
to be three-way marginals than was the case with the other two parties, hence its higher
conversion rate.25
As the three frequency distributions shown in Figures 1–3 move between elections, as
each party’s constituency average share of the votes changes and, to the extent that the
changes in individual constituencies vary from a uniform swing, the distributions also
change shape, so the conversion rates should alter. Table 5 shows in more detail those rates
for two percentage share bands – 30–40 and 30–45 – at the seven general elections from
1983 on, plus the narrower 40–45 percentage share band;most parties would expect to win
a constituency with that share in a three-party contest. A number of main conclusions stand
out.
At the first three elections the conversion rates for the Liberal Democrats were much
smaller than those for the other two parties in all three bands.Whatever their vote share
between 30 and 45 per cent, the Liberal Democrats were less likely to win the seats than
either Labour or the Conservatives, in some cases by a very large margin: in 1983, for
example, the Conservatives won 88 per cent of the 67 seats where they got 40–45 per cent,
and Labour won 95 per cent of the 59 seats with that share, but the Liberal Democrats’
conversion rate was only 35 per cent of the 17 seats. That party’s best performance was in
1997, when it won 22 per cent of the seats where it gained 30–40 per cent, 42 per cent
where its share was between 30 and 45, and 94 per cent where it was 40–45.But it declined
thereafter.
For the other two parties, the clearest difference is for the 2001–10 elections when
Labour had substantially larger conversion rates in each band than the Conservatives; in
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2005 Labour won 62.2 per cent of the seats where it gained 30–45 per cent of the votes,
and 90.6 per cent of those where its share was 40–45, compared to figures of 28.4 and 78.8
per cent, respectively, for the Conservatives. Prior to that, however, the differences between
the two were slight and largely patternless – although both had very low conversion rates,
even in the 40–45 per cent vote share band, at the 1992 election.
The importance of the geography component to the overall bias in recent UK general
election results – how efficiently each of the parties’ votes are distributed across the
constituencies – is thus a function of two separate factors. The first is the frequency
distribution of each party’s vote shares: the degree and direction of skewness is a crucial
determinant of the efficiency of the process whereby votes are translated into seats. But the
nature of the skewed distributions cannot account for all of the inter-party variation in the
ratios of seats to votes because of variations in the percentages of their votes that were either
surplus,wasted or effective (Table 3). The relative proportions of each party’s votes in those
three categories is apparently largely a function of variations in their success rates at winning
Table 5: Conversion Rates: Percentage of Seats Won by Each Party with Different Shares
of the Vote Total
% of votes 30–40 30–45 40–45
Party Election CR N CR N CR N
Conservative 1983 24.2 128 46.2 195 88.1 67
1987 12.4 67 35.9 170 67.1 73
1992 5.7 106 20.8 178 43.1 72
1997 10.4 183 34.5 275 82.6 92
2001 2.5 162 19.1 225 61.9 63
2005 5.5 145 28.4 211 78.8 66
2010 26 131 48.8 211 86.3 80
Labour 1983 25.7 109 50 168 94.9 59
1987 8.6 93 32.9 152 71.2 59
1992 9.4 95 23.6 157 40.3 72
1997 18.8 69 38.9 108 74.4 39
2001 10.7 75 32.5 114 74.4 39
2005 32.6 92 62.2 188 90.6 96
2010 38.5 148 56.4 218 94.3 70
LibDem 1983 4.7 106 8.9 123 35.3 17
1987 4.2 96 9.5 116 35 20
1992 5.4 56 8.6 70 21.4 14
1997 22.2 45 41.9 62 94.1 17
2001 10 30 40.7 54 79.2 24
2005 14 50 33.8 74 75 24
2010 11.5 78 20 100 50 22
Key: CR – conversion rate (percentage of seats won); N – number of constituencies.
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seats when their vote share falls in the range 30–45 per cent. Below the lower figure, each
party almost invariably failed to win the constituency whereas above that figure victory was
assured (Table 4).
Crucial to appreciating the variations in conversion rates within that vote range is the
nature of the local competitive situation. The likelihood of a party winning a seat if its vote
share lies between 30 and 45 per cent depends on its competitors’ relative performance. If,
for example, Labour had between 30 and 45 per cent of a constituency’s votes and both the
Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats had a substantial share of the total too, then
Labour’s chances of success increased – three-way marginals are necessarily won with
smaller vote shares. In addition, the better the aggregated performance of the minor/other
parties, the smaller the vote share that one of the three large parties needs for victory. In a
close three-way marginal constituency where the minor parties win 10 per cent of the
votes, victory is quite likely for one of the major parties with just 33 per cent; where the
minor parties get only 2 per cent between them, 36 per cent may be needed.On the other
hand, in a constituency where the third party gets only about 15 per cent of the votes, and
where the minor parties win 10 per cent, then a share of around 38 per cent is probably
needed by one of the other two.26
Conclusions
In the context of contemporary electoral reform debates, the analyses presented here have
more than sustained the Liberal Democrats’ opposition to the first-past-the-post system.
The Conservatives have also been disadvantaged at most of the recent elections. Their
analyses of that situation have focused on differences in constituency electorates and the
legislation passed in 2011 is designed to correct that. But the disadvantage they have
suffered from the electorate size component has been small – as has Labour’s advantage –
and although removing its cause would eliminate that bias element, which could be crucial
in a close contest, it does not mean a ‘level playing field’ in future contests between them
and Labour (Thrasher et al., 2011).
The geography of a party’s votes – how efficiently they are distributed across the
constituencies – is crucial to the creation of biased election results in the UK. Part of the
reason – as others have shown (e.g. Gudgin andTaylor, 1979; Johnston et al., 2002) – lies in
the frequency distribution of each party’s vote shares: certain distributions – where the
party ‘wins small but loses big’ – produce better outcomes than others. Vote distribution
profiles for the three main parties since 1983 reflect patterns of voter behaviour (and of
party behaviour in their efforts to mobilise support, which is spatially very variable:Denver
and Hands, 1997; Pattie and Johnston, 2009) which are not readily manipulated. Studies of
campaign effects show that the more intensive a party’s campaign in a constituency the
better, ceteris paribus, its performance there (Johnston and Pattie, 2008), so the geography of
party activity and resources is crucial.27That is open to manipulation at the margin through
the encouragement of tactical voting – and, at the extreme, by parties agreeing not to field
candidates against each other in particular circumstances,which occurred with the Alliance
of the Liberals and Social Democrats in 1983 and 1987.
But as our analyses of conversion rates have shown, the interrelationships of those
distributions is also crucial.Where the contest between all three of the largest parties is
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relatively close, then a seat may be won with less than 35 per cent of the votes – especially
if one or more of the minor parties also performs well. Conversely, a party may capture
above 40 per cent of the constituency vote and still lose to a stronger rival.
In a country where two parties predominate and there is not only either malapportion-
ment or gerrymandering but also the parameters of the first-past-the-post electoral system
(how constituencies are defined) and the geographies of party support show no peculiari-
ties, then election results are largely predictable. But as the situation moves towards a
three-party system, with smaller parties also winning more than a trivial share of the votes,
the election outcomes become less predictable and more likely to be biased. This is the
current British situation and its appreciation calls for a method that can unravel the causes
of bias. That has been achieved here, using a modification of a well-tried measure of bias
in two-party systems to take account of the three-party situation.
Unpredictability is a marked feature of recent British election results, which raises
questions about the electoral system’s ‘fitness for purpose’ (Curtice, 2009; 2010). So much
depends on the interrelationships between a series of geographies; we can successfully
predict what will happen when they interact in particular ways – but not when those
situations will emerge. The minimal electoral reform undertaken by the Conservatives
substantially to reduce variations in constituency size will not change that situation
markedly.
(Accepted: 23 June 2011)
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Notes
1 The manifesto is available at http://www.libdems.org.uk/our_manifesto.aspx [Accessed 19 January 2012].
2 The manifesto is available at http://www.labour.org.uk/labours-Manifesto-for-a-future-fair-for-all [Accessed 19 January 2012].
3 In the negotiations over the possibility of a Labour–Liberal Democrat coalition being formed immediately after the 2010 election,
it is suggested that Labour offered to make the change toAV without a referendum although Mandelson (2010, pp. 548–9) suggests
that holding a referendum in autumn 2010 remained the plan.
4 http://www.conservativeelectoralreform.org/
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5 http://www.conservatives.com/Policy/Manifesto.aspx. Labour responded to these proposals – which it termed gerrymandering
– in its manifesto by promising to establish a ‘non-partisan Parliamentary Boundaries Review to examine the rules for constructing
Parliamentary constituencies’.
6 For the full sequence of bias estimates calculated in that way for the seven elections since 1983 see Borisyuk et al. (2010); Johnston
et al. (2001); Johnston and Pattie (2011a). In addition to this ‘equal shares’ approach Brookes also allowed for a procedure that
involved reversing the shares of the two main parties which gave similar, though not identical, bias estimates.
7 Blau (2001; 2003) has presented a reasoned critique of this approach and proposed an alternative method, which reaches very
similar conclusions about the size, direction and components of the observed bias.
8 The interaction term may also encompass some ‘random noise’ – bias towards or against the particular party that is not identified
with one of the main components.
9 Although we use the term ‘beneficiary’ or ‘advantage’ elsewhere there is no suggestion that a party is deliberately engineering this
situation but rather that it so happens that a given electoral situation is better for it than its rivals. The method of measuring
electoral bias is simply one way of offering a detailed description of parties’ electoral gains and losses.
10 The average constituency in England in 1987 had 68,806 electors; for Scotland andWales the averages were 54,895 and 56,614,
respectively. The constituencies won by the Liberals inWales averaged 51,474 electors; those won in Scotland averaged 51,154.
From 2000 on, Scottish constituencies had to be defined using the same electoral quota as England, but they were still smaller on
average than those in England at the 2010 election (65,500 in Scotland and 71,680 in England) because of the small constituencies
in the Scottish Highlands and Islands where ‘special geographical considerations’ were invoked by the Boundary Commission
during its 2004 redistribution. The averageWelsh constituency had 56,500 electors in 2010.
11 The SNP and Plaid Cymru contested only a minority of the constituencies and – with the exception of the Greens in 2010 and
a small number of independents at the earlier elections – no other parties came close to victory in any constituency.
12 The average turnout in Labour-won seats in 2001 was 56.7 per cent, compared to 63.0 per cent in those won by the Conservatives
and 63.8 per cent in those won by the Liberal Democrats.
13 Wales was guaranteed at least 35 seats in the 1944 House of Commons (Redistribution of Seats) Act and Scotland 71; the figure
for Great Britain should be not substantially greater or less than 613, leaving 507 for England. Over time, the number has grown,
more rapidly in England than in the other two countries but not sufficiently so as to counter differentials in their rates of
population growth. By 2001,Wales had 40 seats, Scotland 72 and England 629. Scotland’s number was reduced to 59 in 2005
as part of the 1998 devolution settlement (see above,Note 10) but Wales’ complement remained unchanged at 40, and England’s
was increased before the 2010 election to 533. Because Labour is relatively stronger inWales and Scotland than in England – it
won 34 of the 40Welsh seats in 2001 (85 per cent) and 56 of Scotland’s 72 (78 per cent), as against 323 of England’s 529 (61
per cent) – it benefits from their smaller constituencies in the votes-to-seats translation, as reflected in that bias component.
14 For example, if the electoral quota were 72,000, a borough with 194,400 electors would be entitled to 2.7 constituencies: it would
be allocated 3, with an average electorate of 64,800; a county with an electorate of 914,400 would be entitled to 12.7; it would
be allocated 13, averaging 70,340 electors. On the other hand, a borough with 165,600 electors would be allocated 2 (against an
entitlement of 2.3) averaging 82,800 each, whereas one with 885,600 (entitlement 12.3) would have 12 constituencies averaging
73,800. The smaller the local government unit the larger the average deviation of constituency electorates from the quota – and
most of the areas with small constituencies tend to be in cities where Labour is the stronger of the two main parties.
15 See the discussion of this in the Boundary Commission for England’s Newsletter 2/2011, available from: http://
consultation.boundarycommissionforengland.independent.gov.uk/publications/#newsletters
16 The exceptions to the +/-5 per cent rule are the Scottish constituencies of Orkney & Shetland (33,085 electors at the 2010
general election), H-Eileanan An Iar (theWestern Isles – 22,266) and the Isle of Wight (which had one seat for 109,966 electors
in 2010, but has been allocated two under the Act).
17 This is the case, for example, with the Bloc Québécois in Canada, which gets a share of the seats commensurate with vote share
because votes are all concentrated in one province (LeDuc, 2007). In the UK, Plaid Cymru’s votes are significantly concentrated
withinWales, so that with 0.56 per cent of the UK total it obtained a reasonably proportional share of the 650 seats with three
(0.46 per cent); the SNP was less successful, however, as with 1.65 per cent of the votes it obtained only 6 seats (0.92 per cent).
18 One was won with only 29.4 per cent: by the Liberal Democrats in a three-way marginal contest (Norwich South),where Labour
won 28.7 per cent and the Conservatives 23.0.The Green party candidate won 14.9 per cent and three others shared the remaining
4.1 percentage points.
19 This was the basis for some of the early attempts to measure ‘electoral bias/distorted representation’ (Gudgin and Taylor, 1979;
Johnston, 1979).
20 The number of seats is one less than the full total of 632 because, in line with established practice, the incumbent Speaker was not
challenged by the main parties.
21 This was a rare ‘three-and-a-half-way marginal’: the Liberal Democrats won 29.4 per cent, Labour 28.7 per cent, the Conservatives
22.9 per cent and the Greens 14.9.
22 The BNP did so in Barking,Dagenham & Rainham, and Rotherham; the Greens did in Brighton Pavilion (which they won) and
Norwich South; and Respect did in Bethnal Green & Bow, Birmingham Hall Green and Poplar & Limehouse.
23 In all eight of the Conservative victories only two parties got over 20 per cent of the votes and in none of these did either the
SNP or PC get over 20 per cent. The Conservatives’ successes in those two countries were all in ‘straight fights’ with Labour.
24 Parts of rural Scotland andWales have long been Liberal heartlands.
25 A similar sequence of values (55.7, 57.3 and 59.8) emerges if the percentage shares used in the formula apply to all parties
contesting the seat rather than just the ‘big three’.
26 Detailed analyses using Mann-Whitney U-tests, not reported here, show that each party was significantly more likely to win a seat
with a vote share in the 30–45 per cent range if either (a) the third-placed party performed well or/and (b) the minor parties
performed well.
27 As exemplified by the Conservatives’ successful target seats strategy in 2010 (Ashcroft, 2010; Johnston and Pattie, 2010).
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VOTER SUPPORT FOR MINOR PARTIES
Assessing the Social and Political Context of Voting
at the 2004 European Elections in Greater London
Galina Borisyuk, Colin Rallings, Michael Thrasher and 
Henk van der Kolk
A B S T R A C T
The context of support for a range of minor parties in the United
Kingdom is identified using ward-level aggregate data from the 2004
European elections in London. Four parties in particular, namely
Respect, Green, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) and
the British National Party (BNP), which collectively obtained 3 in 10 of
all European votes cast in London and performed well at the subsequent
general election in 2005, are considered. Bivariate and multivariate
analyses, employing socio-economic and political variables, show that
for each of the four parties there is an identifiable and reasonably well-
defined ward-level context of support. Regression models help to explain
around three-quarters of variance in vote support. Strong similarities
are found in the context of support for the anti-European Union UKIP
and the far-right, anti-immigrant BNP. Close study of the geography of
support shows that while the spread of votes for minor parties is fairly
homogeneous across some boroughs, in others there is a fair degree of
heterogeneity.
KEY WORDS  elections in London  empirical research  minor political parties
 ward-level aggregate data
Introduction
The 2005 United Kingdom general election saw overall support for main-
stream parties decline and relatively high levels of support in particular for
four minor parties. The anti-European Union, United Kingdom Independence
Party (UKIP) came fourth in the popular vote behind Labour, Conservative
and Liberal Democrat parties, receiving more votes than both the Scottish
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and Welsh Nationalist parties. With candidates in over three-quarters of
parliamentary constituencies, UKIP received 2.2 percent of the nationwide
vote. The Green Party received more than 250,000 votes, 1 percent of the
UK total, virtually doubling its share, while the far-right British National
Party (BNP) polled slightly fewer than 200,000 votes, a total almost four
times its previous best. Although performing less well than the other parties,
the anti-Iraq War Respect Party did capture a seat in inner London. Of
course, comparative analysis shows that the UK, a unitary state using the
first-past-the-post electoral system, with strong party organization and low
electoral volatility, does not provide fertile ground for minor party success
(Gerring, 2005). However, it was not entirely a surprise in 2005 that these
parties should erode the vote share of the three dominant parties – all had
provided a foretaste of their electoral potential in the previous year.
Unfortunately, the extent to which support for such parties is simply a
‘protest vote’ rather than something more substantive cannot be adequately
determined using the standard techniques. The post-election survey conducted
as part of the 2005 British Election Study, for example, comprises 20, 6 and
45 respondents for the Green, BNP and UKIP parties, respectively. A single
respondent, from a survey of over 3000 respondents, gave Respect as their
partisan choice. Such numbers do not permit an in-depth analysis of a
voter’s motives for supporting these parties.
An alternative method would be to use aggregate data. With party vote
share within a relevant electoral area as the dependent variable, the context
of support for minor parties may be examined using a range of socio-
economic and political characteristics as predictor variables. The main
drawback with using aggregate data, of course, is that we cannot study the
motives of individual voters but we can study the social context within
which votes for minor parties are cast. A second drawback is that general
election data are available only at the parliamentary constituency level, each
with an electorate of approximately 68,000. The problems of ecological
inference (EI) are acute when such large units are involved. Moreover,
because minor parties generally contest only a fraction of seats, the number
of cases available for analysis may be rather small.
However, there is an opportunity to study support for minor parties at
an unusually low level of aggregation and where the pattern of contestation
is not an issue. On 10 June 2004, electors across London voted in the
European Parliament elections while simultaneously choosing the Mayor
and Assembly of the Greater London Authority (GLA). Normally, European
election data are only available for the relatively large areas covered by
either a parliamentary constituency or local authority. However, this round
of elections in London used electronic counting procedures and subse-
quently all voting figures for each type of election were made available for
the smallest electoral districts (local council wards). Potentially, these data
constitute an invaluable resource for examining the social and political
context of party support.
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This study is further helped by the particular electoral structure in London.
Three different voting systems were used for the 2004 election (Rallings and
Thrasher, 1999). The London Mayor was chosen by ‘Supplementary Vote’,
while the Assembly election used the Additional Member ‘top-up’ system
(AMS), with each elector receiving two votes: one electing candidates from
single-member constituencies, and one choosing among parties from a
London-wide list. A 5 percent threshold operates, without which both the
BNP and Respect would each have won a seat in 2004. A London-wide list
was used for the European Parliament election. The electoral structure
therefore ensured that all voters within the London region had an oppor-
tunity to cast a ballot for Respect, Green, UKIP and BNP either with their
constituency and/or list vote.
This may partly explain why combined support for the three main parties
(Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat) in the three elections only
ranged between 67 percent and 81 percent (Table 1). The largest combined
percentage occurred at the ‘presidential style’ Mayoral election, widely
perceived as a two-horse race between the Labour and Conservative candi-
dates. Aside from this contest, however, between one-quarter and one-third
of voters cast ballots for minor parties, prominent among these being the
four parties that would later feature at the 2005 general election. In 2004,
Respect campaigned almost exclusively on the Iraq War issue, while the
Greens, although emphasizing environmental protection and climate change,
also voiced opposition to the Iraq invasion. On the centre–right, UKIP
continued its demand for withdrawal from the European Union (EU). The
far-right BNP, strongly opposed to multiculturalism, issued a manifesto for
London that highlighted what the party perceived as ‘uncontrolled immi-
gration’ and ‘bogus asylum claimants’. It did not field candidates in the
Assembly constituencies, but did present candidates for both the London-
wide lists.
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Table 1. Results of the European, Mayoral and Assembly election in London, 2004
London Assembly
Euro Mayor List Const
Party % % % %
Conservative 26.8 29.1 28.5 31.2
Labour 24.7 36.8 25.0 24.7
Lib Dem 15.3 15.3 16.9 18.4
Sub-total 66.8 81.2 70.4 74.3
Respect 4.8 3.3 4.7 4.6
Green 8.4 3.1 8.6 7.7
UKIP 12.3 6.2 8.4 10.0
BNP 4.0 3.1 4.8 –
Sub-total 29.5 15.7 26.5 22.3
All others 3.7 3.1 3.2 3.4
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The 2004 election in London therefore presents a valuable opportunity to
examine the context of support for a range of minor parties while avoiding
the normal deficiencies presented by individual-level survey and/or large-
scale aggregate data. First, we consider existing research to identify the
potential correlates associated with voting for each of the four selected
parties. The second section provides more detail about the data and method-
ology used. In the third section, we develop regression models that high-
light the social and political context of support for minor parties. We go on
to show that examining the spatial distribution of each party’s vote also
reveals features of the geography of support.
Votes for Minor Parties
Support for minor parties may be regarded specifically as an outlet for
voters’ dissatisfaction with the major parties or, more broadly, with party
politics (Belanger, 2004; Denemark and Bowler, 2002; Poguntke, 1996).
According to Belanger, it is the former attitude that mainly forms the basis
for minor party support; the latter leads principally to voter abstention.
Having said this, support for specific minor parties is not just a consequence
of voters temporarily or permanently dissatisfied with the major parties.
According to Gerring (2005), minor parties’ support is also determined by
the institutional and political context. Thus, for example, federalism is
associated with minor parties, partly because of the existence of (regionally
organized) minor parties. By contrast, presidentialism reduces minor party
support because the focus tends to move towards a restricted number of
(partisan) presidential candidates.
Additional to those factors, the literature on second-order elections states
that minor parties are often less visible at the national level than at the
local and the European levels (Reif, 1985; Reif and Schmitt, 1980). This is
because local and European elections are used by some voters displeased
with mainstream parties as an opportunity to be expressive, safe in the
knowledge that the formation of a national government is not at stake.
Finally, the electoral system may have a role in shaping the ‘dissatisfied
vote’ (Gerring, 2005). With single-member districts, for example, voters
behaving strategically will deviate from their most preferred candidate to
vote for the least worst ‘viable’ candidate. This means that even some voters
dissatisfied with one of the major parties will keep voting for these parties
because choosing one of the minor parties brings no advantage (Alvarez and
Nagler, 2000; Cox, 1997). And it is not just voters that are affected; minor
parties can decide not to field non-viable candidates in single-member elec-
toral areas. By contrast, in list systems with large constituencies and virtu-
ally no threshold, such as the Dutch system, there is little reason for voters
to deviate from their most preferred ‘minor’ party, since this party should
at least win some seats. It is mainly sophisticated ‘coalitional’ voting which
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may prompt some voters to deviate from their most preferred minor party
(Cox and Shugart, 1996; Irwin and Van Holsteyn, 2003). In mixed systems
combining both single-member districts and party lists, some voters will
decide to ‘split their ticket’. Part of this will be a consequence of voters and
parties behaving strategically in the constituency part of the elections, but
acting sincerely on the list ballot (Gschwend and Van Der Kolk, 2006).
These findings show why it is interesting to focus on the 2004 elections
in London to understand better the social basis of minor party support. In
national (and local) elections, minor parties in England are hindered by
the use of first-past-the-post, but system effects are different under AMS.
In addition, more voters are willing to vote for a minor party in a non-
parliamentary election, because it gives a clear signal to the major parties
without affecting national government formation. Having said this, it is
useful to summarize what is already known about the social context of
support for UKIP, BNP, the Greens and Respect.
Given polling evidence, it is unsurprising to find some electoral support
for parties that campaign for the country’s withdrawal from the EU.
Opinion polls find that opposition to the EU and further integration is
greater among older respondents (Curtice, 1996; Evans, 1995). This is
confirmed by aggregate data showing a positive relation between the
percentage of older voters and the size of UKIP support (Curtice and Steed,
2000) as well as the proportion of self-employed living within an area
(Curtice et al., 2005).
The BNP favours repatriation of foreign migrants (Margetts et al., 2004)
and seeks to guarantee that native English, Scots, Welsh and Irish remain
the dominant ethnic grouping. During the 1930s, similar sentiments were
expressed by the British Union of Fascists, which succeeded in establishing
pockets of strength in parts of east London and southwest Essex, areas that
now lie within the boundaries of the Greater London Authority (Kushner
and Lunn, 1990; Linehan, 1996; Lunn and Thurlow, 1980; Thurlow, 1987).
More recently, the BNP has achieved local government electoral success
(Renton, 2003), and in May 2006 became the main opposition on Barking
and Dagenham borough council. The 2004 European election saw the party
supported by almost 1 in 20 voters across Britain. Its vote is positively corre-
lated with working-class areas and low levels of formal educational quali-
fications (Curtice et al., 2005), but the BNP is not as successful as UKIP in
securing support among communities with relatively large numbers of small
businesses and older people.
Various analyses of Green voters generally suggest that they tend to be
younger, university educated, less likely to be church-goers, but more likely
to have public sector jobs (Carter, 2001: 92). One study (Knutsen, 2004)
asserts the largely non-religious nature of the British Greens, while another
(Eckersely, 1989) argues that the correlation between support for green
politics and a higher education qualification may be the most important.
Analysis of the 1989 European Parliament election, at which the third-placed
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Green Party posted its best ever result in a nationwide election, found
support for the party strongest in middle-class-dominated areas of southern
England (Pattie et al., 1991). At the same election, the socio-demographic
correlates of support (and activism) among survey respondents were with
young people and those with some form of higher education qualification
(Rudig et al., 1991, 1996). The importance of university education is
confirmed by a review of aggregate data from the European election in
1999, with Green support more associated with middle-class areas domi-
nated by professionals rather than those working in commerce (Curtice and
Steed, 2000). Such patterns of support were again in evidence at the 2004
European election (Curtice et al., 2005).
Little research has been conducted on support for the Respect Party, not
least because it was only formed in 2004 following George Galloway’s
expulsion from the Labour Party. The 2004 European contests provided it
with its first national electoral platform. Aggregate data analysis shows that
the party polled best in areas containing relatively large Muslim popu-
lations. The association between Muslim voters and support for Respect
was most keenly observed in London, where the party captured more than
one in five votes in two of the city’s boroughs. The presence of other ethnic
minorities also appears to have had a positive, though modest, impact on
the vote (Curtice et al., 2005).
This brief review has identified some clear associations between support
for each of the four minor parties and the socio-economic characteristics of
either local authorities or parliamentary constituencies. Areas supporting
UKIP may contain older voters and a higher proportion of small businesses.
The BNP may do better in working-class wards with lower levels of formal
education. Those parts of London leaning towards the Greens should be
associated with younger voters, highly educated, non-Church-going and
possibly working in public-sector jobs. Respect’s supporters are most likely
to be concentrated in areas where the Muslim population is larger and
where other ethnic groups are also located. It will be interesting to discover
whether these relationships are confirmed when ward electoral data are
available for examination.
Data and Methods
For this type of analysis, ward-level data bring distinct advantages over the
usual level of aggregation (constituency or local authority). First, they reduce
eightfold the size of the district available for analysis – the average ward
electorate in London numbers only 8,000. Second, they increase the number
of cases from 32 (the number of local authorities across London, excluding
the Corporation of the City of London)1 or 74 (the number of parliamentary
constituencies in London) to 624 in total. A further benefit is that because
of the timing of the review and implementation of ward electoral boundaries
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in London it is possible to match electoral and census data for the same
units. The 2001 census provides extensive information about each ward
population’s occupational status, educational attainment, housing tenure,
racial origin, religious affiliation and other characteristics. A combination
of these three conditions provides an opportunity for the analysis of support
for minor parties using ecological data. We are not suggesting, of course,
that such data allow us to conclude precisely who votes for minor parties,
but they do help us pinpoint more accurately than before some of the
context, social, economic, political and geographic, of that support.
The dataset contains the votes cast for each candidate (in the case of the
Mayoral election) or party at the 2004 elections. Each elector could vote
up to a maximum of five times, viz., Mayoral first and second votes;
Assembly list and constituency votes; European list vote. For various
reasons, we have chosen to discard all but one of these votes. First, the
Mayoral votes were influenced as much by personality as by partisan choice
– the incumbent, Ken Livingstone represented the Labour Party, but had
been first elected as an Independent (Rallings and Thrasher, 2000). Second,
the BNP did not field candidates in the 14 Assembly constituencies, thereby
largely negating the use of those contests for analysing the overall range of
minor party support. Third, the correlates between each party’s vote share
for the two types of list vote, European Parliament and London Assembly,
range between 0.96 and 1.0. Accordingly, we have chosen to concentrate
on just one of these votes, that for the European Parliament; an analysis
using the Assembly list vote produces virtually identical findings to those
presented here.
Although data were disaggregated for the 624 wards in London, votes
cast either by post or ballots counted by hand were listed separately and
are available only for each local authority. There is no way of identifying
from which wards these particular ballots originated. It happens that the
number of manually counted ballots is extremely small, just 5,098 out of
more than 1.88 million votes cast (0.3 percent), and their distribution may
be regarded as having no consequence. However, the number of postal
ballots is larger, approximately 13 percent of the total vote. The exclusion
of such a substantial amount of data could significantly affect our findings.
However, the pattern of electoral support among postal and in-person
voters in each of the 32 London boroughs is highly correlated, with all co-
efficients higher than 0.9. Furthermore, postal vote shares for minor parties
reflect (have strong linear associations with) the same socio-economic
factors at the local authority level as the in-person vote shares do at the
ward level. We assume, therefore, that the exclusion of postal votes from
the analysis does not affect our findings.
The electoral data were augmented by a range of measures obtained by the
2001 national census. Our choice of measures was informed partly by the
existing research evidence. This highlights the importance of occupational
status, educational attainment, age structure, ethnic composition, as well
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as general indicators of poverty and deprivation (such as car ownership,
unemployment, housing tenure). However, we could not exclude from
consideration that the appeal of one or more of these parties was quite
context-specific and conditional upon election timing. For example, we felt
that Respect would make a specific appeal to Muslim voters. Accordingly,
we include a larger set of socio-economic measures in the initial analysis.
We first examine the distribution of vote share for the four parties across
more than 600 wards. Clearly, if there is little variance then it is unlikely
that differences in ward social characteristics are linked to the level of
support. Next, we consider some bivariate relationships between party vote
and various socio-economic characteristics of each ward.2
We then proceed with multivariate analysis rather than employing one or
other of the methods for EI (for example, see King [1997] and Thomsen
[1987]). Our reasons for eschewing the increasingly popular method of EI
are that we do not wish to restrict the analysis of social context to a limited
set of dimensions (for example, black/white; Muslim/non-Muslim; university
educated or not) and, moreover, given the multiparty aspect of the electoral
situation we felt that current methods for EI were not particularly suitable.
Instead, a series of regression models use each minor party’s vote share as
the dependent variable. The first set of independent (predictor) variables is
based on characteristics taken from the 2001 census. However, given the high
incidence of intercorrelation among these variables, we decided to reduce
them to a smaller number of structural principal components or factors.3 The
factor scores are then used as the independent composite variables. Finally,
we add independent variables that provide the political context for each
ward, either in terms of a minor party having had some prior ward electoral
profile or as a measure for capturing the existence of ‘protest’ voting. These
variables include for the 2002 local council elections whether or not a minor
party contested the ward and which main party (Labour or Conservative)
won all available seats (London uses two and three member wards for local
elections). Finally, we use Geographical Information Systems (GIS) to examine
the geography of support for minor parties at the 2004 election.
Analysis and Discussion
Table 2 gives the distribution of vote shares at the 2004 European Parlia-
ment elections in London for both major and minor parties, while Figures
1a–d (discussed in more detail below) show the spatial distribution of votes
for the minor parties only. It is clear from the minimum and maximum
values that support for all parties ranges relatively widely. It is also apparent
that support for the minor parties is skewed towards the lower end of the
range. For example, although the BNP has a minimum value vote share of
0.6 percent and a maximum value of 21.9 percent (Garden Suburb in Barnet
and Goresbrook in Barking and Dagenham, respectively), the data range
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has a relatively small standard deviation of 3.5. The vote shares of the Greens
and UKIP reveal a similar pattern of support. The most dramatic variation
in vote share is that for Respect. In two wards (Harefield in Hillingdon and
East Wickham in Bexley), its vote was just 0.2 percent, but in another
(Green Street West in Newham) it was as high as 47.0 percent. Of course,
the skewed nature of the data should assist our objective of identifying more
precisely the areas where support for these parties is either relatively small
or relatively large.
A broad range of bivariate relationships between ward vote shares and
socio-economic characteristics is examined in Table 3. With just two excep-
tions, all the correlations are statistically significant (with p < 0.001). Strong
observed bivariate relationships, i.e. correlation coefficients with an absolute
value of 0.6 or higher (Anderson and Finn, 1997) should be noted.4
The interplay in support between the parties shows a strong and positive
relationship between UKIP and BNP – in other words, wards that supported
one of these parties also tended to support the other. By contrast, there is an
equally strong, although inverse, relationship between Respect and UKIP:
where one party did relatively well, the other performed relatively poorly.
The Green vote is also negatively correlated with both BNP and UKIP
support. Given their respective ideological and policy positions, Respect and
the Greens are more likely to have drawn support from left of centre voters,
while the BNP and UKIP may have had more appeal to centre–right voters.
More intriguing relationships can be found, however, when the change in
vote share for major parties between the 2002 local elections in London and
2004 is taken into account. Although the correlations are less strong, the
worse Labour’s performance in 2004 compared with 2002, the greater the
support for both Respect and the BNP in 2004. There are also statistically
significant negative associations between the Conservatives and UKIP and,
more surprisingly, between the left of centre Liberal Democrats and both
right-wing minor parties, the BNP and UKIP.
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Table 2. Distribution of European vote shares for each party, 2004 (n = 624)
Mean Minimum Maximum SD
% % % %
Major parties
Conservative 24.6 7.0 58.2 11.0
Labour 25.5 7.4 63.4 9.2
Lib Dem 15.5 5.5 37.0 5.8
Minor parties
Respect 5.3 0.2 47.0 5.8
Green 8.8 2.4 26.9 4.5
UKIP 12.4 2.9 28.1 5.7
BNP 4.3 0.6 21.9 3.5
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Table 3. Correlations between party support and census characteristics (logit
transformed)
Respect Green UKIP BNP
Party support
Respect 1.00 0.32 –0.73 –0.33
Green 0.32 1.00 –0.59 –0.59
UKIP –0.73 –0.59 1.00 0.79
BNP –0.33 –0.59 0.79 1.00
Change in vote 2004–2002
Conservative 0.22 0.32 –0.21 –0.04a
Labour –0.31 0.18 –0.04a –0.37
Liberal Democrat 0.18 0.19 –0.36 –0.36
Census characteristics
Age
Aged 18–24 0.62 0.27 –0.52 –0.25
Aged 65+ –0.68 –0.42 0.66 0.33
Education
No academic or professional qualification 0.19 –0.44 0.28 0.70
Degree qualification (level 4/5) 0.23 0.72 –0.64 –0.83
Occupation
Standard occupational classification (SOC), –0.02 0.65 –0.42 –0.73
Groups 1–3 (from managers and senior 
officials to associate professional and 
technical occupations)
SOC Groups 4–7 (from administrative and –0.12 –0.67 0.52 0.73
secretarial occupations to sales and customer 
service occupations)
SOC Groups 8–9 (from process, plant and 0.24 –0.48 0.21 0.64
machine operatives to elementary occupations)
Unemployed 0.75 0.27 –0.54 –0.07
Approximated social grade, AB: Higher and –0.24 0.46 –0.22 –0.65
intermediate managerial/administrative/
professional
Approximated social grade, C2: Skilled manual 0.01 –0.58 0.42 0.73
Housing
Private rent 0.49 0.58 –0.71 –0.73
Owner-occupier –0.60 –0.49 0.56 0.21
Deprivation
Deprived in housing dimension 0.76 0.42 –0.72 –0.36
No car in household 0.64 0.52 –0.57 –0.23
Three or more cars in household –0.63 –0.56 0.57 0.23
Residential mobility
Residential migrant (from within UK) 0.43 0.68 –0.65 –0.61
Ethnicity
UK born –0.75 –0.38 0.84 0.65
Non-white 0.84 0.12 –0.71 –0.33
New Commonwealth (Ethnic group: Indian/ 0.68 –0.13 –0.46 –0.21
Pakistani/Bangladeshi)
Religion
Christian –0.77 –0.21 0.74 0.49
Muslim 0.92 0.19 –0.68 –0.31
No religion –0.17 0.69 –0.01 –0.12
a Non-significant correlation.
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Turning to the socio-economic correlates of minor party support, the
extremely high correlation between the Respect vote and the recorded
Muslim ward population shines out. Conversely, there is an inverse corre-
lation between Respect’s vote and the proportion describing their religious
affiliation as Christian. This suggests that religious differences may be influ-
ential in shaping certain aspects of the party system, at least regarding
patterns of voting in supra- and sub-national elections.5 Other strong rela-
tionships show that Respect is positively associated with a non-white popu-
lation, younger rather than older voters, with areas of high unemployment
and other economic deprivation, and low levels of owner occupation. The
strongest correlations between the Green vote and social context are with
the proportions of the population having a degree level qualification and
stating no religious affiliation. There are also notable correlations between
the party’s vote share and the numbers working in managerial or professional
occupations, and with the presence of those who have recently moved from
elsewhere in the UK. The absence of any strong correlation between their
vote shares, and the different loadings on the religious/non-religious dimen-
sion, further suggest that Respect and the Greens were not in competition
in the same wards for the ‘left’ minor party vote.
Support for both UKIP and BNP appears to be negatively related to the
percentage of people with high levels of educational attainment. Similarly,
neither party performs well in areas where the population is relatively
mobile or where a high proportion of properties in the private rented sector
are sited. Both parties, understandably given their respective policy state-
ments, fare best in areas where the proportion of UK born residents is
highest. Although no census measures show opposite signs in the bivariate
relationships for these two parties, there are other socio-economic charac-
teristics where the pattern of association is different. For example, the UKIP
vote more strongly correlates with an elderly and Christian population,
whereas BNP support is more associated with wards with a high proportion
of manual workers and low levels of educational attainment. Allied with the
fact that the two parties seem to do best in the same wards (compare Figures
1c and 1d), this suggests that BNP and UKIP might have campaigned in
similar areas, but targeted quite different categories of supporter. It will need
multivariate analysis to try to distinguish those areas that show a preference
to one rather than the other of these parties.
In order to capture better the context of support for all four parties, we
undertook a multivariate regression analysis using each minor party’s vote
share as the dependent variable and, initially, ward-level census character-
istics as predictors. To avoid multicollinearity the logit transformed census
variables were subjected to a factor analysis. The core idea behind this
procedure is the assumption that observed variables (in our case, census
variables) could be considered the result of interplay (linear) between several
mutually independent latent factors. The factor analysis was restricted to
those socio-economic variables (categorized according to age, education,
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housing and occupation, etc., domains) which demonstrated stable factor
solutions following a random selection of sub-samples of wards. Using the
principal components procedure, four common factors were extracted (see
Table 4). The factor loadings for the first factor, which explains 47 percent
of the total variance, highlight areas with large non-white populations
adhering to an ‘eastern’ religion in contrast to those with high numbers of
UK born and Christian or non-religious citizens. We term this factor, ‘religious
minorities’. The second factor (accounting for 19 percent of the variance)
focuses on economic deprivation, with unemployment, renting property and
household overcrowding all featuring strongly. This second factor is termed
‘economically deprived’. The third factor (16 percent of the variance) iden-
tifies a young, mobile population (‘young mobile’), and the fourth factor
(6 percent) picks up areas associated with a lack of educational qualifica-
tions and a low number of self-employed residents (‘low status employees’).
Factor scores for each ward were calculated and used as the predictor vari-
ables in the regression models.
These newly derived variables are initially employed as predictors for the
vote share of the main parties (Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat).
The purpose here is to test whether the derived factors are useful for the
modelling of party support in 2004. For reasons of consistency we use logit
transformed vote share although the argument for transformation is less
compelling here than for the smaller parties.6 The results (Table 5) show
that the models explain 70 percent and 60 percent of the variance in Conser-
vative and Labour Party vote, respectively.7 Modelling the Liberal Democrat
vote share proved more difficult – accounting for only 33 percent of the
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Table 4. Factor loadings of selected census characteristics on four orthogonally
(varimax) rotated factors
Factors
Religious Economically Young Low status
minorities deprived mobile employees
Eastern religion (Hindu, Sikh, Muslim) 0.94 0.09 0.15 0.14
Non-white 0.85 0.33 0.22 0.21
Christian –0.85 –0.22 –0.21 0.06
Born in UK –0.75 –0.38 –0.39 0.26
No religion –0.72 0.38 0.40 –0.23
3+ cars –0.09 –0.88 –0.37 –0.07
Social housing 0.01 0.86 0.09 0.35
Unemployment 0.32 0.84 0.17 0.30
Population density 0.25 0.72 0.24 –0.20
Residential migration 0.11 0.33 0.81 –0.36
Aged 18–24 0.40 0.27 0.71 0.20
Aged 65+ –0.33 –0.49 –0.61 –0.17
Self-employed –0.10 –0.13 –0.20 –0.91
No educational qualification 0.08 0.21 –0.40 0.84
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variance. However, this finding is not wholly discouraging. Previous attempts
at modelling the party’s vote using aggregate data have met with a similar
lack of success (Dorling et al., 1998), and even results using survey derived
individual-level socio-economic characteristics have been disappointing
(Clarke et al., 2004). We are confident, therefore, that the derived factors
are reasonably good predictors of party support.
The results of the regression modelling for minor parties are given in Table
6. The explained variance ranges from a high of 82 percent for Respect to
a low of 70 percent for the Greens. Examination of the standardized beta
coefficients shows that the four factors contribute in different ways in each
of the models. The most important factor for Respect’s vote, as might be
expected from the earlier bivariate analysis, is the religious minorities factor.
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Table 5. Regression model of main party support
Dependent Conservative Labour Liberal Democrat
R2 (adjusted) = 0.70 0.60 0.33
Unstandardized Standardized B (SE) Beta B (SE) Beta
coefficients, coefficients, 
B (SE) beta
(Constant) –1.21** (0.01) –1.12** (0.01) –1.77** (0.01)
Religious –0.11** (0.01) –0.18 0.24** (0.01) 0.49 –0.08** (0.01) –0.18
minorities
Economically –0.36** (0.01) –0.58 0.22** (0.01) 0.43 0.06** (0.01) 0.13
deprived
Young mobile –0.13** (0.01) –0.21 0.10** (0.01) 0.20 0.15** (0.01) 0.35
Low status –0.33** (0.01) –0.51 0.19** (0.01) 0.36 –0.18** (0.01) –0.41
employees
**Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level.
Table 6. Basic regression model of minor party support
Dependent Respect Green UKIP BNP
R2 (adjusted) = 0.82 0.70 0.81 0.75
B (SE) Beta B (SE) Beta B (SE) Beta B (SE) Beta
(Constant) –3.29** –2.45** –2.07** –3.38**
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Religious 0.65** 0.68 –0.07** –0.14 –0.30** –0.58 –0.28** –0.37
minorities (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Economically 0.47** 0.48 0.27** 0.50 –0.24** –0.44 –0.10** –0.13
deprived (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Young mobile 0.29** 0.30 0.25** 0.47 –0.22** –0.41 –0.28** –0.37
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Low status 0.13** 0.13 –0.25** –0.45 0.17** 0.30 0.54** 0.68
employees (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
**Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level.
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The same factor has a similar ranking in the UKIP model but the sign on the
coefficient is reversed. Although the economically deprived factor is of
principal importance in modelling the Green vote it is closely followed by
the young mobile (positive sign) and low status employees factors (negative
sign). Low levels of formal educational attainment and lower levels of self-
employment are characteristics of those areas that lend support to the BNP.
Areas having a high proportion of young residential migrants and ethnic
populations are not, as expected, fertile territory for the anti-immigrant,
anti-multicultural BNP. Similar wards tend to support UKIP candidates also,
although the different size of the betas on both the economically deprived
and low status factors could suggest that UKIP may be drawing its support
from more affluent areas than does the BNP.
To test whether the impact of socio-economic factors on support for these
two apparently similar parties is significantly different, we examined the
difference in logit transformed vote shares for UKIP and BNP. If a factor has
the same explanatory power for both parties then its impact on variations
for the new dependent variable (difference in logits) will be non-significant.
If, however, these differences can be explained by the factors, we should be
able to say something more about the differences between the two parties.
In effect, a difference in the logit transformed vote shares of small parties
approximately equals the logarithm of the ratio between their shares.8 Table
7 presents a model for the explanation of the variability in the ratio between
UKIP and BNP shares. It shows that only the religious minorities factor is
non-significant at the 0.01 level (but reaches significance at the 0.05 level).
It is clear that the fourth factor, the lack of an educational qualification and
absence of small businesses, plays a critical role in a model that accounts
for 69 percent of the overall variance in the difference between UKIP and
the BNP. Given the negative influence of the factor, and taking into account
that the UKIP vote share is always higher than the BNP share, we should
expect a smaller difference between UKIP and BNP in a ward that has a
higher factor 4 score (higher proportion of low status employees). Factors
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Table 7. Regression model of differences between support for UKIP and BNP
Difference
Dependent UKIP/BNP
R2 (adjusted) = 0.69
B (SE) Beta
(Constant) 1.31** (0.01)
Religious minorities –0.03* (0.01) –0.05
Economically deprived –0.14** (0.01) –0.29
Young mobile 0.06** (0.01) 0.14
Low status employees –0.37** (0.01) –0.76
**Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level.
*Coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level.
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2 and 3 make a much smaller impact on the dependent variable, although
the latter does have a positive association. This suggests that areas with a
young mobile population may express a stronger preference for UKIP over
the BNP. Overall, therefore, it appears that the BNP gets closer to UKIP in
winning support in areas characterized by populations with low educational
qualifications and lower than average numbers of self-employed.
Interestingly, there are clear differences in the types of areas supporting
the Conservative and UKIP parties. For the Conservatives, the regression in
Table 5 shows a negative sign for low status employees, but the sign is
positive for UKIP in Table 6. Furthermore, the two factors that contribute
most towards explaining variability in the Conservative vote are associated
with economic conditions, whereas for UKIP the most significant (and
negative) factor is religious minorities. On the other hand, there are scant
differences between areas that opted for Labour and Respect.
Thus far the analysis has considered only the social context of support
for parties. Support can, of course, also be influenced by a ward’s political
context. We might expect, for example, that a minor party would benefit in
2004 from having contested a ward at a previous contest. Accordingly, for
each party, we coded the variable ‘2002 candidate’ as ‘1’ when it had at
least one candidate in the ward at the 2002 London borough elections, and
‘0’ when it did not.9 Another set of variables assesses the direction of any
protest vote that minor parties may have captured. Party control in each
ward is divided into one of three categories – first, where Conservatives won
all the available seats; second, where Labour did so; and third, all other
cases.10 This dimension is presented as two dummy variables – ‘Conserva-
tive ward’ and ‘Labour ward’.
All three new measures are included in the extended regression models in
Table 8. It is clear that the addition of these particular political variables
does not generally improve the models, with the possible exception of Green
support where the adjusted R2 value rises from 0.70 to 0.74. However,
whether or not a party fielded candidates at the previous local elections in
2002 does appear to have a statistically significant impact on levels of
support for both the Greens and BNP. We should interpret the value of the
coefficient associated with the dummy variable as follows. Given two wards
with identical socio-economic compositions, but where a Green candidate
contested only one of the wards in 2002, then the party’s vote share in that
ward in 2004 will be at least 16 percent larger than in the ward where no
candidate contested in 2002.11 A similar calculation shows that the impact
of the BNP contesting a ward in 2002 is even greater. Where the BNP had
contested at the prior local elections we should expect its vote share to be
at least 24 percent larger than in a comparable ward which did not have a
BNP candidate in 2002.12 We expected that the level of support for minor
parties might also be affected by the prevailing political complexion of each
ward, i.e. Conservative, Labour or other. Holding socio-economic charac-
teristics constant, it appears that in Labour wards support for Respect and
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the Greens is higher and support for UKIP and BNP is lower. Conversely, in
Conservative wards support for UKIP and BNP is higher while for Respect
and the Greens it is lower. However, these findings are only statistically
significant for the Green Party. Overall, therefore, these regression models
indicate that the relative impact of aspects of the political context of a ward
is rather small once social composition factors are taken into account.
At this point it is interesting to be reminded of the similarities between
this analysis of the European vote in London and earlier research that
examined the country as a whole, at a much higher level of aggregation
and largely using only bivariate analysis (Curtice et al., 2005). In both
studies, support for the Respect Party is highly correlated with the proportion
of Muslims and other minority ethnic populations. Multivariate analysis
indeed confirms that this is the most important factor for estimating the
party’s level of support. Green Party support is associated with the university
educated, but our bivariate analysis does not find a strong correlation with
younger people as such. However, the multivariate analysis shows that
young residentially mobile communities, areas of social deprivation and
social housing show support for the Greens, while communities associated
with low status, poorly educated employees are not fertile ground for the
party.
Both studies find older people associated with UKIP, but for London alone
we did not find a strong relationship with the presence of self-employed
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Table 8. Extended regression model of minor party support
Dependent Respect Green UKIP BNP
R2 (adjusted) = 0.82 0.74 0.81 0.76
B (SE) Beta B (SE) Beta B (SE) Beta B (SE) Beta
(Constant) –3.30** –2.53** –2.06** –3.38**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Religious minorities 0.64** 0.67 –0.10** –0.19 –0.29** –0.56 –0.27** –0.37
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Economically 0.45** 0.45 0.22** 0.39 –0.23** –0.42 –0.09** –0.12
deprived (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Young mobile 0.28** 0.29 0.22** 0.40 –0.21** –0.40 –0.28** –0.37
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Low status 0.11** 0.11 –0.28** –0.51 0.18** 0.33 0.54** 0.68
employees (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Party’s candidate 0.18** 0.17 0.04 0.02 0.27** 0.06
at 2002 election (0.03) (0.03) (0.09)
(dummy variable)
Conservative ward –0.06 –0.03 –0.13** –0.11 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01
(dummy variable) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Labour ward 0.07 0.04 0.06* 0.06 –0.05† –0.05 –0.03 –0.02
(dummy variable) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
**Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level. *Coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level. †Actual p-value is 0.056.
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workers. UKIP’s vote is inversely related with Muslim and non-white popu-
lations. The absence of formal educational qualifications and the proportion
of manual workers are strong correlates with BNP support in both London
and elsewhere. However, the regression modelling shows that the presence
of low status employees is the most powerful predictor of the BNP vote.
Importantly, the analysis employing only local authority-level data concluded
that while BNP support was strong in areas with large non-white and Asian
populations across parts of northern England and the West Midlands, that
pattern was not evident for London (Curtice et al., 2005). We can confirm
that this finding is robust even at much smaller levels of aggregation.
Although it is known that using different geographical scales can some-
times produce rather different research findings (Fotheringham and Wong,
1991), in this case we get largely similar results to those of the earlier study
by Curtice and colleagues. Had the pattern of minor party support within
each borough been homogeneous across all wards, then it is unsurprising
that two studies using different levels of aggregated data should produce
similar conclusions. But when we map minor party support for all London
wards (see Figures 1a–d),13 it is apparent that within London boroughs
there are rather different patterns of support that, by definition, could not
be identified using local authority aggregate level data alone. For example,
although Respect polled a virtually identical vote share (11 percent) across
the boroughs of Hackney and Waltham Forest (Figure 1a), the variability
in ward shares is very different (standard deviations 3.3 and 6.2, respec-
tively). In both Southwark and Wandsworth (Figure 1b) the Greens polled
11 percent, but the standard deviation in Southwark (4.4) is two and a half
times higher than in Wandsworth (1.7). For UKIP (Figure 1c), we can
consider two pairs of London boroughs which show similar patterns of
differences. For both Bromley (UKIP vote share 19 percent, SD = 4.3) and
Barking and Dagenham (22 percent, SD = 4.1), the standard deviation in
ward level support is virtually twice that found across Bexley (23 percent,
SD = 2.3) and Sutton (18 percent, SD = 2.1) even though the borough level
vote shares for UKIP are roughly comparable. Similarly, in Newham and
Bromley (Figure 1d), while the BNP vote is virtually identical to the support
across London as a whole (4.7 percent) the variability in Newham (3.0) is
almost twice that in Bromley (1.7). Close study of the geography of support,
therefore, shows that while the spread of votes for minor parties is fairly
homogeneous across some boroughs, in others there is a fair degree of
heterogeneity.
Although mapping minor party support in this way provides important
insights into the distribution of support, it also produces some surprising
puzzles. For example, the regression models generally show a good fit to
the data, with levels of explained variance ranging from 74 percent to 82
percent. Moreover, there is no evidence of multicollinearity; the size and
direction of effects from the independent variables are intuitively correct.
The number of outliers14 is also commensurate with the size of sample.
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Standard techniques for the analysis of residuals do not reveal a problem –
there is no substantial deviation from normality and no clear patterns in the
scatterplot of residuals against values of the dependent variable. However,
after mapping the residuals it is obvious that they tend to cluster – areas
where the model underestimates a party’s share group together. The same is
true for areas where vote share is overestimated. Admittedly, most residuals
are very small, but nevertheless the pattern suggests some sort of spatial
dependence. The existence of spatial autocorrelation is confirmed by the
Moran statistics,15 which serve to characterize overall spatial correlation
(Lee and Wong, 2001). We conclude from this that there is some omitted
predictor(s) in the models; there is something in the ‘geography of support’
that our regression models are failing to capture.16
But this takes us into very deep waters indeed. Should we agree with King
(1996), in saying that the value in exploring the political geography partly
lies in helping political scientists to understand more about aspects of their
data? In short, it is not so much a case that context matters but rather more
a question of trying to understand better those factors, for example, the
effects of party canvassing and campaigning, which are revealed from
mapping the geography of party support. Or is it that we should lean more
towards explanations such as ‘neighbourhood effects’ (Johnston et al., 2004)
in order to appreciate why the residuals from what appear to be reasonably
specified regression models should cluster rather than be randomly distrib-
uted? Unfortunately, the available data do not permit us to test either of
these hypotheses.
Conclusions
Access to this unusual dataset has helped to identify and clarify the social
and political contexts of support for minor parties, which in 2004 captured
roughly one in four votes in London. They each appear to have identifiable
bases of support which, in turn, fit with the ideological and policy stances
they have adopted. The analysis confirms a religious cleavage; areas with
large Muslim populations were more likely to express support for Respect,
while Christian populations did not. Respect also polled well among areas
with younger voters, areas of unemployment and low owner occupation
households. It still appears that support for the Greens is strongest among
those with a degree qualification, those working in professional and mana-
gerial occupations and residential migrants. Separating apart those areas
that swung towards either UKIP or BNP proved a fairly difficult problem.
Although votes for UKIP outweigh those for the BNP, the relative distri-
bution of support is, as the maps clearly show, remarkably similar. Regres-
sion models using factor scores suggested that UKIP, more than the BNP, was
drawing support from more affluent areas. Using difference in support for
these two parties as the dependent variable showed that areas characterized
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by low educational qualifications and low levels of self-employed occupations
were also wards where the BNP vote was closer to the support enjoyed by
UKIP. Our analysis also showed the importance of having fought a prior elec-
toral campaign. For both the Greens and BNP the ward vote was notably
larger following a local election campaign. This may have consequences for
these and similar parties contemplating whether or not to field candidates at
future local elections.
The analysis, however, has raised other questions that aggregate data
analysis alone is ill-suited to answer. To what extent, for example, are such
levels of voting for minor parties simply a function of political protest and
to what extent are they symptoms of a more profound disengagement with
mainstream parties? The 2005 general election too resulted in a higher
proportion of votes cast for parties outside the political mainstream, but, as
we noted earlier, the small number of people recorded in the British Election
Study as supporters of these particular minor parties does not permit a
thorough analysis. There is some evidence though that repeated oppor-
tunities to vote for one of the smaller parties bring electoral dividends. For
example, both the Greens and BNP had a higher than expected level of
support in London in 2004 in those wards which they had previously
contested at the 2002 borough council contests. Another round of London
borough elections took place in May 2006 and we shall compare these
results with the 2004 contests in order to understand better the context of
support for these minor parties.
Notes
Earlier versions of this article were presented at seminars at Trinity College, Dublin and
Nuffield College, Oxford. We are extremely grateful for contributions from seminar
participants and also for comments and suggestions from this journal’s referees.
1 The Corporation of the City of London covers the financial area of the city,
where the pattern of local government administration and electoral competition
is different compared with other parts of the capital. Accordingly, we exclude
this area from our analysis.
2 Histograms of vote shares for the four parties across electoral wards show
extremely skewed distributions, with many cases concentrated on the left side of
the range. The skewed bounded data might cause a critical problem when applying
correlation and regression analysis techniques, each of which require an assump-
tion of normality in the data. Accordingly, all vote shares were transformed using
a logit transformation of the form [ln(p/(100 – p)], where ln denotes the natural
logarithm and p the percentage share. This transformation was chosen because
it disperses values near the boundaries and provides a more normal distribution
than occurs with the untransformed data (Atkinson, 1985). Some of the 2001
census characteristics for each London ward also show skewness in the data (for
example, social housing, ethnic minorities and religion). Subsequently, the census
variables were also logit transformed.
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3 Factor analysis attempts to identify underlying latent variables, or factors, that
explain the pattern of correlations within a set of observed variables (Gorsuch,
1983).
4 Variables that did not have a correlation with an absolute value of 0.6 (or higher)
with at least one minor party are excluded completely from the table.
5 Indeed, the religious cleavage may be identified from voting at the 2005 general
election. In a number of parliamentary constituencies with relatively large
Muslim populations, candidates from the Respect Party performed rather well.
In Bethnal Green and Bow, the Labour incumbent was defeated by the party’s
leader, George Galloway.
6 All analyses reported in this article relate to logit transformed variables, which follow
a Gaussian distribution. The findings remain valid when non-transformed variables
are used (available from the authors on request). However, for minor parties, there
is a special reason for applying logit transformation (see Thomsen, 1987).
7 As the size of each ward varies between 4,000 and 12,000 electors, ward elec-
torate was used for weighting purposes in all regression models.
8 We can demonstrate this point as follows:
logit1 – logit2 = ln(share1/(100-share1)) – ln(share2/(100-share2))
= ln(share1/share2/((100-share1)/(100-share2)))
= ln(ratio/(1 – (ratio – 1)/(100/share2–1)))
~ ln(ratio) if share2 is small.
9 Most wards in London return either two or three council members. At the 2002
London borough elections, Green candidates stood in 311 wards, while UKIP and
BNP candidates were present in 53 and 18 wards, respectively. Establishment of
the Respect Party came after the 2002 election.
10 One-hundred-and-ninety-nine wards fall in the first category, 269 in the second
and 156 in the third.
11 When drawing conclusions about the importance of a particular independent
variable, we should note that a regression model with logit transformed variables
is essentially a non-linear model in terms of variables of interest (i.e. party
support and/or change in party support). Because of this condition, the marginal
effect of a dummy variable is not constant but rather depends on the level of
other variables in the model. If the socio-economic composition of a ward
implies a small Green vote share, then the ratio equals approximately e0.18 =
1.20, i.e. we can expect about a 20 percent increase in Green vote share if the
party contested previously. When calculated for the actual socio-economic
composition of all 624 London wards, this ratio ranges between 1.20 and 1.16.
12 A ward whose socio-economic composition implies a small BNP share might
expect to see a 31 percent (e0.27 = 0.31) larger BNP share if the party had fielded
a candidate in 2002. When calculated for the actual socio-economic composi-
tion of all 624 London wards, this ratio ranges between 1.31 and 1.24.
13 The ward cartograms were kindly prepared for us by John Pritchard at the
University of Sheffield. Ward maps using standard methods can be viewed at
http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/Elections
14 Cases are regarded as outliers where the actual observation differs from the
estimated one by more than 2 SD.
15 For each of our four models, Moran’s statistics take values well above those
expected for uncorrelated data.
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16 To address this problem, we developed additional models in which different
measures of ‘political’ context were used. These included at the ward level, the
winner’s vote share, the combined vote share for major parties, minor party vote
shares in 2002, percentage point difference between the first- and second-placed
party. At the borough level, we also used the vote shares of Conservative and
Labour parties. None of these models improved upon those described in Table
8 and, moreover, none solved the problem of spatial autocorrelation.
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Introduction
Research shows that smaller parties generally perform better in voting systems based on
some form of proportional representation (PR) than in those that employ simple plurality
voting or ‘first past the post’ (FPTP) (Cox, 1999; Lijphart, 1994; Lijphart and Grofman,
1984; Rae, 1971; Taagepera and Shugart, 1989). Additionally, studies of mixed-member
systems also suggest that the combinations of PR and FPTP voting methods create
particular opportunities for smaller parties (Bohrer and Krutz, 2004; Dunleavy and
Margetts, 2004; Johnston and Pattie, 1999, 2002; Karp, 2009; Siaroff, 2000). Less well
researched and understood is whether, when PR and FPTP systems operate not in com-
bination as with say the Additional Member System (AMS) but in parallel (in the sense
that electors in the same geographies have discrete opportunities to vote in these sys-
tems), smaller parties take advantage of free-rider opportunities provided by one system
that are then exploited to enhance the party’s performance under the other system.
Specifically, can smaller parties with resource constraints that struggle with the
mechanical and psychological effects of FPTP (that contribute towards a limited pattern
of electoral competition and poor seats to vote ratios) receive benefits from separate
opportunities to compete under more favourable PR conditions? Furthermore, is there
evidence that valuable data about potential electoral support derived from these oppor-
tunities are subsequently transferred to the less favourable environment of a FPTP elec-
tion? One such condition, for example, would be where large district magnitude electoral
areas used at a PR election are simple aggregations of smaller electoral units used in a
FPTP election and where data on the PR election result are subsequently disaggregated
to the FPTP electoral district level. Such information would be of significant benefit to a
smaller party that might struggle to find sufficient candidates to stand in every FPTP
electoral district. Simply by scrutinizing the PR results (where the costs of finding can-
didates were relatively low), a small party could identify those areas where support is
strongest and then use that information to optimize the location of its candidates at a sub-
sequent FPTP election. The research question is: Does a party’s performance at a PR
election provide it with low-cost but vital information about its relative standing among
voters that is then utilized strategically at a subsequent FPTP election? This article
addresses that question by analysing data from six elections covering the Greater London
area between 2002 and 2010.
Local government in London is shared among different authorities. Thirty-three
borough councils operate alongside a Greater London Authority (GLA) comprising a
directly elected mayor and 25-member Assembly. Three separate voting systems are
used to select these institutions. The boroughs utilize FPTP voting with councillors
elected in two or three-member units (wards) every four years.1 Wholesale boundary revi-
sions were introduced prior to the 2002 borough council elections and these particular
wards, 624 in total, have now held three separate council elections in 2002, 2006 and
2 Party Politics
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2010. By contrast, the London Assembly uses a two-vote mixed-member proportional
system. Under this system, which combines elements of FPTP and PR, one vote is cast for
individual candidates in 14 single-member electoral districts and winners are determined
by simple plurality. The second vote is cast for parties that present a London-wide list to
voters. The remaining 11 seats are allocated after the distribution of constituency seats has
been taken into account and subject to a party receiving at least 5 percent of the total list
vote. The inaugural GLA elections were held in 2000 with subsequent contests in 2004 and
2008.2 There is a research literature that considers the immediate interaction of this mixed
electoral system both for voters and political parties (Benoit, 2001; Ferrara, 2004; Ferrara
and Herron, 2005; Johnston and Pattie, 2002; Karp, 2009; Kostadinova, 2006), but no
investigation of the parallel operation of separate voting systems. Crucially, voting data
for the 2004 and 2008 London Assembly elections were subsequently made available at
the ward level used for the London borough elections. It becomes a simple process there-
after to compare and contrast patterns of voting under FPTP and AMS conditions.
One clear advantage for smaller parties of a mixed-member over a simple plurality
system is the different requirements in terms of candidates (Shugart and Wattenberg,
2001). In the particular case of London, whereas a FPTP election would need more than
600 candidates if each elector is given the opportunity to support the party, a list vote
procedure means de facto considerably fewer candidates (11 in this instance) have the
same electoral presence. In some wards a party may have fielded a candidate in a FPTP
election prior to the AMS version but in other cases it will not have done so. Is there evi-
dence that a party witnessing relatively strong support in some areas at the list vote ele-
ment of the AMS election uses that information when presenting candidates at a
subsequent FPTP election? This re-configuration may either consist of finding additional
candidates to contest wards where PR-voting has suggested stronger than average sup-
port in places not previously contested or, alternatively, where the pool of candidates
is relatively constant, withdrawing candidates from poorly performing wards and locat-
ing them into better prospects.
The next section of the article provides a brief summary of party contestation and per-
formance from 2000 onwards when the first GLA election was held and introduces the
Green Party as the test case for the research. The second section summarizes the data
being considered and outlines our approach to the research question. The substantive
analysis is contained in the third section followed by the conclusions.
Voting systems and party performance
The pattern of party competition in recent London borough elections shows that the three
largest parties (Labour, Conservative and Liberal Democrats) contest a large majority of
the total 624 wards (almost 100 percent in the case of Labour and Conservative and
around 90 percent for the Liberal Democrats) (see Table 1). These parties are therefore
unsuitable for this type of analysis since there is insufficient variation in contestation
between the FPTP and the AMS election. The Green Party, on the other hand, is the larg-
est of the smaller parties in terms of both contestation and vote-share, but has failed to
field candidates in a large minority of wards. Although its electoral presence has been
increasing, a third of wards did not have a Green candidate in 2010.
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The proportion of seats contested is even less, with most two and three-member
wards featuring only a single Green candidate. In 2002 the party stood 523 candidates
for 1,861 vacancies, 28 percent of the total. In 2010 there were 845 Green candidates
contesting 45 percent of all vacancies. Under FPTP conditions the Green Party has
struggled to get elected those candidates it does field. In 2002 a single Green councillor
was elected; in 2006 an 8 percent share of the vote yielded a dozen councillors; and in
2010, when the borough contests coincided with a general election, the party had just
two successes.
Table 2, similarly, summarizes the results of elections for the London Assembly. The
Greens fielded a full 11-candidate slate for list votes on each occasion and, thanks to
AMS, have always won ‘top up’ seats – three in 2000 and two in both 2004 and
2008. More than one in ten voters supported Green candidates with both their constitu-
ency and list votes at the 2000 election with about 8 percent doing so in the subsequent
two contests.
The aim in the remainder of the article is to identify variations in contestation by
Green Party candidates in the FPTP borough council elections that may be associated
with ward-level support received by the party in the list vote element of a previous AMS
election. The stronger that association, the greater the likelihood that small parties
such as the Greens are able to apply valuable information obtained from the pattern
of voting across large electoral district areas to the more candidate-intensive FPTP
electoral areas.
Of course, an alternative method of investigating this question would be to interview
senior Green Party organizers responsible for managing London elections. These
Table 1. Summary results of London borough elections 2002–2010
Vote % Wards cont % Seats cont %
2002
Con 34.2 605 97.0 1,769 95.1
Lab 34.1 624 100.0 1,858 99.8
LDem 20.6 535 85.7 1,478 79.4
Green 5.5 311 49.8 523 28.1
Other* 5.6
2006
Con 35.0 620 99.4 1,811 97.3
Lab 28.0 620 99.4 1,828 98.2
LDem 20.8 564 90.4 1,537 82.6
Green 7.9 357 57.2 567 30.5
Other 8.1
2010
Con 31.7 624 100.0 1,846 99.2
Lab 32.5 620 99.4 1,850 99.4
LDem 22.4 580 92.9 1,536 82.5
Green 6.6 418 67.0 845 45.4
Other 6.8
*Contestion by ‘other parties’ is not included because of over-counting in multi-member wards.
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organizers might be asked whether aggregate data were scrutinized for clues about the
spatial distribution of electoral support; were decisions about where to locate election
candidates made strategically and centrally? There may be some small parties where
such an approach might work, but the Greens are not necessarily one of them. Early suc-
cesses made by local Green parties were heavily dependent upon grassroots supporters
tapping into sympathetic voters (Bennie, 2004; Burchell, 2002). The Greens remain, ‘a
very decentralized party, [and] the decision of which wards to target in local elections is
left to the individual local parties’ (Spoon, 2009: 621). Although the Green Party took a
rather more strategic approach towards targeting parliamentary constituencies, culminat-
ing in the victory in Brighton Pavilion in 2010, a large element of discretion is still
retained by local activists. It is unlikely, therefore, that our analysis will reveal a grand
master plan, but it may reveal prima facie evidence that on the grounds some local Green
parties in London did become aware of pockets of support that had hitherto remained
dormant but were awakened by the opportunities provided by the availability of data
on list votes at the London Assembly elections.
Data and method
Two partially overlapping sets of elections are considered with each set comprising the
624 wards located across the 32 London boroughs. The first set comprises the 2002 bor-
ough elections, the 2004 city-wide list votes cast at the London Assembly election and
another cycle of borough elections in 2006. The second set also contains three elections,
Table 2. Voting for the London Assembly 2000–2008
Constituency List
% vote % vote
2000
Con 31.2 28.5
Con 33.2 29.0
Lab 31.6 30.3
LD 18.9 14.8
Green 10.2 11.1
Other 6.0 14.9
2004
Con 31.2 28.5
Lab 24.7 25.0
LD 18.4 16.9
Green 7.7 8.6
Other 18.1 21.1
2008
Con 37.4 34.6
Lab 28.0 27.6
LD 13.7 11.4
Green 8.1 8.4
Other 12.9 17.9
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viz., the 2006 borough elections, the 2008 Assembly list votes and the 2010 borough
elections. Both sets, therefore, feature two FPTP elections at either end of the time
period with a PR-list vote in the middle. The main research hypothesis is that the like-
lihood of the Greens fielding candidates in a ward at a FPTP borough election is related
to both their presence in that ward and neighbouring wards at a previous borough elec-
tion and their relative success at winning votes there on the London-wide list. The pri-
mary variable of interest is whether or not the Green Party fields a candidate in a ward
at a borough election (e.g. 2006) that is preceded by both a previous FPTP contest
(2002) and an AMS list vote (2004).
Multiple binary logistic regression analysis was used in an effort to test two subsidiary
hypotheses. The first hypothesis addresses a contagion effect, i.e. whether a Green
candidate standing in a ward at a previous borough election may persuade other Green
candidates to stand in neighbouring wards (those whose geographic boundaries are
shared with a ward fielding a Green candidate) at the next borough elections. The sec-
ond hypothesis might be said to be concerned with a learning effect – does relative suc-
cess (at the ward level) at a recent London-wide list vote affect the chances of the
Greens fielding or not fielding a candidate in the ward at the immediately subsequent
borough election?
The first set of data (2002, 2004 and 2006) is used for model building, whereas the
second set (2006, 2008 and 2010) is used for out-of-sample model testing. Thus, when
building the logistic regression, the dependent variable, ‘Green2006’, indicates whether
a Green candidate contested a ward in 2006 (a dummy variable, takes the value 1 if there
is at least one Green candidate in the ward and 0 otherwise). Two independent variables
are: a categorical variable, ‘pattern2002’, that describes the 2002 pattern of the Green
contestation in the ward and its neighbouring wards, and a continuous variable,
‘share2004’, that is the percentage of the vote-share cast for the Greens in a ward based
on results from the London-wide list vote in 2004. The categorical variable ‘pattern2002’
takes three values: the value 1 if the Greens stood in the ward in 2002; the value 2 if the
Greens stood in a neighbouring ward but not in the ward itself; and the value 3 if they did
not stand in either the ward or a neighbouring ward in 2002.3 It was decided that the addi-
tion of ward-level demographic data was unnecessary since the London-wide Green vote
is itself a proxy measure for certain social-demographic characteristics, e.g. young, resi-
dentially mobile, well educated (Borisyuk et al., 2007).
This modelling produces a general equation for the location of Green candidates at a
London borough election. The equation is then used to predict the pattern of competition
for the second election set at the 2010 borough elections. So, when performing the out-
of-sample test and ‘predicting’ the 2010 outcome, the base year becomes the 2006 bor-
ough elections (categorized as for the 2002 contests above) and a continuous variable
showing level of support for Greens on the London-wide list in 2008.
Results
Table 3 gives the parameter estimates for a logistic regression fitted to the first set of
elections. The dependent variable is binary and takes the form – stood in 2006/did not
stand in 2006. Both independent variables, ‘pattern2002’ and ‘share2004’, are
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significant (p < 0.001) and contribute independently in the logistic regression equation.4
A one percentage point increase in the 2004 list vote increases the odds of finding a 2006
Green candidate in a particular ward by more than 30 percent (the odds ratio of 1.32), all
other circumstances being the same. The categorical variable ‘pattern2002’, which com-
prises two dummy variables, should be discussed in more detail. It appears that while the
presence of a Green candidate in the ward in 2002 increases significantly the likelihood
of a Green standing in the same ward again in 2006, such influence does not extend to
neighbouring wards, i.e. those that share some common boundaries with the ward of
interest. The resulting equation can be written in the following form:
Logit (green2006) ¼
–3.02 þ 0.28 * share2004 þ 1.87 * green2002ward þ 0.41 * green2002neighbour,
where the dependent variable green2006 and continuous independent variable share2004
are described above, and green2002ward and green2002neighbour are dummy variables
that constitute the categorical pattern2002. The statistical non-significance of the dummy
variable ‘green2002neighbour’ means that the model fails to find evidence that the con-
tagion effect hypothesis is valid. To be more precise: when information about 2004
Greens’ share of vote is taken into account, the impact from the Greens contesting
neighbouring wards in 2002 is positive but weak and statistically non-significant.5
An intuitively appealing way to evaluate the predictive ability of a logistic regression
is to compare the original dichotomous variable (the dependent variable) with the model
estimates. A logistic model calculates the likelihood/probability of a particular outcome (a
Green candidate contesting a ward, in our example). Calculated probability, however, can
be used for deriving a dichotomous variable – if the model produces a probability greater
than a cut-point (let’s say, 50 percent) then the ward is classified as a ward that is expected
to have a Green candidate standing. Table 4 gives the cross tabulation of the original
dependent variable with the derived dichotomy and provides a summary of the results
of the fitted logistic regression while evaluating its predictive ability. The model overall
correctly classifies 74 percent of cases/wards but is rather better at predicting where the
Greens will field candidates rather than those cases where a Green candidate will not stand.
Table 3. Pattern of Green Party competition: London borough elections 2006
Variables in the equation B S.E. Wald d.f. Sig. Exp(B)
share2004 (%) 0.280 0.034 67.990 1 0.000 1.323
pattern2002 57.323 2 0.000
green2002ward
(Green candidate in a ward)
1.873 0.368 25.905 1 0.000 6.509
green2002neighbour
(no Green candidate in a ward;
at least 1 Green in neighbourhood)
0.410 0.360 1.295 1 0.255 1.506
no Green candidates in a ward;
no Green candidates in neighbourhood
Reference category
Constant –3.024 0.410 54.496 1 0.000 0.049
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This logistic model can be used for out-of-sample tests and to predict the location of
Green candidates at the 2010 borough elections. Indeed, equation (1) can be re-written in
a more general form that is suitable for any election set comprising the base year borough
election (‘year0’, similar to 2002 election as in model (1)), the subsequent London
Assembly election (‘year1’, similar to 2004 in model (1)), and finally the borough elec-
tion of interest (‘year2’, i.e. 2006 in model (1)):
Logit(greenYear2) ¼
–3.02þ 0.28 * shareYear1þ 1.87 * greenYear0wardþ 0.41 * greenYear0neighbour.
When applying the above model to ‘predict’ the 2010 election, the base year becomes
the 2006 borough election (did a Green candidate stand in the ward, was a Green stand-
ing in a neighbouring ward; did no Green candidate stand?) and the vote-share is the
ward-level Assembly list vote for the Greens in 2008. Using this general model, the aim
is to predict whether a Green candidate would stand in a ward or not in 2010. If the
Table 4. Classifying pattern of candidates at the 2006 London borough elections Classification
Tablea
Predicted
green2006
Observed
Green candidate
in a ward
No Green
candidate in a ward
Percentage
correct
green 2006 Green candidate
in a ward
278 79 77.9
No Green candidate
in a ward
85 182 68.2
Overall percentage 73.7
a The cut value is 0.500.
Table 5. Application of the 2006 equation to the 2010 London borough results Cross-tabulation
% within green2010
Expected ‘green2010’
(from 2006 model)
% correct
predictions
Green candidate
in a ward
No Green
candidate in a ward
Actual ‘green2010’ Green candidate
in a ward
80.4% 19.6% 80.4
No Green candidate
in a ward
27.2% 72.8% 72.8
Overall percentage 77.9
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equation produces a probability of above 50 percent for a ward, then the ward is classi-
fied as one expecting the presence of a Green candidate in 2010. If the probability is
below 50 percent, then the model predicts no Green would contest in the 2010 borough
election.
The result of this modelling is then compared to the actual outcome in 2010 and the
results are given in Table 5. In total, 78 percent of all outcomes were predicted correctly.
However, it is clear that the model finds it more difficult to predict cases where a Green
candidate was absent from a ward contest at the 2010 London borough election in
exactly the same way as happened for the 2006 elections. In effect, this means that
according to the model the relationship between the pattern of 2010 Greens’ contestation
and the actual results of two previous elections remains the same as it was in 2006. In
27 percent of the 206 wards without a Green candidate in 2010 the model wrongly
predicted a Green would have stood. Conversely, the model shows that in 20 percent
of the 418 wards where the Greens did field a candidate their prior pattern of contestation
and list-vote performance might suggest that such a challenge in 2010 was possibly not a
good use of scarce resources.
When considering wards where the Greens stood a candidate for the first time in 2010
(i.e. no candidates in 2006), we can compare 73 places where the model predicts ‘no Green
candidate’ and 31 wards where the model predicts ‘yes’. In those wards where the presence
of Green candidates corresponds with the model prediction the mean share of vote for the
Green party in 2010 is 11.1 percent. By contrast, in wards that Green candidates contested
but the model predicts no contestation the average vote-share reached just 7.5 percent.
Nine wards which the Greens contested in 2006 but were not viable according to the model
were then compared with 305 wards where there was correspondence between the model
and actual pattern of Green contestation. The difference in the means of the Green vote-
share is striking – 5.3 percent and 10.1 percent accordingly, although we accept that the
number of cases may be a factor here. There remain 56 further cases/wards where the
model does not correspond with the actual 2010 pattern of contestation: a Green candidate
does not contest but the model prediction disagrees with that. We do not know, of course,
what outcome there might have been in such places, but it is quite possible that from the
viewpoint of the Green Party that this is a real opportunity lost.
In general, therefore, the Greens have performed reasonably well in targeting the
places they did or did not field candidates in 2010, but their strategy was not as good
as it might have been had the 2008 list vote been fully taken into account. In short,
despite a reasonably powerful model for predicting the presence or not of Green Party
candidates at London borough elections the pattern in 2010 is, from the viewpoint of our
modelling, sub-optimal – Green candidates contesting a fraction of wards where the
prospect of votes is marginal and at the same time not contesting other wards that might
have contributed positively to the party’s overall vote if not their total of seats.
Finally, in order to understand this distribution of candidates further, the spatial pattern
of Green borough election contestation and GLA party list support across London for the
two election sets is mapped in Figures 1 and 2. In Figure 1, four categories (using different
shadings) are used to classify wards according to Green Party list vote-share at the 2004
London Assembly election; categories were determined by identifying natural breaks in
the data as calculated by ArcGIS (the Jenks method – see Kennedy 2009: 349). Patterns
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of party competition (using different hash lines) between the 2002 and 2006 borough elec-
tions overlay these vote-share categories. There are three such categories: where a Green
contested a ward in 2002 but not in 2006; wards with a Green standing in 2006 but which
had not been contested in 2002; wards with Green candidates at both these elections.
Where there is no patterning at all, the ward was not contested at either of the borough
elections although there is of course some level of Green list vote at the 2004 election.
It is immediately clear that support for the Greens is spatially concentrated into two
darker bands (relatively high vote-shares and competition in both 2002 and 2006) that
are fairly central and run more or less parallel to one another. These dark shaded wards
(indicating a relatively high vote-share in 2004) are also those where the party contested
both of the borough elections. The wards that lie within these two bands are located on or
very near to the River Thames, which divides the city into its northern and southern
halves. A more detailed inspection also reveals in the southwestern part of the capital
a number of wards where the Greens polled between 7.6 and 27.4 percent of the 2004
list vote, and where a Green candidate stood in 2006 but had not stood in 2002. Conver-
sely, there are few wards where the level of support in 2004 is low, but where a Green
candidate did contest in 2006 although some can be seen in north and east London.
Turning to Figure 2, which maps data relating to the second period 2006–2010, the
general spatial pattern is similar. Green support is again concentrated in the inner Lon-
don wards that run north and south of the River Thames. Similarly, wards situated on the
outer edges of the capital remain areas providing few Green party votes. That said, there
are a number of wards in the far south of the capital where Green candidates stood in
Figure 1. Pattern of Green Party competition and 2004 London Assembly list vote support
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2010 despite a relatively poor performance at the 2008 election – contrary to what might
be expected if a party was optimizing the location of its FPTP candidates. Generally
speaking, however, as the regression analysis implies, the distribution pattern of Green
candidates in 2010 that also contested in 2006 (cross hatching) is mostly in areas with a
relatively strong level of support in 2008 (dark shading).
Conclusions
The original research question addressed whether a party’s performance at a PR election
would provide it with low-cost information about its relative standing among voters that
is utilized strategically at a subsequent FPTP election. More specifically, could smaller
parties that struggle under FPTP conditions exploit the more favourable circumstances of
a proportional voting system and subsequently transfer that advantage – fielding candi-
dates in areas of strongest support and ignoring places where little support might be
expected. Our approach to this question was to divide the results from parallel voting
systems taking place across London into two separate datasets. The first of these sets,
featuring results from elections from 2002 to 2006, generated a regression equation that
was then used to forecast those places where the Greens would or would not field can-
didates for the 2010 local elections.
However, analysis of the aggregate voting data does not demonstrate unequivocally
that a small party, in this case the Greens, did successfully exploit the information con-
tained about the distribution of voter support across a large number of electoral districts
Figure 2. Pattern of Green Party competition and 2008 London Assembly list vote support
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supplied by list voting at the London Assembly elections in both 2004 and 2008. While
the initial regression model correctly forecast three-quarters of cases where Green can-
didates would or would not stand at the 2006 borough elections, the model’s perfor-
mance was not significantly better in relation to the pattern of Green candidates
contesting the 2010 borough elections. Although both independent variables (share and
pattern) contribute independently to the logistic regression the increase in odds of find-
ing a Green candidate was modest. Some may regard such a finding as acceptable, sug-
gestive of a party organization transferring information from one type of election to
improve its performance at another. Others, may take a different view, maintaining that
the results, although somewhat better than chance, are insufficient evidence of a party
that is exploiting the circumstances of parallel voting systems. The real conclusion prob-
ably lies somewhere between these two extremes.
There does appear to be some process of taking into account the list vote patterns
when organizing the location of candidates at a subsequent FPTP election, but the pro-
cess is haphazard rather than strategic. Those places where Green candidates stood, but
the model suggested they would not, may simply be a product of the enthusiasm of local
activists keen to stage a presence with electoral support a secondary consideration.
Rather more difficult to explain are those voting districts where Greens did not stand but
where the prior list vote and our modelling suggested that a relatively large voter support
base could be exploited. It is possible that some local ward Green parties were aware of
(and did respond to) the party’s performance at the list vote element of the Assembly
elections in 2004 and 2008 but that other ward organizations were unaware of this per-
formance and failed to act.
There is no clear evidence, therefore, that in general a small party such as the Greens
can and does exploit the opportunities provided by different voting systems that run in
parallel to one another. However, simply by highlighting the availability of these data
and in undertaking and publishing this analysis we may be contributing towards a more
optimal pattern of party competition in the future. All small parties that struggle to find
sufficient candidates to contest FPTP vacancies henceforth could make a point of closely
examining the distribution of support at a list vote election and use that information to
target specific wards at the following plurality elections. The next London Assembly
elections are scheduled for May 2012 with the borough elections following two years
later. In 2014 we may return to this question and encounter a rather different outcome
to the one considered here.
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Notes
1. This analysis excludes one borough, the City of London, because local elections to that author-
ity are mostly non-partisan.
2. Although not considered here, the directly elected mayor is chosen by a method known as the
Supplementary Vote (SV) (Van der Kolk et al., 2006).
3. To incorporate the nominal categorical variable ‘pattern2002’ within the logistic regression
model, a reference/dummy coding is used that transforms the 3-level categorical variable into
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two dummy/binary independent variables with a common reference category ‘no Greens either
in the ward or in neighbouring wards’.
4. The correlation between the only continuous predictor ‘share2004’ and the two dummy vari-
ables that constitute ‘pattern2002’ is fairly moderate (the point-biserial correlation coefficients
are approximately 0.4) and indicates that there is no serious problem with multicollinearity. The
collinearity diagnostic statistics, the Variance Inflation test and the eigenvalues used to measure
the presence of multicollinearity, do not reveal potential problems (the Variance Inflation Fac-
tors do not exceed 4 and the Condition Index is less than 8), although the relevance of these tests
is open to question because of the type of independent variables (just one continuous and two
dummies).
5. To check whether the presence of Green candidates in neighbouring wards in 2002 is reflected
in the level of Green share of vote in a given ward in 2004, another variant of the contagion
effect hypothesis may be formulated. This states that at the ward level the Green share of vote
in the London Assembly election in 2004 is itself associated with the presence of Green can-
didates in neighbouring wards at the 2002 borough election. Examination shows that the Greens
received a mean share of 7.1 percent in 2004 across 256 wards where some neighbouring wards
stood Green candidates in 2002, while in 57 wards where no neighbouring wards featured
Green candidates in 2002 the mean share was 6.4 percent. This difference of 0.7 percentage
points is statistically non-significant according to Student’s t-test (p ¼ 0.063) meaning that the
data do not reveal any evidence of a contagion effect from the 2004 results (and that the regres-
sion model (1) has no hidden, indirect through 2004 shares, contagion effect component).
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The paper presents a revised method for estimating national vote shares using aggregate
data from local government by-elections. The model was originally developed to forecast
the annual outcome of local elections but was adapted in time to provide an accurate
forecast of Labour’s landslide victory at the 1997 general election. However, over the past
decade the changing pattern of party competition which has seen parties becoming more
selective about which elections to contest has led to more elections being excluded from
the modelling because they failed to meet the exacting criteria that all three major parties,
Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrats, had contested both the by-election and the
previous main election, normally held in May. Relaxing these criteria, although increasing
the number of available cases would adversely affect the forecast, over- or under-esti-
mating party votes. Instead, the revised method overcomes the problem of differential
competition by estimating vote shares for parties that contest one but not both elections. A
further innovation is the calculation of a weighted moving quarterly average which takes
account of the number of days elapsed between the by-election date and the date of
forecast. Using the new method we provide estimates for likely party shares for the 2010
general election.
 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Unlike most other election forecasting models, the
example described here is primarily designed not to fore-
cast a national parliamentary election but instead to fore-
cast national equivalent votes at annual local elections.
Judged by this criterion it has proved successful. The model
uses aggregate level data obtained from local council by-
election results from the early 1980s onwards that take
place in virtually every week of the year. It operates by
calculating change in vote share across two elections, the
main election and the subsequent by-election, using cases
that feature candidates from all three of the main parties,
viz., Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrats at both
types of contest.. The theoretical basis behind the approach
is that, unlike their parliamentary equivalents that generate
a media circus and become a vehicle for voters’ protests,
local council by-elections are relatively straightforward
electoral events where people behave in a normal manner
and where any idiosyncratic outcomes have a way of
cancelling themselves out over the longer term.
From 1995, when we began using the model for fore-
casting the May local elections, it immediately demon-
strated its value, so much so that we used it to forecast the
1997 general election and were pleased to see that it out-
performed the national polling companies (Rallings and
Thrasher, 1999). A retrospective look at the 1992 election,
however, found that in common with the main polling
companies the model forecast was a narrow Labour victory
instead of an eight-point Conservative lead (Rallings and
Thrasher, 1999).
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Prior to the 2001 general election we encountered
problems caused by an outbreak of foot and mouth
disease which led some local authorities to restrict local
by-election activity. This meant that from the end of
February to the synchronous local/general election in
June there were just 51 cases, many fewer than normal
and none of which were held in the month prior to the
general election itself. Nevertheless, our forecast for The
Sunday Times published on June 2 used our analysis of
split-ticket voting at the synchronous 1997 elections to
generate ﬁgures from the model data (Rallings and
Thrasher, 1998, 2001, 2003). The forecast read Labour
41% (42.0% actual), Conservative 32% (32.7%) and Liberal
Democrats 20% (18.8%). Interestingly, three of the ﬁve
companies conducting national polls over-estimated
Labour by 3–5 points in their eve of poll surveys,
continuing the pattern from the early 1990s.
Following the 2001 election, where recorded turnout
fell below 60%, voter apathy appeared to spread to the local
parties. It was not that there were many fewer by-elections
than before but that the pattern of party competition
started to change. Where three-party contests had once
been commonplace they now became less so as one or
other of the main parties failed to present candidates.
Furthermore, in some areas more candidates from minor
parties began to participate and secure signiﬁcant electoral
support, thereby making such cases unsuitable for national
forecasting purposes. In short, an increasing number of
cases were being excluded from the by-election modelling
because the pattern of party competition at both the by-
election and its May predecessor were incompatible with
the task of estimating national vote shares. On May 1, 2005
our Sunday Times forecast was again adjusted on the basis
of split-ticket voting (now 2001 as well as 1997 aggregate
level data were available). The forecast was Labour to win
a majority of 96 seats having polled 37% (36.1%), the
Conservatives 34% (33.2%), and Liberal Democrats 21%
(22.6%). The eve of poll ﬁndings from the polling companies
proved as accurate.
During the recent parliament, however, the need to
address the problem of declining case selection has become
imperative. In the following section we outline the initial
by-election model before reporting on our efforts to
address the problems affecting the admission/exclusion of
cases. Next, we introduce the revised model and then
assess its utility by applying forecasts retrospectively both
to the May local electoral cycle from the 1990s onwards.
Finally, we use recent evidence to forecast the likely
outcome of the 2010 general election. Although we are
committed to the value of these data for forecasting since
these are, “real votes in real ballot boxes” and constitute in
Austin Ranney’s terms the ‘hardest’ data political scientists
can get (Ranney, 1962) the model remains a work in
progress. We are still testing whether the number and
location of by-elections, to an extent affected by the wider
electoral cycle, is a factor that inﬂuences forecasts and, if so,
in what direction. We are also working with data that
records the cause of the by-election vacancy since the
circumstances (enforced resignation, retirement or death of
incumbent for example) may affect the distribution of
subsequent party support.
2. The original by-election model
Wehave been collecting local council by-election results
from across Britain since the mid 1980s. Each year sees an
average of 290 vacancies although this ﬂuctuates with the
broader electoral cycle. The forecast model requires infor-
mation about both the by-election result and the outcome
at the preceding May-election for each ward (the local
electoral district). Clearly, assuming that the pattern of
party competition is identical across elections it is
straightforward to calculate change in vote share and swing
for a given ward but forecasts, generalising from the
particular, require a set of benchmark ﬁgures that are
common across a range of wards. This comes in the guise of
the ‘national equivalent vote’ (NEV) an estimate of how the
country as a whole might have voted extrapolated from
actual local election voting in any given year (Curtice and
Payne, 1991; Rallings and Thrasher, 1993).
For any given ward election in May, therefore, we know
both the distribution of party support in the ward and how
that compares with the country as a whole. The original
method used only by-elections which featured candidates
from Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat parties at
both the May election and the by-election. An additional
caveat was that cases would be excluded from consider-
ation where votes for other parties and Independents at
either the May or by-election were greater than 10% of the
total vote. The exception to this was cases where the
intervention and support for other parties/independents
was consistent across the two elections. Because of a non-
uniform local electoral cycle it was important to note the
particular year when a by-election ward had held its May
election since this became an important part of the calcu-
lation. A worked example is provided in Table 1 while the
method is described formally in the Appendix.
3. The revised by-election model
From 2001 the rather dramatic change to the pattern of
party competition had implications for modelling. In 2000
some 68% of by-elections featured candidates from all three
main parties; this dropped to 62% in 2001with a further fall
to 55% in 2002. Although the proportion of three-party
contests recovered from this low point it did not match the
Table 1
Calculating the current national equivalent vote from the November, 1996
by-election result in Ixworth ward, St Edmundsbury Council.
Steps in the method Conservative Labour Lib Dem
a) By-election share in ward 43.4 26.2 30.4
b) 1995 May vote in the ward 36.1 29.6 34.3
c) Change in vote share (ab) þ7.3 3.4 3.9
d) 1995 National Equivalent Vote 25 47 23
e) Estimate of current NEV (d þ c) 32.3 43.6 19.1
Of course, in a given ward it is possible that the change in a party’s vote
sharemay be greater than its NEV for a particular year, leading to a current
NEV estimate that is nonsensical. However, by averaging the estimates
across all by-elections over a month/three month period, any extreme
results are smoothed out. In essence, therefore, between the May and the
subsequent by-election the model is calculating change in each party’s
vote share, adding/subtracting that change to the NEV value for the
relevant year and averaging across cases to estimate a current NEV for
a given point in time.
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consistent levels seen throughout the 1990s. This, combined
with a retreat from three-party contests in the main May
elections, especially in the English shires, led to model
estimates being sourced from a declining base of data.
The initial response was to investigate thoroughly the
changing structure of party competition and second to
devise methods that might then compensate for missing
values, permitting more cases to be used to estimate
national support. A third aimwas to determine the optimal
time frame for averaging – it should be a trade-off between
averages being responsive to new information and yet not
over- sensitive to random variations.
A starting point was to examine for every case the
structure of party competition at both the by-election and
the previous May election. In more than 7000 by-elections
there was three-party competition at both the May and by-
election in 3425 cases. In a further 544 by-elections
a Liberal Democrat candidate, present for the May contest
was missing from the subsequent by-election. In another
250 and 77 cases it was the Labour and Conservative
candidate respectively that missed the by-election. Of
course, the process worked in the opposite direction with
by-election vacancies attracting greater party competition
than had the May equivalent. For example, in 648 cases
where three main parties contested a by-election the
Liberal Democrats had not challenged when the main May
election was fought. In a further 255 and 155 cases it was
Labour and the Conservative candidates respectively that
aremissing from theMay election but are present at the by-
election contest. In other examples the structure of party
competitionwas partial but stable in the sense that perhaps
only two of the three parties competed at both elections. In
457 cases, for example, only Conservative and Labour
challenge one another with the Liberal Democrats absent
on both occasions. In a further 331 examples the two
protagonists are Conservative and Liberal Democrats while
104 cases are Labour versus Liberal Democrats only. The
structure of party competition, therefore, dictated differing
responses in devising new procedures designed to include
more cases for devising model estimates.
The ﬁrst examples consider cases where the pattern of
party competition is more extensive at the main elections
in May than it is for the subsequent by-election. Local
voters in May could select from Conservative, Labour and
Liberal Democrat candidates but the Liberal Democrats (in
the example shown) decide to stand aside from the by-
election contest (Example 1, Appendix). Previously, the
model ignored such cases but a different method is now
employed, providing a notional by-election share for the
Liberal Democrats which is equal to the minimum share
value the party achieved across the relevant local authority
at the May election. The theoretical basis for this assump-
tion is that the likely explanation for the Liberal Democrats
to withdraw from the by-election is the expectation of
receiving a low level of votes. The votes for the parties that
did contest the by-election are then adjusted to take
account of the estimated vote for the absent party. It is
important that the process of normalising votes in this way
does not distort the actual result, for example, transforming
a positive change in vote share for one of the parties that
did contest into a negative one. In order to prevent this
from happening the share change for a party that both
contests and increases its share is never allowed to fall
below zero. Following these adjustments the by-election
result is then treated in the usual way for the purposes of
estimating national vote shares.
There are other occasions when the extent of party
competition is further fragmented; three main parties
contest theMay election but now two fail to contest the by-
election. For example, both Labour and Liberal Democrats
do not present by-election candidates to challenge the
Conservatives (Example 2 in Appendix). The problem here
is that the change in Conservative vote share from May is
likely to be inﬂated because of the absence of two of its
competitors. In such cases we proceed with the method
described above, now estimating by-election shares for
both Labour and Liberal Democrats based on the minimum
values across the local authority at the previous May elec-
tion. Following this procedure the Conservative by-election
share is recalculated by subtracting from its actual share
the estimated shares for both Labour and Liberal Demo-
crats. Again, if the actual Conservative by-election share is
an increase from its share in May but the process of esti-
mating shares for the two missing parties transforms that
to a decrease then change is limited to zero. Where the
Conservative by-election share does actually decrease,
despite the two missing parties but presumably because of
the support for independents or other smaller parties, then
no estimates are made for change in share for Labour and
Liberal Democrats while the Conservatives are given the
actual May to by-election change.
Another scenario is that now just two parties contest
the May election but only one of these parties has a by-
election candidate. An example is that Conservative and
Labour challenge one another in May but that Labour does
not contest the by-election (Example 3, Appendix). Since
there is no Liberal Democrat standing at either election its
change is regarded as missing data in the modelling. An
estimate for Labour’s by-election vote is made in the usual
manner by assuming that its by-election vote would be
equivalent to its share in its worst performing ward across
the local authority at the previous May election. The
adjusted Conservative by-election vote share then becomes
its actual share minus the estimated Labour share with the
caveat that the direction of change cannot be counter-
intuitive: it is set to zero if an actual positive change
becomes a negative one after adjustments and estimated
vote shares are made.
The examples discussed so far have focused on proce-
dures when the pattern of party competition at the by-
election is less than at the previous May election. There are
cases where the opposite situation applies and more
parties challenge for the by-election vacancy. The ﬁrst
situation involves twomain parties with candidates in May
but these are subsequently joined by the missing party
when the by-election is fought. We assume that Conser-
vative and Labour are rivals in May but the Liberal Demo-
crats put in a by-election appearance (Example 4,
Appendix). In such a case an estimated May vote for the
Liberal Democrats is based on the party’s worst performing
ward across the local authority. A restriction is imposed and
this assumes that its by-election vote share is a positive
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change in vote from the estimated May election; if not then
change in share is limited to zero. For the two parties that
contested both elections change is set to zero if after esti-
mating a May vote for the Liberal Democrats a negative
change in vote becomes a positive one.
A minor adjustment to the example given above is that
two parties contest the by-election but only one of these
two was present at the previous May election. In May the
Conservatives compete against independents and/or minor
parties only but are then subsequently challenged by
a Labour by-election candidate (Example 5, Appendix).
Since there is no Liberal Democrat at either election its
change is treated as missing. Labour’s estimated May vote
share is that in its worst performing ward across the local
authority. The Conservative share in May is recalculated to
be its actual vote minus the estimated Labour share. The
restriction is that Labour’s by-election share cannot be less
than its estimated May share and is set to zero if that would
happen. Similarly, Conservative change is set to zero if the
consequences of these adjustments are that the direction of
change is altered.
A more extensive adjustment is required when only one
of the main parties contests the seat in May but the by-
election sees all three parties contest. One such situation
would be where the Conservatives stood a candidate on
each occasion its two rivals did not ﬁght the May election
(Example 6, Appendix). Estimates are calculated in the
normal manner for each of Labour and Liberal Democrats
that are equal to vote share in their weakest wards across
the authority.
Finally, a more complex pattern of party competition
occurs when two participate in the May election but
a different pair of parties contest the by-election. For
example, Conservative and Labour compete for the seat in
May but then the by-election has no Labour candidates but
local Liberal Democrats decide to contest (Example 7,
Appendix). Step one estimates a May vote share for the
Liberal Democrats calculated in the usual manner. Step two
sees Labour’s May vote reduced by subtracting its worst
performing ward result while step three recalculates the
share for the Conservatives. The normal restrictions are
then applied.
The result of making such compensations is that
a greater proportion of by-election cases may be included
in modelling national equivalent vote estimates. The extent
of that increase is shown in Fig. 1. The two curves show the
proportion of by-elections used in estimating national vote
shares. The broken line is the proportion that were usable
under the strict criteria of three-party competition in both
the May and by-elections and a large fraction of total votes
cast for the main parties. The solid line is the proportion
after compensating for incomplete three-party competition
and allowing for missing values when one or other of the
three main parties fails to compete at either election. The
most dramatic difference occurs in the period after 2001
when, as we reported earlier, there was a signiﬁcant move
away from the pattern of party competition that had
evolved over an almost twenty-year period before then.
Of course, we need to be assured that the effects of
estimating missing vote shares do not introduce inaccura-
cies to a model that enjoyed a proven track record of
forecasting national support for the annual round of local
elections. Plotting each party’s forecast vote share over
a long period reveals that the effect of estimating votes for
missing parties is to reduce the amount of volatility in the
monthly estimates due to the increased number of cases
used. In the period from 2005, for example, the Conserva-
tive three month average varies between 18 and 44% (range
26 points) using the original method while the range is just
10 percentage points (19–32%) for the revised method.
Similarly, Labour varies between 19 and 32% and between
22 and 30% for the old and newmethods respectively while
the Liberal Democrats were ranging between 19 and 49%
and now lie between 22 and 34%. Another measure of
volatility is the level of change of support from one month
to the next. Fluctuations that are very pronounced are more
likely to be of a random nature rather than reﬂecting real
changes in the public mood. Compared with the original
method the revised model estimates demonstrate greater
stability in short-term support1.
The ﬁnal element in the revision process was to consider
how best to create estimates for a given point in time.
Providing estimates of national support based on by-elec-
tions from a single week would be ill advised since these
can vary considerably, inﬂuenced by a range of local and
national factors and also being affected by relatively small
numbers of cases. A more robust approach is to use
a broader time period. This has the effect of smoothing
large ﬂuctuations that may occur using weekly data. Closer
examination of results and trends over a twenty-ﬁve year
period suggested that a more reliable procedure is
a weighted quarterly moving average2. Thus, each forecast
is based not simply on the ﬁgures for a single month but
also some information from the preceding twomonths. The
weighting procedure takes into consideration the time
elapsed fromwhen each by-election occurs and the date of
forecast, usually the last day of the month of interest. Thus,
a by-election that happens on the last day of June has
a bigger impact on June’s averages compared to a by-elec-
tion that held on April 1. There is a linear decrease in
Fig. 1. Consequence of new data selection criteria: proportion of by-elec-
tions used by the original and the revised model.
1 In terms of Conservative support during the 2005 parliament the
original method suggested a maximum increase of 12 percentage points
and a maximal decline of minus 24 points (standard deviation ¼ 4.5)
while using the revised method the Conservative ﬁgures do not change
by more than 5.6 points (std ¼ 1.9) across a two month period. The
equivalent ﬁgures for Labour are þ5 to 6 (std ¼ 2.0) now changing
between þ4 and 3.5 (std ¼ 1.4) and Liberal Democrats þ19 to 15
(std ¼ 4.7) using the old method to change between þ4 and 10 (std ¼ 2.
2) on the revised model.
2 Our experience is that employing a three month average provides
a better smoothing of the data than a two month average.
C. Rallings et al. / Electoral Studies 30 (2011) 269–277272
A 124
weights that reﬂects the days elapsed from the forecast
date. In turn, the above June by-election will also have an
impact on July and August ’averages’ but its impact on the
model estimate is reduced with time. In short, if the
number of by-elections stays more or less the same across
all months then the inﬂuence of this June by-election
decreases linearly (it is highest for June, smaller for July,
and smallest for August) before it is completely removed
from the quarterly calculation.
4. Estimating national equivalent vote share using the
revised model
The ﬁrst test of the revised model lay in its ability to
forecast correctly the May elections using the April model
estimate. The ﬁrst iteration of the model was a reliable
method for forecasting the national equivalent vote for
local elections and it would be a retrograde step if the
revised method performed less well. Fig. 2a–c shows for
each election year since 1993 both the April by-election
model vote share (comprising data from the April, March
and February results) and the eventual May NEV for the
threemain parties. The solid line represents the by-election
model share and the dotted line is NEV. Overall, the
methods for estimating missing data do not appear to
impact negatively on the model forecasts.
For the Conservatives the two curves are close together
but there is no consistent pattern in terms of the forecast
accuracy. The largest gap over the period is in 2005 when
the model over-estimated the Conservative NEV (note: this
is the party’s local election performance rather than its
general election vote share) and both 2007 and 2008 when
it did somewhat better at the actual elections than had
been forecast from the by-election data. A close examina-
tion of the pattern of support for Labour again shows that
the two curves are close together with two clear excep-
tions, both of which are general election years (2001 and
2005). The 1997 general election does not repeat this gap
but it should be noted that this period (1995–1997) rep-
resented the peak of Labour’s local electoral performance
and it is unlikely that the party could have improved
further on its by-election results. The 2001, 2005 data are
suggesting that Labour appears to raise its game (or its
supporters take notice) where a general election contest
arises. It is very rare for Labour to do better in by-elections
than in the main May local elections; the one exception
over this period is in 1997 but the gap is rather small. For
the Liberal Democrats (Fig. 2c) the pattern is the reverse of
Labour’s performance. The tendency is for the by-election
model to give a higher estimate than Liberal Democrats’
actual NEV. This feature is particularly noticeable in both
2003 and four years later in 2007, the peak of the local
electoral cycle in terms of council seats up for election. It
does seem that the Liberal Democrats perform better in the
by-election situation than at the national level when much
of the country is voting in the main May elections. Of
course, compared with the party’s general election perfor-
mance this gap (between by-election model forecast and
general election vote) is greater still for reasons addressed
earlier.
Fig. 2. The revised by-election model and NEV, 1993–2010. (a)Conservative, (b)Labour, (c)Liberal Democrats.
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5. The trends in the by-election model and opinion
polls since 2005
In this section we consider how the model has esti-
mated support since the 2005 general election and
compare that with the opinion polls using weighted
moving quarterly averages. The intention, using Fig. 3a–d, is
to show more clearly the relationship between model
estimates and the polls. Fig. 3a tracks support for the
Conservatives and shows that although both curves run
close together, seldom being more than a few percentage
points apart, there is no consistent pattern in the sense that
one estimate is always above/below the other. In the
immediate aftermath of the May 2005 election Conserva-
tive support rises gradually but then, following Brown’s
hesitation about a snap election in autumn 2007 it accel-
erates towards a peak in midsummer 2008 according to the
by-election model but two months later in terms of poll
rating. Since then the trend has been gradually downwards.
In the run-up to the 2005 general election Labour’s
estimated national vote using the by-election model was
around 30% while the polls were somewhat higher, aver-
aging in the high 30s (Fig. 3b). Following the general
election the party receives a small boost in the polls but its
performance in by-elections notably declines towards the
mid 20s. Thereafter the two curves track one another
whilst remaining between 6–12 percentage points apart –
however people are responding to opinion surveys it
appears that Labour is unable to translate such support into
actual votes. Blair’s announcement to leave ofﬁce appears
to be the catalyst that turns the party’s fortunes around on
both measures, noticeably so in terms of the poll ratings.
Brown’s hesitation over the election date pops the ratings
bubble until the economic crisis and the Prime Minister’s
Fig. 3. The by-election model and opinion polls, 2005–2010. (a)Conservative, (b)Labour, (c)Liberal Democrats, (d)Other.
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role in brokering international agreements contributes to
another bounce in the polls for his party. In the meantime,
Labour’s by-election performance has remained lacklustre
with any improvement barely registering on this measure.
In June 2009 the two measures intersect for the ﬁrst time
this parliament when the weighted poll average reaches
24.1% and presumably hits the bedrock support for Labour;
the by-election model had been estimating support of
around that level for the previous year.
The post 2005 data for the Liberal Democrats conﬁrm
the pattern of the previous two decades. The party
consistently performs better at local elections than its
national poll rating suggests (Fig. 3c). For the eighteen
months following the 2005 general election the party
hovers on or around 30% but January 2007 sees a signiﬁcant
improvement in its fortunes, reaching a four-year high of
34% in April that year. But then there is a rather dramatic
10-point collapse in May and June followed by a recovery
over the autumn and winter months. Polling suggests that
party support has ranged over a few percentage points
throughout the entire parliament, entering the run-in to
the 2010 general election a point or two lower than for the
previous election.
Finally, Fig. 3d shows the trend in support for other
parties. The twomeasures are close together for most of the
time although the inﬂuence of the approaching European
elections in June 2009, which triggers a growth in support
for such parties in the opinion polls is delayed slightly for
the by-election model (a case of polls driving votes?) and is
short-lived although as the general election nears the two
lines may be intersecting.
Any student of parliamentary by-elections and their
outcomes would know that they are not reliable guides to
how people might vote at a general election but it does
appear that aggregate local electoral data are picking up
similar movements in electoral opinion to the individual
level data acquired in national surveys. The votes cast there
are real votes and voters have incurred some costs in per-
forming these actions. There is no need to adjust them in
terms of weighted past vote or the likelihood of actually
voting but there is a need to take account of variance in the
pattern of party competition. On some occasions the by-
election model takes time to respond to issues that are
immediately apparent in the polls but on other occasions
they may be a better guide to the underlying trends. They
provide a more reliable indicator of how local voters may
behave than surveys but what do they portend for the 2010
general election.
6. Estimating the 2010 vote shares
At the outset we stated that the model is principally
designed for a purpose different to the one outlined here.
Judged solely on the basis of its ability to forecast national
equivalent vote shares for the annual local election cycle it
is a success, seldom beingmore than a couple of percentage
points out for any single party if general election years are
excluded. There is no doubt, however, that for the model to
work to estimate parliamentary voting then certain
adjustments may be required, dependent upon the general
election context. In the past the main adjustment affects
support for the third party, the Liberal Democrats, both in
terms of the level of protest voting that it has received and
also the extent of split-ticket voting (either because they
genuinely prefer to vote Liberal Democrat at local council
elections or because of tactical voting reasons). The context
of the 2010 general election, however, is that support for
the two main parties has declined with the Liberal Demo-
crats the principal beneﬁciary of this swing against the
two-party system establishment. There are other, perhaps
less prominent factors, that should also be taken into
account when adapting this model to generate general
election forecasts. One such is Labour’s general weakness in
apparently getting its vote out. Even allowing for some
over-estimation of its support by the pollsters, Labour has
under-achieved in the past, with the notable exception of
the pre-1997 period.
The April NEV estimate is showing Conservatives 35.7%,
Labour 27.2% and Liberal Democrats on the same ﬁgure,
27.2%. Inpreparing this general election forecastwe assume,
in a departure from the recent past, that no downward
adjustment of the Liberal Democrat vote is necessary.
Indeed, we are proposing on this occasion to add
a percentage point to both its and Labour’s support to take
account of additional supporters for these parties entering
the general election contest. This produces, after rounding,
a national vote share forecast of Conservative 36%, with
Labour and Liberal Democrats each on 28%. However, an
additional adjustment is made to the seat forecast based on
a more complete understanding of by-election voting in
Conservative-target parliamentary constituencies. Two
separate forecastmodelswere created, one comprising only
wards located in the top 150 Conservative-target parlia-
mentary constituencies with all other wards entered into
the second model. This demonstrated that the Conserva-
tives were performing slightly better in their target seat
areas vis a vis Labour. Accordingly, the seat projection does
not assume national uniform swing but a rather higher
swing from Labour to the Conservatives in their battle-
ground seats. The seat forecast, therefore, is Conservatives
299 seats, Labour 237 seats, Liberal Democrats to win 83
seats while other parties win 31 seats.
Appendix
Estimation of current national equivalent vote shares
The model may be formally expressed as follows:
Let CONsh, LABsh, and LDsh be the ward vote share at
the by-election for Conservative, Labour and Liberal
Democrats respectively while the parties’ vote share at the
previous ward election held in May would be CONshMay,
LABshMay, and LDshMay. The national equivalent vote at the
date of the relevant previous May local election is desig-
nated as NEV.CON, NEV.LAB, and NEV.LD.
The difference in share of vote between May and By-
elections for enumerated parties might then be repre-
sented as follows:
CONchange ¼ CONsh  CONshMay
LABchange ¼ LABsh  LABshMay
LDchange ¼ LDsh  LDshMay
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Finally, to estimate the current national equivalent vote
we add to the previous national equivalent vote the
difference between a party’s by-election vote share and its
vote share recorded at the May election.
Estimates of current NEV are calculated as follows,
NEV.CON þ CONchange, NEV.LAB þ LABchange,
NEV.LD þ LDchange.
This process is repeated for as many by-elections as ﬁt
our speciﬁed criteria and each party’s current national
equivalent vote is arrived at by averaging the results over
a stated time period.
Missing data imputation
Example 1: Imputation for missing vote share for Liberal
Democrats absent from by-election contest.
Let all three main parties have candidates in May elec-
tion but Liberal Democrats provide no candidate in the by-
election:
May election/By-election
con þ lab þ ld/con þ lab
The imputation procedure implies the following
notional by-election result:
LDshnew ¼ MINIMUMacross district in May(LDsh)
CONshnew ¼ CONsh  CONsh/
(CONsh þ LABsh)  LDshnew
LABshnew ¼ LABsh  LABsh/
(CONsh þ LABsh)  LDshnew
In order to preserve the actual direction of changes for all
parties some restrictions are imposed:
If CONsh > CONshMay but CONshnew < CONshMay then we
set CONchange ¼ 0.
If LABsh > LABshMay but LABshnew < LABshMay then
LABchange ¼ 0.
Note: In above formulae and everywhere else in the
paper, superscript ‘new’ reﬂects notional by- or May elec-
tion when any procedure of imputation is applied.
Following the imputation procedure, notional election
result (i.e. ‘new’) is then treated in the usual way for the
purposes of estimating NEV.
Example 2: Imputation for missing vote share for both
Labour and Liberal Democrats absent from by-election contest
(con þ lab þ ld/con)
Notional By-election result:
LDshnew ¼ MINIMUMacross district in May(LDsh)
LABshnew ¼ MINIMUMacross district in May(LABsh)
CONshnew ¼ CONsh  LABshnew  LDshnew
If CONsh > CONshMay but CONshnew < CONshMay then we
set CONchange ¼ 0.
If CONsh <¼ CONshMay, then
LABchange ¼ MISSING, LDchange ¼ MISSING;
CONchange ¼ CONsh  CONshMay
Example 3: Imputation for missing Labour by-election
share in case when Liberal Democrats absent from both May
and by-election contest (con þ lab/con)
LDchange ¼ MISSING
Notional By-election result:
LABshnew ¼ MINIMUMacross district in May(LABsh)
CONshnew ¼ CONsh  LABshnew
If CONsh > CONshMay but CONshnew < CONshMay then we
set CONchange ¼ 0.
Example 4: Imputation for May vote share for Liberal
Democrats (con þ lab/con þ lab þ ld)
Notional May-election results:
LDshMaynew ¼ MINIMUMacross district in May(LDsh)
CONshMaynew ¼ CONshMay  CONshMay/
(CONshMayþLABshMay)  LDshMaynew
LABshMaynew ¼ LABshMay  LABshMay/
(CONshMayþLABshMay)  LDshMaynew
Restrictions:
If LDsh < LDshMaynew then LDchange ¼ 0.
If CONsh < CONshMay but CONshnew > CONshMaynew thenwe
set CONchange ¼ 0.
If LABsh < LABshMay but LABshnew > LABshMaynew then we
set LABchange ¼ 0.
Example 5: Imputation for missing Labour May vote share
in case when Liberal Democrats absent from bothMay and by-
election contest (con/con þ lab)
There is no LD candidate inMay and by-elections. So, we
cannot assess LD changes:
LDchange ¼ MISSING
Notional May-election results:
LABshMaynew ¼ MINIMUMacross district in May(LABsh)
CONshMaynew ¼ CONshMay  LABshMaynew
Restrictions:
We have to get at least a non-negative change for LAB, so
If LABsh < LABshMaynew then LABchange ¼ 0.
If CONsh < CONshMay but CONshnew > CONshMaynew then we
set CONchange ¼ 0.
Example 6: Imputation for missing May vote shares for
both Labour and Liberal Democrats (con/con þ lab þ ld)
Notional May-election results:
LABshMaynew ¼ MINIMUMacross district in May(LABsh)
LDshMaynew ¼ MINIMUMacross district in May(LDsh)
CONshMaynew ¼ CONshMay  LABshMaynew  LDshMaynew
Then usual procedure for calculation of changes and
estimated shares is applied.
Restrictions:
We have to get at least a non-negative change for LAB
and LD, so
If LABsh < LABshMaynew then LABchange ¼ 0.
If LDsh < LDshMaynew then LDchange ¼ 0.
If CONsh < CONshMay but CONshnew > CONshMaynew then we
set CONchange ¼ 0.
Example 7: Imputation formissing vote shares for bothMay
and by-elections for different parties (con þ lab/con þ ld)
Notional May-election results:
LDshMaynew ¼ MINIMUMacross district in May(LDsh)
LABshMaynew ¼ LABshMay  MINIMUMacross district in
May(LABsh)
CONshMaynew ¼ CONshMay  LDshMaynew þ LABshMaynew
Restrictions:
We have to get at least a non-negative change for LD:
if LDsh < LDshMaynew then LDchange ¼ 0.
If CONsh < CONshMay but CONshnew > CONshMaynew
or CONsh > CONshMay but CONshnew < CONshMaynew
then we set CONchange ¼ 0.
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Although women comprise over half of the UK electorate, their relatively low
numbers in elected office continues. The 2005 general election saw 128 women
members returned—19.8% of the House of Commons. Despite the recent
upward trend the UK still ranks rather low in the Inter-Parliamentary Union’s
league table of women’s representation. The situation is little better for the
European Parliament where the UK lies below the EU average. In 2004 the
proportion of elected women actually declined from 24.1% to 23.1%. Women’s
representation is, in common with many other countries, better for sub-national
units of government. Currently, women comprise up to one-third of candidates
and more than a quarter of local councillors, leaving the UK midway among
member states of the European Union.1 A similar story is found within the new
devolved institutions of the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly.2 The UK,
therefore, certainly confirms the ‘law of minority attrition’, whereby the pro-
portion of women holding elected office decreases as the perceived importance
of political office increases.3
Relatively speaking, local government has been enlightened in providing
women with the vote and encouraging them to stand for election. Unmarried
women taxpayers could vote in local elections from the 1830s onwards. By
1875, nearly half a century before they were even permitted to vote in parliamen-
tary elections, women could be and were elected to such local authorities as
Boards of Guardians. Local government has consistently provided more political
career opportunities for women. A study in 1964, for example, estimated that 16%
of all local election candidates were women, more than three times as many that
fought parliamentary constituencies at the time.4
Although women’s recruitment as candidates and their electoral success has
been widely studied for the UK parliament it is largely ignored at the local govern-
ment level.5 This neglect is partly because of data availability but it also replicates
the situation for other polities; national parliaments are studied but lower levels of
government are overlooked.
This paper partly redresses that imbalance, using newly available local
electoral data to track and analyse aspects of the recruitment and retention of
women candidates and councillors since the early seventies. In order to set this
research within the broader literature on women’s recruitment we provide a
brief review of existing research on national legislatures. Following this we
ISSN 1356-9775 print/ISSN 1469-3631 online/07/020181-19 # 2007 Taylor & Francis
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outline the data before framing a series of research questions based on the prior
evidence. The data analysis concentrates first on women candidates and second
on women councillors.
Determinants of women’s (under-)representation in elected office
Norris and Lovenduski identify three main factors affecting women’s recruitment
to a career in national politics.6 First are systemic factors, including the voting
system, district magnitude (the number of seats in each electoral district or consti-
tuency) and the party system.7 For our specific purposes here we add electoral fre-
quency and different types of local authority to this list. A second set of factors are
party political, comprising organization, rules and ideology. Although Darcy
rejects the view of a male-dominated, party-establishment conspiracy restricting
women’s recruitment, Sanbonmatsu points to the gatekeeping role exercised by
party elites.8 Certainly, some party organizations have been slower than others
in responding to the imbalance in women’s representation.9 In the UK, while
the Labour and Liberal Democrat Parties guarantee that women candidates
appear on shortlists for parliamentary seats, the Conservative Party, at the time
of writing, does not. Accordingly, our analysis pays close attention to party
effects in the recruitment of women. The third factor identified by Norris and
Lovenduski is socio-economic circumstance, including the individual’s access to
resources. This ‘eligibility pool’ is critical because fewer women are located in
the customary occupations held by aspiring elected politicians. Moreover,
women are less likely to be encouraged to stand and less likely to perceive them-
selves as qualified to stand.10 Resource pressures are also key deterrents to women
standing for local election in the UK.11 Indeed, women councillors leaving local
government complain of difficulties in balancing commitments.12
Being selected is only the first rung on the political career ladder and getting
elected is a hazardous business. Some of the sharpest differences in women’s rep-
resentation again relate to the electoral system used. The proportion of women in
PR-elected legislatures, for example, is roughly twice that for majoritarian
systems.13 A key part of the explanation for this lies with district magnitude.
Large district magnitudes, as frequently used in PR systems, may encourage
parties to select both men and women candidates.14
Majoritarian systems, including our own ‘first past the post’, are not restricted
to single-member electoral districts, however, and as district magnitude rises
more opportunities may arise for women.15 Research on the relationship
between plural voting and district magnitude from the USA is inconclusive.
Some studies show women candidates fare better, or certainly no worse, in
multi-member than in single-member districts but other research struggles to
find statistical significance.16 Previous, though limited, research on English local
elections (where multi-member wards are used in some authorities) concludes
similarly, finding no clear linear relationship between district magnitude and
women’s success.17
It is widely acknowledged that a major obstacle to increasing women’s
representation is political incumbency.18 At the 2005 UK general election, for
example, in almost nine out of ten constituencies at least one candidate was an
incumbent. From the total of 573 incumbents, just 50 (8.7%) failed to be re-
elected. Since most MPs are men, incumbency becomes an obvious obstacle to
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women’s representation. Although incumbent advantage may be less pronounced
in local contests, women must wait for vacancies to arise. To counteract this some
US states introduced ‘term limits’ whilst in Wales, prior to the 2004 council elec-
tions, men incumbents of long duration were encouraged to stand down.19
Another potential obstacle to increasing women’s representation is that some
voters may dislike women candidates. However, individual-level data show that
voters respond positively towards female candidates.20 This question is over-
looked in the UK context because of single-member constituencies and because
so few voters allow a candidate’s sex to override partisanship. But local electoral
data allow the question to be addressed because sometimes parties present not
one but rather a slate of candidates when more than one seat is at stake. One pre-
vious analysis, limited to two sets of local elections, could find no statistical differ-
ence between the electoral fortunes of men and women, but we can consider this
question more fully here.21
Data
The Local Elections Database used in this article has been compiled by the Local
Government Chronicle Elections Centre, University of Plymouth, with funding
provided from the Economic and Social Research Council.22 The database
includes, inter alia, the result from every local government election in Britain
from 1973 (1964 for London). However, this paper concentrates only on
England since 1973 because the pattern of local government structure and party
competition in both Scotland and Wales are substantially different. Further exclu-
sions to the scope of data are necessary because of certain structural change since
1973.23 These changes include the abolition of the Greater London Council and six
metropolitan counties in 1986, and the replacement, since 1996, of some two-tier
local government areas with single-tier, all-purpose unitary local authorities. In
order that our over-time analysis is not unduly affected by these changes, we
include only those types of local authority in existence over the entire period—
see Table 1.24 Such omissions do not affect our substantive findings.
Additional, though useful, complexity in the data follows from different
electoral arrangements for different types of local authority. As Table 1 shows,
some types of authority re-elect their whole council every fourth year, but for
others there are elections in most years with a fraction of the seats, normally a
third, becoming vacant. District magnitude (the number of councillors per
ward) varies. Currently, almost all multi-member wards (termed divisions in
Table 1. A typology of English local authority electoral cycles
Type of local authority Electoral cycle Partial/whole District magnitude
London boroughs Quadrennial Whole 1–3
Metropolitan boroughs ‘Annual’ Partial 1 per election
District councils
(c.2/3 of cases)
Quadrennial Whole 1–3
District councils
(c.1/3 of cases)
‘Annual’ Partial 1 per election
County councils Quadrennial Whole 1
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county councils) elect either two or three members. These differences mean that
we can control both for electoral frequency (annual or quadrennial) and district
magnitude (one seat versus many seats) when analysing the selection and election
of women.
Excluding reorganized authorities, noted above, reduces the cases to 140,000
separate elections covering the period 1973–2003. Each result includes each can-
didate’s sex, party, vote and incumbency with details available for over half a
million candidates. These cases are used for the broad description of overall
trends in the recruitment of women to local government since the seventies.
Smaller sub-sets of data are used to address more specific research questions
described below.
Research and methodology questions
Although much of the research on women’s selection and election has had a
national focus, the literature helps in identifying some key structural factors.
Additionally, there are specific aspects of local government structure that
provide opportunities for greater analytic purchase. Accordingly, this paper
addresses the following research questions. Are there differences in trends in
the recruitment and election of women among the various types of local authority,
county, district and borough? While differences exist in the proportions of women
representing political parties in the House of Commons, are they also present in
local government? Electoral context may also play a role in women’s recruitment.
Is the variable nature of the electoral cycle relevant, with annual elections offering
more decision points for candidates deliberating about whether or not to stand?
Once the decision to stand is made are the seats that women contest the most
likely to result in victory or defeat? Are these candidates invariably competing
against men incumbents? Some local elections usemulti-member wards/divisions
and this additional variable allows for a more nuanced analysis of women’s
recruitment. Is there evidence that local parties take advantage of multi-
member seats, presenting voters with a more gender-balanced ticket? Prior
research has identified ‘a contagion effect’, suggesting parties follow one
another in selecting women candidates and we discover whether this pheno-
menon occurs in English local government.
Once elected is there evidence that women fare differently from men, both in
terms of voter support and the length of time served as councillors? When women
retire from the council are parties more likely to select a woman candidate as
replacement, thereby at least maintaining the proportion of women council
members? This is a lengthy list of research questions but one which reflects the
paucity of existing research.
The analysis begins by considering women candidates. The initial focus is on
the proportion of women candidates and whether over time any patterns that
emerge are conditional upon either the type of local authority or the candidate’s
party. The critical role of local parties in selecting women candidates will be
addressed in light of the questions posed above, i.e. electoral competitiveness,
gender balance and the presence of incumbents. The second part of the analysis
considers women councillors. Again, we begin by considering the overall trends,
comparing how types of local authority and different political parties vary
in the proportion of women councillors. Next, we assess how well women
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councillors do in terms of voter support and whether there are significant
differences in the duration of men and women’s political careers. Finally, we
investigate the pattern of succession in seats when women incumbents retire
from the council.
Women candidates in English local government
Women now comprise around 30% of total candidates, double the figure for the
first post-reorganization elections in 1973 (see Figure 1). The early years showed
little movement: women comprised a fifth of all candidates on only three
occasions prior to 1986. However, in the subsequent four-year period, women
rose to a quarter of candidates. From then onwards the general trend continued
upward, although the pace of progress slowed. One aspect of the data requiring
explanation is the four-yearly dip beginning in 1989. This decline coincided
with the county council elections. Geographically speaking they are the largest
local authorities and, during the period 1989–2001, used single-member electoral
districts. It is plausible that women are more reluctant to stand in these elections
because of the resource implications of travelling to what may be quite distant
council meetings. Unfortunately we have no spatial data that would facilitate
examination of this possibility. Women candidates may also be less likely in
single-member electoral districts because local party selection meetings show pre-
ference towards men. We shall consider this question below.
Figure 2 charts the trends in women candidates for the different types of local
authority identified in Table 1. During the seventies the highest proportion of can-
didates was in the London boroughs and the lowest in the metropolitan boroughs.
These authorities cover some of the most densely populated areas and share many
demographic characteristics. The lowest points on the metropolitan borough line
Figure 1. Women candidates in English local elections.
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coincide with special whole-council elections in multi-member wards that follow
periodic boundary changes; in other words, precisely when electoral arrange-
ments closely approximate those in London. As the proportion of women challen-
gers increased during the eighties, so differences between the different types of
local authority diminished. There was a particularly steep climb in the metro-
politan boroughs after the nadir of 1982, while the trend line for London boroughs
stabilized. By the beginning of the nineties convergence was almost complete,
despite the slight lag for the county councils.
Another aspect in the selection of women candidates relates to possible party
effects. As Figure 3 shows, the Liberal Democrats (including formerly Liberals and
the SDP/Liberal Alliance) chose proportionally more women than either of the
two main parties, namely Conservative and Labour. Following establishment
in the late eighties the Liberal Democrats made an effort to select more women,
a tactic more successful at local than for parliamentary elections.25 Another
factor that may account for the party gap is that the two main parties have been
restricted in selecting more women until men first elected in the late seventies
retire from office.
Figure 2 shows that the proportion of women recently contesting single-
member seats at county council elections was lower than for other types of
authority—this may be because of reasons discussed above but may also relate
to district magnitude. In their study of US state legislatures, Darcy and others
found that women candidates were more numerous in multi-member districts
and that this did not occur by chance.26 In order to test for a similar effect here
the analysis considers those authorities that use whole-council elections and
Figure 2. Women candidates and type of authority.
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variable district magnitudes—effectively the London boroughs and a majority of
shire districts. The results are shown in Figure 4.27
Data for London are restricted to two- and three-member seats because the
number of single-member cases is small.28 In 1974 women were much more
likely to have stood in three-member rather than two-member districts. In 1986,
the reverse position held. In other years, however, there appears to have been
very little variation between the two. Over the whole period, women comprised
28% of candidates in two-member and 29% in three-member seats. In this situ-
ation a useful procedure for considering the relationship between more than
two categorical variables simultaneously is loglinear analysis.29 This analysis
Figure 4. Ballot structure and women candidates: (a) London; (b) districts (whole).
Figure 3. Women candidates by political party.
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shows that, in London at least, there is no statistically significant relationship
between candidate sex and district magnitude.30 A more detailed analysis is con-
ducted for the shire districts where there is a wider range of one, two and three-
member electoral districts and more than 100,000 individual candidates. But this
analysis also does not reveal a significant relationship between women candidates
and increasing district magnitude.
Although the proportion of women candidates has risen overall, that growth is
unlikely to lead to an equality of representation if the seats that women contest are
the most difficult to win. There are two principal factors that may impact on
women’s success. First, there is the size of the winner’s majority in the seat for
which they are the challenger. Second, it is important to know whether or not
they are challenging an incumbent or instead fighting an open seat.
In order to test whether women challengers are mainly provided opportunities
to fight more difficult seats we selected cases where district magnitude is one and
where the incumbent party was either Conservative, Labour or Liberal Democrat.
We then divided seats according to, first, whether the percentage majority at the
previous election was greater than 20% (safe seat) or less than 20% (marginal
seat) and, second, whether or not an incumbent councillor was contesting.
For metropolitan boroughs, the mean percentage of women challengers was
21.7% in marginal seats and 25.6% in safe seats. In seats without an incumbent
standing there was a mean of 20.5% for women candidates in marginal seats,
but 24.2% in safe seats. Where an incumbent stood the percentage of women chal-
lengers was 22.9% in marginal and 26.7% in safe seats. Loglinear analysis reveals
statistically significant two-way associations between seat marginality, whether it
is an open seat, and the participation of women candidates. We conclude that
women candidates in the metropolitan boroughs are more likely to be found fight-
ing difficult-to-win seats and challenging incumbents.31
The picture is less clear for the two types of district councils. Loglinear analysis
of authorities that use whole-council elections does not reveal statistically signifi-
cant associations between seat marginality and number of women candidates
when incumbency is taken into account. However, two-way associations
between number of women andmarginality, and between marginality and incum-
bency are significant. The proportion of women candidates was 29.0% in marginal
seats, 31.4% for safe seats. Women comprised 30.2% of challengers to incumbents
in marginal seats but 34.7% in safe seats. In authorities with partial council elec-
tions, women comprised 24.5% of the candidates in more marginal seats but
26.4% in safe seats. In open seats women comprised 22.0% of challengers in
marginal and 24.6% in safe seats. However, in seats with an incumbent seeking
re-election, there was less than a one percentage point difference in the two
types of seats (27.8% and 28.5%). We have no satisfactory explanation at this
point for why the pattern of women’s recruitment in the metropolitan boroughs
should be so clear but more opaque for the shire districts.
Previous research shows that women candidates sometimes ‘cluster’, in the
sense that when one party selects a woman its rivals often follow suit.32 Focusing
on contests with only one seat at stake and where candidates stood from each of
the three main parties—Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat—we ident-
ified sufficient cases to test for clustering in the metropolitan boroughs, county
and district councils. Table 2 confirms that there appears to have been a contagion
effect for each type of authority. In the metropolitan boroughs, for example, even
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when there was no female Labour candidate, the chance that the Conservatives
fielded a woman candidate was higher when the Liberal Democrats also selected
a woman (29.6% against 23.1%).33 When Labour fielded a woman candidate, once
again it was more likely that the Conservatives would complete the all-female
slate of candidates if Liberal Democrats had done the same (32.3% against
29.6%). A similar pattern was present for both the counties and districts.
We conducted a loglinear analysis of three-way contingency tables to assess
the statistical significance of these findings. The independence model (that the
presence of women candidates for Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat
is mutually independent) is rejected for all types of election.34 In short, there is
a statistically recognizable tendency for women candidates to cluster together.
Interesting though this is, there is no reliable method using aggregate data, for dis-
covering why this should be the case. A supply-side argument may be that women
locally are aware of other women deciding to stand and feel it is appropriate that
they too should stand. A demand-led argumentmight be that local parties observe
their rivals’ behaviour and when at least one selects a woman then efforts are
made also to find a woman candidate.
Women councillors in English local government
The increase in the number of women elected to local office over time (see
Figure 5) has followed a similar path to the growth in women candidates noted
in Figure 1. Until 1985, and despite fluctuations from year to year, women filled
roughly 16% of all seats in local government. Over the following decade,
however, there was an almost uninterrupted rise. Any noticeable downturns
tended to coincide with county council elections in 1989, 1993, 1997 and 2001
(recall Figure 1). It is ironic that the synchronous general and county council elec-
tions in 1997 resulted both in a record number of women MPs (120, 18.2%) but a
lower than average number of women elected to the county councils (522, 23.7%).
Amore formal control for the type of local authority shows that in the immedi-
ate post-reorganization period women county councillors were relatively numer-
ous, but thereafter progress was comparatively restrained (see Figure 6). The
London boroughs, originally with the greatest proportion, were later largely
matched by both the shire districts and metropolitan boroughs. The pattern
Table 2. The contagion effect: percentage of Conservative (CON) women candidates
conditional on gender of Labour (LAB) and Liberal Democrat (LD) candidates
County Metropolitan
Shire district
(partial)
CON CON CON
Woman N Woman N Woman N
LAB Man LD Man 23.2% 7,036 26.1% 6,780 25.2% 9,376
Woman 25.3% 2,482 28.2% 2,511 27.8% 3,755
(Subtotals) 23.7% 9,518 26.6% 9,291 25.9% 13,131
Woman LD Man 24.8% 2,034 27.8% 1,794 26.5% 3,317
Woman 27.6% 797 30.4% 759 26.9% 1,459
(Subtotals) 25.6% 2,831 28.6% 2,553 26.6% 4,776
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in the metropolitan boroughs has been somewhat erratic, but closer examination
reveals a cohort effect, with a relatively high proportion of men incumbents
seeking re-election at certain points of the four-year electoral cycle.
There are also differences among parties in the proportion of women elected
(see Figure 7). For example, at the beginning of the period, although women
were few in number they comprised a larger proportion of the Liberal Party’s
Figure 6. Women councillors and type of authority.
Figure 5. Women councillors in English local government.
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overall representation than was the case for either the Labour or Conservative
Parties. As the party’s council membership has grown, so it has maintained its
record for being ‘women-friendly’. In turn, Conservative women councillors
have generally formed a greater proportion of their party’s local government
membership than have Labour women. Labour women county councillors (and
indeed candidates) are especially scarce.
Of course, for women candidates to make the transition to women councillors
requires sufficient support from voters. When using aggregate data, unwarranted
inferences about individual-level behaviour should be avoided. But the unusual
structure of local elections in England means that opportunities arise to identify
whether, other things being equal, voters discriminate for or against women.
For the first of our analyses we selected multi-member electoral units among
the London boroughs and district councils where a major party fielded more
than one candidate and where only one of those candidates was a woman.
If there was evidence of bias, for or against, then the finishing positions of
women within each party’s slate of candidates would differ from that expected
(calculated under the assumption of random finishing order). Negative residuals
between observed and expected frequencies in the higher positions of a party’s
slate would imply that fewer women than expected occupied these positions—
evidence of voter discrimination against women. On the other hand, positive
discrimination would mean positive residuals in the higher positions on party
slates. The third possibility, of no voter preference for candidates on the basis of
sex, would produce no pattern in the distribution of residuals.
The analysis suggests that electors do not discriminate against women and in
some cases we found statistically significant evidence of a positive bias. For all
three main parties positive residuals could be found in either first or second
Figure 7. Women councillors by political party.
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positions and negative residuals in third place or lower. In county and district
(partial) elections, the difference between actual finishing order and the expected
one was not statistically significant. In London and districts (whole), voters had a
statistically significant preference for women candidates from all three main
parties. In metropolitan boroughs there was indifference to candidate sex
among Conservative and Liberal Democrat voters but Labour voters had a
small preference for women. This analysis does not control for alphabetical
order on the ballot, nor candidate ethnicity, although we would expect any
effects from these to be randomly distributed.
Another method for indirectly considering voter preference towards a candi-
date’s sex is to examine the change in percentage share of the vote for candidates
who succeed in capturing a seat for the first time. Are men swept to power on a
stronger or weaker tide of voter support or should we accept the null hypothesis
that there are no differences in mean change in percentage vote share for newly
elected men and women councillors?
Figure 8 shows the pattern of inter-election swing (defined as change in share
of vote between one election and the next) in single member seats in the metro-
politan boroughs, county councils, and district councils with partial elections.
In two cases—the counties and districts—the respective means were very
similar. However, in the metropolitan boroughs, the mean percentage change
for newly elected men was three percentage points but for women it was nearer
to two points. A two-way ANOVA test (candidate sex and time/year of election
were used as fixed factors) showed that time had a significant influence on
swing (reflecting non-constant change in vote shares through time) but gender
was insignificant. We considered whether these differences were a function of
the incoming councillor replacing an incumbent party. Given that women are
more likely to challenge in safe seats it is, in fact, more likely that the percentage
change in vote for a newly elected woman will be greater than for a man. Dividing
seats into those won from the same or a different party does not explain why
differences in the metropolitan boroughs exist.
Once elected, is there evidence that the duration of a woman’s political career
is likely to be different from that of a man’s? Given the emphasis on resource
pressures we anticipate that women will voluntarily remain in office for a
shorter period than men. Accordingly, we selected a number of starting points
for a range of council types and wards whose boundaries remained unchanged
until 2003. Identifying newly elected councillors, we then monitored their
Figure 8. Change in vote share for newly elected councillors: (a) counties; (b) districts
(partial); (c) metropolitan.
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careers, noting the time when they voluntarily stood down (councillors defeated
at the ballot box are excluded from the analysis). Table 3 shows only small differ-
ences in career duration between men and women. The t-test for independent
samples revealed no statistical significance (p . 0.1 for all comparisons). This
does not provide support for the view that the duration of women’s political
careers is adversely affected by resource pressures.
These data were compared with two councillor surveys conducted in 1997 and
2000 although these were not restricted to those voluntarily retiring from elected
office.35 The 1997 survey found that the average tenure was 7.6 years for women
councillors and 9.4 years for men—a difference of 1.8 years. The subsequent
survey in 2000 reported tenure as 8.3 and 9.4 years for women and men, respect-
ively, a narrower though still significant gap. We attempted to replicate these
surveys using candidate-level data instead; defeated councillors as well as those
that retired voluntarily were examined. The analysis moved backwards in time,
originating in 1997 or 2000, and traced the duration of careers for the county coun-
cils, metropolitan boroughs and district councils that elect by thirds. The findings
showed quite small differences in career duration. For the counties the difference
was non-significant while for the metropolitan boroughs and district councils the
differences were only significant at the 5% level.
These two sets of data—our own and I&Dea surveys—differed slightly but
there may be an explanation for this. First, our selection technique was deter-
mined by our data. Extensive boundary changes sometimes meant that an
elected member was forced to move to another electoral district and we were
unable to maintain contact. Additionally, the method that was used to calculate
duration in office in Table 3 was to use fixed time periods and many of these coun-
cillors will continue in office, leading us to underestimate the longevity of political
careers. Finally, with the survey data, we should allow for both faulty memory
and non-response bias. This is clearly an issue that requires further investigation.
Above, we noted that for candidates elected for the first time there were no
differences, controlling for candidate sex, in the level of voter support. Further-
more, in multi-member wards, women candidates performed well on their
party slates. There are two further tests that we can conduct. By selecting all
single-member electoral districts and controlling for sex, we can measure first,
the relative swing against incumbents and second, the level of turnout.
Figures 9 and 10 confirm our initial findings. There were no significant differences
Table 3. Duration of political careers
Mean time on the council (years) (No. of cases)
Men Women
Counties 9.1 8.8
New councillors elected in 1981 (N ¼ 649) (N ¼ 157)
Districts (whole) 9.2 8.8
New councillors elected in 1979 (N ¼ 378) (N ¼ 87)
London 7.1 6.8
New councillors elected in 1978 (N ¼ 808) (N ¼ 231)
Metropolitan 8.4 8.6
New councillors elected in 1982–4 (N ¼ 889þ 307þ 291) (N ¼ 193þ 78þ 73)
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in vote swings amongst men and women incumbents seeking re-election. Neither
were there differences in levels of turnout. In short, the local electorate as a whole
does not appear at any time during the past 30 years to have expressed a prefer-
ence towards councillors on the basis of their sex.
How concerned are local political parties that the proportion of women coun-
cillors, if not improved, is at least sustained? We address this question by focusing
on single-member electoral districts, noting what happens in the selection process
when councillors stand down. Table 4 suggests that the incumbent party does try
Figure 9. Voting for and against incumbents.
Figure 10. Turnout and councillor gender.
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to maintain, if not improve, the proportion of women. In the metropolitan
boroughs, for example, when a man stands down his party selects a woman repla-
cement in just under a fifth of cases (18.4%). By contrast, when a woman retires, a
woman is the party replacement in more than a quarter of cases (26.5%). The
pattern is more apparent in districts that use whole-council elections. In just
under one in eight cases of a man retiring, a woman is selected but in almost
half the seats where a woman resigns another woman is the replacement. All
differences are statistically significant.
Conclusions
The availability of such a large data set covering a 30-year period permits both a
longitudinal analysis and sufficient diversity to test for some subtle, though
important, electoral system effects. The first part of our analysis focused on
women being selected; the second dealt with women being elected.
Since local government reorganization in the early seventies to recent times the
proportion of women candidates has doubled. The rate of growthwas particularly
rapid in the second half of the eighties and it would be fascinating to identify this
pattern in other polities. Small perturbations in the trend line coincided with elec-
tions to the shire county councils. This may follow from resource pressures on
women since these authorities cover the largest geographical areas. Each of the
three major political parties recruited more women candidates over the period,
although the Liberal Democrats maintained an advantage over Labour and the
Conservatives.
We found that, unlike some other plurality systems, and certainly unlike PR
systems, the proportion of women candidates is unrelated to increases in district
magnitude, at least to a maximum of three. Women candidates were selected more
frequently than men to fight difficult-to-win seats, although this may reflect a bias
among party selection panels and/or the personal wishes of women, happy to
stand but unwilling to win. In some types of council, women candidates are
Table 4. Maintaining women’s representation
Type of authority Women candidates Total N
Woman resigned Metropolitan 26.5% 1,015
Counties 28.4% 894
Districts (whole) 45.4% 603
Districts (partial) 26.3% 2,660
Man resigned Metropolitan 18.4% 4,190
Counties 20.6% 3,471
Districts (whole) 13.8% 2,676
Districts (partial) 19.7% 9,346
Incumbent remains Metropolitan 26.0% 1,790
Counties 20.7% 208
Districts (whole) 22.6% 164
Districts (partial) 28.0% 2,378
Total N Metropolitan 1,507 6,995
Counties 1,011 4,573
Districts (whole) 680 3,443
Districts (partial) 3,204 14,384
Women in English local government 195
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
 of
 Pl
ym
ou
th]
 at
 03
:38
 18
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
12
 
handicapped by being selected to challenge an incumbent. There is a contagion
effect in the recruitment of women candidates; when one party selects a
woman, there is a good chance that its rival(s) also select a woman. This effect
is found in certain types of PR voting but it is unexpected—and so far
unexplained—in single-member plurality systems.
The second part of the analysis focused on elected women. Given that women
were more likely to be selected for less winnable seats, it was expected that the
proportions of women elected would lag slightly behind the trend line for candi-
dates. This was the case throughout, with the growth in both women candidates
and councillors tending to flatten out in recent years. Women have comprised a
consistently higher proportion of Liberal Democrat than Conservative or
Labour councillors.
Variability in the structure of local elections meant that we were able to test
whether voters as a whole expressed a preference for men or women councillors.
In multi-member electoral districts women candidates tend to receive more
votes than do men on the same party slate, controlling for ballot-position
effects. This was generally true for all types of local authority. Again, it is difficult
to say with any conviction why this should be the case. Candidate sex also seemed
to weigh lightly with voters when a councillor sought re-election. There is no
evidence that either swing or turnout differs according to the incumbent’s sex.
Political parties do appear to be mindful of at least maintaining the proportion
of elected women. When a woman councillor retires efforts are made to find
another woman to replace her. According to the aggregate data, the careers of
men and women councillors are comparable in duration.
In general terms, therefore, systemic factors, such as district magnitude and
the cycle of local elections, do not operate to the detriment of women candidates
or councillors although aggregate data cannot explain why women are more often
challengers in safe rather than marginal seats. Similarly, party political factors do
not appear to constrain women’s involvement. Indeed, local parties appear con-
scious of the need to safeguard, if not expand, the proportion of women standing
for elective office. There is no evidence that the explanation for the under-rep-
resentation of women lies with voter preference. There is no prima facie reason,
therefore, why political party selection meetings should discriminate against
women as candidates.
And yet the proportion of women candidates and councillors in local govern-
ment remains relatively low. There is a limited amount of evidence that resource
issues may explain some of this trend. Why would local parties necessarily select
women to fight the more difficult seats when the evidence suggests that voters
respond positively to their selection? Women’s representation on relatively
large (geographically speaking) local authorities has become lower than in auth-
orities whose areas are smaller, despite the fact that responsibility for services
such as education and social care are entrusted to the larger authorities.
In describing the general trends in the recruitment of women as both candi-
dates and councillors we have opened up a new set of research questions.
While the evidence is strong that systemic factors do not suppress the numbers
of women it is less clear what role is played by party political and resource
factors. There are no studies of local party selection panels and processes that
could confirm whether or not that a person’s sex becomes relevant. Equally,
there is no evidence that parties are proactive in prompting women to stand or
196 Galina Borisyuk et al.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
 of
 Pl
ym
ou
th]
 at
 03
:38
 18
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
12
 
that the parties now find it harder to recruit women for county elections. This type
of research would need to be conducted alongside large-sample surveys of candi-
dates and councillors that address personal resource issues. There is a suggestion,
but no firm evidence, that the progress in women’s recruitment may have stalled
because of an imbalance in opportunities for men and women. This article has
shed light on the recruitment of women as candidates and councillors to local gov-
ernment since the early seventies, but without knowing more about what goes on
inside local parties and how men and women cope with the resource pressures of
serving as a local councillor it is difficult to design policies that could overcome
women’s under-representation.
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Introduction
 
This paper considers the impact of distance to
polling station upon voter turnout to three
different types of elections in three time periods in
Britain. The three types of election are parliamentary,
local and European elections and cover the period
from the late 1970s onwards. Our basic hypothesis
is that in high salience elections, for example, a
national general election, the distance travelled to
the polling station to vote is discounted more than
for other elections; in short where there is less at
stake, electorally speaking, geography matters and
turnout declines with distance. If this relationship
is demonstrated, and distance measures are related
to levels of participation, then that becomes relevant
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to the explanation for low and declining turnout
and should be factored into policy initiatives that
address this problem.
The gap between turnout at general elections in
Great Britain and that for other types of election held
at different times is among the largest of any western
liberal democracy. This gap, ranging between
25 and 40 percentage points, is rarely subject to
systematic examination; rather, explanations of voter
turnout concentrate on specific types of elections
and seek explanations for turnout/abstention
within that context. This may be due to the lack of
useful data. Survey data are most abundant for
national elections and relatively scarce for local and
European elections, for example. Even then, res-
pondents to national election surveys are rarely asked
about their participation or otherwise across the
range of elections. Moreover, there is the longstanding
problem associated with the over-reporting of
turnout given the close associations between
voting and civic duty. The alternative is to use
aggregate data but problems exist here also. Apart
from the problems of making inferences about
individual level behaviour from ecological data, it
is unsuitable because there is often no common
comparative unit of analysis, or if there is, it is
much too large to facilitate analysis.
However, there is scope for comparative analysis
when local authorities retain records of voters’
participation at the level of individual polling
stations. The numbers of voters allocated to each
polling station are rather small and the communities
served are likely to remain reasonably stable (in
terms of social composition) over relatively short
time periods. Unfortunately, many local authorities
in Britain do not compile detailed records of turn-
out at this level but there are exceptions, one of
which is the focus of this paper. Having access to
such low-level aggregate data and over a relatively
long time period (the late 1970s onwards) allows
us to test for the effects that a range of distance
measures for the journey to vote may have upon
the numbers of voters that participate.
The paper proceeds as follows. First, we examine
existing research on turnout at elections in Britain,
identifying those variables considered most rele-
vant to the level of turnout but also focusing on
potential explanations for the gap in turnout. In the
same section we review existing studies where the
costs associated with the journey to vote at a poll-
ing station appear sufficient to affect the level of
electoral participation. The existing evidence informs
our choice of independent variables when model-
ling turnout at the polling station level. The second
section describes some of the political context for
the London borough of Brent that comprises the
basis of this study, while in the third section we
describe the methods used in constructing the data
set. In the fourth section we describe in a series of
multi-level models the testing of the hypothesis
regarding the effect of geography on low/high sali-
ence elections. The concluding section summarises
the research findings and considers both future
research and the possible policy implications.
 
Explaining turnout
 
Most studies of electoral participation in Britain
focus on one specific type of election and very few
consider turnout across the range of elections. For
parliamentary elections turnout is influenced by
the social composition and political marginality of
individual constituencies (Denver and Hands 1997)
while individual characteristics such as age, strength
of party identification, interest in the campaign,
caring who wins the election, and the perceived
ideological difference between the parties and the
closeness of the overall contest (Heath and Taylor
1999, Pattie and Johnston 1998) all have a bearing
on who and who does not participate. Geography
too plays its part in affecting turnout with measurable
effects due to neighbourhood and other spatial
units (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Johnston and
Pattie 2006; Johnston 
 
et al
 
. 2007). Clarke 
 
et al
 
. (2004),
after examining the British Election Study, conclude
that models of ‘general incentives’ and ‘cognitive
mobilisation’ perform best when explaining turnout.
Electoral participation, it seems, ‘is partly a matter
of calculations of the costs and benefits of certain
courses of action, and partly a matter of characteristics
which define the “good” citizen, such as attentiveness
to the campaign, political knowledge, and especially,
civic duty’ (Clarke 
 
et al
 
. 2004, 274). Although far
fewer in number, local election studies have identified
similar variables and drawn similar conclusions.
Aggregate data analysis, for example, shows that
electors in ‘safe’ seats are less likely to participate
than those in marginal ones while the proportion
of elderly residents and population stability are
positively correlated with turnout (Rallings and
Thrasher 1990; Rallings 
 
et al
 
. 2000). At the individual
level, age, length of residence, a sense of involvement
in local politics and strength of party identification
all appear to be important in determining the
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propensity to vote (Miller 1988). Crucially, perhaps,
voters can be separately identified from non-voters
at local elections because of their stronger sense of
both civic duty and perception of electoral salience
(Curtice 
 
et al
 
. 2001).
Lower voter turnout at both local and European
elections is addressed by the theory of ‘second-order’
elections (Reif and Schmitt 1980; Reif 1984). Turn-
out is expected to be lower at second-order (local/
European) than at first-order (general) elections
simply because less is at stake and fewer people
care about the outcome. Specific issues relevant to
the election at hand tend to be of lesser salience.
Studies in Britain, however, have found evidence
that the choice of electors is influenced by context-
specific factors at both local elections (Heath 
 
et al
 
.
1997) and referendums (Denver 2002). The turnout
‘gap’ also resonates with the classical rational choice
theory of the ‘calculus of voting’. In Riker and
Ordeshook’s (1968) terms, if the costs of voting are
substantially similar at the two contests, but the
expected benefits rather less at one type of election
than the other, then there is less reason to turn out.
The tipping point for voter participation at low
salience elections, therefore, may become sensitive
to minor adjustments to voting costs. For example,
in experiments with all-postal voting in Britain and
elsewhere, when all electors receive ballot papers
at home and are able to vote prior to the election
day, there should be, in theory, fewer circumstantial
abstainers (Blondel 
 
et al
 
. 1998). Indeed, the effect of
all-postal ballots in raising turnout at low salience
local and European elections is now well docu-
mented for the British case (Rallings and Thrasher
2007). Research, mainly conducted in the United
States, is ambivalent about how, if at all, those who
are drawn to vote by all-postal elections differ from
those who vote where normal electoral procedures
are in place. Some research (Berinsky 
 
et al
 
. 2001;
Berinsky 2005; Karp and Banducci 2000) concludes
that voting by mail has the effect of increasing
turnout most among those who are already predis-
posed to vote, but Southwell (2004) finds that postal
voting expands the pool of potential voters by
facilitating participation by ‘soccer moms’ or employed
people whose busy schedules may make them
circumstantial abstainers.
A close examination of marked electoral registers
in the UK, showing who had and had not voted
and where they lived, demonstrated, among other
things, that electoral turnout is sensitive to changes
in geography relative to the location where people
are required to vote (Orford and Schuman 2002a
2002b; Taylor 1973); in short, distance matters, a
feature not simply restricted to the UK (Haspel and
Knotts 2005). Even subtle changes in electoral pro-
cedure and their effect on aggregate levels of turn-
out merely serve to emphasise the importance of
the costs of voting and the price sensitive voter.
Those visiting a polling station, for example, will
factor in costs associated with the distance to travel
and the estimated journey time. Other things being
equal, it appears that those living in the densest
populated urban areas perceive this cost as lower
than do those living in outer suburbs where traffic
congestion between home and work is relevant to
the calculus of voting (Gimpel and Schuknecht
2003). Offering voters some relief from this cost by
permitting either early voting or a postal ballot
does have the desired effect. In their study of Clark
County, Nevada, Dyck and Gimpel (2005) estab-
lished that voting by post became more popular as
the voter’s distance from the polling station
increased, but it is worth noting that the distances
involved were as high as 65 miles. There is also
evidence that word of mouth among busy commuters
about the availability of early voting facilities
could play a positive role in affecting turnout
(Gimpel 
 
et al
 
. 2006). Further confirmation of sensi-
tivity to polling place location comes from a study
of the 2003 California recall election (Brady and
McNulty 2005), which found that the consolidation
of polling places in some areas had a negative
impact on turnout; for some electors the disruption
to their voting routine and the additional travelling
costs proved a sufficient disincentive to voting.
While it appears that a number of factors are
common across explanations of voter turnout at
different types of election, there are clues that the
costs of voting contribute to relative differences in
turnout. We now begin describing some of the
political context for this examination of the effects
of geography upon voter turnout.
 
Case study and context
 
The key concern of the paper is to investigate the
impact of distance to the polling station on voter
turnout. This would require individual level data
on who had and had not voted, where they lived
and the location of the polling station. Such data
are often available from local authorities in the
form of marked electoral rolls and these have been
used in previous (small-scale) research (e.g. Orford
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and Schuman 2002a 2002b). However, their use in a
large-scale study such as this one is limited by the
fact that they are not available in a digital format
which necessitates their manual input. For a single
election in one constituency this could relate to
several tens of thousands of records. Moreover,
these marked rolls are rarely kept for more than
5 years after an election, which prohibits an
investigation into long-term trends in turnout.
Instead, turnout data aggregated to the level of the
polling district will be used as this tends to be
available in a digital format and for longer periods
of time. A proxy measure of distance will be
constructed – in this case the average distance
between voters’ homes and the polling station for
each polling district, looking at small groups of
homes using unit postcode data. This is explained
in more detail in the next section.
The focus for this case study is the London
Borough of Brent, which has compiled complete
polling-district-level data on turnout for parliament-
ary, European, and local elections for the period
1978–2001. These data include the number of voters,
the number of registered electorate and the number
of postal voters for each polling district. It does
not contain information on the non-registration of
voters or how voters travelled to the polling station
to vote (e.g. walking, by car etc.). Each electoral ward
(used for local elections and as the building blocks
for parliamentary constituencies) is subdivided
into a number of polling districts and each has a
polling station where people go to vote. Electors
can only cast their vote at a specified polling sta-
tion, usually the closest one. As parliamentary and
European elections are not distinctly ward-level
elections, polling districts are a useful spatial scale
to study and also provide an unusually fine-grained
analysis of aggregate voting data (averaging about
1300 electors).
Brent has the added advantage of encompassing
three entire parliamentary constituencies (Brent East,
Brent North, and Brent South), thus providing
greater opportunities for direct comparisons.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the electoral geography of
Brent in 2001. Figure 2 shows that not all polling
stations are located within the polling district that
they serve, reflecting the policy of using certain
buildings as polling stations, which is discussed
later. The three time periods examined here cover a
20-year span. Time period one relates to the 1979
parliamentary election, the 1979 European election,
and the 1978 local election; two relates to the 1992
parliamentary election, the 1989 European election,
and the 1990 local election; and three to the 2001
parliamentary election, the 1999 European election,
and the 1998 local election. The polling districts
used in each election are very stable, ranging from
114 used in time period one to a maximum of 118
used in the parliamentary election in time period
two. Generally the same polling districts have been
used in all of the elections in all three time periods.
Statistical summaries of percentage turnout at each
election in each of the three time periods are reported
in Table I. Graphical summaries indicated that
percentage turnout approximates a normal distri-
bution in all of the elections across the three time
periods. The mean turnout reveals the turnout gap
between the three elections with twice as many
voters, on average, turning out to parliamentary
elections than to European elections across all three
time periods. Also, turnout is generally declining
across the three time periods, with an average
decrease of 25 percentage points in turnout between
time periods one and three, with this drop being
Table I Percentage turnout by polling district to each election in each time period
Period 1a Period 2b Period 3c
Euro Local Parl Euro Local Parl Euro Local Parl
Maximum 46.13 68.22 82.48 41.62 57.06 81.24 32.21 54.43 67.21
Minimum 7.04 11.71 44.72 14.01 18.43 51.92 2.03 3.82 13.83
Mean 27.62 46.86 71.16 31.4 42.91 68.02 21.78 36.22 49.15
Standard deviation 7.21 8.72 7.08 4.72 6.72 6.03 4.41 7.4 7.27
No. of registered electorate 187 140 188 076 186 759 181 180 179 723 162 240 171 476 167 058 181 516
No. of polling districts 114 114 114 114 117 118 115 115 115
a1979 European elections, 1978 local elections, 1979 parliamentary elections.
b1989 European elections, 1990 local elections, 1992 parliamentary elections.
c1999 European elections, 1998 local elections, 2001 parliamentary elections.
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the greatest for parliamentary elections. The standard
deviation measures the variation in turnout between
polling districts for each election. Within each time
period the greatest variation in turnout occurs in
local elections, although the differences with parlia-
mentary elections are rather small and for period
three there is very little difference. In short, the gap
in turnout between parliamentary, local and Euro-
pean elections is consistent with the general trend,
while the national secular decline in electoral par-
ticipation is also captured by these data.
The political context can change substantially
between elections and there is a need to understand
this, particularly when interpreting the impact of
party competition and marginality upon turnout.
To this end we have examined election results in
Brent for the elections prior to those from which
our polling district data are drawn in order to iden-
tify the possible impact of political competition
and mobilisation on turnout levels. Brent East is
likely to have been treated by the parties as a semi-
marginal in the 1979 general election with a conse-
quent slight possible increase in mobilising activity.
A similar pattern was observed before the 1978 local
elections. The 1979 European Parliament election
was the first of its kind and campaigning was
conducted at a very broad level with no difference
likely between polling districts.
At the 1992 general election the highly marginal
constituency of Brent East (4.5%) was the only seat
in the borough to register an increase in turnout. In
local elections there were just six wards throughout
Brent with majorities of less than 10% at the time of
the 1990 contests, two in North and four in East.
There is no evidence to suggest that electors in
one part of Brent were mobilised any more or less
Figure 1 Constituencies and wards in the London Borough of Brent, 2001
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than in any other at the 1989 European parliament
election contest.
The surprise gain of Brent North for Labour in
the 1997 general election meant that it became a
key ‘defend’ seat for the party in 2001, perhaps
prompting comparatively high levels of turnout in
its constituent wards. Most electoral activity at the
1998 local elections was likely to be concentrated in
East, where five out of the 11 wards had majorities
of 5% or less. The introduction of a new electoral
system within a London-wide regional European
parliament constituency probably meant that there
was no special ward-level or polling-district-level
campaign activity in Brent itself. In each time
period, therefore, it would seem likely that turnout
variation between polling districts will be more
apparent at parliamentary and local than at Euro-
pean election level.
 
Data assemblage and description
 
Constructing a GIS for voter turnout in Brent
 
Brent authority supplied digitised boundary data
for its polling districts, a list of the polling stations
for each polling district and turnout data for each
of the nine elections. Boundary changes during the
20-year period were negligible, making the con-
struction of the GIS easier. The locations of the
polling stations were identified on maps and geo-
referenced to the nearest metre as individual points.
The British Ordnance Survey (OS), the national
mapping organisation, supplied digital road network
data (OS MERIDIAN). Although this is the
contemporary road network, there have not been
any substantial changes to this in Brent over the
past 20 years. The locations of the electorate in the
polling districts were captured using postcode data
Figure 2 Wards, polling districts and polling stations in the London Borough of Brent, 2001
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obtained from the All Fields Postcode Directory
(AFPD). This provides the location of every postcode
in Brent geo-referenced to the nearest 10 m and is
available for all three time periods. Each postcode
represents approximately 14 individual addresses
and is represented by point data in the GIS.
Although it is acknowledged that the geography of
voters and the geography of postcodes may not be
identical, we argue that postcodes make a very
good proxy for where voters live, particularly for
analysis aggregated to polling districts as is the
case here. Non-residential postcodes and postcodes
where the grid-reference was flagged in the AFPD
to be of poor quality were removed. Although the
OS can provide digital point data on the location of
individual addresses geo-referenced to the nearest
1 m, these data are only available for time period
three. Similarly, up-to-date OS postcode data also
provide the number of addresses per unit postcode
which allows each postcode to be weighted, but
these data are not available for time periods one
and two. Hence, to be systematic and consistent,
the AFPD data were used in all three time periods.
Each postcode was assigned to a polling district
using Point-in-Polygon analysis in the GIS. This
could introduce some error given the 10 m resolution
of the postcode data in that the postcodes may be
assigned to the wrong polling district. However,
the high density of postcodes across most of the
study area should cancel out the effects of any
systematic mis-allocation of postcodes to polling
districts. Terrain data were obtained from the OS
(OS Land-form PROFILE) that provided average
height information at a spatial resolution of 10 by
10 m and this was used to assign a height value to
each of the polling stations and to all of the postcodes.
 
Generating spatial data in the GIS
 
The GIS was used to generate an array of spatial
variables that is used to examine the spatial effects
on turnout; or to put it another way, the contribution
of geography towards the calculation of voting
costs. Table II contains a summary of the spatial
variables. The first set of variables is chosen to
capture the effect of distance on turnout. It is assumed
that each voter travels from their home to the
polling station (although this journey may include
other activities, such as shopping or commuting)
and so distances are measured from individual
postcodes to the elector’s assigned polling station.
Two sets of distances were generated representing
aggregate travel behaviour in each polling district.
The first, Euclidean (or straight line) distance was
calculated from each postcode to the polling station
in metres and then the overall average Euclidean
distance was calculated for each polling district,
together with the minimum, maximum and standard
deviation of distance. The second distance measure
is road network distance. This was calculated from
each postcode to the polling station in metres and
then the overall average network distance was
calculated for each polling district, as well as the
minimum, maximum and standard deviation of
distance. It should be noted that the road network
digital data do not contain information on footpaths
and so road network distances may overestimate
walking distances in some cases. Table III provides
a summary of the distance variables. As expected,
network distance is greater than Euclidean distance
across all three time periods. Time period two has
the greatest variation in distances as measured by
the standard deviation, reflecting the slight changes
to the polling district and polling station geography
at this time. Generally though, distances have got
shorter between time period one and three, with
average Euclidean distance being just over 300 m
and average network distance around half a kilometre.
The second set of spatial variables addresses the
possible effect of terrain on turnout and in this case
the effect of having to travel up hill to the polling
station (or return home after voting). This may
have a significant effect on voters who walk to the
polling station and subsequently their perception
of the costs of voting. The absolute height differ-
ence in metres between each postcode and the poll-
ing station was calculated and the overall average
height difference was calculated for each polling
district together with minimum, maximum and
standard deviation of height differences. Although
this measure captures the aggregate effect of ter-
rain in a polling district, it does not capture specific
nuances, such as if a postcode and polling station
are located at similar heights but are separated by a
hill or valley. Table III shows that although the
average height differences have remained the same
(just over 4 m), the variation between polling districts
has got smaller.
The third set of spatial variables is concerned
with the context of the polling district itself. These
variables relate to its shape or compactness, its
marginality at a previous election and the nature of
the polling station. Compactness, or how tightly an
area is packed, is often used as a characteristic of
shape and the electoral studies literature suggests
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Table II The four sets of spatial variables for polling districts (PD) generated by the GIS
Variable description Variable name
Distance measures (10 m)
Average Euclidean distance of every 
postcode to the polling station in each 
PD
Linear distance decay ED
Non-linear distance decay: 1/ED1
1/ED2
1/ED3
Average road network distance of every 
postcode to the polling station in each 
PD
Linear distance decay ND
Non-linear distance decay: 1/ND1
1/ND2
1/ND3
Terrain measures (10 m)
Average difference in height between polling 
station and every postcode in each PD
Terrain
Polling district context measures
Cox compactness measure of PD Cox
Fractal dimension of PD FD
Dummy variable – status of the road that the 
polling station is situated upon
A road
B road
Minor road
Dummy variable – polling station 
building type
School
University/college
Community centre
Library
Temporary hut
Church hall
Hall – other
Other
Dummy variable – marginality of the ward 
that polling district is located
Marginal
Voter dispersion (density) measures (these do not appear as variable names in the tables)
Percentage of postcodes less than X m from polling station in each PD
Where X is 100, 200, 300, 400, 500, 600, 700, 750, 1000, 1250 and 1500 m based on Euclidean distances
Where X is 100, 200, 300, 400, 500, 600, 700, 800, 900, 1000, 1250, 1500, 2000 and 2500 m based on road network distances
Table III Descriptive summary of the principal spatial variables
Period 1a Period 2b Period 3c
Min Max Mean SdDev Min Max Mean SdDev Min Max Mean SdDev
Average Euclidean distance 111 840 327 141 99 880 339 147 91 680 314 110
Average network distance 175 1189 487 194 165 1467 513 218 132 1466 475 181
Average terrain difference 1 22 4.38 3.2 1 22 4.66 3.56 0 15 4.41 2.97
Compactness – Cox 0.18 0.81 0.53 0.14 0.18 0.81 0.53 0.14 0.18 0.81 0.53 0.14
Fractal dimension – FD 1.2 1.38 1.25 0.03 1.2 1.38 1.25 0.03 1.2 1.38 1.25 0.03
a1979 European elections, 1978 local elections, 1979 parliamentary elections.
b1989 European elections, 1990 local elections, 1992 parliamentary elections.
c1999 European elections, 1998 local elections, 2001 parliamentary elections.
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many different measurements of compactness,
although many of these are simple transformations
of one another (Niemi 
 
et al
 
. 1990). Two measures of
compactness are used here. The first is the Cox
measure, an easy to calculate measure commonly
used in electoral studies (Young 1988), which is the
ratio of the area of the district to the area of a circle
with the same perimeter: Cox = (4
 
π
 
A
 
)/
 
P
 
2
 
 where 
 
A
 
is the area and 
 
P
 
 is the perimeter of the polling dis-
trict. It has the added advantage that the measure
is bounded by 0 (as the polling district approaches
a straight line) and 1 (as the polling district
approaches the shape of a circle). The second mea-
sure of compactness uses the fractal dimension of
the polling district, which falls between one and
two (Longley and Batty 1989). Both compactness
measures were calculated in the GIS. Table III
shows that there is very little difference between
the compactness of the polling districts between
the three time periods, reflecting the overall stability
of the polling district geography, with very little
variation in the compactness of polling districts
within each time period, as shown in Figure 2.
Generally, most of the polling districts are small
and roughly circular with a small number of
larger, more irregularly shaped districts. In order
to measure marginality, a dummy variable
flagged whether a polling district was located in a
marginal ward (majority of 10 percentage points
or less) in the local elections for each of the three
time periods.
The nature of the polling station refers to the
building that it is located within (e.g. school,
library, temporary hut/cabin), and the status of the
road that it is situated upon (a major A road, a
lower status B road or a minor road). These are
summarised in Table IV. Generally the same build-
ings are used as polling stations for each election,
hence there is very little variation within or between
each time period. Schools account for almost one
half of all polling stations, followed by church
halls. Community centres and temporary huts have
both seen an increase in use as polling stations
since time period one. Nearly three quarters of
polling stations are situated on minor roads, with
just over 15% on A roads and the rest on B roads.
The final set of spatial variables captures the
geographic dispersion or density of voters in each
polling district. This is measured by using the pro-
portions of postcodes within specific distances of
the polling station that are calculated as percentages
of all the postcodes in the polling district. Both
Euclidean and network distances are used to create
two sets of measures. These measures provide a
more sophisticated means of capturing the effects
of distance to the polling station and the compact-
ness of voters within each polling district. In terms
of Euclidean distance, a quarter of electors on aver-
age live within 200 m of a polling station and
nearly half within 300 m. Very few live beyond
three quarters of a kilometre and electors are gen-
erally living closer to the polling station between
Table IV Polling station context in each election in each time period
Period 1a Period 2b Period 3c
Euro Local Parl Euro Local Parl Euro Local Parl
Church hall 25 25 24 24 25 26 25 23 24
Community centre 8 8 8 11 9 7 15 15 13
Hall – other 7 7 7 6 7 7 7 7 6
Temporary huts 7 7 7 6 8 11 9 9 12
Library 2 2 2 0 0 0 1 1 1
Other 6 5 6 3 6 4 3 4 4
School 56 57 57 60 59 59 54 54 53
University/college 3 3 3 4 3 4 1 2 2
A road 20 19 20 19 19 21 20 19 22
B road 10 10 10 9 9 9 9 8 7
Minor road 84 85 84 86 89 88 86 88 86
a1979 European elections, 1978 local elections, 1979 parliamentary elections.
b1989 European elections, 1990 local elections, 1992 parliamentary elections.
c1999 European elections, 1998 local elections, 2001 parliamentary elections.
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time period one and three. A similar situation
occurs with respect to network distance, although
the distances are greater. However, on average around
three quarters of electors live within three quarters
of a network kilometre of a polling station.
 
Generating social data in the GIS
 
As well as spatial variables, the prior research on
turnout demonstrates that it is also important to
include social variables in the analysis. These variables
were generated using census data for Brent. As the
study is over a 20-year period, data from three
censuses were used: the 1981 census for time
period one; the 1991 for time period two; and the
2001 census for time period three. The data obtained
from the three censuses are summarised in Table V.
These data reflect the main socioeconomic effects on
turnout based on published research. The data
were obtained as count data for the smallest areas
possible, which were enumeration districts (EDs)
in the 1981 and 1991 censuses and output areas
(OAs) in the 2001 census. Using the GIS the count
data were re-apportioned from EDs and OAs to
polling districts and the variables in Table V
calculated. Since these variables are taken from
three different censuses, there are some differences
in their definitions and measurements over time.
Because of this and also the potential problems
posed in the analysis by multi-collinearity between
the different variables, factor analysis (with Varimax
rotation and Kaiser normalisation) was used to
collapse the census data into a smaller number of
uncorrelated variables in each of the three censuses.
The factor analysis reveals that 80% of the variance
in the census variables in each of the three censuses
is explained by just four factors. The first factor is
positively loaded against the census variables in
the list that are commonly associated with areas of
deprivation. The second factor is positively loaded
against the census variables commonly associated
with areas that have large student populations. The
third factor is positively loaded against the census
variables that are commonly associated with areas
that have a large proportion of retired people. The final
factor is positively loaded against census variables
that are commonly associated with areas that have
a large proportion of white people in professional
occupations. Hence, four variables based on the
four factors were used to capture the continua of
socioeconomic variation in Brent in the three time
periods. The first measures the relative deprivation
of a polling district; the second measures the student
population of a polling district; the third measures
the retired population of a polling district; and the
final variable measures the proportion of white people
in professional occupations in a polling district.
 
Modelling spatial effects on turnout using 
multi-level analysis
 
In order to test hypotheses regarding the effect of
geography on high/low salience elections, three
multi-level models were estimated for European,
parliamentary and local elections in each time period.
Since the organisation of elections is multi-levelled
– in the sense that people vote within polling
districts that are nested within particular wards
within constituencies – we should expect a complex
spatial geography of turnout, something that was
demonstrated to occur in Brent in Orford 
 
et al
 
.
(2008). The dependent variable in all the models is
percentage turnout at the polling district (i.e. total
number of votes/registered electorate) with the
(small) number of postal voters removed. The first
model, represented by equation (1) is the null
model and calculates the contribution of each level
(polling district, ward and constituency) to the
total variance in turnout across all three levels,
without taking into account any predictor variables.
The second model, represented in equation (2),
estimates the impact of the social, spatial and
polling district context variables on the variation in
election turnout (the random intercepts model).
The final model, equation (3), estimates the
interactions of the predictor variables at higher
Table V The data obtained from the three Census of 
Populations (1981; 1991; 2001)
Percentage population aged 18–29
Percentage population economically active
Percentage population unemployed
Percentage population economically inactive
Percentage population retired
Percentage population students
Percentage population sick
Percentage population belonging to a white ethnic group
Percentage population belonging to an Asian ethnic group
Percentage population in professional/managerial occupations
Percentage population having degree level qualifications
Percentage households in local authority tenure
Percentage households in private rented tenure
Percentage households with access to three or more cars
Percentage households with no access to a car
Percentage migrants in year before census
A 164
 Electoral salience and the costs of voting at elections in the UK
 
205
 
Trans Inst Br Geogr
 
 NS 34 195–214 2009
ISSN 0020-2754 © 2008 The Authors.
Journal compilation © Royal Geographical Society (with The Institute of British Geographers) 2008
 
levels to examine whether their effects on turnout
vary spatially across Brent (the fully random model).
The models were estimated using iterative generalised
least squares (IGLS) in the multi-level modelling
package MLwiN version 2.0 (Rasbash 
 
et al
 
. 2003)
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where i = 1, . . . , I polling districts; j = 1, . . . , J wards;
and k = 1, . . . , K constituencies; m = 1, . . . , M
predictor variables; Tijk is turnout at European (or
local or parliamentary) election in polling district i
within ward j from constituency k; Xmjk is a predictor
variable in the same polling districts; X0jk is a
column vector which consists entirely of ones; α, β
are the fixed parameters to be estimated; νconstit(k),
υward(jk) and εpd(ijk) are three random parameters to be
estimated that represent the variation of turnout
between constituencies, between wards within
constituency, and between polling districts within
a ward and are assumed to be normally distributed
with zero mean values and unknown variances
, respectively. In equation (3),
the random intercept γward(jk) is assumed to be
normally distributed with zero mean value and
τward variance. In addition, at ward level the random
components are allowed to be correlated with
covariance coefficient ρward.
The null models, reported in Table VI, estimate
the average rate of turnout for the whole of Brent
for each election in each time period (the constant
term) and these are similar to the means reported
in Table I. The null model allows the variation
around the estimated average turnout to be parti-
tioned into variation at the level of the individual
polling district, ward and constituency. The num-
bers in brackets are the standard errors of the
coefficients and can be used to judge significance
of the estimated parameters. This works well for
the fixed parameters but for the random parameters
which follow an approximate normal distribution,
Rasbash et al. (2003) also recommend using a likeli-
hood ratio test. By checking if the likelihood ratios
of successive models are significantly different
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compared with a chi-squared distribution, the
significance of the estimated variance terms can be
evaluated. There is no significant variation at the
constituency level for any of the elections (shown
by the large standard errors), indicating that a con-
stituency level effect does not exist, not even in
parliamentary elections, but this may be due to the
small number of constituencies in the study (only
three). The greatest variation in turnout occurs
between polling districts, although significant
variation in rates of turnout also occurs at ward
level, with the exception being parliamentary election
turnout in time period three which is insignificant
at the ward level with all the variation occurring at
polling district level. Due to its insignificance, the
constituency level was removed and the models re-
estimated, but this had very little effect on the
estimated parameters. Hence for the sake of consist-
ency the estimated parameters of all the models are
shown with the constituency included as level 3. A
comparison of the proportion of the significant
variation in the models (that is, at the polling district
and ward levels) indicates that around one half of
the variation in rates of turnout occurs at the ward
level in local elections. This compares to between
two fifths and one third in European elections from
time period one to three and between one third
and zero in parliamentary elections over the same
time period.
The random intercepts models, which include
the influence of the social, spatial and polling dis-
trict context variables, were estimated for the nine
elections. Diagnostic tests were undertaken on the
residuals to check the validity of each of the models.
These revealed that two neighbouring polling
districts in the ward of Alperton had exceptional
influence in the models with respect to distance
measures. Upon further investigation it was revealed
that the polling stations in these polling districts
had been juxtaposed by Brent council when they
supplied the data. These two were subsequently
removed from the analysis as was a polling district
in Stonebridge that was consistently revealed as an
outlier due to very low turnout in all the elections
across the three time periods. The nine models
were re-estimated and are reported in Table VII,
where, for the sake of clarity, only the fixed coef-
ficients that are significant at the 5% level or better
are shown. The differences in the likelihood ratio
statistics of the random intercept models with the
corresponding null models are statistically signifi-
cant at the 1% level, strongly indicating that the
predictor variables have an important effect in
explaining variation in turnout in all three elections.
The inclusion of the predictor variables has re-
sulted in a decline in the polling district level and the
ward level variances. Indeed, ward level variance
is no longer significant in any of the models, with
the exception of the local elections in time periods
two and three and instead all the significant
variation in turnout occurs at the polling district
level. This supports the findings in Orford et al.
(2008), in which the residual significant ward level
variance in local election turnout was attributed
to the possible effects of local campaigning in
the local elections. Moreover, the proportion of
variance at ward level in local elections has increased
between time period two and three from one quarter
to one third of the total variance, indicating that,
perhaps, the impact of local campaigning has become
more important through time.
The random intercepts models assume that, while
the relationships between the predictor variables
and turnout to elections in each ward are the same,
some wards have uniformly higher rates of turnout
than others. In order to investigate whether the
relationship between the predictor variables and
turnout varies between wards, the predictor variables
were included at the ward level (equation 3) in the
two random intercept models that had significant
ward level variance and the models were re-estimated.
None of the estimated ward level variance and
covariance terms in these fully randomised models
was significant, suggesting that the relationship
between the predictor variables and local election
turnout are as described by the random intercepts
models in Table VII.
Analysis of the predictor variables
The social variables show that an increase in the
relative deprivation of a polling district is associated
with a drop in voter participation and this variable
is the most significant in all elections in all time
periods. Polling districts with a higher proportion
of retired people tend to be associated with larger
turnout for all elections, as is expected, particularly
for parliamentary elections. Polling districts with a
higher proportion of students tend to have a larger
turnout to European elections. The most interesting
point is that as turnout declines in all three elections
between time periods one and three, the significance
of the social variables also declines. This suggests
that social characteristics of the polling districts are
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Table VII The random intercepts model for each election in the three time periods. Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors
European Local Parliamentary
Period one Period two Period three Period one Period two Period three Period one Period two Period three
1979 1989 1999 1978 1990 1998 1979 1992 2001
Fixed
Constant 27.20 29.32 26.40 45.25 40.81 38.00 71.02 70.40 49.40
(0.36)** (1.10)** (0.88)** (0.76)** (0.89)** (1.53)** (0.32)** (1.63)** (0.45)**
Deprived –4.46 –2.58 –2.62 –4.32 –3.15 –3.12 –4.25 –4.00 –2.92
(0.34)** (0.31)** (0.34)** (0.44)** (0.57)** (0.62)** (0.31)** (0.54)** (0.45)**
Student –1.15 1.20 2.22 –4.13 –3.20
(0.34)** (0.29)** (0.49)** (0.43)** (0.31)**
Retirement 2.72 1.09 1.94 2.07 1.92 2.21 2.12 3.90
(0.35)** (0.29)** (0.40)** (0.48)** (0.59)** (0.31)** (0.44)** (0.46)**
White and prof. occup. 1.15 1.51 –1.13 –1.01
(0.34)** (0.29)** (0.38)** (0.43)*
Terrain –0.36 –0.48
(0.13)** (0.11)**
Temporary huts 5.49 2.90 3.39
(1.35)** (1.25)* (1.30)*
Marginal 4.61 3.75 4.10
(0.85)** (1.26)** (1.46)**
1/ED3 11 324 200
(2 531 210)**
ND –0.006 –0.007 –0.007
(0.002)** (0.003)* (0.002)**
1/ND1  1514  673
 (332)**  (260)*
Random
Constituency level 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.70 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (1.22) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (4.41) (0.00)
Ward level 0.88 0.00 1.14 0.55 5.79 9.73 0.53 3.75 1.73
(1.05) (0.00) (0.89) (1.29) (2.87)* (3.50)** (0.85) (2.00) (1.70)
Polling-district level 10.42 8.60 7.79 13.37 18.42 17.13 8.92 12.62 16.30
(1.64)** (1.15)** (1.21)** (2.13)** (2.85)** (2.83)** (1.41)** (1.94)** (2.53)**
–2 log-likelihood 583.20 553.81 565.70 599.98 679.14 676.00 558.77 646.80 646.15
*Significant at the 0.05 level or better; **significant at the 0.01 level or better.
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becoming less important in explaining the variation
in turnout.
The terrain variable, the average difference in
height between the polling station and all the post-
codes in the polling district, was insignificant in all
the models except for European elections in time
periods two and three. Here, an increase in height
difference is associated with a drop in turnout of
3.6% per 10 m in the 1989 election and 4.8% per 10 m
in the 1999 election, indicating greater sensitivity
to variations in geography through time. The com-
pactness variables, described earlier, are insignifi-
cant in all three elections in all time periods. This is
perhaps understandable given the general similar-
ity in the compactness indexes of the polling dis-
tricts and the fact that they are very stable between
time periods one and three. Therefore there is very
little variation to explain the differences in voter
turnout, with most polling districts being very small,
compact and generally regular in shape. The status
of the road that the polling station is situated upon
has no significant effect on turnout in any of the
elections. The type of building where the polling
station is located is also insignificant, with the
exception of temporary huts for European elections
in time periods one and two and parliamentary
elections in time period one. Temporary huts are
located in central areas, such as on shopping
streets or in supermarket car parks, and hence they
represent locations where voters may engage in
more than one activity. In European elections their
use as polling stations increased turnout in polling
districts by 5.5% on average in 1979 but only by
2.9% on average in 1989. Although the use of
temporary huts as polling stations has increased
through time, their impact on turnout appears to
have diminished as perceived costs of voting has
increased. Finally, the marginality of the ward
within which the polling district is located is signif-
icant in local elections as hypothesised, increasing
turnout by 4.6% on average in time period one,
3.75% on average in time period two and around
4% on average in time period three.
The third set of variables in Table VII refers to
distance measures, and these are more fully reported
in Table VIII. Since it is not possible to determine,
a priori, the functional form of the relationship
between distance and turnout, four different func-
tional forms were estimated for the average Euclidean
and average network distance measures in Table II.
The first is a linear distance decay curve (ED and
ND, Euclidean and network distances, respectively),
which assumes that turnout declines at a constant
rate with distance and hence the distance coeffici-
ent will be negative. The next three are nonlinear
distance decay curves (1/EDn and 1/NDn). These
assume that turnout declines at a non-constant rate
with distance; the larger the exponent ‘n’, the steeper
the curve and the quicker the voter drop-off with
distance. The parameters in Table VIII were esti-
mated by adding one of the eight distance varia-
bles (starting with the linear Euclidean distance
variable – ED) into the fully specified random
intercepts model and the model estimated. The
fully specified random intercepts model contains
the social variables, the terrain variable and the
polling district context variables, but not the density
variables (these are investigated later). Variables
insignificant at the 5% level were removed as part
of the model estimation. Once the model was
estimated, the parameters of the distance variable
were recorded in Table VIII and then the variable
was removed. The process was then repeated with
the next distance variable until the parameters of
all eight of the distance variables had been esti-
mated. This process avoids the problems of colline-
arity that would occur if all the distance variables
were added into the model at the same time and
the model estimated.
The distance variable with the largest statistical
significance in Table VIII for a particular election in
a particular time period is deemed to have the
strongest relationship with turnout and best cap-
tures the voter drop-off with distance. These are
marked in bold in Table VIII and are also reported
in Table VII. The distance measures in Table VIII
show that distance is a significant variable in all
three European elections, in local elections from
time period two onwards and in parliamentary
elections in time period two only. These results
appear to confirm our hypotheses on the importance
of geography at low salience European and local
elections. Moreover, in both time periods two and
three, network distance is more significant than
Euclidean distance in European turnout, with
Euclidean distance being totally insignificant in the
last time period. In both time periods it is the non-
linear distance decay curve (1/ND1) that has the
most statistical significance. This suggests that voter
turnout declines at an increasing rate with distance
from the polling station. Hence at 250 m from the
polling station, voter turnout is estimated as (1514/
250) = 6.1% above the polling district average in
the 1989 election and (673/250) = 2.7% above the
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Table VIII Effects of Euclidean distance (ED) and network distance (ND) on voter turnout in the three elections in the three time periods. Numbers in 
parenthesis are standard errors
European Local Parliamentary
Period one 
1979
Period two 
1989
Period three 
1999
Period one 
1978
Period two 
1990
Period three 
1998
Period one 
1979
Period two 
1992
Period three 
2001
ED −0.004 −0.007 −0.001 −0.001 −0.008 −0.009 −0.002 −0.008 −0.001
(0.003) (0.002)** (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)* (0.004)* (0.002) (0.003)* (0.004)
1/ED1 573 895 91 217 708 337 304 554 118
(243)* (224)** (189) (292) (321)* (312) (214) (251)* (227)
1/ED2 71 391 94 860 10 345 30 139 68 076 12 031 39 825 48 258 8576
(25 934)** (23 498)** (17 118) (34 870) (33 392)* (29 411) (23 458) (24 701) (25 597)
1/ED3 11 324 200a 10 463 640 1 073 802 4 418 915 6 668 978 −1 447 239 3 100 545 1 946 207 1 179 678
(2 531 210)** (2 677 525)** (1 205 168) (4 861 887) (4 697 295) (3 431 782) (6 571 318) (2 767 698) (2 521 663)
ND −0.002 −0.005 −0.005 0.001 −0.006 −0.007 0.000 −0.007 −0.002
(0.002) (0.002)* (0.002)* (0.002) (0.002)** (0.003)* (0.002) (0.002)** (0.002)
1/ND1 518 1514 673 −154 1078 379 71 955 187
(401) (332)** (260)* (431) (494)* (445) (343) (389)* (390)
1/ND2 88 785 254 313 73 413 −27 026 16 0817 −12 536 18 692 113 455 27 358
(69 499) (56 280)** (35 357)* (75 368) (81 112)* (56 729) (59 211) (60 588) (49 388)
1/ND3 15 318 462 44 435 980 8 273 651 −564 266 30 075 254 −7 432 851 338 921 15 926 542 4 125 430
(13 925 875) (10 651 600)** (5 014 334) (2 257 064) (16 238 449) (9 313 042) (11 297 367) (13 497 069) (6 817 710)
Bold coefficients have the largest significance for a particular election.
*Significant at the 0.05 level or better; **significant at the 0.01 level or better.
aIn the calculation of the effect of distance on percentage turnout, the reported coefficient forms the numerator and the distance measure forms the denominator. Hence, in the 
example of 1/ED3, the percentage turnout at 200 m is calculated as 11 324 200/(200)3 = 1.42%. At 500 m the calculation is 11 324 200/(500)3 = 0.09%. Therefore, as distance 
increases, percentage voter turnout decreases. 
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polling district average in the 1999 election and at
500 m this falls to (1514/500) = 3.0% and (673/500)
= 1.3%, respectively. This indicates that voter drop-
off with distance has become larger over time for
European elections. In time period one, network
distance was insignificant for European elections.
Rather, Euclidean distance was significant, with
this significance increasing with steeper distance
decay curves. This suggests that in the 1979 elec-
tion, voter drop-off was very rapid with distance
(as is shown in Table III, Euclidean distance is
shorter than network distance) and this may have
been caused by voter fatigue due to the parliamen-
tary election being held just a month earlier.
In terms of local election turnout, there are no
significant distance effects in time period one,
but network distance becomes significant in time
periods two and three. In comparison to Euro-
pean elections in these time periods, it is the linear
distance decay curve that is the most significant,
indicating that voter drop-off is less steep with
distance for local elections, again supporting
our hypotheses. Hence turnout declines by a steady
0.6% per 100 m in the 1990 election and a steady 0.7%
per 100 m in the 1998 elections, again indicating
that turnout is declining more rapidly with distance
through time.
In parliamentary elections, distance generally
has an insignificant effect on turnout, with the
exception of the 1992 general election in which
turnout tended to decline by 0.7% per 100 m from
the polling station. This particular election was
generally perceived as competitive and nationally
the turnout was high. We have no clear idea at this
moment why geography should appear significant,
although other factors such as bad weather on the
day of the election or particular traffic conditions
may have made proximity to the polling station
more important than usual.
The final part of the analysis concerns the effect
on turnout of the geographic dispersion or density
of voters in each polling district as measured by
the percentage of postcodes in each polling district
within specific distances of the polling station.
Euclidean and road network distances were both
used to calculate the distance intervals from the
polling station but only road network distances are
reported here as they had the most significant
effects in the models. Similar to the estimation of
distance, the density variables were entered into
the fully specified random intercepts model one at
a time, the model estimated, and then the variable
removed. The fully specified random intercepts model
contains the social variables, the terrain variable
and the polling district context variables, but no
distance variables (as the density variables will
capture the effect of distance and so the inclusion
of distance may cause collinearity problems). For
the sake of brevity, the parameter estimates for the
density variables are not reported, with the excep-
tion of the variables with the largest significance
for each election in each time period, which are
reported in the discussion. Figures 3(a–c) are
summaries of t-statistics (the density coefficient/
standard error) for the network distances (e.g. 100 m,
200 m etc.) from the polling station for each time
period. T-statistics greater than 1.96 and less than –
1.96 are significant at the 5% level and these are
indicated in each figure by dashed lines. Figure 3(a)
shows that the dispersion of voters within polling
districts has no significant effect on turnout with
t-statistics for all three elections being insignificant
and falling between the two dashed lines. This is
understandable given the insignificance of dis-
tance on turnout in time period one for local and
parliamentary elections and the very steep voter
drop-off with distance in European elections.
Figure 3(b) shows that the geographic dispersion
of voters within polling districts has a significant
effect on turnout in all three elections in time
period two. This effect is largest in European elec-
tions and is very similar in local and parliamentary
elections. The significance peaks in European elec-
tions at around 500 m from the polling station
(with a coefficient of 0.05 significant at the 1% level
or better) and at around 600 m from the polling
station in local elections (with a coefficient of 0.05
significant at the 1% level or better) and 800 m in
parliamentary elections (with a coefficient of 0.065
significant at the 1% level or better). Hence, at 500 m,
the average increase in turnout in European elections
is 0.05% per percentage increase in voter density.
Thus if 50% of the voters in a polling district live
within 500 m of the polling station, then this will
increase turnout in this polling district by 2.5%
compared with the Brent average . This increase in
turnout rises to 5% on the Brent average for polling
districts with 100% of voters living within 500 m of
the polling station. In local elections, the increase
in turnout at the significant peak of 600 m is again
0.05% and in parliamentary elections the increase
in turnout at the 800 m significance peak is 0.065%.
Again, this supports the previous findings on the
effects of road network distance on turnout and
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helps corroborate the hypothesis that turnout to
European elections is much more sensitive to distance
effects than in local elections and turnout in local
elections are more sensitive to distance effects than
in parliamentary elections, with voter drop-off occur-
ring sooner with distance from the polling station
as electoral saliency moves from high to low.
Figure 3(c) shows that the geographic dispersion
of voters within polling districts in time period
three has a significant effect in local and European
elections but not in parliamentary elections, again
supporting the previous findings. In this case
though, there is very little difference between local
and European elections in respect to the significance
of voter density in percentage turnout. The signifi-
cance peaks again at around 500 m in European
elections (with a coefficient of 0.04 significant at the
1% level or better) and 600 m in local elections
(with a coefficient of 0.07 significant at the 1% level
or better). Hence, at the 500 m peak, the average
Figure 3 Significance of voter density on turnout by network distance in time period one (a), 
time period two (b) and time period three (c)
A 171
212 Scott Orford et al.
Trans Inst Br Geogr NS 34 195–214 2009
ISSN 0020-2754 © 2008 The Authors.
Journal compilation © Royal Geographical Society (with The Institute of British Geographers) 2008
increase in turnout in European elections is 0.04%
per percentage increase in voter density and at the
600 m peak in local elections it is 0.07%. Nearly
twice as many people turn out to vote in local than
in European elections for similar voter densities,
which is an increase from time period two when
there was no difference. Therefore, although Figure
3(c) suggests that that the effects of distance in
European and local elections are becoming similar
through time in terms of their significance, in terms
of actual number of voters the drop-off is still
greater for European elections as less people turn
out to vote for a given density of voters.
Summary and conclusions
The analysis demonstrates that, for European and
local elections, polling districts with longer average
distances between postcodes and polling stations
tend to have lower turnout than districts with
shorter average distances, and this condition holds
after social factors such as deprivation are taken
into account. A similar result occurs when average
distance is substituted for postcode density within
polling districts. Although based on ecological rather
than individual level voting data, these results
nonetheless give support for the contention that
geography matters more at low salience, second-
order local and European elections but matters less
for turnout at parliamentary elections. Distance and
density measures are most important at European
elections where the problem of low turnout is most
acute. Moreover, voter drop-off with distance has
become larger over time and turnout to European
elections is also increasingly sensitive to terrain.
Reasons for the increasing importance of distance
may reflect the increased time pressures faced by
prospective voters, such as longer commuting time
and changing work and home commitments, meaning
that the costs of voting have become more significant
over the past 20 years.
Interestingly, ward marginality, a good proxy for
competitiveness, does have a noticeable effect on
turnout at local elections and in time periods two
and three ward level variance remained significant
in local elections after other factors had been taken
into account, but this was not the case in any of the
other elections. Hence, while it is clear that social
factors continue to be important for the explana-
tion of turnout, it is also apparent that electors also
appear to be engaging in some assessment of the
costs and benefits of voting (Blais 2000). Finally,
the context of the polling district and polling sta-
tion, beyond the marginality of the ward, does not
appear to have an effect on turnout, although there
are indications that in earlier elections the use of
temporary huts in central locations did increase
voter participation but this no longer seems to be
the case.
Of course there are factors other than the ones
discussed here that may affect voter turnout, but
these have not been included, principally due to
the lack of data. These include the weather on the
day of the election, with bad weather generally
resulting in an increase in the perceived costs of
voting and hence lower turnout. It could also be
the case that those living close to a polling station
are encouraged or reminded to vote by the sight of
others voting on the day of the election. This effect
can only be captured with recourse to more detailed
individual level data geo-referenced at a finer spatial
scale. There is also the issue of non-registration in
relation to turnout in the sense that turnout will
generally be lower than the current data suggest if
the people who are eligible but have not registered
to vote are also considered. These people are not
likely to be randomly distributed across the study
area but will be found in particular polling dis-
tricts, such as those with a high incidence of social
deprivation, making the geography of people who
do and do not vote more complicated.
In conclusion then, turnout would appear to be
lower the greater the average distance that voters
have to travel to the polling station at both Euro-
pean and local elections, especially in more recent
times, which generally conforms to our hypothesis.
It is not likely to be important at first-order parlia-
mentary elections for the reasons discussed above.
Of course, we should be wary of making broad
generalisations on the basis of a single case study
based within a London borough. Clearly, more research
is needed that, ideally, should include areas that
are geographically different from one another. Are
electors that reside in less densely populated areas
and where polling stations may be further apart
more or less sensitive to distance from polling
station than their urban neighbours? Is there a tip-
ping point where the distance to travel rules out
the probability of walking and what, if any, is the
effect on participation. When various government
initiatives, from all-postal voting to electronic
counting, have either encountered significant prob-
lems or have had no effect on turnout it is, perhaps,
time that more attention is given towards facilitating
A 172
Electoral salience and the costs of voting at elections in the UK 213
Trans Inst Br Geogr NS 34 195–214 2009
ISSN 0020-2754 © 2008 The Authors.
Journal compilation © Royal Geographical Society (with The Institute of British Geographers) 2008
voting by a more strategic approach to the siting of
polling stations. In this respect, future research will
investigate the impact of polling stations that have
moved between elections within polling districts
whose boundaries have remained the same. It
will compute optimal locations of polling stations,
informed by these results, and calculate the aggre-
gate effects on turnout and the possible impact in
marginal wards. It will also investigate in more
detail the context of the polling station in terms of
making it easier for people to vote, such as car
parking and general accessibility, in order to over-
come some of the perceptions of the costs of voting.
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BSTRACT
 
Examination of ward-level aggregate data for English local council elections
that employ a form of block voting demonstrates that 7–15% of total potential votes are
unused. We test two possible explanations for this phenomenon. Firstly, unused votes occur
when electors have a restricted choice of candidates, principally when parties fail to field as
many candidates as there are available seats. Secondly, unused votes stem from a misunder-
standing of the voting procedure. We find that both sources make statistically significant
contributions to the explanation of the level of unused votes. The number of unused votes does
decrease when more candidates stand for election. However, we also find that within each
party’s slate of candidates those placed higher on the ballot paper have a clear advantage
over those lower in the alphabetic order and hence lower in ballot paper order. Moreover,
the level of educational attainment of a ward’s population is a statistically significant predic-
tor of unused votes, suggesting perhaps that some voters are failing to understand the voting
system. This analysis raises issues concerning voter awareness of block voting procedures
and whether ballot paper order should be randomized in such cases in order to eradicate
alphabetic bias.
 
Introduction
 
The chaos that attended the counting and subsequent exclusion of more than
100,000 ballot papers from the Scottish Parliament election in 2007 demonstrates
the need for clear and unambiguous instructions to voters (Electoral Commission,
2007). Electoral legitimacy is compromised when a significant fraction of voters
misunderstand the ballot paper, as with this and the so-called “butterfly ballot” at
the 2000 US Presidential election (Wand 
 
et al
 
., 2001). Various reforms of ballot
paper design, including the inclusion of party descriptions alongside candidate
names, the use of party logos and proposals to include candidate photographs, are
designed to facilitate elector understanding and engagement with the voting process
(Reynolds & Steenbergen, 2006). Yet, while some progress has been made,
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problems clearly remain, affecting voting systems that are normally regarded as
user-friendly from the voters’ point of view.
For example, one of the advantages claimed for “first past the post” or plurality
voting over other systems is its apparent simplicity. In single-member electoral
districts marking a cross alongside the chosen candidate is all that is required and
generally results in a low number of spoiled ballots. Of course, plural voting does
not only use district magnitudes of one, i.e. single-member constituencies. One
popular variant of plural voting is the block vote.
 
1
 
 Under this arrangement, each
voter can “X” vote for as many candidates as there are seats to be filled. This
method was widely used in the UK to elect MPs prior to the mid-1880s when single-
member constituencies became the norm (Joyce, 2004). Elsewhere, block voting is
now used rather sparingly, employed in a handful of US state elections, Lebanese
parliamentary elections and in the election of the Polish Senate. Although block
voting for parliamentary elections ceased in the late 1940s it still continues for local
government council elections in parts of the UK and these form the subject of this
article.
What potential problems are there with block voting that stem from an elector
misunderstanding the nature of the ballot? First, electors may not realize that they
have more than one vote, despite an instruction printed on the ballot paper, “You
may vote up to N times”. Second, some electors, even after reading that instruction,
may take it not to mean “up to and including N times” but rather “vote N–1 times”.
A third problem could result from ballot paper length – as district magnitude
increases and more candidates compete, a long ballot may deter voters from
scanning across all candidates. Taken together, these responses could result in the
total number of actual votes being smaller than the number of potential votes – in
short, some proportion of votes will remain “unused”.
Of course, unused votes may arise following a deliberate choice rather than
from some misunderstanding of the rules. When a partisan voter has a restricted
choice because their party has not fielded a full slate of candidates, then it is
perhaps rational not to re-distribute “spare” votes to other candidates. Equally, a
voter might not wish to support a particular candidate for personal reasons,
whatever the party label. Distinguishing between the causes of unused votes is
obviously important: voters making conscious choices are rather different from
those misunderstanding the voting rules. What evidence is there then that a signifi-
cant number of voters do not or cannot follow instructions about completing the
ballot paper?
Surveys investigating voter comprehension of novel and sometimes complex
ballot design and voting systems have been undertaken (for example see Dunleavy
 
et al
 
., 1992; Dunleavy 
 
et al
 
., 1997; Bowler & Farrell, 1995), but these have
involved mock election ballots rather than a real election. The evidence that
emerges from the 2007 Scottish election study is that just over half the post-
election sample claimed to understand the voting system. Almost a third did not
understand it well and one in ten did not understand it at all. The re-design of the
ballot paper led to rejected ballots reaching one in eight of constituency ballots cast
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in the most extreme examples. There was a strong association between the propor-
tion of rejected ballots in a constituency and the level of social deprivation (Carman
& Mitchell, 2007).
The focus of this article is local councils in England that employ block voting
methods. We use aggregate rather than individual-level data (which do not exist for
these particular elections) to examine ballot effects (Brockington, 2003; Geys &
Heyndels, 2003; Hamilton & Ladd, 1996; Robson & Walsh, 1973). Making
inferences about individual-level behaviour from aggregate data is problematic but
these data could at least show 
 
what
 
 is happening when people’s choices are affected
by the nature of the ballot.
The research questions are simply stated. What is the extent of unused votes and
are there significant differences between types of local authority? Can we explain
the absolute level of unused votes simply by controlling for the level of party
contestation: are voters unwilling to cast votes for candidates representing parties
that rival their own partisan choice? Finally, if other factors apparently influence the
level of unused votes, what clues about the possible behaviour patterns of individual
voters can be identified from the aggregate data?
The first section describes the data and shows the extent of unused votes in block
voting for English local authorities. We find that for elections to each of the four
types of local authority a sizeable number of potential votes are unused although
the proportion varies. In the second section the impact of contestation upon the
level of unused votes is considered. Although it is clear that the proportion of
unused votes is directly related to the range of choice, it is also apparent that this
factor alone does not account for unused votes. In the third section, therefore, we
consider the set of decision heuristics that might possibly guide voter choices.
Initially, we hypothesize that partisan voters employ a rather simple heuristic,
scanning the ballot paper downwards and stopping when a candidate from the
chosen party is identified. Such voting behaviour is entirely consistent with the
habit of voting in a single-member election. In the case of a block vote election it
will manifest itself in evidence of an alphabetic bias in the distribution of support
across candidates from the same party. Ordinal logistic regression reveals that an
alphabetical bias does indeed exist and stays significant even when controlling for a
candidate’s incumbency status. This finding gives strong support to the contention
that some voters misunderstand the voting procedure. In the fourth section we use
each of these factors together – the level of contestation and level of voter under-
standing – and test their contribution to the explanation of the level of unused
votes. Using aggregate data, of course, we have no direct measure of any one
individual’s understanding of the voting system. Accordingly, as a proxy measure
we use the proportion of people without a formal educational qualification resident
in each local electoral ward. The multivariate regression model demonstrates that
both factors (party contestation and decision heuristic) have a significant impact on
the level of unused votes. The final section considers the implications of this
research for the future application of block voting both generally and specifically
for some local council elections within the UK.
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Estimating Unused Votes
 
The analysis is based on ward-level data for four types of local authority. Two of
these types, the 32 London boroughs and 174 districts (including the post-1995
unitary authorities) conduct whole council elections every four years using multi-
member wards. Local voters in these areas, therefore, should be reasonably familiar
with the procedure for block voting. The remaining two types of authority, the 36
metropolitan boroughs and 52 district (and unitary) councils, normally fill single
seat vacancies for a fraction of their council members annually. However, following
a periodic review of ward boundaries, they experienced untypical whole council
elections in 2004 and 2002 respectively. These elections provide us with an interest-
ing field experiment about what happens when local parties and voters familiar with
single-member plurality voting instead participate in a block vote election.
Excluding those wards where the election was uncontested, we have a potential
pool of 2,770 cases available for detailed analysis (614 London wards with elections
in 2006; 812 Metropolitan wards with elections in 2004; 926 district wards with
whole council election in 2003; and 418 wards in those district councils implementing
boundary reviews in 2002).
Unfortunately local authorities that employ block voting seldom report for each
electoral district (ward) the precise number of ballot papers issued and included in
the count (Ware 
 
et al
 
., 2006). We assume, however, that the ward turnout and
electorate details which are provided by each local authority are accurate.
 
2
 
 Using
both the reported percentage turnout and electorate size we calculate the number of
ballot papers included in the final count. Since percentage turnout is mostly given to
one decimal place there is some loss of precision but any overall error is likely to be
small. The total number of potential votes is calculated, therefore, as the product of
valid ballot papers included in the ward count (number of voters) and its district
magnitude (number of vacancies). The percentage of unused votes is calculated by
dividing the difference, potential votes minus actual total of votes cast, by the total
number of potential votes.
After initial examination of the data we chose to reduce the number of cases
available for analysis because of clear or suspected errors. In some 25 wards it
became apparent that since either the percentage turnout or electorate figure was
incorrect these cases should be excluded from the analysis. In a further 11 wards
more than 40% of potential votes appear to have been unused. These may be genu-
inely extreme cases but they could instead be caused by inaccurate reporting, either
of percentage turnout or electorate size. In order that these and similar data would
not skew the distributions and distort our analysis we decided to exclude all wards
within the top percentile of unused votes at each election. This lowers the mean
values for unused votes slightly but it makes the overall findings more robust.
Following deletion of uncontested wards, erroneous cases and the top percentile of
extreme cases there remained 2,718 three-member wards available for analysis.
Table 1 shows the minimum, maximum, and mean level of unused vote for each
type of authority. In London about one in thirteen of potential votes are unused while
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in the metropolitan boroughs the figure is rather higher, more than one in seven are
unused. Figures for the district councils lie somewhere between the two extremes.
We tested the hypothesis that there is no statistically significant
 
3
 
 difference between
the mean level of unused votes across all types of authorities and rejected it.
 
4
 
Of course, many unused votes may be a function of the available choice of candi-
dates, with differences between local authorities explained by the wide disparity in
patterns of the contestation for seats. For example, a Labour identifier might vote
only for the two Labour candidates and not use her/his third vote. There are indeed
different patterns of party contestation (see Table 2). The mean number of candidates
at each ward election varies from ten for the London boroughs to seven in the whole
council districts. Elections in London and the major urban areas that comprise the
metropolitan boroughs are more party political than are those in the districts where
the challenge from Independent candidates is higher. The London borough elections
attract the largest proportion of full slates (that is a candidate for each vacancy) from
the main parties, followed by the metropolitan boroughs. In around three-quarters of
London wards electors had an opportunity to use all of their available votes for
candidates representing one of the Conservative, Labour or Liberal Democrat
parties. In the metropolitan boroughs fewer than half the wards featured full party
slates, perhaps reflecting reluctance by the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats to
challenge in entrenched Labour wards. The pattern of party contestation among the
district councils shows that those authorities normally elected by “thirds” have a
higher density of party candidates than do those who use the whole council election
method, but that both have a lower proportion of full slates than the other two types.
Many partisan voters may act rationally when facing a restricted range of
candidates and refuse to donate “spare” votes to other candidates. We test for this
possibility by considering the level of unused votes in wards where 
 
only
 
 the three
main parties contested the election (752 wards in total). In this competitive structure
it follows that when each party has as many candidates as there are vacancies the
number of “unfilled positions” is zero. If just one party fields two, rather than three
candidates then the overall number of unfilled positions is equal to one and so on.
 
Table 1.
 
Unused votes in three-member wards
Mean Std. Dev Min. Max. No. wards
London boroughs, 2006
 
a
 
7.7 3.9 1.1 25.0 607
Metropolitan boroughs, 2004
 
b
 
15.2 7.1 0.8 36.2 801
Unitary and shire districts, 2003
 
c
 
13.7 8.6 0.3 38.6 905
Unitary and shire districts, 2002
 
d
 
10.6 6.5 0.5 31.2 405
 
Notes
 
:
 
a
 
 Referred to as London in following tables.
 
b
 
 Metropolitan.
 
c
 
 Whole council elections, or “W” districts.
 
d
 
 Council elections by thirds, or “T” districts.
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With zero unfilled positions as our starting category we then combined cases with
one or two unfilled positions into a second category, leaving all other possibilities,
of three or more unfilled positions, coded as a third category. If party contestation is
the 
 
only
 
 explanation for unused votes then we expect to find that in wards where
there are no unfilled positions the number of unused votes should approach zero.
Conversely, the more restricted the choice of candidates presented to voters, the
higher the expected level of unused votes.
Table 3 shows the mean percentage of unused votes as a function of the number of
unfilled positions. For London wards in 2006 the mean value of unused votes is still
6% even when all three parties each field three candidates (and there are no other
candidates). This rises to a mean of 9% unused votes when at least one party fields
just two candidates. For these boroughs we reject the hypothesis that the level of
unused votes does not differ from zero in the case of full slates (one-sample t-test)
and also reject the hypothesis that there is no difference between the “all full slates”
group of wards and wards where one of the main parties had an incomplete slate of
candidates (independent-samples t-test). Although the number of cases is rather
small in two categories, the findings are statistically significant. Findings from the
2004 metropolitan borough elections, while similar in trend to the London boroughs,
show proportions of unused votes higher across the range of categories. At first
glance that could suggest the interruption to the normal pattern of single-member
voting in the metropolitan boroughs is itself responsible for the higher rate of unused
votes. However, that conjecture is not supported by the district council data. There
appears to be little difference in unused votes between those authorities that
normally have multimember ward elections and those where they are a rare occur-
rence following revisions to ward boundaries.
 
Table 2.
 
Patterns of party contestation in three-member wards
(a)
Mean candidates
(b)
Main parties
(c)
Full slates
(d)
Minor party
(e)
Independent candidate
(per ward) (% wards)
London 10.3 90.0 72.3 73.8 16.8
Metropolitan 9.0 83.1 47.7 60.4 19.7
“W” districts 7.3 53.8 18.1 30.1 31.3
“T” districts 8.2 71.6 41.2 28.9 24.4
 
Notes
 
:
Column (a) presents the mean number of candidates standing for election in a ward.
Columns (b) – (e) indicate percentage of wards where:
(b) each main party fields at least one candidate for election;
(c) all main parties have full slate of candidates;
(d) at least one minor party has a candidate;
(e) at least one Independent candidate stands for election in a ward.
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If we relax the rather stringent conditions of only three major party contesta-
tion and include wards where one or more other parties fielded candidates, the
number of available cases increases to 1,989 (see Table 4). However, the mean
values remain comparable for both type of council and number of positions
unfilled.
We can draw two broad conclusions from the findings thus far. First, that unused
votes are an important function of the pattern of party contestation. It seems that a
sizeable proportion of voters, when offered a restricted choice of candidates, prefer
not to cast any spare votes for another party’s candidate(s). Second, that even when
parties present a full slate of candidates, some voters (about one in fifteen in
London and the districts; about one in nine or ten in the metropolitan boroughs) do
not use their full quota.
 
Table 3.
 
The mean of unused votes by unfilled positions (three-member wards; only main 
parties contesting)
Full slate 1–2 unfilled positions 3+ unfilled positions
London 6.2 8.9 17.5*
N = 112 N = 14 N = 1
Metropolitan 9.7 16.4 28.5
N = 104 N = 104 N = 24
“W” districts 6.6 11.2 21.3
N = 68 N = 110 N = 45
“T” districts 6.7 11.0 19.1
N = 106 N = 54 N = 10
 
Note:
 
 *for London, this category was excluded from the statistical analysis because of
small N.
 
Table 4.
 
The mean of unused votes by unfilled positions (three-member wards; each main 
party has at least one candidate and other parties may be fielding candidates)
Full slate 1–2 unfilled positions 3+ unfilled positions
London 7.0 8.9 13.4*
N = 439 N = 101 N = 6
Metropolitan 11.2 16.6 26.4
N = 382 N = 230 N = 54
“W” districts 6.8 10.8 19.8
N = 164 N = 202 N = 121
“T” districts 6.5 10.5 17.9
N = 167 N = 97 N = 26
 
Note:
 
 *For London, this category was excluded from the statistical analysis because of
small N.
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Decision Heuristics
 
The previous analysis has shown that even where there is complete contestation a
proportion of block votes remains unused. In this section we explore whether there
is any pattern to their distribution that may help our understanding.
 
Alphabetic Order
 
Among candidates from the same party we could discover evidence of alphabetic bias
(for previous analyses citing evidence of positional bias see, Bain & Hecock, 1957;
Masterman, 1964; Mackerras, 1968; Hughes, 1970; Scott, 1972; Robson & Walsh,
1973; Brooke & Upton, 1974; Upton & Brook, 1974, 1975; Taebel, 1975; Upton,
1976; Bakker & Lijphart, 1980; Kelley & McAllister, 1984; Darcy, 1986; Lijphart &
Pintor, 1988; Darcy and McAllister, 1990; Hamilton & Ladd, 1996; Miller &
Kroznick, 1998; Rallings 
 
et al
 
., 1998; Koppell & Steen, 2004; Ho & Imai, 2006a,
2006b; but see Darcy, 1998 for different findings). This is presumably because people
generally scan the ballot paper from the top downwards before finding their target
party. Those voters who understand the voting rules continue scanning until the requi-
site number of votes is cast. Those who do not realize that they have up to three votes
to cast may select the first party candidate they locate and then finish voting (see
Bullock & Hood, 2002, for the US experience). A further group of voters, perhaps
intent on “split-ticket” voting, will operate a different search algorithm: scan
downwards and vote for the target (or alternative) party and then resume downwards
seeking the alternative (or target) party. If the latter groups of voters exist in numbers
then the aggregate data should provide evidence. In order to investigate this we first
establish whether or not there is an alphabetical advantage in block votes and, if there
is, whether and how this relates to the distribution of unused votes.
To examine whether there is any significant correlation between a candidate’s
rank in the alphabetic order within the party slate and that candidate’s finishing posi-
tion within the slate, we consider three-member wards where the major parties
fielded a complete set of candidates. The Spearman rank correlation coefficients are
higher for London (0.44) than for districts (0.35 for 2002 “thirds” districts and 0.28
for whole council districts) and the metropolitan boroughs (0.2), but all are statisti-
cally significant. In short, the higher a candidate’s position in the ballot order (i.e.
the higher a candidate’s surname in the alphabet), the better a candidate performs
 
relative to candidates from the same party
 
 placed lower in the alphabetic/ballot
order.
Although the correlation analysis shows a relationship it is not clear how much of
an advantage accrues to candidates from a superior ballot order position. Table 5
considers full-party slates in three-member wards. Candidates are located according
to both their ballot order and finishing position within the slate, i.e. their vote relative
to party colleagues.
We examined, for example, 1,750 separate party slates at the 2006 London
borough elections. Of the candidates placed highest in alphabetical/ballot paper
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order some 58% finished first within the party group, 28% finished second and just
14% finished in third and last place. A candidate positioned highest on the ballot
order was thus more than twice as likely to finish at the top rather than in second
place on the party slate. The advantage is even greater when first is compared with
third alphabetically: the former is four times more likely to have finished ahead in
votes received.
The alphabetic effect is smaller although still statistically significant for the
metropolitan boroughs where voting in multimember electoral districts is not the
usual practice. An examination of 1,934 separate party slates in these authorities
shows that candidates highest in the ballot paper order were placed first in the party
vote in 43% of cases and last in just 25% of cases. The reverse applies for
candidates whose surname places them third within the party list. This is clearly
 
Table 5.
 
Alphabetical order and finishing position within three-candidate slates
London Finishing position
Alphabetical order First Second Third
First 57.8 28.3 13.9
Second 28.6 43.1 28.3
Third 13.6 28.6 57.8
Metropolitan Finishing position
Alphabetical order First Second Third
First 43.0 31.9 25.1
Second 33.9 37.4 28.7
Third 23.2 30.7 46.1
“T” districts Finishing position
Alphabetical order First Second Third
First 53.1 30.6 16.2
Second 27.2 42.3 30.5
Third 19.7 27.1 53.2
“W” districts Finishing position
Alphabetical order First Second Third
First 49.0 30.0 21.0
Second 30.6 40.8 28.6
Third 20.4 29.2 50.4
 
Note
 
: Table entries are row percentages.
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different than would happen by chance, although the effect is apparently not as
strong as it is in London.
 
5
 
In districts using whole council elections those placed highest on the ballot were
more than twice as likely to finish top of their party’s support as in third place
(1,649 party slates were available for analysis). In districts where partial council
elections were the norm (930 slates), alphabetic advantage was even more
pronounced. There was a better than even chance that someone placed highest in
alphabetic order would finish in first place relative to their party colleagues. There
was a better than even chance that someone placed lowest in the ballot order would
finish with the smallest number of votes.
We also considered political parties separately in order to assess whether alpha-
betic voting was something that affected some rather than others. This is not the
case: votes for 
 
all
 
 parties appear skewed towards candidates at the top of each
party’s ballot ordering. Moreover, even when a party selects just two candidates
rather than three, the data suggest that voters still favour ballot order. In theory,
candidates from the same two-party slate have a more or less even chance of finish-
ing ahead of one another. In fact, a candidate in the leading ballot order position is
about twice as likely to finish above their colleague after votes are counted.
 
Impact of Incumbency
 
At this point we can conclude that there is strong evidence of alphabetical advan-
tage.
 
6
 
 However, one important aspect of the data that has been ignored thus far is the
effect, if any, of incumbency. Candidates seeking re-election probably believe that
four or more years serving on the local council will provide them a degree of public
recognition. Surely, supporters of the incumbent ward party will recognize
candidates who are sitting councillors rather more than a candidate who is perhaps
contesting an election for the first time. We started to answer this question by exam-
ining separately only party slates where 
 
all
 
 nominated candidates are incumbents
seeking re-election (919 slates in total). The results (not shown here) are virtually
identical to those in Table 5 and confirm the continuing presence of alphabetic
advantage amongst incumbents.
To test further for the possible effect of incumbency, we examine situations
where a party slate consists of a single incumbent and two non-incumbent or
“novice” candidates as we shall call them. In total there are 990 party slates in the
data set with this particular configuration of candidates. Table 6 suggests that
incumbents do have an advantage but that alphabetic order remains relevant.
For example, in the 2004 metropolitan borough elections incumbents highest in
the ballot order finished in first place in 72% of cases, that is almost seven times
more likely than in third place (11% of cases). The pattern is even more pronounced
both at the 2006 London borough elections and for district council elections gener-
ally. Nevertheless, as incumbents descend the ballot order so their advantage over
non-incumbents also diminishes. Indeed, a sitting councillor seeking re-election in
London in 2006 and placed third in ballot paper order behind two novice candidates
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was more likely to finish in third rather than first place, although the differences are
rather small.
When we consider the reverse position to that above, with one novice candidate
alongside two incumbents on the party slate (1,124 slates), the data show that a novice
candidate placed at the top of the ballot paper order had a good chance of overcoming
any incumbency effects at the London borough and partial district council elections
– see Table 7. For other authorities, however, the pattern is different. In both the metro-
politan boroughs and whole council election districts, incumbency clearly dominates
over ballot paper position advantage: the novice, even when placed at the top of the
ballot order, was more likely to finish third than first in the popular vote. Nevertheless
there remains some degree of alphabetical advantage. A novice who happens to be in
first place on the party slate is always less likely to finish third than is the novice who
finds that their name appears after that of their two incumbent colleagues.
 
Table 6.
 
Ballot position effect for incumbent with two non-incumbents seeking election
London Finishing position
Alphabetical order First Second Third
First 83.8 13.5 2.7
Second 51.4 34.3 14.3
Third 34.5 27.3 38.2
Metropolitan Finishing position
Alphabetical order First Second Third
First 72.3 16.9 10.8
Second 69.0 16.7 14.3
Third 52.0 29.3 18.7
“T” districts Finishing position
Alphabetical order First Second Third
First 79.0 17.3 3.7
Second 52.7 29.1 18.2
Third 56.6 22.6 20.8
“W” districts Finishing position
Alphabetical order First Second Third
First 82.9 8.5 8.5
Second 66.4 26.1 7.6
Third 48.2 28.6 23.2
 
Note
 
: Table entries are row percentages.
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Ordinal Logistic Model
 
Although both incumbency and position on a party slate appear to be important, their
relative strength remains less clear. To take account of these issues simultaneously
and evaluate their relative effects on a candidate’s electoral success, we conducted a
multivariate analysis. The dependent variable represents a candidate’s finishing
position within a party slate, i.e. 1, 2, or 3. The independent variables are a candi-
date’s position on the ballot paper as a whole, his/her alphabetic rank within the party
slate, his/her incumbency status and whether at least one other incumbent stood for
re-election. Finally, an interaction term between a candidate’s incumbency status and
alphabetic rank on a party slate is explicitly incorporated into the model specification.
This additional term is designed to capture the possibility that the impact of alpha-
betic rank on a candidate’s success can be different for an incumbent and a novice.
 
Table 7.
 
Ballot position effect for non-incumbent with two incumbents seeking re-election
London Finishing position
Alphabetical order First Second Third
First 37.6 35.3 27.1
Second 18.8 40.0 41.2
Third 11.6 25.3 63.2
Metropolitan Finishing position
Alphabetical order First Second Third
First 12.4 31.0 56.6
Second 14.4 37.5 48.1
Third 8.7 18.3 73.1
“T” districts Finishing position
Alphabetical order First Second Third
First 33.9 32.2 33.9
Second 14.3 32.1 53.6
Third 5.5 21.8 72.7
“W” districts Finishing position
Alphabetical order First Second Third
First 27.8 32.2 40.0
Second 9.9 32.2 57.9
Third 8.6 18.1 73.3
 
Note
 
: Table entries are row percentages.
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Because the dependent variable takes on values in a set of naturally ordered cate-
gories, an ordinal regression model was an obvious choice (Agresti, 2002). Trying
to keep the model as parsimonious as possible, we began with the proportional
effects cumulative logit model.
 
7
 
 The model consists of several logistic regressions.
Each regression has its unique constant, (similar to the intercept term – “threshold”
in SPSS terminology) and common location parameters, the slope coefficients. The
proportional odds assumption states that the relationship between the independent
variables and the logits are the same for all logits. However, our data reject the
proportionality assumptions and the general form of the cumulative logit regression
was used instead.
 
8
 
 The generalized ordinal model estimates for the threshold and
location parameters are presented in Table 8.
The first panel gives results that are similar to that of the logistic regression: 
with the binary dependent variable being “
 
first
 
 finishing position within a party
slate” vs. “
 
second or third
 
 position”. The dependent variable in the second panel
contrasts “
 
the first or second
 
 finishing position” with the “
 
third
 
 position” category: 
Parameters in the two logistic regressions are estimated simultaneously using the
Maximum Likelihood method.
It is important for our research questions that all predictors are significant at least
at the 0.05 level and that the direction of their influence on the dependent variable is
consistent with the findings from our initial bivariate analysis. For example, the
positive coefficient for “a candidate’s alphabetic rank on a ballot paper” in the first
equation indicates that as a candidate moves one position further from the top of a
ballot paper, the odds of finishing in the first place within his or her party slate
decreases by 3%, controlling for other variables. The regression coefficient for the
dummy variable “another incumbent” is negative and the odds ratio (Table 8, the
last column) of 2.67 indicates that the odds of finishing at the top of the party slate
increase by more than double if there is no other incumbent seeking re-election,
controlling for all other variables (including the candidate’s own incumbency
status). The positive coefficient for “incumbency status” (with 
 
incumbent
 
 as the
reference category) and positive influence of the interaction term “incumbency by
position within slate” means that being a novice candidate decreases the odds of
finishing at the top of a party list (with all other circumstances equal). The direction
of the effect of the independent variable “alphabetic rank within party slate” on the
dependent variable is similar to that of “a candidate’s position on a ballot paper”
discussed above. However, it makes a much stronger impact: adjusting an incum-
bent’s location within the slate downwards by one position results in a fully 43%
logit x1 1 1= +α β *
logit x2 2 2= +α β *
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reduction of the odds of finishing with the largest number of votes. The effect is
even more pronounced for a novice candidate.
The examples in Table 9 amply demonstrate how dramatically the probabilities of
different finishing positions within the party slate may change as the conditions
alter. We consider six types of condition and calculate the probability of a candidate
finishing first, second or third within the party slate. The final column shows the
 
Table 8.
 
Ordinal cumulative logistic model: impact of incumbency and alphabetic rank on a 
candidate’s finishing position within party slate
95% confidence 
interval
Parameter B Std. Error Lower Upper Exp (–B)
1 (Threshold) 0.734** 0.073 0.591 0.876
Incumbency: novice 0.797** 0.094 0.613 0.982 0.45
incumbent 0.0
 
a
 
Another incumbent no
 
−0
 
.982** 0.043
 
−
 
1.067
 
−0
 
.898 2.67
yes 0.0
 
a
 
.
Alphabetic rank within party slate 0.568** 0.040 0.490 0.647 0.57
Alphabetic rank on ballot 0.027** 0.008 0.012 0.043 0.97
Incumbency by alphabetic 
rank within party slate
novice 0.198** 0.045 0.111 0.286 0.82
incumbent 0.0
 
a
 
2 (Threshold) 2.43** 0.096 2.241 2.617
Incumbency: novice 0.701** 0.114 0.477 0.926 0.50
incumbent 0.0
 
a
 
.
Another incumbent no
 
−0
 
.679** 0.040
 
−0
 
.758
 
−0
 
.601 1.97
yes 0.0
 
(a)
 
Alphabetic rank within party slate 0.667** 0.045 0.580 0.755 0.51
Alphabetic rank on ballot 0.018* 0.008 0.003 0.032 0.98
Incumbency by alphabetic
rank within party slate
novice 0.099* 0.048 0.005 0.194 0.91
incumbent 0.0
 
a
 
.
 
Notes
 
:
Dependent variable: a candidate’s finishing position on a party’s slate (Ascending).
Link function: Logit.
 
a
 
Set to zero because this parameter is redundant
** Significant at the 0.01 level
* Significant at the 0.05 level
N = 18,789
Pseudo R Squares
Cox and Snell0.14
Nagelkerke0.16
McFadden0.07
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reduction in the probability of finishing in first position compared with the first of
our six conditions.
If alphabetic voting does not exist, candidates would have an equal chance of
finishing in either first, or second or third position, controlling for incumbency of
course. Clearly, that is not happening. The best condition (from an individual candi-
date’s point of view) is that they are the only incumbent, that their surname places
them at both the top of the overall ballot and, by definition, at the top of their own
party’s list of candidates. In this situation there is a 75% chance of finishing in first
place in the party slate and only an 8% chance of being in the third position. This
situation could be contrasted with that which holds for the fifth condition. What
happens if two novice candidates from the same party appear before the incumbent
in ballot order? Now, the incumbent is in third place alphabetically within the party
slate although the party slate as a whole remains in the first three positions on the
ballot paper. The model reveals that this candidate has a 48% chance of finishing in
first position on the slate – a 27 point reduction compared to the situation in the first
condition. The worst condition considered here is number 6. Here, there is a novice,
non-incumbent candidate who is third on both the party slate and overall ballot
position order and is also facing a challenge from an incumbent seeking re-election.
This person has just an 8% chance (67 points lower than the candidate described in
 
Table 9.
 
Probability of candidate’s finishing position under different conditions
Probability of finishing position
Conditions First Second Third
Changes in probability of 
first finishing position
1
 
0.75
 
0.16 0.08 –
2 0.53 0.32 0.15
 
−
 
0.22
3 0.53 0.30 0.16
 
−
 
0.22
4 0.74 0.17 0.08
 
−0.01
5 0.48 0.26 0.26 −0.27
6 0.08 0.27 0.65 −0.67
Notes: The conditions are that the candidate is: 
1 The only incumbent, in top position within the party slate and also in first position on the
ballot paper.
2 An incumbent in top position within the party slate and also in first position on the ballot
paper; there is also at least one more incumbent seeking re-election.
3 A novice in top position within the party slate and also in first position on the ballot paper;
also there is no incumbent on the ballot.
4 The only incumbent, who lies in top position within the party slate but is moved to third
position on the ballot paper.
5 The only incumbent, in third position within the party slate and is moved to third position
on the ballot paper.
6 A novice in third position within the party slate and is moved to third position on the ballot
paper; there is also at least one other incumbent seeking re-election.
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the first condition) of receiving more votes than her party colleagues but a 65%
chance of receiving the least votes.
We can conclude at this point that there is a statistically significant alphabetic
advantage but we do not yet know whether unused votes are associated with the
effect. As we noted before, the alphabetic advantage may occur as a result either
of “split-ticket” voters and/or the incomplete use of available votes. Split-ticket
voting can produce an even stronger alphabetic bias than the incomplete use of
votes because just one split-ticket voter may provide alphabetical advantage for
candidates from two (or three) party slates. However, this kind of voting behaviour
does not result in any unused votes. We can expect quite the opposite from a
confused voter’s behaviour: the phenomenon of alphabetic bias and unused votes
would be the result of the same kind of behaviour and are therefore related. This
important distinction between two possible sources of alphabetic bias provides us
with a chance to test (and hopefully reject) the hypothesis that an alphabetic bias is
a pure consequence of split-ticket voting and does not relate in any manner to
unused votes. If the hypothesis is not to be rejected then in the specific situation
when all main parties supply full slates of candidates and neither Independents nor
minor parties contest, we would expect that there is no association between the
percentage of unused votes and the extent of alphabetic bias in a ward.
To determine the ward-level degree of alphabetic bias, we first calculate the over-
all alphabetic bias for each party contesting a ward. This can be characterized by the
difference between the vote cast for a party’s candidate placed at the top of the party
slate and that of the candidate positioned last. A party’s alphabetic bias describes
how many potential partisan votes are “lost” for the party. The maximum alphabetic
bias across all parties contesting a ward comprises the ward-level extent of alphabet-
ical voting. However, in order to control for ward size, we consider a measure of
relative bias by dividing the difference between votes cast for “the first” and “the
last” of each party’s candidates by the total number of votes cast in a ward.
The contestation pattern in 390 wards corresponds to the required conditions (that
only the three main parties contest a ward and that each fields a full slate of three
candidates) for testing the hypothesis of no association between unused votes and
alphabetical voting. In these wards the explanation for unused votes due to a
restricted choice of candidates is not relevant. Two further possibilities remain.
Either unused votes occur simply by chance (and, thus, are uncorrelated with
alphabetic bias), or both unused votes and alphabetic bias may arise from voters
who misunderstand the system. In this case we should find a positive association
between the level of alphabetic bias and unused votes. Correlation analysis indeed
reveals a statistically significant Pearson correlation (r = 0.3, P < 0.001) between the
percentage of unused votes and ward-level relative alphabetic bias. Thus, the
hypothesis that alphabetic bias is a pure consequence of split ticket voting is
rejected. It appears that (at least in the case of a ballot paper with a complete party
slate) where a large number of voters do not use their full allocation of votes, a
strong alphabetic bias towards candidates nearer the top of the ballot paper is
revealed.
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Unused Votes in English Local Government Elections 17
Unused Votes: A Multivariate Model
We have established that unused votes for all types of authorities are some function
of the pattern of party contestation. But, it is also clear that contestation is not the
only explanation since even when parties field a full slate of candidates a proportion
of votes still remain unused. We have also now demonstrated that the level of
unused votes is associated with alphabetical voting, suggesting that both are the
result of some voters’ confusion about the requirements of block voting. To bring
together these different lines of enquiry we employ a multiple regression approach
to examine how the factors listed above contribute to the explanation of the
variations in the level of unused votes. The linear regression model includes the
percentage of unused votes at the ward level as the dependent variable. The choice
of independent variables is driven partly by the research hypotheses and partly by
the findings from our initial data analysis.
The first group of core predictor variables in the model are based on the principle
of “limited choice of candidates” as a source for unused votes. These variables are: 
● the combined number of unfilled positions in a ward for the three main parties;
● the number of unfilled positions in a ward for minor parties;
● a dummy variable “Independent”, which indicates whether at least one Indepen-
dent candidate is standing for election in a ward – some non-partisan voters could
choose to vote for a particular independent candidate(s) only and consequently
use just one/two votes.
Despite the potential redundancy of some variables, we also test for the possibility
that unused votes could result from ballot paper length if some voters become
unable or unwilling to cope with a long list of names. Growing party contestation
means that the average length of the ballot paper in multimember ward elections is
increasing over time (Rallings & Thrasher, 2002). Therefore, the model includes the
total number of candidates at the ward election as an independent predictor (the
variable “ballot length”). We take into account the possibility that candidate incum-
bency could be a salient factor; when just one or two incumbents stand for re-
election, a voter may decide that they are the only choice and respectively use only
one or two of the three available votes. A dummy variable “incomplete set of
incumbents” takes the value of one when just one or two incumbents stand in a ward
election, zero otherwise.
A second group of independent variables is designed to capture evidence that
unused votes could stem from a misunderstanding of the block-voting system.
Whilst aggregate data do not permit us to assess directly the extent of (mis)under-
standing, we use a proxy measure that may reflect people’s ability to comprehend
the block vote ballot (see Herron & Sekhon, 2003; Knack & Kropf, 2003; Sinclair
& Alvarez, 2004; Kimball & Kropf, 2005). Accordingly, we extracted data from
the 2001 census for the proportion of adults resident in a ward without any formal
educational qualification. The idea that unused votes and alphabetical voting are,
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18 C. Rallings et al.
to some extent, the result of the same behaviour is incorporated in the model
through the variable, “ward-level relative alphabetic bias” (calculated as discussed
earlier). Finally, we also include three dummy variables for London boroughs,
metropolitan boroughs, and for “thirds” districts. These variables take account of
the different average level of unused votes in these types of local authority and are
compared against the whole council district election authorities as their reference
point.
The OLS estimates for the ward-level percentage of unused votes are presented in
Table 10. The model as a whole is statistically significant and explains 56% of the
total variance in the dependent variable. All regression coefficients are statistically
significant, indicating that each explanatory variable affects the percentage of
unused votes while controlling for other variables.
The conclusions which are drawn from this model reprise major findings from the
bivariate analysis. The independent variable for low educational qualification levels
Table 10. Unused votes as a function of party contestation and (mis)understanding of block 
voting system (OLS estimates)
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
Standardized 
Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta t Sig.
(Constant) 8.91** 0.82 10.9 0.000
Londona 2.93** 0.36 0.17 8.1 0.000
Metropolitana 6.04** 0.31 0.37 19.6 0.000
“T” Districtsa 0.78 * 0.30 0.05 2.6 0.011
Ballot length −1.06** 0.08 −0.33 −13.9 0.000
Unfilled positions, main parties 1.39** 0.10 0.34 14.6 0.000
Unfilled positions, minor parties 0.79** 0.09 0.12 8.4 0.000
Independenta 1.84** 0.26 0.11 7.1 0.000
Incomplete set of incumbentsa 0.54** 0.19 0.04 2.8 0.005
% without qualification 0.17** 0.01 0.25 16.4 0.000
Ward-level alphabetic bias 7.93** 2.01 0.05 3.9 0.000
Notes:
Dependent variable: ward-level percentage of unused votes.
Regression includes control for type of election (local authority), party contestation in a ward
and level of educational attainment. Detailed description of the independent variables is
presented in the text.
Cells show the OLS estimates, their standard errors, beta coefficients, t statistics, and
associated p-values.
aDummy variable
**Significant at the 0.01 level
*Significant at the 0.05 level
N = 2718
Adjusted R-square = 0.56
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Unused Votes in English Local Government Elections 19
in a ward has a positive effect on the level of unused votes, as do the number of
unfilled positions for main and minor parties and the participation in the election of
Independent candidates. Similarly, finding just one or two incumbents standing for
re-election also increases the percentage of unused votes.
Although the length of the ballot paper appears to be a significant independent
predictor, the direction of its impact (negative) is perhaps contrary to our initial
expectation that a long ballot might lead to confusion and thereby an increase in
unused votes. Although multicollinearity causes no serious concerns in the model,9
it should be noted that ballot paper length is highly negatively correlated (–0.7) with
the number of unfilled positions. High correlation implies that the effects of these
variables might confound each other. This allows for different interpretations of the
negative sign on the regression coefficient. One interpretation is that a longer ballot
paper probably means more choice for a voter and a corresponding decrease in the
percentage of unused votes. Another is that it is also possible that when a partisan
voter faces a long ballot paper, he or she could identify several candidates from a
rival party before encountering the first in the list from their own preferred party.
The fact that there is more than one candidate from the same party might be the cue
to the voter that more than one vote is available. Nevertheless, it is more likely that
the length of the ballot paper per se is not as important for the explanation of unused
votes as the limited choice of candidates from a voter’s preferred party.
Although the regression coefficient for the variable “ward-level relative alpha-
betic bias” is positive, we are not suggesting that it makes a direct impact on the
dependent variable. Rather, we assume that the level of unused votes and ward-level
alphabetic bias are both the result of some voters misunderstanding the voting rules.
Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that the variable remains significant even after
controlling for other variables in the model.
For predictors that are continuous variables, standardized betas help to assess the
relative effect on the dependent variable. Thus, we conclude that the “ward-level
relative alphabetic bias” has a statistically significant positive association with the
dependent variable but its influence is small, with the standardized beta of 0.05. By
contrast, the highest beta (0.34) relates to the independent variable “unfilled posi-
tions, main parties”. The respective regression coefficient of 1.39 implies that we
could expect up to a 5 percentage point difference in the level of unused votes if the
three main parties had a complete slate of candidates in one ward and there were
three unfilled positions in a second ward. The beta coefficient associated with the
ward level of educational attainment, the proxy designed to reflect voters’ ability to
comprehend the block voting rules, takes the value of 0.25 and the regression
coefficient is 0.17. We conclude from this modelling that for each ten percentage
point increase in the proportion of adults without formal educational qualification,
there is approximately a two point increase in the percentage of unused votes.
This analysis confirms that for all types of local authority the extent of party
contestation contributes most to the level of unused votes, but that low levels of
educational attainment among the population at large is also relevant to the
explanation.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
 of
 Pl
ym
ou
th]
 at
 03
:49
 18
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
12
 
20 C. Rallings et al.
Conclusions
A significant fraction of voters do not use their full allocation of votes in local
council elections that use the block vote method. Whilst contestation, or, strictly
speaking, its absence, is significantly related to the level of unused votes there is
additional evidence that other factors must be relevant to the explanation. The
analysis shows a clear relationship between ballot order position and finishing
position, and further examination controlling for the structure of contestation and
incumbency effects confirms an alphabetic advantage. This is found for different
types of local authority and across the range of parties.
This evidence for alphabetic voting, identified in the previous research literature
and now confirmed for recent local elections, together with a significant level of unused
votes, raises some important issues of both a general and specific nature. There are
good reasons for believing that a fraction of voters do not understand the voting rules,
despite their apparent simplicity. Of course, we have no sure way of knowing from
this analysis alone whether this level of misunderstanding is found elsewhere but the
fact that other countries that use a similar electoral method have taken steps to alleviate
some of the effects of alphabetic voting suggests that the problem could be widespread.
This leads to the specific issue of what, if anything, should be done in the UK. The
evidence is mounting that the introduction of different voting systems that sit along-
side one another are causing problems of understanding.10 There is also evidence
presented here that candidates whose surnames appear towards the top of the ballot
paper have a distinct advantage over their rivals. Is it appropriate that the votes
received by candidates from the same party are apparently related to their respective
surnames? Is it acceptable that the chances of someone being elected or not may hinge
on where their surname happens to place them on the ballot paper? One solution
would be to emulate practice elsewhere. In Australia, for example, a method of
double random draw is used for Federal elections while the “Robson rotation” is used
for elections to the Tasmania House of Assembly and for the Australian Capital Terri-
tory Legislative Assembly. The Robson rotation means that the favoured positions of
top and bottom are shared equally among all candidates across a party slate.11 Since
1975 ballots for some elected officials in the state of California have been randomized
to help nullify the effects of alphabetic voting as have those in some US Presidential
primary elections, for example most recently in New Hampshire in January 2008.
Another, more radical solution, would be to review the continued use of block
voting. There has been examination of the value such wards have in local govern-
ment (Stewart & Game, 1991; Electoral Commission, 2003) but little consideration
of how voters interact with the voting system itself. While it is a minority that do not
use their full allocation of votes the spillover effect from this is that preference is
given to candidates higher on the ballot paper order. Local authorities that use this
method of election could, of course, undertake programmes designed to educate
voters but we suspect that such publicity is likely to be missed by the very group that
it is intended to assist. At the very least local authorities that use this voting method
should ensure that the ballot paper is designed with clear instructions to voters.
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Notes
1. Terminology varies with some texts referring to “bloc” voting, “plurality-at-large” or simply “at-
large” voting. Throughout we use the term block voting. This system should not be confused with the
Limited Vote. For a discussion see Cox (1999).
2. In some cases local authorities are calculating and reporting ward-level turnout by counting both
valid and invalid ballots. However, we do not believe that the number of invalid ballots is
sufficiently large to undermine our analysis.
3. Throughout we consider the result as statistically significant if the p-value is 0.01 or less.
4. Welch and Brown-Forsythe statistics were used to test the hypothesis that the means of four groups
are not significantly different. These statistics are alternatives to the usual F-test in a one-way
ANOVA table when the group variances are not equal (in our case the Levene statistic rejects the
null hypothesis about equality of variances). When the variances of the dependent variable are not
equal across groups, the results of the ANOVA table are unreliable.
5. At the 2002 London borough election, the pattern of alphabetical advantage (not presented in this
article) is exactly the same as that for the 2006 London election and stronger than in metropolitan
boroughs.
6. Significance of relationships in the cross-tabulations were tested with chi-square statistics and found
to be significant.
7. Statistical analysis was conducted using SPSS 15.0 for Windows (SPSS, 2006).
8. Violation of the proportional odds assumption can lead to invalid results. However, in our case, the
proportional odds and general cumulative logit model give estimates that are almost identical.
9. Maximum VIF, variance inflation factor, is 3.4 and condition indices do not exceed 30. For a
discussion see Belsley et al. (1980).
10. A good example is the confusion that has arisen over voters’ understanding of the Supplementary
Vote that is used for the election of local government mayors (see van der Kolk et al., 2006).
11. We tested whether there was any bias towards candidates placed at the very bottom of the ballot
paper because there is a school of thought that these candidates are also favoured by the heuristic
adopted by some voters. We found no evidence that shows candidates at the very bottom of the ballot
paper are preferred.
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ABSTRACT Using pooled data from four separate nationwide surveys of local election
candidates conducted from 2006–09 the paper assesses the role and importance of
parties in the recruitment and selection of candidates. In many respects candidates are
similar to councillors with men outnumbering women in a two to one ratio, with very few
non-white candidates coming forward for selection and an age bias towards older rather
than younger people. Candidates are found generally to have higher educational
qualiﬁcations and to be employed in professional and managerial populations than in
the public at large. Although a majority of candidates are resident in the ward that they
contest a large fraction live elsewhere, suggesting that local parties cast the net widely
during the recruitment process. The data suggest that the recruitment networks used by
parties are relatively closed with many candidates reporting prior experience as local
party oﬃcer holders or as members of charitable organisations and local public bodies.
For two-thirds of candidates the initial decision to stand follows from a request by
someone else, often a fellow party member. Women are more likely to be asked than
men. Although candidates are aware of the current under-representation of some social
and ethnic groups they are generally against using aﬃrmative action measures to
redress any imbalance. Although local parties are sometimes seen as contributing
towards the problem of under-representation of some groups on council benches the
data suggest than an increase in independent candidates would be unlikely to improve
the situation and could perhaps cause it to deteriorate still further.
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One criticism aimed at local government in Britain is that it is ‘male, pale
and stale’; council benches are often dominated by white, middle aged and
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NFER, 2009; Rao, 2005) but there are good reasons for questioning why
this situation prevails. Is it that recruitment processes, mostly undertaken by
local party organisations, implicitly favour this demographic to the
exclusion of others? Or is the fundamental problem that some sections of
society, especially women, people from the Black, Asian and other minority
ethnic populations (BAME) and younger people are under-represented
because these groups are reluctant to come forward for selection? If it is
largely white, middle-aged males that come forward for selection then it is
unsurprising that these people are the most frequently elected. The answer
to these questions ultimately aﬀects the identiﬁcation and likely success of
any strategies for addressing the issue of under-representation in local
government (Councillors Commission, 2007).
This paper examines the evidence on recruitment using pooled data from
four surveys of local election candidates in England and Wales (excluding
town and parish councils) conducted since 2006 (for evidence about
Scotland see MacAllister, 2003). The great strength of these data is that
they provide information not only about the people eventually elected as
councillors but also those that try but fail to be elected. Given the long-
standing interest in the nature, scope and role of political parties in local
government it is important to discover the extent to which parties are crucial
in the recruitment process and how these organisations thereby aﬀect the
local electoral process generally (Adolino, 1998; Ball & Solomos, 1990;
Barron et al., 1989; Bristow, 1980; Brown et al., 1999; Canavon & Smith,
2001; Gordon, 1979; ODPM, 2003). A useful starting point is to identify
whether party organisations are proactive in seeking people to stand or
reactive in terms of responding to and facilitating someone’s own electoral
ambitions. Each candidate was asked about the ﬁrst time that they contested
a local election. Did the individual arrive at their own decision to stand,
motivated by the desire to fulﬁl an ambition, to pursue a career in politics,
or did they stand after being asked to do so? Simply knowing what
proportion of candidates fall into each of these categories serves to deﬁne
the nature of the task in addressing under-representation in local
government. Identifying diﬀerences between candidates that decide to stand
and those that are asked may provide clues that under-representation
follows from a failure of some social groups to engage politically or it may
conﬁrm the suspicion that local party elites recruit from within their own
social networks and that parties, far from being agents of change are key
features of the problem itself.
Surveying Local Election Candidates
One fundamental weakness of existing surveys of councillors is that they
provide only information about those that win elections; winners may or
may not be typical of those that stand. Concerned at the limited scope of
such surveys, therefore, we began to survey not just councillors but also
362 C. Rallings et al.
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candidates contesting an election for the range of principal local authorities,
viz., London and metropolitan boroughs, district and unitary authorities in
England and Wales. The process began in 2006 and the full electoral cycle
was complete after the 2009 elections. Surveying all candidates, not just
councillors, is crucial if progress is to be made in addressing the
representativeness of local government and the role of political parties in
this process.
Candidates are randomly selected from the nomination lists published by
each local authority. Sampling procedures vary according to the number of
candidates that are contesting in a given year. In 2009, when the number of
contests and therefore of candidates was relatively small, the random
selection interval lay between one in two and one in three. In 2007, when
28,379 candidates contested, the sampling interval was closer to one in every
10 candidates. The target for each survey is to collect the names and
addresses of more than 3,000 candidates and to achieve at least 1,000
responses assuming a ﬁnal response rate of about a third (see Table 1).
Those selected were issued a postal questionnaire to their home addresses
immediately after the election. As well as providing demographic informa-
tion about each candidate (age, sex, ethnic background, occupational and
employment status, and educational qualiﬁcations) the surveys addressed
questions concerning party membership, political and electoral experience,
recruitment and campaigning. Candidates were also invited to consider
issues pertinent to the representativeness of local government, speciﬁcally
the under-recruitment of women, people from the BAME populations as
well as younger people. This analysis uses pooled data from all four postal
surveys conducted among local election candidates between 2006 and 2009,
amounting to a total of 4,646 individual respondents.
Because the procedure uses random sampling, there is a reasonable
expectation that, unless there is response bias, respondents are an accurate
reﬂection of the candidate population. Nevertheless, further checks are
conducted when the aggregate election data are available. For example, it is
veriﬁed that the proportion of men and women respondents to each survey
reﬂects the proportion across all candidates and that the proportion of seats
contested by each party is reﬂected in the distribution of partisanship among
our respondents. For other characteristics (for example, ethnic background,
Table 1. The local election candidate surveys
Survey year Selection criterion
Questionnaires
Response (%)issued returned
2006 1 in 5 2,800 1,181 42.2
2007 1 in 10 2,848 1,255 44.1
2008 1 in 4 3,142 1,105 35.2
2009 1 in 2.5 3,534 1,105 31.3
Parties, Recruitment and Modernisation 363
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age proﬁle), however, it is not practical to undertake similar checks.
Notwithstanding the standard caveats about interpreting data that apply to
random sampling procedures in surveys of this size (margin of error about
þ/7 3%, conﬁdence interval at the .05 level), we believe that these data
provide an accurate picture of people currently contesting local elections
across England and Wales.
Who Stands?
Examination of local election results shows that the percentage of women
standing for local election rose rapidly during the 1980s but then in the
following decade stabilised to its current level. Generally speaking, about
30% of candidates are women and a slightly smaller percentage than that
(about a two-point diﬀerence) become councillors. There is no evidence at
all that voters discriminate against women – if anything, women appear to
do slightly better than men when candidates from the same party contesting
multiple vacancies are considered. The aggregate data show that the three
main parties, Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrats, are broadly
similar in their recruitment of women whilst diﬀerences emerge amongst the
smaller parties contesting local elections (Borisyuk et al., 2007). These
patterns are also found in the survey data (see Table 2).
Two-thirds of Labour and Liberal Democrat candidates are men as are
seven in 10 Conservative candidates – a small but notable diﬀerence perhaps
given the national party’s current diﬃculties in recruiting women to ﬁght
parliamentary elections. The Green Party is a clear outlier, recruiting men
and women candidates in almost equal numbers. Conversely, the British
National Party (BNP) recruits one woman candidate for every nine men that
stand. Somewhere between these two extremes is a range of smaller parties
and groups, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), Plaid Cymru
(PC), Independents, and all ‘Others’. Although the Registration of Parties
Act (1998) has contributed towards a reduction in independents (many
Table 2. Local candidates by party
Men
(%)
Women
(%)
White
(%)
Non-white
(%)
Age
Mean years Std dev.
Conservative 70.0 30.0 97.1 2.9 55.2 13.9
Labour 66.6 33.4 95.1 4.9 54.7 12.9
Lib Dem 66.5 33.5 97.0 3.0 55.0 13.1
Green 54.7 45.3 99.2 0.8 49.6 13.8
UKIP 76.6 23.4 98.2 1.8 59.5 13.7
PC 75.8 24.2 100.0 – 54.6 10.4
BNP 89.7 10.3 100.0 – 52.3 13.5
Independent 76.5 23.5 96.7 3.3 57.5 11.0
‘Others’ 75.5 24.5 94.1 5.9 53.4 14.3
All candidates 68.3 31.7 96.7 3.3 54.8 13.4
364 C. Rallings et al.
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preferring to stand for one of the many micro parties) such candidates
continue to stand in some areas. The demise of independents is regarded by
some as symptomatic of the excessive power of political parties but it is not
entirely clear whether encouraging more people to stand as independents
would transform the local councillor demographic – indeed it may
exacerbate the problem.
Candidates for all parties are likely to be men; it is even more likely that
they are white. Across all four surveys candidates describing themselves as
white (white British, white Irish, other white) are an overwhelming
majority. Non-white candidates account for slightly more than 3 per cent
of the total, compared with 8 per cent in the overall population at the 2001
census and an estimated 10 per cent in the current population. Two
parties, BNP and Plaid Cymru, ﬁelded no BAME candidates but even the
gap between these and Labour, whose candidates are the most ethnically
mixed of the major parties, is not particularly large. Further examination
reveals that BAME candidates are found in larger numbers in elections for
the London boroughs. In these authorities, they account for 16 per cent of
the total, but in other larger cities the proportion is about a quarter of that
ﬁgure. The shortage of electoral candidates among the BAME population
is a serious issue for local government and beyond but the causes of this
are not entirely clear (Saggar, 1998, 2000). We suspect that the problem in
local government continues to be one of both demand (party membership
and recruitment processes fail to engage with these particular commu-
nities) and supply (members of these communities are not coming forward
as candidates). What is now clear is that the problem aﬀects all political
parties.
Candidates are predominately male and white; they are predominantly
middle-aged as well. The mean age of all candidates is 54.8 years (standard
deviation of 13.4 years) with only the Greens ﬁelding candidates whose
average age is (just) below 50 years. The oldest are those standing for UKIP
(59.5 years, std dev 13.7 years) while there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences
across candidates contesting for the main parties. A more detailed
examination that takes account of the type of local authority, however,
does reveal some variations between parties. For example, in the 2006
London borough elections the mean age of Labour candidates is 48 years
compared to 50 and 53 years for the Conservative and Liberal Democrat
parties respectively. The mean age of independents contesting in London is
rather higher at 56 years. By contrast, in the metropolitan boroughs,
Labour candidates have a higher average age, 53 years, than do candidates
for their main rivals whose average age is two years lower. To an extent
this age diﬀerence correlates with incumbency – many Labour candidates
in metropolitan boroughs are incumbent councillors seeking re-election. In
general, for all the main parties, candidates that contest in the English
shires are older than their colleagues campaigning in the cities. In the
shire districts the mean age is around 56–57 years while for the county
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elections in 2009 the average is a year or two higher. The average age of
independents is higher than that for party candidates for all types of local
authority election.
These surveys clearly demonstrate that the injunctions about the
unrepresentativeness of councillors apply to candidates generally. Further
conﬁrmation of this is found after considering the range of educational
qualiﬁcation, employment and occupational status across candidates (see
Table 3). However, while there are no dramatic diﬀerences between the
parties in terms of candidates’ sex, ethnicity and age, this does not apply to
their education and occupational characteristics. Approximately six in 10
Labour and Liberal Democrat candidates hold a university degree but this
falls to four in 10 amongst Conservatives, UKIP members and indepen-
dents. The Greens boast the highest percentage of university graduates
amongst their candidates but only one in 10 of those challenging as BNP
holds an equivalent qualiﬁcation.
It is not wholly surprising given their average ages that one in three
candidates is retired from work. There is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence among the
main parties but while only one in ﬁve Green candidates is retired double
that level of UKIP candidates are no longer in work. The Conservative
party recruits from among the self-employed; one in ﬁve of its candidates
run their own business compared to 11 per cent in the overall working
population. The proportion of self-employed among Labour candidates is
close to the national ﬁgure but for independents, one in four of whom is self-
employed, it is more than double that level. Half of Labour and Green party
candidates are in part- or full-time employment but only a third of
Conservatives are similarly employed. Less marked diﬀerences in occupa-
tional status are found between parties. Half or slightly more of all party
candidates have professional/managerial occupations with the exception of
UKIP and, especially, the BNP whose candidates are likely to be in more
routine employment.
Table 3. Educational attainment and occupational status
Party
No formal
education
qualiﬁcation
University
degree
Employed
full-time/
part-time
Self-
employed Retired Professional
Manager/
technical
Conservative 8.9 41.5 34.8 21.6 33.9 49.8 31.4
Labour 10.0 59.6 49.5 9.5 31.5 49.5 25.6
Liberal
Democrats
3.8 63.3 42.3 15.7 33.0 55.3 27.1
Green 1.4 78.5 50.3 18.1 20.1 57.5 20.5
UKIP 13.9 37.3 34.5 15.5 42.9 44.5 26.2
BNP 17.6 10.8 42.5 16.4 23.3 27.0 17.6
PC 6.3 65.6 43.8 15.6 28.1 50.0 23.3
Independent 18.1 38.3 30.3 25.8 34.8 49.8 28.6
‘Others’ 9.1 45.5 42.9 18.6 29.3 40.3 32.1
All candidates 8.2 53.5 41.6 16.7 32.0 50.7 27.5
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Other studies of participation in politics paint a similar picture with some
social groups active, others inactive (see Electoral Commission, 2004, 2007;
Fieldhouse & Purdam, 2002; Gill, 2000; Henn et al., 2002; Jowell & Park,
1998; Pattie et al., 2004). A crucial question then becomes whether the
parties could make a real diﬀerence about who stands if they gave more
attention to recruitment processes. There is little systematic research into the
ways and means that local party organisations recruit candidates (Copus,
2001, 2004; Meadowcroft, 2001; Seyd & Whiteley, 2004; Wheeler, 2006).
This contrasts with a growing literature examining the recruitment of
parliamentary election candidates (Childs et al., 2006; Cutts et al., 2008;
Evans, 2008; Norris & Lovenduski, 1993, 1995; Studlar & Welch, 1993) and
candidates seeking election to the newly devolved institutions (Bradbury
et al., 2000; Chaney & Fevre, 2002; Mitchell & Bradbury, 2004). When
candidates seek nomination for a parliamentary constituency his or her
personal links with the area are often a key factor in the selection criteria.
Being born, raised and currently resident locally are all virtues for
prospective candidates. A useful starting point in investigating the
recruitment process, therefore, is the extent to which local election
candidates are ward residents. Table 4 shows that overall 55.1 per cent
are resident but, by deﬁnition, the remaining 44.9 per cent are not. Among
the major parties the Conservatives are most likely to select a ward resident
with Labour the least likely. A clear exception to the general trend, however,
is independents; overall, almost eight in 10 of these are living in the ward
that they contest, unsurprising, given that their reasons for standing are
often closely associated with the locality.
What is unexpected, perhaps, is that local parties so often select
candidates that are not ward residents. Among diﬀerent types of local
authorities some parties may struggle, it seems, to ﬁnd candidates from
amongst the immediate local community. Local Conservative parties in the
London and metropolitan boroughs, for example, recruit a majority of
candidates from outside the ward but two thirds of their county council
candidates are living in the division that they contest for the party. Although
Labour generally recruits ward residents this is certainly not true of the
London boroughs, where only a third of its candidates live in the area. With
the clear exception of independents (although we should be mindful of
relatively smaller numbers of candidates when making this point) all parties
Table 4. Percentage of candidates residing in ward contested
Authority type Con Lab LD Minor Ind All
London 45.3 33.3 42.6 50.0 100.0 42.2
Mets 43.1 55.7 39.0 47.2 93.8 48.5
Districts/Unitaries, all-out 61.4 53.9 55.7 64.3 76.6 60.4
Districts/Unitaries, thirds 51.6 50.6 53.4 57.0 74.0 53.5
Counties 65.1 54.3 58.0 53.8 87.9 59.0
All authorities 56.0 51.2 52.2 55.3 79.2 55.1
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appear to ﬁnd it diﬃcult to recruit ward residents to contest London
borough elections – overall, a majority of these candidates live outside the
ward. The explanation for this ﬁnding may include population migration
and residential stability, the size and compactness of ward boundaries and
also, perhaps, party organisations.
We have found few diﬀerences in the social characteristics of people that
currently sit on council benches and those that seek to replace them. It may
be that the enduring dominance of certain groups (men, white, middle-aged
and professional) is because the social networks where such people
predominate overlap with one another (Putnam, 2002) leading to relatively
closed party recruitment processes. The surveys asked candidates about
their involvement in other activities, including as a candidate for
parliamentary election, or holding oﬃce in the local party, trade union
and other type of association (see Table 5). Few candidates have stood for
parliament although a greater proportion has done so for Liberal
Democrats and the smaller parties than for the two main parties. Almost
half the candidates have held oﬃce for the local party organisation,
however. This ﬁgure rises to more than two-thirds among Labour party
candidates but is rather smaller for Conservatives. The proportions involved
with both charitable and professional associations are relatively uniform
across all of the parties; about four in 10 for the former and less than half
that for the latter. Labour candidates are naturally most likely associated
with trade union activity but other parties, and even independents, have also
had involvement. Women’s organisations, including the Women’s Institute,
do not feature prominently within the recruitment network but candidates
are associated with a variety of other local public bodies and community
groups. These activities include serving as school governors or as members
of housing trusts. Independent candidates are most likely to feature as
members of charitable organisations as well as local community groups.
Of course, these categories are not mutually exclusive because an
individual may be involved across a range of these organisations and
associations. That said, the nature and scale of these social networks
suggests that the pool that parties recruit from may be somewhat restricted.
Table 5. The recruitment network
Con (%) Lab (%) LD (%) Minor (%) Ind. (%) All (%)
Parliamentary candidate 4.5 6.2 11.0 16.8 4.4 8.5
Local party 43.5 69.6 52.3 32.5 18.1 49.2
Charitable organisation 39.1 40.8 40.5 33.9 45.3 39.3
Professional association 17.7 18.1 18.1 13.9 19.6 17.4
Trade union 6.4 44.0 17.1 17.5 19.3 21.1
Women’s organisation 7.4 9.0 3.8 5.4 2.2 6.4
Local public body 33.8 43.7 32.9 17.8 35.9 33.7
Local pressure group 15.5 26.2 23.8 32.1 34.7 23.9
Local community group 39.8 47.1 42.4 41.3 55.8 43.4
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In sum, candidates like councillors come from a rather narrowly deﬁned
segment of the total population. They are more likely than the general
population to have a university degree or its equivalent qualiﬁcation and to
work in some professional or managerial capacity; women, BAME and
younger people are under-represented across all parties and in both the
shires and the cities. Participation in politics and other activities in the local
community also mean that candidates are socially engaged, often before
being selected to contest an election. But this is only part of the picture.
What is not yet clear is whether the motivation to stand aﬀects who stands.
In short, are the people that decide to stand any diﬀerent from those that are
actively recruited to stand?
Motives to Stand
Table 6 groups candidates according to whether the initial decision to
contest a local election was entirely their own decision or whether they stood
after being asked and encouraged to do so by others. The data show that for
only one candidate in three is the initial decision to stand entirely their own
Table 6. Distribution of candidates and the decision to stand (row percentages)
Entirely own decision Approached/encouraged by others
London 33.6 66.4
Mets 33.7 66.3
Districts/Unitaries, all-out 32.9 67.0
Districts/Unitaries, thirds 28.2 71.8
Counties 36.4 63.6
All candidates from main parties 32.4 67.6
Con 31.8 68.2
Lab 34.5 65.5
LD 30.8 69.2
First time candidate 27.7 72.3
Incumbent 35.6 64.4
Female 23.4 76.6
Male 36.6 63.4
White 32.1 67.9
Non-white 46.4 53.6
45 yrs and under 37.3 62.7
46 yrs and over 30.9 69.1
No qualiﬁcation 32.0 68.0
GCSE or A level 31.8 68.2
Degree 32.6 67.4
Full/Part-time employment 32.5 67.5
Self employed 33.9 66.1
Retired 31.2 68.8
Other 34.8 65.2
Professional 33.0 67.0
Managerial/ technical 32.7 67.3
Other 31.6 68.4
Live in the ward 32.6 67.4
Do not live in the ward 32.2 67.8
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decision; two in three candidates are invited to stand by others. What is
perhaps most striking about this ﬁnding is its uniformity. Dividing
candidates by type of authority makes little diﬀerence, although county
council candidates are somewhat more likely to be self motivated and those
in district and unitary authorities with thirds elections rather less likely.
Similarly, local party organisations across the political spectrum are actively
recruiting two in three candidates although it does appear that ﬁnding
candidates may be becoming more diﬃcult – more than seven in 10 ﬁrst-time
candidates were approached but fewer than two-thirds of incumbents
remember being invited to stand.
Some interesting diﬀerences do though emerge when considering
candidate demographics. The ratio of the category, own decision/asked to
stand, among men is 1:2; the corresponding ratio among women is 1:3.
Women appear more likely to need to be encouraged to stand as local party
organisations try to address the shortage of women in local government and
take steps to remedy the current imbalance. Data suggesting that fewer than
one in four women come forward of their own accord support previous
research observing that large numbers of women do not currently consider a
political career in local politics (Briggs, 2000; Giddy, 2000; Hills, 1983; Rao,
2005).
Non-white candidates appear more likely to arrive at their own decision
to stand rather than responding to others’ invitations but we should note the
low numbers involved. Moreover, even if this ﬁnding is valid its cause is
open to interpretation. Are these candidates highly motivated but atypical
of that section of the general population? Or is it that local party
organisations are connecting poorly with these communities and hence
ﬁnding it diﬃcult to recruit as easily there as among the white community?
The same question may be asked about the recruitment of younger people.
Candidates aged 45 years and under are more likely to take their own
decision to stand but their numbers generally among local election
candidates are rather low. Are the obstacles and constraints on a council
career deterring younger people or is that existing party networks do not
embrace this fraction of the population?
It becomes clearer still that there is something unusual about the
recruitment of women, ethnic minorities and younger people after
controlling for other factors. In terms of educational attainment there is
no diﬀerence between those deciding to stand and those who are asked to do
so. Similarly, characteristics relating to employment status, occupational
activity and place of residence do not aﬀect the ratios between the proactive
and reactive candidates.
Of course, these factors may be working together or separately and it is
better to employ a multivariate analysis in order to estimate their overall
impact. One method for considering this is to use logistic regression where
the binary dependent variable is whether the candidate made their own
decision to stand or not. The independent variables include gender, age, and
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ethnicity, a candidate’s employment status (a binary variable that
distinguishes between a rather wide ‘other’ category versus the remaining
categories of full/part-time employed, self-employed, and retired), and
ﬁnally elective experience (a binary variable that codes candidates as 1 if a
ﬁrst-time contestant, otherwise 0). A binary variable that characterises how a
candidate estimates his/her chances of winning the election was also
included (binary variable very low chance vs. some positive chance) because it
is clear that many candidates that contest local elections are little more than
‘paper’ candidates (Rallings et al., 2007, 2008, 2009).
The logistic regression model correctly classiﬁes 67 per cent of cases
although Nagelkerke R Square is rather low at 0.044. All the independent
variables mentioned above are statistically signiﬁcant at least at the 5 per
cent level. Older candidates (aged over 45 years), female and ﬁrst time
candidates are less likely to decide on their own to be a candidate. Those
candidates who estimate their own chances of winning the seat as very low
are also less likely to say that it was their own decision; this ﬁts with an
explanation that prior to the May elections parties seek out volunteers to
stand in wards where there is little prospect of winning but ﬁelding a
candidate is important. The probability of a respondent saying that
the initial decision to stand for election was entirely their own is higher
for ethnic minority candidates, conﬁrming the pattern seen above that
parties appear more reactive than proactive in the recruitment of such
candidates.
Causes of Under-recruitment: Supply or Demand?
Perhaps further clues about the causes of under-representation of some
groups among candidates may also be found after examination of their
views of the modernisation agenda. The surveys contained questions about
the shortage of women, BAMEs and younger people and explored some of
the reasons for this situation.
Table 7 describes responses speciﬁc to women’s under-representation.
Candidates from the main parties respond in similar vein to a question that
considered whether women fail to stand because of a lack of interest in
politics. Independent candidates are slightly more likely to agree with this
statement and less inclined to disagree with it. With the exception of minor
party candidates, a majority disagree that the under-supply of women in
local politics results from a lack of conﬁdence but between a ﬁfth and a
quarter do agree. The strongest agreement occurs when the explanation for
women’s under-recruitment is presented as political career versus family
commitments. More than six in 10 in all parties agree that women’s
responsibilities in the home and to the family create obstacles to
recruitment. However, when candidates are asked about the role of local
political party organisations in recruiting women, sharper diﬀerences
emerge. Only a ﬁfth of Conservatives agree that parties ‘don’t do enough’
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to recruit women, whereas Labour candidates are almost twice as likely to
hold that view. Liberal Democrats lay between the two. Of course, it is not
entirely clear what these responses mean. It might be that Labour candidates
are castigating their own party or alternatively they might be criticising the
failures of other parties. The proportions from the three main parties
disagreeing with the suggestion that parties are failing in the recruitment of
women are both similar and large. Among independents, while around a
third is willing to blame parties, a plurality adopt a neutral position on this
issue.
Various questions, asked in some but not all surveys, have sought to
tackle the issue of aﬃrmative action measures designed to improve the
number of women on council benches. In 2006 and 2007, for example, the
principle of party quotas for women candidates was considered. Eight in 10
Conservatives and six in 10 Liberal Democrats disagree with the idea; only
Labour candidates, with 43.8 per cent disagreeing and 38.1 per cent
agreeing, could be described as ambivalent. In 2006 a clear majority of
candidates in all parties were against all-women shortlists – including an
85.4 per cent disagreement amongst Conservative members. There was a
similar level of hostility to the proposal for reserved council seats for
women; 85 per cent of Conservatives, 75 per cent of Liberal Democrats and
61 per cent of Labour candidates disagreed with the idea. This creates a real
diﬃculty for the political parties whose leaders are anxious to recruit more
women but face opposition from their local activists to aﬃrmative action
measures.
Candidates, the vast majority of whom are white, are more reticent about
voicing opinions about under-representation among BAMEs than women.
Table 8 shows that around a third prefer to stay neutral on whether they
lack political interest. Nevertheless, nearly a ﬁfth of Conservative and minor
Table 7. Attitudes towards women’s recruitment (%)
Women are . . . Con Lab LD Minor Ind
Not interested in politics
Agree 15.7 15.5 11.6 18.4 19.7
Neutral 20.2 14.7 17.1 19.8 23.3
Disagree 64.1 69.8 71.3 61.8 57
Lack conﬁdence for politics
Agree 20.7 26.6 24 25.1 21.5
Neutral 22.8 18.3 22.1 26.5 24.7
Disagree 56.5 55.1 53.9 48.4 53.8
Put families above political career
Agree 64.9 64.1 64.7 63.2 61
Neutral 21.7 22.8 23.9 24.6 26.5
Disagree 13.5 13.2 11.4 12.1 12.4
Political parties don’t do enough to recruit
Agree 21.6 38.5 29.2 34.8 35.2
Neutral 24.1 16.2 27.9 32.5 43.8
Disagree 54.3 45.3 42.9 32.7 21.1
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party candidates do feel that this may be among the reasons for the under-
representation of BAMEs compared to half that level among their Labour
and Liberal Democrat rivals. Whereas family commitments were viewed as
an obstacle to women barely a ﬁfth of all candidates hold a similar view
about BAMEs. Respondents do, however, place rather more of the blame
on local party organisations for the under-recruitment of BAMEs.
Compared with women’s recruitment, candidates are more likely to agree
that the parties could do more. Almost half of Labour and Liberal
Democrats took this line but only a quarter of Conservatives did so. Once
again, though, there is opposition to the idea of special treatment. Only 3
per cent of Conservatives support party quotas for BAMEs, fewer than one
in 10 Liberal Democrats do so and even among Labour candidates only a
quarter agree with this idea. Generally, candidates are less certain about the
possible reasons for the under-representation among BAMEs but are certain
of their dislike for active measures to remedy the situation.
Given that the average local election candidate is in his mid-ﬁfties it is
unsurprising to discover that across the parties two-thirds agree that the
lack of interest by younger people in politics is a factor in their under-
recruitment with only one in four disagreeing (see Table 9). It does not
appear that conﬁdence is seen as the key factor and it is certainly not that
younger people put their families above a political career in local
government. But what does become clear is that it is this group, rather
more than women and BAMEs, candidates feel that parties should be doing
more to recruit. Over half the Conservatives think parties could do more but
this rises to two-thirds of Liberal Democrats and three-quarters of Labour
candidates. Even among independents, two in three feel that parties should
be reaching out to younger people in order to redress the imbalance in
council compositions.
Table 8. Attitudes towards recruitment of BAMEs
Black, Asian & other minority ethnic people are . . . Con Lab LD Minor Ind.
Not interested in politics (2007–09)
Agree 18.9 11.2 9.6 18.1 13.8
Neutral 34.5 25.0 29.8 32.7 42.9
Disagree 46.6 63.8 60.6 49.1 43.3
Do not have the conﬁdence for politics (2007–09)
Agree 17.7 19.8 19.9 17.9 15.9
Neutral 37.8 29.6 35.7 39.7 45.8
Disagree 44.4 50.6 44.5 42.4 38.3
Put their families above a political career (2007–09)
Agree 21.9 19.8 18.3 19.1 19.6
Neutral 47.5 48.6 56.2 51.3 55.8
Disagree 30.5 31.6 25.5 29.6 24.6
Political parties don’t do enough to recruit
Agree 25.0 48.5 47.7 35.3 42.1
Neutral 32.6 21.1 28.5 36.0 38.8
Disagree 42.4 30.3 23.8 28.7 19.0
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Even in this case, however, concern for under-representation does not
lead to approval for positive discrimination. Only one in 20 Conservative
candidates positively agree that quotas of some kind for younger people
might be a legitimate policy. Among Liberal Democrats this rises to around
one in 10 and to one in ﬁve amongst Labour candidates. The consensus is
that not enough younger people come forward to be candidates but that
parties should react to this by a process of more active recruitment, short of
introducing formal quotas, of course!
Parties: Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?
There has been a long debate about the role of political parties in British
local government. Whilst they are acknowledged as essential for mobilising
electors and administering local authorities emotive terms such as ‘the
nationalisation of local politics’ and the ‘decline of independents’ place
parties as responsible for undermining the qualities of localness. Removing
some of the power that has transferred to these parties may assist a return to
the golden age of local democracy and autonomy. This is not the place to
rehearse the arguments for and against parties in local government (Copus,
2004; Gyford, et al. 1998; Jones & Stewart, 1993; Stewart & Game, 1991;
Wilson & Game, 2002) but these survey data do help us to assess attitudes
towards the post-1997 modernisation agenda introduced by the Labour
government and largely embraced by the other mainstream parties. This
agenda sets out the need for greater inclusiveness and a broadening of the
electoral base. So central is this issue to the future health of democracy that
in 2007 Prime Minister Gordon Brown announced the establishment of a
Speaker’s Conference that would, ‘consider, and make recommendations for
rectifying, the disparity between the representation of women, ethnic
Table 9. Attitudes towards recruitment of younger people
Younger people are . . . Con Lab LD Minor Ind.
Not interested in politics (2007–09)
Agree 63.9 63.3 58 62.7 71.4
Neutral 9.8 9.0 12.2 12.1 8.0
Disagree 26.3 27.6 29.8 25.1 20.7
Do not have conﬁdence for politics (2007–09)
Agree 35.8 36.8 35.9 40.4 39.8
Neutral 25.3 24.1 26.4 27.0 30.3
Disagree 38.8 39.1 37.7 32.6 29.9
Put their families above a political career (2007–09)
Agree 24.2 14.3 17.8 14.3 21.9
Neutral 30.7 32.4 31.7 33.6 39.5
Disagree 45.1 53.3 50.6 52.2 38.6
Political parties don’t do enough to recruit
Agree 52.7 73 63.4 59.4 66.9
Neutral 17.1 8.2 16.4 22.0 23.6
Disagree 30.2 18.8 20.3 18.6 9.4
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minorities and disabled people in the House of Commons and their
representation in the UK population at large, (Speakers Conference, 2008).
It is legitimate to ask, therefore, whether in respect of the similar disparity
in local government, political parties are part of the problem (in as much as
they perpetuate the under-recruitment of some groups) or part of the
solution (that they are the most eﬀective recruitment agencies and should be
reformed, not removed). We answer this question after ﬁrst categorising
candidates into one of three types, main party, minor party and
independent, and then identifying any signiﬁcant diﬀerences between them
(see Table 10). Distinguishing candidates that contest on behalf of the
Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat parties from smaller parties,
largely the Greens, UKIP and BNP, may be useful in clarifying whether
candidates from outside the party mainstream are similar/dissimilar to those
whom they would supplant. The third category, independents, is useful in
proﬁling the types of people that eschew party organisation and the
constraints of party ideology and discipline, preferring instead to ask voters
to support them as individuals rather than as a party representative.
In terms of the initial decision to stand the ratio between candidates
making their own decision or being asked to stand is identical for major and
minor parties alike; a majority of independents stand after committing to the
decision without outside encouragement. Three in 10 candidates representing
both party categories but only a quarter of independent candidates is a
woman. There are no diﬀerences between all three categories in terms of
candidate ethnicity. Younger candidates aged 40 years or under are more
common among the ranks of local parties than within the category of
Table 10. Main party, minor party and independent candidates
Main party Minor party Independent
Entirely own decision to stand 33.0 32.8 54.0
Women 31.5 33.1 23.5
White 96.2 97.5 96.7
40 yrs and under 15.5 17.3 7.8
41–50 yrs 16.8 17.1 16.9
51–60 yrs 26.6 30.1 33.7
61–70 yrs 32.2 25.6 32.9
71 yrs and over 10.0 9.9 8.6
Age, years (mean) 55.0 54.1 57.5
Age, years (std.) 13.4 13.6 11.0
No educational qualiﬁcation 9.4 5.3 18.1
GCSE or A level 40.7 34.2 43.6
Degree 49.9 60.5 38.3
Full/part-time employment 41.6 43.2 30.3
Self-employed 16.0 16.4 25.8
Retired 32.8 30.6 34.8
Other 9.6 9.8 9.0
Professional 49.7 52.3 49.8
Managerial/technical 28.7 25.6 28.6
Other 21.6 22.0 21.6
Live in the ward 53.8 53.7 79.3
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independents. The mean age of independents is two to three years older than
party candidates. An independent is between two and three times more likely
to hold no formal education qualiﬁcation than a party candidate. Retired
people comprise a third of candidates across the range, parties and
independents, but the self-employed are more in evidence amongst
independents whilst employees are more abundant within the parties. There
are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between candidates in terms of occupational
status but there is no disputing that independents are more centred in their
local communities than are party candidates, a bare majority of whom are
ward residents.
A multivariate logistic regression analysis uncovers more of the complex-
ity surrounding these diﬀerences between independents and party candi-
dates. Here, the dependent variable represents a candidate’s party aﬃliation
with independents coded as 1 and main/minor party candidates 0.
Independent variables include a candidate’s gender, age, employment status
(a binary variable, self-employed versus other), educational qualiﬁcation,
elective experience (a binary variable ﬁrst time candidate coded as 1,
otherwise 0), whether a candidate lives in the ward, and how (s)he estimates
his/her chance of winning (binary variable that contrasts medium to high
chance to win against low/very low chance to win). The model has a
Nagelkerke R Square of 0.11 and classiﬁes correctly approximately 67 per
cent of respondents with the cut-oﬀ point of 0.06. All variables are
signiﬁcant at least at the 5 per cent level and the direction of their inﬂuence
is in the expected direction. First time candidates who are older males with
lower levels of educational qualiﬁcation, are self-employed, live in the ward,
and estimate their chance to win as medium to high, are more likely than
other types of candidate to be found in the ranks of the independents.
These data do not support an argument that the main parties, by
dominating local councils, are preventing an inﬂux as Independents of
people who are currently under-represented in local government– women,
BAME and younger people. Even if it were practically possible to wrestle
power away from the three main parties there is no evidence here that one of
the eﬀects would be to transform the councillor demographic. Indeed, the
net result of having more independents elected might be to increase the ratio
of men to women, increase the average age of councillors and quite probably
increase in small business owners on council benches. Of course, set against
that line of reasoning we should say that those councillors would be more
likely to reside in the area that they represented and would no doubt
strengthen the association between geography, community and local
government representation.
Conclusions
Surveys of local election candidates demonstrate that there is little diﬀerence
in the social characteristics of councillors and those that seek to replace
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them. Even if every incumbent seeking re-election were to be defeated at the
polls and replaced by a challenger the councillor demographic would alter very
little. Candidates themselves respond diﬀerently to possible explanations for
the unrepresentativeness of local government and to proposed solutions. On
the one hand, there is recognition of the obstacles that women, BAME and
younger people might have in coming forward to stand for election and some
support for recruiting more candidates from these groups. On the other hand,
the large majority of current candidates see no need for aﬃrmative action to
achieve such a goal. Of course, central government has the constitutional
power to transform this picture by mandating that a certain fraction of
council seats are reserved for speciﬁc groups. Equally, the leaders of the
national political parties could unilaterally impose strict selection criteria on
local branches. Our evidence suggests that any such action would encounter
major objections from most local party activists.
Although positive action measures are likely to prove unpopular this does
not relieve local parties from any responsibility in engineering change. A
major priority is to assemble more evidence about party memberships and
speciﬁcally the candidate recruitment process. Given that two in three
candidates are asked to stand, often by fellow party members, it is important
to discover how many and what types of people are approached. It may be
that parties are actively trying to recruit under-represented groups but that
these eﬀorts are thwarted either because such people do not become party
members or when asked to stand decline. Or it may be that parties simply
recruit from established networks which suﬀer from the same kinds of
imbalances as the candidate demographic. About one thing our surveys do
seem clear. Working with the established political parties in advancing the
modernisation agenda in local government appears a more credible option
than unconditionally extolling the virtues of independents. The current
proﬁle of independents suggests that more of them would actually
exacerbate rather than alleviate the problems of under-representation.
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